critical thinking is associated with skepticism respect disbelief contrariness

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Exploring Skepticism and Doubt: A Philosophical and Critical Thinking Perspective
Philosophical thinking

From Socrates to the present day, skepticism and doubt have been at the forefront of philosophical thought. Skepticism has been used to challenge existing beliefs and assumptions, while doubt has been used to question and probe ideas, concepts, and beliefs. In this article, we explore the philosophical and critical thinking perspectives on skepticism and doubt. We will look at how they have been used throughout history to shape our thinking and inform our decisions.

We will also examine the implications of skepticism and doubt for our society today and how they can be used to foster greater understanding and collaboration. Skepticism and doubt have long been seen as tools of inquiry and analysis. They have been used to challenge established conventions, challenge accepted wisdom, and explore new ideas. As such, skepticism and doubt can be seen as essential elements of philosophical thinking. This article will explore the various ways in which skepticism and doubt have been employed by philosophers throughout history, as well as their implications for critical thinking. We will also examine the implications of skepticism and doubt in today's world.

We will look at how they can be used to promote greater understanding, collaboration, and progress in our society. We will also explore the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on skepticism and doubt, such as the tendency to become too skeptical or too trusting of ideas. Finally, we will discuss how skepticism and doubt can be used in a constructive manner to promote meaningful dialogue and progress. Skepticism and doubt are two closely related concepts that have been discussed in philosophy and critical thinking for centuries. They involve questioning beliefs or assumptions, and seeking evidence in order to form one’s own conclusions.

Historically, skepticism and doubt have been used to challenge existing beliefs and accepted truths

Today, skepticism and doubt can still be used to think more critically about our beliefs and assumptions, by questioning our beliefs and assumptions, we can avoid making decisions based on false information or our own biases, when we question our beliefs and assumptions, it can help us to think more deeply about our positions and arguments, if taken too far, they can lead to a sense of cynicism or apathy, which can prevent us from forming meaningful connections with others or taking meaningful action.

By questioning our beliefs and assumptions, we can avoid making decisions based on false information or biases. We can also identify potential pitfalls in our reasoning and uncover alternative perspectives that we may not have considered before. Finally, when engaging in debates or discussions, skepticism and doubt can help us to think more deeply about our positions and arguments. However, it is important to use skepticism and doubt judiciously in order to avoid falling into a state of cynicism or apathy. For those looking to learn more about skepticism and doubt, there are a number of resources available.

What is Skepticism and Doubt?

Philosophical skepticism can be divided into several different types, including Cartesian skepticism, Pyrrhonism, Academic skepticism, and Humean skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is the view that nothing can be known with absolute certainty, while Pyrrhonism holds that nothing can be known with absolute certainty and that one should suspend judgement until further evidence is obtained. Academic skepticism maintains that no knowledge is certain and that wisdom is achieved through doubt, while Humean skepticism suggests that knowledge is based on experience and can never be certain. Scientific skepticism is a form of inquiry that uses scientific methods to investigate claims made in the absence of definitive proof. This type of skepticism is based on the premise that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence in order to be accepted as valid.

The Historical Roots of Skepticism and Doubt

Descartes argued that people should use their own reason and experience to form beliefs, rather than relying solely on the teachings of others. He was an advocate of the “method of doubt”, which instructed people to doubt all of their beliefs until they could be proven true. Descartes’ ideas were highly influential and were taken up by other philosophers such as David Hume. Hume argued that humans are limited in their knowledge, and that we should not assume our beliefs to be true unless there is sufficient evidence for them.

The Application of Skepticism and Doubt

Additionally, by applying doubt to our problem-solving abilities, we can avoid the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on instinct or intuition. For example, if we are presented with a complicated problem, we may be tempted to rush to a solution without considering the wider implications of our decision. However, by taking a moment to consider the implications of our decision and question any underlying assumptions, we can make sure that our solution is as informed and well-considered as possible. In addition to helping us think more critically, skepticism and doubt can help us develop a healthier sense of self-awareness. By questioning our own beliefs and assumptions, we can gain a better understanding of our own thought processes and the biases which might be influencing them.

Resources for Learning More About Skepticism and Doubt

Carroll 2.The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource 3.The Skeptics Society: Promoting Science and Reason Since 1992 4.Doubtful News: Keeping You Informed on Strange and Unusual Claims Podcasts: 1.Skeptoid: Critical Analysis of Pop Phenomena 2.The Partially Examined Life: Philosophy for the Rest of Us 3.Reasonable Doubts: Exploring the Claims of Christianity 4.Think Twice: Exploring the Relationship between Science and ReligionIn conclusion, skepticism and doubt are important philosophical and critical thinking tools that can help us better understand our world, beliefs, assumptions, and perspectives. By engaging in questioning and challenging our beliefs and assumptions, we are able to think more critically and gain new insights. Furthermore, skepticism and doubt can be used to inform our decision-making processes, problem-solving abilities, and more. Finally, there are a variety of resources available for readers to learn more about skepticism and doubt and how to apply them to their everyday lives.

Skepticism , doubt , critical thinking , philosophical thinking , and decision-making are all key concepts explored in this article.

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Critical or Analytical Thinking and Suspension of Judgment, Disbelief or Belief

by Damien AtHope | Mar 24, 2016 | Blog

critical thinking is associated with skepticism respect disbelief contrariness

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

How is Critical Thinking Different from Analytical Thinking?

Critical thinking involves:

“Critical Thinking consists of mental processes of discernment, analysis and evaluation, especially as it relates to what we hear by way of points that are raised or issues which are put forward for discussion. It includes the process of reflecting upon a tangible or intangible item in order to form a sound judgment that reconciles scientific evidence with common sense. Hence, Critical Thinking is most successful when it effectively blends our natural senses or feelings with our logic and intuition, all applied in a systematic manner. It involves the following main activities:

Deeply evaluating how far information we are given is current, up-to-date and accurate.
Checking for bias or unsubstantiated assumptions.
Evaluating how far the evidence or opinions presented genuinely proves the point(s) claimed.
Weighing up opinions, arguments or solutions against appropriate (usually logical) criteria.
Making inferences from the data/information and filling in “gaps”.
Taking a clear line of reasoning through to its logical conclusion.
Checking whether the evidence/argument really support the conclusions. ” Ref

Analytical thinking involves:

“Analytical thinking is a thinking process or skill in which an individual has the ability to scrutinize and break down facts and thoughts into their strengths and weaknesses. It involves thinking in thoughtful, discerning ways, in order to solve problems, analyze data, and recall and use information. It involves the following main activities:

Focusing on facts and evidence
Analyzing data or information or systems
Dissecting data/information and the analysis of complex things into simpler constituents
Reasoning – thinking that is coherent and logical
Partitioning, breakdown – an analysis into mutually exclusive categories
Eliminating extraneous data or analysis of a problem into alternative possibilities followed by the systematic rejection of unacceptable alternatives
Analyzing trends or the analysis of changes over time .” Ref

Doubt is not a method, it’s an epistemic attitude of uncertainty or a lack of convocation; whereas reason can be a method and is generally a epistemic attitude towards careful thinking, possessed understanding and a desire for developed justification adhering to rationality.

The “Free Will” Debate.

To me, we have a “will” that is lesser or greater all the time, not really “free will” as some think and that does not remove how in a general way, we tend to have something close to free will. Think if we had true “free will” we would never be limited by influences such as environments, or our fight-or-flight response, or our tend and befriend behaviors. We do not start the world as blank slates, nor does it take long to recognize the beginnings of morality in humans, we see it is babies at around a few months old not after they learn religion nor any philosophy. I see our ebbing and flowing will, one that at times we feel 100% free of will does not equal a mind 100% free-thinking devoid of any basis when we know such thinking errors are the rule, not an unlikely accident. Choose wisely.

I see our will as at times possibly close to what people think of as free will. But such a time is not fixed or lasting and ranges up and down during the day and is in no way actually regulated. As in think of the moment you hear of a crushing loss, could you make truly clear-headed moral reasoned decisions? I do not know about you, but I likely could error being so emotionally hijacked in my thinking. I believe generally most can but there is not just one thinking state nor is simple awareness the came as a critical reflection over days on one idea. is just swimming in our cognitive motivations stemming from both external and external influences thus we are not as free as we believe but yes, we have some “will”, I do not know if free is the best word as it could give a wrong impression or exaggerated explanation and maybe why there is all the confusion.

I am not trying to just push one thinking without thinking, rather I seek to desire truth even if it is being spoken from the mouths of others. I strive to be a free thinker with only reason as my master and humanity in my heart. May I use all the will I have to be the best me I can be, may I be a good human. To me, we are responsible to do what is of value. not ego, not pride, not self-dealing, but genuinely embody a heart of kindness, one that breathes deep a care for humanity. When we stop focusing our great minds on better ways to kill, we can focus on ideas that heal.

How can we silently watch as yet another generation is indoctrinated with religious faith, fear, and foolishness? Religion and it’s god myths are like a spiritually transmitted disease of the mind. This infection even once cured holds mental disruption which can linger on for a lifetime. What proof is “faith,” of anything religion claims by faith, as many people have different faith even in the same religion?

When you start thinking your “out, atheism, antitheism or antireligionism is not vitally needed just remember all the millions of children being indoctrinated and need our help badly. Ones who desperately need our help with the truth. Three things are common in all religions: “pseudo-science,” “pseudo-history,” and “pseudo-morality.”

And my biggest thing of all is the widespread forced indoctrination of children, violating their free choice of what to not believe or believe, I hate forced hereditary religion .

More than just atheists I hope my thinking inspires people to be rationalists who strive to use critical thinking putting reason at the forefront thus as their only master even over their ego. As well as from such thoughtfulness may we all see the need for humanism and secularism, respecting all as helpful servant leaders assisting others as often as we can to navigate truth and the beauty of reality. I strive to be and wish for others to be more than just atheists, may we all aspiring to the greatness of being strong reasoned thinkers with truly strong hearts of kindness.

Long ago I only cared about “myself”, what a foolish time of my life. I once was afraid to champion kindness fearing I would look weak. Now I see the bravery of kindness and the weakness of hate.

Here are three video Chats With famous atheists:

1. Matt Dillahunty: discussing on atheism and philosophy

2. Aron Ra: discussing using anthropology/archaeology

3. David Silverman: discussing on firebrand atheists uniting

M a y I H e l p b e t h e V o i c e o f R e a s o n

Never have a regretted being kind but often upon reflection, I have regretted my expression of anger. I have never wanted more hate in the world but how eagerly and proud I have worked to build a kinder world. For I know it starts with me, I am responsible. Yes, we rise by helping each other. May we all be valiant enough to be kind, even in a gleefully unkind world. I am honored to be of help to others, for we rise by helping each other.

My degree is in psychology (with some training in sociology, multicultural criminology and juvenile delinquency, teaching, intervention, alcohol, and drug addiction therapy as well) and I had excellent grades and was doing great but I dropped out of my masters after 7 classes, to do the new desire to research the origins and evolution of religion around the whole Earth and throughout all time, which is an adventure that has taken over 10 years ago to research for my book: “The Tree of Lies and its Hidden Roots” . I was in college to be a mental health therapist, which I would have enjoyed. Unlike the shit, I have to endure as the out activist, like I am now. In fact, I would likely be financially well off but instead, I chose humanity and possible poverty if needed in order to help change the world as much as I can. It was the work mistake of my life but the proudest thing I have ever done in my life. We rise by helping each other. The pain of the mind is some of the most lasting pain just as freedom of the mind is some of the most lasting freedom. May I be someone who can make anyone feel like someone of value. Human-Kind. Be both…

I am virtuous to the vulnerable and champion justice, so valiantly, as I have experienced the hateful lash of unkindness and wish to champion its opposite, radical kindness in an unkind world, a sigh of true bravery. It seems that there are two main types of philosophers: Thinkers and Specialists, and I have always thought of myself as a thinker.

I am a Methodological Rationalist , I rarely am pushed to doubt as a default, instead, I see reason as my default and at times it may be responsible to doubt, but I get to that conclusion because of reasoning. A common saying in pseudologic is “You can’t prove a negative.” This is, simply not true. This is clearly not true because any statement can be rewritten into the negation of its negation. Any provable statement can be written as a negative. For example, “X is true” can be rewritten as “X is not false”, a negative statement! If “X is true” can be proven true, then you have also proven a negative statement “X is not false”. Moreover, even if it is widely believed that you can’t prove a negative. Going so far as to have people thinking that it is a law of logic—you can’t prove that Santa Claus, unicorns, the Loch Ness Monster, God, pink elephants, WMD in Iraq, and Bigfoot don’t exist. This widespread belief is flatly, 100% wrong. In this little essay, I show precisely how one can prove a negative, to the same extent that one can prove anything at all. Evidence of absence is evidence of any kind that suggests something is missing or that it does not exist. Per the traditional aphorism, “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”, positive evidence of this kind is distinct from a lack of evidence or ignorance of that which should have been found already, had it existed. In this regard, Irving Copi writes: “In some circumstances, it can be safely assumed that if a certain event had occurred, evidence of it could be discovered by qualified investigators. In such circumstances, it is perfectly reasonable to take the absence of proof of its occurrence as positive proof of its non-occurrence.” — Copi, Introduction to Logic (1953), p. 95

Here is why “Reason is my only master”

The most Base Presupposition begins in reason. Reason is needed for logic (logic is realized by the aid of reason enriching its axioms). Logic is needed for axiology/value theory (axiology is realized by the aid of logic). Axiology is needed for epistemology (epistemology is realized by the aid of axiology value judge and enrich its value assumptions as valid or not). Epistemology is needed for a good ontology (ontology is realized with the aid of epistemology justified assumptions/realizations/conclusions). Then when one possesses a good ontology (fortified with valid and reliable reason and evidence) they can then say they know the ontology of that thing. Thinking is good and one claiming otherwise is indeed a person erroring in reason. Which may I remind you is terrible since the most Base Presupposition in our understanding of everything begins in reason.

So, I think, right thinking is reason. Right-reason (Sound reasoning) is logic. Right logic, can be used for mathematics, and from there we can get to science. And, by this methodological approach, we get one of the best ways of knowing the scientific method. Activating experience/event occurs, eliciting our feelings/scenes. Then naive thoughts occur, eliciting emotions as a response. Then it is our emotional intelligence over emotional hijacking, which entrance us but are unavoidable, and that it is the navigating this successfully in a methodological way we call critical thinking or as In just call right thinking. So, to me, could be termed “Right” thinking, that is referring to a kind of methodological thinking. Reason is at the base of everything and it builds up from pragmatic approaches. And, to me, there are three main approaches to truth (ontology of truth) from the very subjective (Pragmatic theory of truth), to subjective (Coherence theory of truth), then onto objective (Correspondence theory of truth) but remember that this process as limited as it can be, is the best we have and we build one truth ontop another like blocks to a wall of truth.

“In logic , more precisely in deductive reasoning , an argument is sound if it is both valid in form and its premises are true. Soundness also has a related meaning in mathematical logic , wherein logical systems are sound if and only if every formula that can be proved in the system is logically valid with respect to the semantics of the system. In deductive reasoning , a sound argument is an argument that is both valid , and all of whose premises are true (and as a consequence its conclusion is true as well). An argument is valid if, assuming its premises are true, the conclusion must be true.” ref

An example of a sound argument is the following well-known syllogism :

“All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.” Because of the logical necessity of the conclusion, this argument is valid; and because the argument is valid and its premises are true, the argument is sound. However, an argument can be valid without being sound. For example: “All birds can fly. Penguins are birds. Therefore, penguins can fly.” This argument is valid because, assuming the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. However, the first premise is false. Not all birds can fly (penguins, ostriches, kiwis etc.) For an argument to be sound, the argument must be valid and its premises must be true.” ref

The soundness of a deductive system is the property that any sentence that is provable in that deductive system is also true on all interpretations or structures of the semantic theory for the language upon which that theory is based. In symbols, where S is the deductive system, L the language together with its semantic theory, and P a sentence of L : if ⊢ S P , then also ⊨ L P .” ref

Strong soundness

“Strong soundness of a deductive system is the property that any sentence P of the language upon which the deductive system is based that is derivable from a set Γ of sentences of that language is also a logical consequence of that set, in the sense that any model that makes all members of Γ true will also make P true. In symbols where Γ is a set of sentences of L : if Γ ⊢ S P , then also Γ ⊨ L P . Notice that in the statement of strong soundness, when Γ is empty, we have the statement of weak soundness.” ref

Pragmatic theory of truth, Coherence theory of truth, and Correspondence theory of truth

In a general way, all reality, in a philosophic sense, is an emergent property of reason, and knowing how reason accrues does not remove its warrant. Feelings are experienced then perceived, leading to thinking, right thinking is reason, right reason is logic, right logic is mathematics, right mathematics is physics and from there all science.

Right-(SOUND)-Reason: is reasoning to the highest soundness available.

Science is not common sense?

Science is quite the opposite of just common sense. To me, common sense is experience-related interpretation, relatively, as it generally relates to the reality of things in the world, which involves “naïve realism” as well as possible psychological certainty and low epistemic certainty. Whereas, most of those who are scientific thinkers, hold typically more to scientific realism or other stances far removed from the limited common sense of naive realism. Science is a multidisciplinary methodological quest for truth. Science understands what is, while religion is wishing on what is not. Scientific realism sees external reality as described by science is what is REAL and thus TRUE with the highest epistemic certainty regardless of possible psychological certainty.

Getting Real with Logic

Logic is the result of rationalism, as what do you think gets you to logic if not starting at reason? I want to hear your justification for your claims, all the presuppositions you are evading to explain the links in your claims of truth. As it is invalid to just claim this without a justification for your professed claims and the presupposing you do to get there, that is not trying to use rationalism to refuse rationalist thinking. How are you making the statement and not appearing to what is the rationale behind it? If not, you must want to think “Logic is self-generating as valid” and this understood value is to you not reducible to reason? You are devoid of an offer of your burden of proof, first just try to keep up with the thinker’s responsibility to provide more than unjustified claims. Logic is derived by axioms and thus using rationalism to validate them, think otherwise provide your proof. My Rationalism: is two things externalistic “scientific rationalism” a belief or theory that opinions and actions should be based on reason and knowledge rather than on religious belief or emotional response. And internalistic “philosophic rationalism” the theory that reason is the most base presupposition before all others, rather than simply trying to rely on experience is the foundation of certainty in knowledge. Activating experience occurs we then have thinking, right (methodological) thinking (critical thinking) is reason, right reason is logic, right logic can be used for math, right math in response to the natural world is physics, and from there all other Sciences, physics is the foundation for chemistry and chemistry is the foundation of biology. May Right-(SOUND)-Reason be your only master and may you also master reason.

Religion vs. Science, Don’t Confuse Beliefs

A basic outline of scientific epistemology:

Science: Hypotheses (Rationalism/Deductive, Inductive, or Abductive Reasoning etc.) + Testing (Empiricism/Systematic Observation) – Checking for errors (Skepticism/Fallibilism) + Interpret/Draw a Conclusion (Rationalism/Deductive, Inductive, or Abductive Reasoning etc.) *if valid* = Scientific Laws (describes observed phenomena) or Scientific Theory (substantiated and repeatedly tested explanation of phenomena) = Justified True Belief = Scientific Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty supportive of correctability

*being epistemically certain, is believing a truth has the highest epistemic status, often with warranted psychological certainty but it may not, neither is it a requirement*

“Damien, I have a question: Who/what gives humans value?”

My response, We give value, as value is an awareness and judgment, it is an emergent property of validation; the ability to use critical thinking and logic in a useful way, to conclude worth, benefit, or good.

I am the “one” you have been waiting for. I am will to power, a deep thought so true it has taken flight to the lofty aspirations dreamed for and a care transmitted to offer hope to humanity. I believe in you and will strive to champion you with all I have for you are so worthy… I am that freak of nature, a power from the anti-power crusaders, warring against the power dynamic to return it back where it belongs- the hands of the people. I am a free-thinking invader into the shell of malignancy infecting humanity which strangles reason out of the world. A proud anarchy theorist, I breathe the fire of the heathens, a thought revolutionary and mental freedom fighter. I am a humanist atheist who desires a better world for us all, one that is kinder, more just, and more rational in its pursuits.

I am a “ Scientific Axiology ” minded “ Philosophic Axiologist .”

*Philosophic Axiology ( Value Theory )

*Scientific Axiology ( Formal Axiology )

Axiological atheism can be thought to involve ethical/value theory reasoned and moral argument-driven apatheism, ignosticism, atheism, anti-theism, anti-religionism, secularism, and humanism. The valuations move up the latter as the levels of evaluation is made to value judge all the elements to better understand the value or disvalue available to reach the most accurate valuation reasonable with a sound aware value conciseness. Axiological atheism can be thought to involve Ethical Atheism . Below shows the 7 axiological atheism argument flow to show the value layers and my thoughts on it:

1. Apatheism : starts at real, we are born and by the fact reality is devoid of magic removes theological desires to understand the obvious naturalistic world, until we learn otherwise. (a “presumptive-value” failure, thus no motivation to adequately start the evaluation needed to understand if there is real value for an Axiology assessment to accurately place it in the value hierarchy). = no value 2. Ignosticism : sees theological arguments and language as equivocation, contradictory, and/or un-cognitively relatable other than emotionalism or the like. I see Ignosticism as using the Theological non-cognitivism arguments of “mind understanding issues” (rationalism challenging) and an evidentialist/verificationist arguments of “lacking evidence issues” (empiricism challenging). As an atheist, I am a person who disbelieves or lacks belief in the existence of god or gods. In my non-belief, I am also ignostic feeling that every theological position assumes too much about the concept of god(s). As an ignostic, I am a person who rational no idea of anything from reality whatever to label as “a concept of god” thus I can say I have no idea of anything that can connect to the term god and no reason to think anyone else can either. (again a “presumptive-value” failure, no good Ontology of the thing for Identifying values that could influence belief but without what is needed to understand if there is real value for an axiology assessment to accurately place it in the value hierarchy). = no value

3. Atheism : How can we not reject the concept of gods, aka: supposed supreme magical beings, when not even some simple magic is supported in reality. So how then is it not even more ridiculous to claim some supreme magic aka: gods which are even further from reality. May I remind you that faith in the acquisition of knowledge is not a valid method worth believing in. Because, what proof is “faith”, of anything religion claims by faith, as many people have different faith even in the same religion? As an atheist, I am a person who disbelieves or lacks belief in the existence of god or gods. In my non-belief, I am also ignostic feeling that every theological position assumes too much about the concept of god(s). As an ignostic, I am a person who rational no idea of anything from reality whatever to label as “a concept of god” thus I can say I have no idea of anything that can connect to the term god and no reason to think anyone else can either. Atheists talk about gods and religions for the same reason doctors talk about cancer, they are looking for a cure or a firefighter talking about fires because they burn people and they care to stop them. We atheists too often feel a need to help the victim’s of mental slavery, held in the bondage that is the false beliefs of gods and the conspiracy theories of reality found in religions. If you think you believe in a god, “what do you mean by god,” saying a name tells me not one thing about the thing I am asking to know “its” beingness / thingness / attributes / qualities. Thus, what is the thing “god” to which you are talking about and I want you to explain its beingness /thingness / attributes/ qualities? Religious/theistic people with supernatural beliefs often seem as though they haven’t thought much about and that is something we can help using ontology questions about the beingness / thingness / attributes/ qualities they are trying to refer too. What do you mean by god, when you use the term god? And, I am not asking you for the name you attach to the thing you label as a god. I don’t need to know what the god you believe is known “by.” I am asking, what is the thing you are naming as a god and what that thing is, its qualities in every detail like all things have if they are real. Are you just making stuff up or guessing/hoping or just promoting unjustified ideas you want to believe, what is a god? As an atheist, I feel more wonder than I did as a theist because I thought, “big deal” to any wonder I experienced, thinking god could do anything. So with such an unrealistic mindset, everything lost its wonder but it’s the opposite as an atheist. As a theist, the world was full of superstitions and supernatural magic possibilities and thus utilized thinking that was not in the real world. As an atheist all I have now is the real world, not that all atheists seem to get this, we all are in a real world devoid of magic anything, therefore, everything adds to my feeling of awe. There should be little debate with atheist acknowledging discernable reality compared to theists with non-reality claims. Yes, I have way more awe and wonder as an atheist than I ever had as a theist because as a theist anything was possible with god. Therefore, as a theist things where not that amazing. However, as an atheist grasping what an absolute accidental or how random things are, with a 95 to 99 % of all life ever existing on this planet went extinct. I am thoroughly amazed we are even here the evolved children of ancient exploded stars, likely born in galaxies born in super-massive black holes, it’s all amazing. There is no evidence for Gods. But is their proposition outside of reason? As always start in reality from the evidence we do know, such as never in the history of scientific research or investigation has any supernatural claims shown to be true. So it is completely outside of possibility and is utterly ridiculous. Therefore, belief should be rejected as there are no warrants at all and it is axiologically unworthy to such a preponderance to demand disbelief. (yet again a “presumptive value” failure, no good Ontology of the thing not the cognitively meaningful claims relatable to reality that must be attached to all magic and gods claims for Identifying values that could influence belief but without what is needed to understand if there is real value for an axiology assessment to accurately place it in the value hierarchy).

4. Antitheism : Anti-theism requires more than either merely disbelieving in gods or even denying the existence of gods. Anti-theism requires a couple of specific and additional beliefs: first, that theism is harmful to the believer, harmful to society, harmful to politics, harmful, to culture, etc.; second, that theism can and should be countered in order to reduce the harm it causes. If a person believes these things, then they will likely be an anti-theist who works against theism by arguing that it be abandoned, promoting alternatives, or perhaps even supporting measures to suppress it. It’s worth noting here that, however, unlikely it may be in practice, it’s possible in theory for a theist to be an anti-theist.This may sound bizarre at first, but remember that some people have argued in favor of promoting false beliefs if they are socially useful. To me, I think many may have a misconception of the term. Atheism and anti-theism so often occur together at the same time and in the same person that it’s understandable if many individuals fail to realize that they aren’t the same. Making a note of the difference is important, however, because not every atheist is anti-theistic and even those who are, aren’t anti-theistic all the time. Atheism is simply the absence of belief in gods; anti-theism is a conscious and deliberate opposition to theism.Many atheists are also anti-theists, but not all and not always. To me as an antitheist, I see the concept of gods antihumanistic and wholly harmful to a free humanity and if the so-called gods somehow do end up being real that I will switch to direct opposition as I would any tyrant oppressing humanity. Antitheism (sometimes anti-theism) is a term used to describe an opposition to theism. The term has had a range of applications and definitions. In secular contexts, it typically refers to direct opposition to the validity of theism, but not necessarily to the existence of a deity. As an anti-theist, I am a person who is active in opposition to theism: both the concepts of god(s) as well as the religions that support them.This is because theistic concepts and theistic religions are harmful and that even if theistic beliefs were true, they would be undesirable. (And, again a “presumptive value” failure, of the other value challenges of the lesser evaluations and value judgments addressed in the apatheism, ignosticism, atheism value judgment conclusion and an Axiological Atheism assessment of the god concept that must be attached to all magic and gods claims Identifying a lack of value and/or disvalue that influence harm to real value in an axiology assessment to accurately place its value violations in the value hierarchy).

5. Antireligionism : Not just Atheist, axiological atheists should be antitheists but this generally will involve anti-religionism. it would generally thus hold anti-religionist thinking. Especially, I am an anti-religionist, not just an atheist, and here is why summed up in three ideas I am against. And, in which these three things are common in all religions: “pseudo-science”, “pseudo-history”, and “pseudo-morality”. And my biggest thing of all is the widespread forced indoctrination of children, violating their free choice of what to not believe or believe, I hate forced hereditary religion. And my biggest thing of all is the widespread forced indoctrination of children, violating their free choice of what to not believe or believe, I hate forced hereditary religion. As well as wish to offer strong critiques regarding the pseudo-meaning of the “three letter noise” people call “G.o.d” (group originated delusion)!As an anti-religionist, I am a person who can look at religion on the whole and see it is detrimental to the progress of humanity thus am in opposition to all and every religion, not even just opposition to organized religion. In case you were wondering, I am anti-pseudoscience, anti-supernatural, and anti-superstition as well. May I not be a silent watcher as millions of children are subjugated almost before their birth let alone when they can understand thought and are forcibly coerced, compelled, constrained, and indoctrinated in the mental pollution that religion can be. My main goal against religion is to fully stop as much as possible forced indoctrination, one could ask but then why do I challenge all adults faith?Well, who do you think is doing the lying to children in the first place. End Hereditary religion, if its a belief let them the equal right to choose to believe. “Religion is an Evolved Product” and Yes, Religion is Like Fear Given Wings… (And, one last time a “presumptive value” failure, of the other value challenges of the lesser evaluations and value judgments addressed in the apatheism, ignosticism, atheism value judgment conclusion and an Axiological Atheism assessment of the god concept and anti-theism assessment of the god show not just a lack of value but a possibly or likely harm demonstrating bot just a lack of value but a real disvalue and that includes the religions potentially removing value in an axiology assessment to accurately place it in the value hierarchy).

6. Secularism : is the only honorable way to value the dignity of others. If it was not true that there is a large unequal distribution of religion contributing to violence then there would be equal religion and atheist secularism violence. You do not see atheists bombing agnostics the very idea is laughable however even different branches of the same religion do will and have killed one another. So, violence not who we are it’s something we need to be compelled to do. Therefore, please support secularism. We are all one connected human family, proven by DNA showing we should treat each other as fellow dignity beings, supported equally (no gods and no masters). States may often have powers, but only citizens have the glue of morality we call rights. And, as they say, in my “dream society”, lots of things are free (aka. planting free food everywhere, free to everyone); but I wonder what you mean when people say you can’t just let things be free, I think, yeah, how can I take free stuff from a free earth.If one observes the virtues of (T. R. U. E. “The Rational Universal Ethics” or “The Responsible Universal Ethics”) that connect to all things as that of the connectedness equality like those which mirror the rays of the sun, fall down equally with a blind but fair indifference. (what is being expressed is that this sun shining will not favor one over another, no, the same upon everyone offering its light to all plant, animal, human, women, men, single or married, homosexual, bisexual, heterosexual, nonreligious, religious, people of means and those without, able-bodied and those which special needs, people of color, and those who are not, those with access to resources and those which out, young and elderly, etc.) All who wish to follow T. R. U. E. thus embodying a universalize equalitarian standard of ethics should strive to be like a ray of connected light to the world, shining equally and freedom to all of the world by such efforts a nonbiased unitive ethical approach is possible, one would have an increase in positive feelings to help others understanding equalitarian connectedness. If you don’t think different you will not behave differently, if you have never lived differently it is hard to see things differently and if you do not strive to understand difference one is thus unknowingly or not bound by limited encapsulation. I am for a Free Secular Society. I am not for oppression or abuse of religious believer and want a free secular society with both freedoms of religion and freedom from religion. Even though I wish the end of faith and believing in myths and superstition, I wish this by means of informing the willing and not force of the unwilling. I will openly challenge and rebuff religious falsehoods and misunderstanding as well as rebuke and ridicule harmful or unethical religious ideology or behavior.

7. Humanism : is the philosophic thinking that humans can solve human problems by human means, without feeling a need to appeal to the likes of holy books, mystical anything, nor the belief in gods or religions. But, instead, aspires to a true belief in humanity, viewing it with a persuasion of equality. This caring realist thinking found in humanism utilizes an unstated assumption or aspiration, to do no harm as much as possible and to do good whenever one can.Moreover, we are all one connected human family, proven by DNA showing we should treat each other as fellow dignity beings, supported equally. And, no one really owns the earth, we may make claims to it even draw lines on maps thinking this makes the fantasy borders, illusion supported by force and the potential for threat. Thus the ethical truth is we need to share the earth as communally as possible. And use the resources as safe and ethically as possible striving towards sharing and caring. (do no Harm and do good = Humanism). My core definition of humanism is that humans can solve human problems by human means. I am not saying other things can’t or shouldn’t be added to it but to me, a definition of humanism must always contain something coherent to such a thinking or not contradict such as I have offered. Thus, why it is appropriate to say “good without god” when one is a humanist.

Dogmatic–Propaganda vs. Disciplined-Rationality

Religionists and fideists, promote Dogmatic-Propaganda whereas atheists and antireligionists mostly promote Disciplined-Rationality. Dogmatic–Propaganda commonly is a common motivator of flawed or irrational thinking but with over seventy belief biases identified in people, this is hardly limited to just the religious or faith inclined. Let me illustrate what I am saying, to me all theists are believing lies or irrationally in that aspect of their lives relating to god belief. So the fact of any other common intellectual indexers where there may be “right” reason in beliefs cannot remove the flawed god belief corruption being committed. What I am saying is like this if you kill one person you are a killer. If you believe in one “god” I know you are a follower of Dogmatic-Propaganda and can not completely be a follower of Disciplined-Rationality. However, I am not proclaiming all atheists are always rational as irrationally is a revolving door many people believe or otherwise seem to stumble through. It’s just that god-belief does this with intentionally.

Disciplined-Rationality is motivated by principles of correct reasoning with emphasis on valid and reliable methods or theories leading to a range of rational standpoints or conclusions understanding that concepts and beliefs often have consequences thus hold an imperative for truth or at least as close to the truth as can be acquired rejecting untruth. Disciplined-Rationality can be seen as an aid in understanding the fundamentals for knowledge, sound evidence, justified true belief and involves things like decision theory and the concern with identifying the value(s), reasonableness, verification, certainties, uncertainties, and other relevant issues resulting in the clearest optimal decision/conclusion and/or belief/disbelief. Disciplined-Rationality attempts to understand the justification or lack thereof in propositions and beliefs concerning its self with various epistemic features of belief, truth, and/or knowledge, which include the ideas of justification, warrant, rationality, reliability, validity, and probability.

ps. “Sound Thinker”, “Shallow Thinker”, “Dogmatic–Propaganda” & “Disciplined-Rationality” are concepts/terms I created*

Atheists but I have faith in gravity tho, but it isn’t exactly “faith”???

My response, “No, I don’t agree, you don’t have “faith” in gravity or gravitation, as it is “a fundamental force” you have proof or if lacking some direct proof would use inference, and if even less evidence you use conjecture, not faith. Do you gauntly thinking you need faith in gravity because you wonder or worry that when walking down a set of stairs that you going to fall back up? You don’t need faith (strong belief without evidence) as there is massive proof, almost to the point that it is easily self-evident. You don’t need faith (strong belief without evidence) for anything, as if it’s warranted it will or should have evidence or it doesn’t deserve not only strong belief but any amount of belief at all as sound beliefs need something to ground their worthiness in relation to reality; the only place evidence comes. “Gravity, or gravitation, is a natural phenomenon by which all things with mass are brought toward (or gravitate toward) one another, including planets, stars, and galaxies.” Ref

“Gravity is responsible for various phenomena observed on Earth and throughout the Universe; for example, it causes the Earth and the other planets to orbit the Sun, the Moon to orbit the Earth, the formation of tides, the formation and evolution of the Solar System, stars and galaxies. Since energy and mass are equivalent, all forms of energy, including light, also cause gravitation and are under the influence of it. On Earth, gravity gives weight to physical objects and causes the ocean tides. The gravitational attraction of the original gaseous matter present in the Universe caused it to begin coalescing, forming stars – and the stars to group together into galaxies – so gravity is responsible for many of the large-scale structures in the Universe.” Ref

Axiological “Presumptive-Value”

Your god myth is an Axiological “Presumptive-Value” Failure, and I as an Axiological (value theorist) Atheist am compelled to speak out on how Claims of god are a Presumptive-Value failure. Simply, if you presume a thing is of value that you can’t justify, then you have committed an axiological presumptive value failure.

Axiological “presumptive-value” Success: Sound Thinker: uses disciplined rationality (sound axiological judgment the evaluation of evidence to make a decision ) supporting a valid and reliable justification.

Axiological “presumptive-value” Failure: Shallow Thinker: undisciplined, situational, sporadic, or limited thinking (unsound axiological judgment, lacking required evidence to make a “presumptive-value” success decision) lacking the support of a needed valid and reliable justification.

Often I get disheartened to see that so many people can look at the unknown or that which is devoid of any and all understanding and claim to know that this is evidence for some god or another. How can they with all honesty even say that they somehow already know about an established scientific unknown, when all along it is what it ever was, which I will remind you, is currently holding a confirmed status of unknown. Thus, still fully intact as currently unknowable (I.e. you simply cannot justifiability claim that such unknown is god or evidence of god). What really is a god anyway? The term god equals mystery that is used to explain the mysterious leaving us with yet more mystery, thus explains nothing. Claims of god are a Presumptive-Value failure. Simply, if you presume a thing is of value that you can’t justify, then you have committed an axiological presumptive value failure. Axiological “presumptive-value” Success: Sound Thinker: uses disciplined rationality (sound axiological judgment the evaluation of evidence to make a decision) supporting a valid and reliable justification.

“Ok, So basically, the difference between reasoning with evidence and without?” – Questioner

My response, Well with or without valid justification because of evidence. As in you can’t claim to know the value of something you can’t demonstrate as having good qualities to attach the value claim too so if you lack evidence of the thing in question then you cannot validate its value. So it’s addressing a kind of justificationism (uncountable) Theory of justification , An (philosophy standard) approach that regards the justification of a claim as primary, while the claim itself is secondary; thus, criticism consists of trying to show that a claim cannot be reduced to the authority or criteria that it appeals to. Think of is as a use-matrix. If I say this is of great use for that, can you validate its use or value, and can I use this as a valid method to state a valid justification for my claims without evidence to value judge from? No, thus an axiological presumptive-value failure as a valid anything.

Theory of justification is a part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of propositions and beliefs . Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of justification, warrant, rationality , and probability . Loosely speaking, justification is the reason that someone (properly) holds a belief. When a claim is in doubt, justification can be used to support the claim and reduce or remove the doubt. Justification can use empiricism (the evidence of the senses), authoritative testimony (the appeal to criteria and authority), or reason . – Wikipedia

“ Presumptions are things that are credited as being true until evidence of their falsity is presented. Presumptions have many forms and value ( Axiology ) is just one. In ethics, value denotes the degree of importance of something or action, with the aim of determining what actions are best to do or what way is best to live ( normative ethics ), or to describe the significance of different actions. It may be described as treating actions as abstract objects, putting VALUE to them.

It deals with right conduct and living a good life, in the sense that a highly, or at least relatively high valuable action may be regarded as ethically “ good ” ( adjective sense), and that an action of low value, or relatively low in value, may be regarded as “bad”. What makes an action valuable may, in turn, depend on the ethical values of the objects it increases, decreases, or alters. An object with “ethic value” may be termed an “ethic or philosophic good” ( noun sense). Values can be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of actions or outcomes. As such, values reflect a person’s sense of right and wrong or what “ought” to be.

“Equal rights for all”, “Excellence deserves admiration”, and “People should be treated with respect and dignity ” are representatives of values. Values tend to influence attitudes and behavior and these types include ethical / moral values, doctrinal / ideological (religious, political) values, social values, and aesthetic values. It is debated whether some values that are not clearly physiologically determined, such as altruism , are intrinsic , and whether some, such as acquisitiveness, should be classified as vices or virtues .” ref , ref

The Way of a Sound Thinker?

“Sound thinking to me, in a general way, is thinking, reasoning, or belief that tends to make foresight a desire to be as accurate as one can with valid and reliable reason and evidence.”

Sound axiological judgment, to me, a “presumptive-value” success, is value judged opinions expressed as facts with a valid and reliable justification. In an informal and psychological sense, it is used in reference to the quality of cognitive faculties and adjudicational (relating to adjudication ) capabilities of particular individuals, typically called wisdom or discernment . In a legal sense, – used in the context of a legal trial , to refer to a final finding, statement, or ruling , based on a considered weighing of evidence, called, “ adjudication “.

A shallow thinker (i.e. not a Deep Thinker , a person whose thoughts are reasoned , methodological , logical, empirical, profound ; an intellectual ) quickly talks, often with boastful postulations, likely just as often pushed strongly and loudly as if this adds substance, and they do this before fully understanding what’s is really involved. Whereas, a Sound Thinker is reasoned ( comparative more reasoned , superlative most reasoned ) generally based on reasoning ; being the result of logical thought. As a first debate process, a Sound Thinker commonly poses Questions to understand slowing down and assessing all the facts or factors involved and then builds their argument or ideas. In classical logic , the law of non-contradiction ( LNC ) (also known as the law of contradiction , the principle of non-contradiction ( PNC ), or the principle of contradiction ) states that contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time, e.g. the two propositions “ A is B ” and “ A is not B ” are mutually exclusive. It is the second of the three classic laws of thought .

Here are examples of theoretical philosophy subjects I delve into:

Ontology Epistemology Axiology Ignosticism Atheism Rationalism Antitheism Antire ligion Anarchism Secularism Secular humanism Humanism Theories of truth Questions on knowledge Practical philosophy Logic Questions on Morality Feminist philosophy Philosophy of science Philosophy of language Philosophy of mind Metaphysics

Axiology and Value Theory?

“Value theory is a range of approaches to understanding how, why, and to what degree persons value things; whether the object or subject of valuing is a person, idea, object, or anything else. This investigation began in ancient philosophy, where it is called axiology or ethics.” – Wikipedia

“The term “Value Theory” is used in at least three different ways in philosophy. In its broadest sense, “value theory” is a catch-all label used to encompass all branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and sometimes feminist philosophy and the philosophy of religion — whatever areas of philosophy are deemed to encompass some “evaluative” aspect. In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory particularly, but not exclusively, of concern to consequentialists. In this narrow sense, “value theory” is roughly synonymous with “axiology”. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. – (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states or objective states of the world. But in a more useful sense, “value theory” designates the area of moral philosophy that is concerned with theoretical questions about value and goodness of all varieties — the theory of value. The theory of value, so construed, encompasses axiology, but also includes many other questions about the nature of value and its relation to other moral categories. – (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The division of moral theory into the theory of value, as contrasting with other areas of investigation, cross-cuts the traditional classification of moral theory into normative and metaethical inquiry, but is a worthy distinction in its own right; theoretical questions about value constitute a core domain of interest in moral theory, often cross the boundaries between the normative and the metaethical, and have a distinguished history of investigation.” – (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Normative Philosophy? – Wikipedia

“Normative generally means relating to an evaluative standard. Normativity is the phenomenon in human societies of designating some actions or outcomes as good or desirable or permissible and others as bad or undesirable or impermissible. A norm in this normative sense means a standard for evaluating or making judgments about behavior or outcomes. – Wikipedia

Normative is sometimes also used, somewhat confusingly, to mean relating to a descriptive standard: doing what is normally done or what most others are expected to do in practice. In this sense a norm is not evaluative, a basis for judging behavior or outcomes; it is simply a fact or observation about behavior or outcomes, without judgment. Many researchers in this field try to restrict the use of the term normative to the evaluative sense and refer to the description of behavior and outcomes as positive, descriptive, predictive, or empirical. – Wikipedia

In philosophy , normative statements make claims about how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong . Normative claims are usually contrasted with positive (i.e. descriptive, explanatory , or constative ) claims when describing types of theories , beliefs , or propositions . Positive statements are (purportedly) factual statements that attempt to describe reality . Normative statements and norms , as well as their meanings, are an integral part of human life. – Wikipedia

They are fundamental for prioritizing goals and organizing and planning. Thought , belief , emotion , and action are the basis of much ethical and political discourse; indeed, normativity is arguably the key feature distinguishing ethical and political discourse from other discourses (such as natural science). Much modern moral/ethical philosophy takes as its starting point the apparent variance between peoples and cultures regarding the ways they define what is considered to be appropriate/desirable/praiseworthy/valuable/good etc. (In other words, variance in how individuals, groups, and societies define what is in accordance with their normative standards.) – Wikipedia

This has led philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and J.L. Mackie (for different reasons and in different ways) to cast doubt on the meaningfulness of normative statements. Philosophers, such as Christine Korsgaard , have argued for a source of normative value which is independent of individuals’ subjective morality and which consequently attains (a lesser or greater degree of) objectivity. In the social sciences , the term “normative” has broadly the same meaning as its usage in philosophy, but may also relate, in a sociological context, to the role of cultural ‘ norms ‘; the shared values or institutions that structural functionalists regard as constitutive of the social structure and social cohesion . – Wikipedia

These values and units of socialization thus act to encourage or enforce social activity and outcomes that ought to (with respect to the norms implicit in those structures) occur, while discouraging or preventing social activity that ought not to occur. That is, they promote social activity that is socially valued . While there are always anomalies in social activity (typically described as “ crime ” or anti-social behavior, see also normality (behavior) ) the normative effects of popularly endorsed beliefs (such as “ family values ” or “ common sense “) push most social activity towards a generally homogeneous set.” – Wikipedia

Theoretical philosophy? – Wikipedia

“The division of philosophy into a practical and a theoretical discipline has its origin in Aristotle ‘s moral philosophy and natural philosophy categories. Theoretical philosophy is sometimes confused with Analytic philosophy , but the latter is a philosophical movement, embracing certain ideas and methods but dealing with all philosophical subject matters, while the former is a way of sorting philosophical questions into two different categories in the context of a curriculum . – Wikipedia

Hammer of Truth that lying pig RELIGION: challenged by an archaeologist “The Hammer of Truth” -ontology question- What do You Mean by That? Hammer of Truth: Investigate (ONTOLOGY), Expose (EPISTEMOLOGY), and Judge (AXIOLOGY) Hammer of Truth: Yes, you too, have lots of beliefs… “The Hammer of Truth” Process

“Hammer of Truth” response to “Do you Believe in god?” “The Hammer of Truth” (scientific philosophy: Ontology, Epistemology, & Axiology) in action. Error Crushing Force of the Dialectic Questions and the Hammer of Truth Atheist Rationalist Talking on “TRUTH” with a Spiritualist Philosopher Damien AtHope: Pre-Historical Writer/Researcher chats with Lisa For Truth: Origins of Religion and Anthropology of Religion Truth Navigation: “Belief-Etiquette” Truth Navigation and the fallacy of Fideism “faith-ism” Truth Navigation: Techniques for Discussions or Debates Science and the word “TRUTH” Truth Navigation and the fallacy of Fideism “faith-ism” Truth is a Value (axiological) Judgment. Why are lies more appealing than the truth? The Battle of Truth To Find Truth You Must First Look Pragmatic theory of truth, Coherence theory of truth, and Correspondence theory of truth I use a kind of Dialectical Rhetoric = truth persuasion (motivational teaching) Religion is not about truth

#rationalism #philosapgy #atheism

My thoughts on Religion Evolution with external links for more info:

(Pre-Animism Africa mainly, but also Europe, and Asia at least 300,000 years ago ), ( Pre-Animism – Oxford Dictionaries )
(Animism Africa around 100,000 years ago ), ( Animism – Britannica.com )
(Totemism Europe around 50,000 years ago ), ( Totemism – Anthropology )
(Shamanism Siberia around 30,000 years ago ), ( Shamanism – Britannica.com )
(Paganism Turkey around 12,000 years ago ), ( Paganism – BBC Religion )
(Progressed Organized Religion “Institutional Religion” Egypt around 5,000 years ago ), ( Ancient Egyptian Religion – Britannica.com )
(CURRENT “World” RELIGIONS after 4,000 years ago ) ( Origin of Major Religions – Sacred Texts )
(Early Atheistic Doubting at least by 2,600 years ago ) ( History of Atheism – Wikipedia )

“Religion is an Evolved Product” and Yes, Religion is Like Fear Given Wings…

Atheists talk about gods and religions for the same reason doctors talk about cancer, they are looking for a cure, or a firefighter talks about fires because they burn people and they care to stop them. We atheists too often feel a need to help the victims of mental slavery, held in the bondage that is the false beliefs of gods and the conspiracy theories of reality found in religions.

“Understanding Religion Evolution: Animism, Totemism, Shamanism, Paganism & Progressed organized religion”

Understanding Religion Evolution:

Pre-Animism (at least 300,000 years ago)
Animism (Africa: 100,000 years ago)
Totemism (Europe: 50,000 years ago)
Shamanism (Siberia: 30,000 years ago)
Paganism (Turkey: 12,000 years ago)
Progressed organized religion (Egypt: 5,000 years ago), ( Egypt, the First Dynasty 5,150 years ago )
CURRENT “World” RELIGIONS (after 4,000 years ago)
Early Atheistic Doubting (at least by 2,600 years ago)

“An Archaeological/Anthropological Understanding of Religion Evolution”

It seems ancient peoples had to survived amazing threats in a “dangerous universe (by superstition perceived as good and evil),” and human “immorality or imperfection of the soul” which was thought to affect the still living, leading to ancestor worship. This ancestor worship presumably led to the belief in supernatural beings, and then some of these were turned into the belief in gods. This feeble myth called gods were just a human conceived “made from nothing into something over and over, changing, again and again, taking on more as they evolve, all the while they are thought to be special,” but it is just supernatural animistic spirit-belief perceived as sacred.

Quick Evolution of Religion?

Pre-Animism (at least 300,000 years ago) pre-religion is a beginning that evolves into later Animism. So, Religion as we think of it, to me, all starts in a general way with Animism (Africa: 100,000 years ago) (theoretical belief in supernatural powers/spirits), then this is physically expressed in or with Totemism (Europe: 50,000 years ago) (theoretical belief in mythical relationship with powers/spirits through a totem item), which then enlists a full-time specific person to do this worship and believed interacting Shamanism (Siberia/Russia: 30,000 years ago) (theoretical belief in access and influence with spirits through ritual), and then there is the further employment of myths and gods added to all the above giving you Paganism (Turkey: 12,000 years ago) (often a lot more nature-based than most current top world religions, thus hinting to their close link to more ancient religious thinking it stems from). My hypothesis is expressed with an explanation of the building of a theatrical house (modern religions development). Progressed organized religion (Egypt: 5,000 years ago) with CURRENT “World” RELIGIONS (after 4,000 years ago).

Historically, in large city-state societies (such as Egypt or Iraq) starting around 5,000 years ago culminated to make religion something kind of new, a sociocultural-governmental-religious monarchy, where all or at least many of the people of such large city-state societies seem familiar with and committed to the existence of “religion” as the integrated life identity package of control dynamics with a fixed closed magical doctrine, but this juggernaut integrated religion identity package of Dogmatic-Propaganda certainly did not exist or if developed to an extent it was highly limited in most smaller prehistoric societies as they seem to lack most of the strong control dynamics with a fixed closed magical doctrine (magical beliefs could be at times be added or removed). Many people just want to see developed religious dynamics everywhere even if it is not. Instead, all that is found is largely fragments until the domestication of religion.

Religions, as we think of them today, are a new fad, even if they go back to around 6,000 years in the timeline of human existence, this amounts to almost nothing when seen in the long slow evolution of religion at least around 70,000 years ago with one of the oldest ritual worship. Stone Snake of South Africa: “first human worship” 70,000 years ago . This message of how religion and gods among them are clearly a man-made thing that was developed slowly as it was invented and then implemented peace by peace discrediting them all. Which seems to be a simple point some are just not grasping how devastating to any claims of truth when we can see the lie clearly in the archeological sites.

I wish people fought as hard for the actual values as they fight for the group/clan names political or otherwise they think support values. Every amount spent on war is theft to children in need of food or the homeless kept from shelter.

Here are several of my blog posts on history:

To Find Truth You Must First Look
Archaeology Knowledge Challenge?
Beware of Pseudo-History like the Claims of a Hammer in a 400 Million-Year-Old Rock
The Evolution of Fire Sacralizing and/or Worship 1.5 million to 300,000 years ago and beyond?
Proto Religion: Superstition around 1 million years ago, to Pre-Animism 300,000 years ago, & then Animism Religion 100,000 years ago
Stone Age Art: 500,000 – 233,000 Years Old
Around 500,000 – 233,000 years ago, Oldest Anthropomorphic art (Pre-animism) is Related to Female
400,000 Years Old Sociocultural Evolution
Burial-pits, Cave-tombs, and/or Shallow-graves begin with Homo
The Emergence of Pre-Religion 300,000 years ago, with Pre-Animism?
Pre-Animism: Portable Rock Art at least 300,000-year-old
Pre-animism 300,000 years old and animism 100,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”
Prehistory: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” the division of labor, power, rights, and recourses.
Homo Naledi and an Intentional Cemetery “Pre-Animism” dating to around 250,000 years ago?
Neanderthals “Primal Religion (Pre-Animism/Animism?)” Mystery Cave Rings 175,000 Years Ago
130,000 years ago – Earliest evidence for burial and it’s Neanderthals…
Did Neanderthals teach us “Primal Religion (Pre-Animism/Animism?)” 120,000 Years Ago?
What about Neanderthals and Religion?
Animism: an approximately 100,000-year-old belief system?
Animism: a belief among some indigenous people, young children, or all religious people!
The Origin of Language: Starts in Symbolism Around 100,000 years ago, to Early Proto-Writing 44,000-5,000 years ago with Unrealized Connections
Rock crystal stone tools 75,000 Years Ago – (Spain) made by Neanderthals
Prehistoric Child Burials Begin at Least Around 78,000 Years Ago
Stone Snake of South Africa: “first human worship” 70,000 years ago
Similarities and differences in Animism and Totemism
Did Neanderthals Help Inspire Totemism? Because there is Art Dating to Around 65,000 Years Ago in Spain?
History of Drug Use with Religion or Sacred Rituals possibly 58,000 years ago?
Totemism: an approximately 50,000-year-old belief system?
Totemism 50,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”
Australia & Aboriginal Religion at least around 50,000 years old
Modern Humans start around 50,000 years ago Helped by Feminisation
Out of Africa: “the evolution of religion seems tied to the movement of people”
Totemism and Shamanism Dispersal Theory Expressed around 50,000 to 30,000 years ago
Back-migrations to Africa, Starting with Eurasia to North Africa around 45,000 years ago
Possible Religion Motivations in the First Cave Art at around 43,000 years ago?
43,000-33,000 years old Aurignacian Figurine Marks, like at the Swabian Jura caves in Germany
41,000-20,000-year-old Upper Paleolithic Tally sticks
40,000 years old Aurignacian Lion Figurine Early Totemism?
40,000-35,000 years ago “first seeming use of a Totem” ancestor, animal, and possible pre-goddess worship?
Prehistoric Egypt 40,000 years ago to The First Dynasty 5,150 years ago
38,000 Years Old Engraving of an Aurochs with Seeming Totemism Expression?
Aurignacian Period female ‘Venus’ carvings start at 35,000 years ago, then Transfer on to Other Cultures?
Sacred Bulls, the Moon, and Fertility begins at least around 35,000 years ago?
Women were the focus of religion, from at least around 35,000 years ago, until 2,000 years ago?
Stars: Ancestors, Spirit Animals, and Deities (around 6,000 years ago, with connections to shamanism at 30,000 years ago and possibly further back to 40,000 years ago with totemism)
34,000 years ago Lunar Calendar Cave art around the Time Shift From Totemism to Early Shamanism
34,000 years old Russan “Sungir” Early Totemistic-Shamanism
31,000-25,000 years old Dolni Vestonice, Czech Republic Totemistic-Shamanism
Shamanism: an approximately 30,000-year-old belief system
Could the Phallus Phenomena (A Bull Horn) and the Shamanism Phenomena beginning around 30,000 years ago
Lenticular Cloud Formations may connect to Ancient “House of Gods” Mythology
“Sky Burial” and its possible origins at least 12,000 years ago to likely 30,000 years ago or older.
The Peopling of the Americas Pre-Paleoindians/Paleoamericans around 30,000 to 12,000 years ago
Hunter-Gatherer/Indigenous Peoples Religiosity, Beliefs, and Practices
Starting 30,000 Years Ago is the Sitting Venus Phenomena
Shamanism 30,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”
Trinity Evolution Started over 30,000 years ago, Maybe?
Paleolithic Totem Venuses become the later Goddesses of the Neolithic and beyond?
The “Inner Asian Mountain Corridor” as well as the “Eurasian Steppe Corridor” and Repetitious Migrations
Who were the Groups migrating and merging with the previous Groups of Europe?
27,000 to 25,000 Years ago Oldest Shaman was Female, Buried with the Oldest Portrait Carving
Could a Gravettian carving around 25,000 years old relate to Later Goddess and the Bull cults like Catal Huyuk
Gravettian burial of Caviglione Woman, (shaman?) dated to around 24,000 years ago
The Gravettian culture (Europe) shared ritual ideas and The Ancient North Eurasian culture (Asia) 24,000 years ago
24,000 Years Old Sacred Burial of a Siberian Mal’ta Boy
Mal’ta–Buret’ culture of Siberia and Basal Haplogroup R* or R-M207
Groups partially derived from the Ancient North Eurasians
Leda and the Swan: possibly relates back to 24,000–15,000 years old Mal’ta–Buret’ culture, Lake Baikal, Siberia?
Similarities in Shamanism?
Black, White, and Yellow Shamanism?
Shamanistic rock art from central Aboriginal Siberians and Aboriginal drums in the Americas
Horned female shamans and Pre-satanism Devil/horned-god Worship?
Epipalaeolithic Near East 20,000 to 9,000 years ago and the Emergence of Advanced Culture as well as New Religion?
Sifting through the relation of Bird spirits/deities of the sky (20,000 to 5,000 years ago)
(Magdalenian/Iberomaurusian) Connections to the First Paganists of the early Neolithic Near East Dating from around 17,000 to 12,000 Years Ago
16,000 to 12,000 years ago Magdalenian Sacred Ritual and Symbols
Are the Natufians of Israel around 15,000 to 11,500 years ago who you thought they were?
Natufians: an Ancient People at the Origins of Agriculture and Sedentary Life
Possible Clan Leader/Special “MALE” Ancestor Totem Poles At Least 13,500 years ago?
Jewish People with DNA at least 13,200 years old, Judaism, and the Origins of Some of its Ideas
Genetic studies on Jewish DNA is not 6,000 years old but has origin links to about 20,000 to 30,000 years ago?
Baltic Reindeer Hunters: Swiderian, Lyngby, Ahrensburgian, and Krasnosillya cultures 12,020 to 11,020 years ago are evidence of powerful migratory waves during the last 13,000 years and a genetic link to Saami and the Finno-Ugric peoples.
My Reasoned Speculations on the Early Migrations of Paganism 13,000 to 3,000 years ago, Cultural Transfer
13,000-12,000 years ago Culture Leading to New Oppression changed everything and it was not always this way.
The Rise of Inequality: patriarchy and state hierarchy inequality
Fertile Crescent 12,500 – 9,500 Years Ago: fertility and death cult belief system?
12,400 – 11,700 Years Ago – Kortik Tepe (Turkey) Pre/early-Agriculture Cultic Ritualism
Paganism: spread of Haplogroup J and its Seeming connection of Bull Worship
Pre-Pottery Neolithic (10000 – 6500 BCE) and Pottery Neolithic (7000–5000 BCE)
12,000-year-old Gobekli Tepe: “first human-made pagan temple”
Gobekli Tepe is more like Shamanistic early Paganism, Not Adam, Eve, and Cain or Bible anything!
Ritualistic Bird Symbolism at Gobekli Tepe and its “Ancestor Cult”
Male-Homosexual (female-like) / Trans-woman (female) Seated Figurine from Gobekli Tepe
Could a 12,000-year-old Bull Geoglyph at Göbekli Tepe relate to older Bull and Female Art 25,000 years ago and Later Goddess and the Bull cults like Catal Huyuk?
Sedentism and the Creation of goddesses around 12,000 years ago as well as male gods after 7,000 years ago.
Alcohol, where Agriculture and Religion Become one? Such as Gobekli Tepe’s Ritualistic use of Grain as Food and Ritual Drink
Epigravettians Join the Religious Partying at Gobekli Tepe?
Neolithic Ritual Sites with T-Pillars and other Cultic Pillars
Paganism: Goddesses around 12,000 years ago then Male Gods after 7,000 years ago
First Patriarchy: Split of Women’s Status around 12,000 years ago & First Hierarchy: fall of Women’s Status around 5,000 years ago.
J DNA and the Spread of Agricultural Religion (paganism)
Paganism: an approximately 12,000-year-old belief system
Paganism 12,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Pre-Capitalism)
Shaman burial in Israel 12,000 years ago and the Shamanism Phenomena
Need to Mythicized: gods and goddesses
12,000 – 7,000 Years Ago – Paleo-Indian Culture (The Americas)
Ancient Egypt: Epipaleolithic, Neolithic, and Predynastic from 12,000 to 5,000 years ago
12,000 – 2,000 Years Ago – Indigenous-Scandinavians (Nordic)
Norse did not wear helmets with horns?
Pre-Pottery Neolithic Skull Cult around 11,500 to 8,400 Years Ago?
Masked Head Hunters of “Karahan Tepe” 11,400-year-old monumental site from the Pre-Pottery Neolithic A to B
10,400 – 10,100 Years Ago, in Turkey the Nevail Cori Religious Settlement
Evolution of human skin color, white-skin is really under 10,000 years old?
Indo-European language Trees fit an Agricultural expansion from Anatolia beginning 8,000 – 9,500 years ago
9,000-6,500 Years Old Submerged Pre-Pottery/Pottery Neolithic Ritual Settlements off Israel’s Coast
Catal Huyuk “first religious designed city” around 9,500 to 7,700 years ago (Turkey)
Goddesses/Demigoddesses/Grandmother-Mother Ancestor Spirits from Catal Huyuk?
Cultic Hunting at Catal Huyuk “first religious designed city”
Special Items and Art as well as Special Elite Burials at Catal Huyuk
New Rituals and Violence with the appearance of Pottery and People?
Haplogroup N and its related Uralic Languages and Cultures
Ainu people, Sámi people, Native Americans, the Ancient North Eurasians, and Paganistic-Shamanism with Totemism
Ideas, Technology and People from Turkey, Europe, to China and Back again 9,000 to 5,000 years ago?
First Pottery of Europe and the Related Cultures
9,000 years old Neolithic Artifacts Judean Desert and Hills Israel
9,000-7,000 years-old Sex and Death Rituals: Cult Sites in Israel, Jordan, and the Sinai
9,000-8500 year old Horned Female shaman Bad Dürrenberg Germany
Neolithic Jewelry and the Spread of Farming in Europe Emerging out of West Turkey
8,600-year-old Tortoise Shells in Neolithic graves in central China have Early Writing and Shamanism
Swing of the Mace: the rise of Elite, Forced Authority, and Inequality begin to Emerge 8,500 years ago?
Migrations and Changing Europeans Beginning around 8,000 Years Ago
My “Steppe-Anatolian-Kurgan hypothesis” 8,000/7,000 years ago
Around 8,000-year-old Shared Idea of the Mistress of Animals, “Ritual” Motif
Pre-Columbian Red-Paint (red ochre) Maritime Archaic Culture 8,000-3,000 years ago
7,522-6,522 years ago Linear Pottery culture which I think relates to Arcane Capitalism’s origins
Arcane Capitalism: Primitive socialism, Primitive capital, Private ownership, Means of production, Market capitalism, Class discrimination, and Petite bourgeoisie (smaller capitalists)
7,500-4,750 years old Ritualistic Cucuteni-Trypillian culture of Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine
Roots of a changing early society 7,200-6,700 years ago Jordan and Israel
Agriculture religion (Paganism) with farming reached Britain between about 7,000 to 6,500 or so years ago and seemingly expressed in things like Western Europe’s Long Barrows
My Thoughts on Possible Migrations of “R” DNA and Proto-Indo-European?
“Millet” Spreading from China 7,022 years ago to Europe and related Language may have Spread with it leading to Proto-Indo-European
Proto-Indo-European (PIE), ancestor of Indo-European languages: DNA, Society, Language, and Mythology
The Dnieper–Donets culture and Asian varieties of Millet from China to the Black Sea region of Europe by 7,022 years ago
Kurgan 6,000 years ago/dolmens 7,000 years ago: funeral, ritual, and other?
7,020 to 6,020-year-old Proto-Indo-European Homeland of Urheimat or proposed home of their Language and Religion
Ancient Megaliths: Kurgan, Ziggurat, Pyramid, Menhir, Trilithon, Dolman, Kromlech, and Kromlech of Trilithons
The Mytheme of Ancient North Eurasian Sacred-Dog belief and similar motifs are found in Indo-European, Native American, and Siberian comparative mythology
Elite Power Accumulation: Ancient Trade, Tokens, Writing, Wealth, Merchants, and Priest-Kings
Sacred Mounds, Mountains, Kurgans, and Pyramids may hold deep connections?
Between 7,000-5,000 Years ago, rise of unequal hierarchy elite, leading to a “birth of the State” or worship of power, strong new sexism, oppression of non-elites, and the fall of Women’s equal status
Paganism 7,000-5,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Capitalism) (World War 0) Elite & their slaves
Hell and Underworld mythologies starting maybe as far back as 7,000 to 5,000 years ago with the Proto-Indo-Europeans?
The First Expression of the Male God around 7,000 years ago?
White (light complexion skin) Bigotry and Sexism started 7,000 years ago?
Around 7,000-year-old Shared Idea of the Divine Bird (Tutelary and/or Trickster spirit/deity), “Ritual” Motif
Nekhbet an Ancient Egyptian Vulture Goddess and Tutelary Deity
6,720 to 4,920 years old Ritualistic Hongshan Culture of Inner Mongolia with 5,000-year-old Pyramid Mounds and Temples
First proto-king in the Balkans, Varna culture around 6,500 years ago?
6,500–5,800 years ago in Israel Late Chalcolithic (Copper Age) Period in the Southern Levant Seems to Express Northern Levant Migrations, Cultural and Religious Transfer
KING OF BEASTS: Master of Animals “Ritual” Motif, around 6,000 years old or older…
Around 6000-year-old Shared Idea of the Solid Wheel & the Spoked Wheel-Shaped Ritual Motif
“The Ghassulian Star,” a mysterious 6,000-year-old mural from Jordan; a Proto-Star of Ishtar, Star of Inanna or Star of Venus?
Religious/Ritual Ideas, including goddesses and gods as well as ritual mounds or pyramids from Northeastern Asia at least 6,000 years old, seemingly filtering to Iran, Iraq, the Mediterranean, Europe, Egypt, and the Americas?
Maykop (5,720–5,020 years ago) Caucasus region Bronze Age culture-related to Copper Age farmers from the south, influenced by the Ubaid period and Leyla-Tepe culture, as well as influencing the Kura-Araxes culture
5-600-year-old Tomb, Mummy, and First Bearded Male Figurine in a Grave
Kura-Araxes Cultural 5,520 to 4,470 years old DNA traces to the Canaanites, Arabs, and Jews
Minoan/Cretan (Keftiu) Civilization and Religion around 5,520 to 3,120 years ago
Evolution Of Science at least by 5,500 years ago
5,500 Years old birth of the State, the rise of Hierarchy, and the fall of Women’s status
“Jiroft culture” 5,100 – 4,200 years ago and the History of Iran
Stonehenge: Paganistic Burial and Astrological Ritual Complex, England (5,100-3,600 years ago)
Around 5,000-year-old Shared Idea of the “Tree of Life” Ritual Motif
Complex rituals for elite, seen from China to Egypt, at least by 5,000 years ago
Around 5,000 years ago: “Birth of the State” where Religion gets Military Power and Influence
The Center of the World “Axis Mundi” and/or “Sacred Mountains” Mythology Could Relate to the Altai Mountains, Heart of the Steppe
Progressed organized religion starts, an approximately 5,000-year-old belief system
China’s Civilization between 5,000-3,000 years ago, was a time of war and class struggle, violent transition from free clans to a Slave or Elite society
Origin of Logics is Naturalistic Observation at least by around 5,000 years ago.
Paganism 5,000 years old: progressed organized religion and the state: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Kings and the Rise of the State)
Ziggurats (multi-platform temples: 4,900 years old) to Pyramids (multi-platform tombs: 4,700 years old)
Did a 4,520–4,420-year-old Volcano In Turkey Inspire the Bible God?
Finland’s Horned Shaman and Pre-Horned-God at least 4,500 years ago?
4,000-year-Old Dolmens in Israel: A Connected Dolmen Religious Phenomenon?
Creation myths: From chaos, Ex nihilo, Earth-diver, Emergence, World egg, and World parent
Bronze Age “Ritual” connections of the Bell Beaker culture with the Corded Ware/Single Grave culture, which were related to the Yamnaya culture and Proto-Indo-European Languages/Religions
Low Gods (Earth/ Tutelary deity), High Gods (Sky/Supreme deity), and Moralistic Gods (Deity enforcement/divine order)
The exchange of people, ideas, and material-culture including, to me, the new god (Sky Father) and goddess (Earth Mother) religion between the Cucuteni-Trypillians and others which is then spread far and wide
Koryaks: Indigenous People of the Russian Far East and Big Raven myths also found in Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian, and other Indigenous People of North America
42 Principles Of Maat (Egyptian Goddess of the justice) around 4,400 years ago, 2000 Years Before Ten Commandments
“Happy Easter” Well Happy Eostre/Ishter
4,320-3,820 years old “Shimao” (North China) site with Totemistic-Shamanistic Paganism and a Stepped Pyramid
4,250 to 3,400 Year old Stonehenge from Russia: Arkaim?
4,100-year-old beaker with medicinal & flowering plants in a grave of a woman in Scotland
Early European Farmer ancestry, Kelif el Boroud people with the Cardial Ware culture, and the Bell Beaker culture Paganists too, spread into North Africa, then to the Canary Islands off West Africa
Flood Accounts: Gilgamesh epic (4,100 years ago) Noah in Genesis (2,600 years ago)
Paganism 4,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (First Moralistic gods, then the Origin time of Monotheism)
When was the beginning: TIMELINE OF CURRENT RELIGIONS, which start around 4,000 years ago.
Early Religions Thought to Express Proto-Monotheistic Systems around 4,000 years ago
Kultepe? An archaeological site with a 4,000 years old women’s rights document.
Single God Religions (Monotheism) = “Man-o-theism” started around 4,000 years ago with the Great Sky Spirit/God Tiān (天)?
Confucianism’s Tiān (Shangdi god 4,000 years old): Supernaturalism, Pantheism or Theism?
Yes, Your Male God is Ridiculous
Mythology, a Lunar Deity is a Goddess or God of the Moon
Sacred Land, Hills, and Mountains: Sami Mythology (Paganistic Shamanism)
Horse Worship/Sacrifice: mythical union of Ruling Elite/Kingship and the Horse
The Amorite/Amurru people’s God Amurru “Lord of the Steppe”, relates to the Origins of the Bible God?
Bronze Age Exotic Trade Routes Spread Quite Far as well as Spread Religious Ideas with Them
Sami and the Northern Indigenous Peoples Landscape, Language, and its Connection to Religion
Prototype of Ancient Analemmatic Sundials around 3,900-3,150 years ago and a Possible Solar Connection to gods?

Judaism is around 3,450 or 3,250 years old. (“Paleo-Hebrew” 3,000 years ago and Torah 2,500 years ago)

The Weakening of Ancient Trade and the Strengthening of Religions around 3000 years ago?
Are you aware that there are religions that worship women gods, explain now religion tears women down?
Animistic, Totemistic, and Paganistic Superstition Origins of bible god and the bible’s Religion.
Myths and Folklore: “Trickster gods and goddesses”
Jews, Judaism, and the Origins of Some of its Ideas
An Old Branch of Religion Still Giving Fruit: Sacred Trees
Dating the BIBLE: naming names and telling times (written less than 3,000 years ago, provable to 2,200 years ago)
Did a Volcano Inspire the bible god?
Yamnaya culture or at least Proto-Indo-European Languages/Religions may actually relate back to North Asia?
Dené–Yeniseian language, Old Copper Complex, and Pre-Columbian Mound Builders?
No “dinosaurs and humans didn’t exist together just because some think they are in the bible itself”
Sacred Shit and Sacred Animals?
Everyone Killed in the Bible Flood? “Nephilim” (giants)?
Hey, Damien dude, I have a question for you regarding “the bible” Exodus.
Archaeology Disproves the Bible
Bible Battle, Just More, Bible Babble
The Jericho Conquest lie?
Canaanites and Israelites?
Accurate Account on how did Christianity Began?
Let’s talk about Christianity.
So the 10 commandments isn’t anything to go by either right?
Misinformed christian
Debunking Jesus?
Paulism vs Jesus
Ok, you seem confused so let’s talk about Buddhism.
Unacknowledged Buddhism: Gods, Savior, Demons, Rebirth, Heavens, Hells, and Terrorism
His Foolishness The Dalai Lama
Yin and Yang is sexist with an ORIGIN around 2,300 years ago?
I Believe Archaeology, not Myths & Why Not, as the Religious Myths Already Violate Reason!
Archaeological, Scientific, & Philosophic evidence shows the god myth is man-made nonsense.
Aquatic Ape Theory/Hypothesis? As Always, Just Pseudoscience.
Ancient Aliens Conspiracy Theorists are Pseudohistorians
The Pseudohistoric and Pseudoscientific claims about “Bakoni Ruins” of South Africa
Why do people think Religion is much more than supernaturalism and superstitionism?
Religion is an Evolved Product
Was the Value of Ancient Women Different?
1000 to 1100 CE, human sacrifice Cahokia Mounds a pre-Columbian Native American site
Feminist atheists as far back as the 1800s?
Promoting Religion as Real is Mentally Harmful to a Flourishing Humanity
Screw All Religions and Their Toxic lies, they are all fraud
Forget Religions’ Unfounded Myths, I Have Substantiated “Archaeology Facts.”
Religion Dispersal throughout the World
I Hate Religion Just as I Hate all Pseudoscience
Exposing Scientology, Eckankar, Wicca and Other Nonsense?
Main deity or religious belief systems
Quit Trying to Invent Your God From the Scraps of Science.
Ancient Alien Conspiracy Theorists: Misunderstanding, Rhetoric, Misinformation, Fabrications, and Lies
Misinformation, Distortion, and Pseudoscience in Talking with a Christian Creationist
Judging the Lack of Goodness in Gods, Even the Norse God Odin
Challenging the Belief in God-like Aliens and Gods in General
A Challenge to Christian use of Torture Devices?
Yes, Hinduism is a Religion
Trump is One of the Most Reactionary Forces of Far-right Christian Extremism
Was the Bull Head a Symbol of God? Yes!
Primate Death Rituals
Christian – “God and Christianity are objectively true”
Australopithecus afarensis Death Ritual?
You Claim Global Warming is a Hoax?
Doubter of Science and Defamer of Atheists?
I think that sounds like the Bible?
History of the Antifa (“anti-fascist”) Movements
Indianapolis Anti-Blasphemy Laws #Free Soheil Rally
Damien, you repeat the golden rule in so many forms then you say religion is dogmatic?
Science is a Trustable Methodology whereas Faith is not Trustable at all!
Was I ever a believer, before I was an atheist?
Atheists rise in reason
Mistrust of science?
Open to Talking About the Definition of ‘God’? But first, we address Faith.
‘United Monarchy’ full of splendor and power – Saul, David, and Solomon? Most likely not.
Is there EXODUS ARCHAEOLOGY? The short answer is “no.”
Lacking Proof of Bigfoots, Unicorns, and Gods is Just a Lack of Research?
Religion and Politics: Faith Beliefs vs. Rational Thinking
Hammer of Truth that lying pig RELIGION: challenged by an archaeologist
“The Hammer of Truth” -ontology question- What do You Mean by That?
Navigation of a bad argument: Ad Hominem vs. Attack
Why is it Often Claimed that Gods have a Gender?
Why are basically all monotheistic religions ones that have a male god?
Shifting through the Claims in support of Faith
Dear Mr. AtHope, The 20th Century is an Indictment of Secularism and a Failed Atheist Century
An Understanding of the Worldwide Statistics and Dynamics of Terrorist Incidents and Suicide Attacks
Intoxication and Evolution? Addressing and Assessing the “Stoned Ape” or “Drunken Monkey” Theories as Catalysts in Human Evolution
Sacred Menstrual cloth? Inanna’s knot, Isis knot, and maybe Ma’at’s feather?
Damien, why don’t the Hebrews accept the bible stories?
Dealing with a Troll and Arguing Over Word Meaning
Knowledge without Belief? Justified beliefs or disbeliefs worthy of Knowledge?
Afrocentrism and African Religions
Crecganford @crecganford offers history & stories of the people, places, gods, & culture
Empiricism-Denier?

I am not an academic. I am a revolutionary that teaches in public, in places like social media, and in the streets. I am not a leader by some title given but from my commanding leadership style of simply to start teaching everywhere to everyone, all manner of positive education.

ref , ref

Hinduism around 3,700 to 3,500 years old. ref

Judaism around 3,450 or 3,250 years old. (The first writing in the bible was “Paleo-Hebrew” dated to around 3,000 years ago Khirbet Qeiyafa is the site of an ancient fortress city overlooking the Elah Valley. And many believe the religious Jewish texts were completed around 2,500) ref , ref

“Judaism is an Abrahamic , its roots as an organized religion in the Middle East during the Bronze Age . Some scholars argue that modern Judaism evolved from Yahwism , the religion of ancient Israel and Judah , by the late 6th century BCE, and is thus considered to be one of the oldest monotheistic religions.” ref

“Yahwism is the name given by modern scholars to the religion of ancient Israel , essentially polytheistic , with a plethora of gods and goddesses . Heading the pantheon was Yahweh , the national god of the Israelite kingdoms of Israel and Judah , with his consort, the goddess Asherah ; below them were second-tier gods and goddesses such as Baal , Shamash , Yarikh , Mot , and Astarte , all of whom had their own priests and prophets and numbered royalty among their devotees, and a third and fourth tier of minor divine beings, including the mal’ak , the messengers of the higher gods, who in later times became the angels of Judaism , Christianity and Islam . Yahweh, however, was not the ‘original’ god of Israel “Isra-El”; it is El , the head of the Canaanite pantheon, whose name forms the basis of the name “Israel”, and none of the Old Testament patriarchs, the tribes of Israel, the Judges, or the earliest monarchs, have a Yahwistic theophoric name (i.e., one incorporating the name of Yahweh).” ref

“El is a Northwest Semitic word meaning “god” or “ deity “, or referring (as a proper name) to any one of multiple major ancient Near Eastern deities. A rarer form, ‘ila , represents the predicate form in Old Akkadian and in Amorite . The word is derived from the Proto-Semitic *ʔil- , meaning “god”. Specific deities known as ‘El or ‘Il include the supreme god of the ancient Canaanite religion and the supreme god of East Semitic speakers in Mesopotamia’s Early Dynastic Period . ʼĒl is listed at the head of many pantheons. In some Canaanite and Ugaritic sources, ʼĒl played a role as father of the gods, of creation, or both. For example, in the Ugaritic texts , ʾ il mlk is understood to mean “ʼĒl the King” but ʾ il hd as “the god Hadad “. The Semitic root ʾ lh ( Arabic ʾ il ā h , Aramaic ʾ Al ā h , ʾ El ā h , Hebrew ʾ el ō ah ) may be ʾ l with a parasitic h, and ʾ l may be an abbreviated form of ʾ lh . In Ugaritic the plural form meaning “gods” is ʾ ilhm , equivalent to Hebrew ʾ el ō h î m “powers”. In the Hebrew texts this word is interpreted as being semantically singular for “god” by biblical commentators. However the documentary hypothesis for the Old Testament (corresponds to the Jewish Torah ) developed originally in the 1870s, identifies these that different authors – the Jahwist , Elohist , Deuteronomist , and the Priestly source – were responsible for editing stories from a polytheistic religion into those of a monotheistic religion. Inconsistencies that arise between monotheism and polytheism in the texts are reflective of this hypothesis.” ref

Jainism around 2,599 – 2,527 years old. ref

Confucianism around 2,600 – 2 , 551 years old. ref

Buddhism around 2,563/2,480 – 2,483/2,400 years old. ref

Christianity around 2,o00 years old. ref

Shinto around 1,305 years old. ref

Islam around 1407–1385 years old. ref

Sikhism around 548–478 years old. ref

Bahá’í around 200–125 years old. ref

ref , ref , ref

“Theists, there has to be a god, as something can not come from nothing.”

Well, thus something (unknown) happened and then there was something. This does not tell us what the something that may have been involved with something coming from nothing. A supposed first cause, thus something (unknown) happened and then there was something is not an open invitation to claim it as known, neither is it justified to call or label such an unknown as anything, especially an unsubstantiated magical thinking belief born of mythology and religious storytelling.

Advocating Anarchism: Morality, Non-coercion, Anti-hierarchy, Solidarity, Internationalism, Mutualism, Cooperationism, Empowermentism, etc.

While hallucinogens are associated with shamanism, it is alcohol that is associated with paganism.

The Atheist-Humanist-Leftist Revolutionaries Shows in the prehistory series:

Show one: Prehistory: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” the division of labor, power, rights, and recourses.

Show two: Pre-animism 300,000 years old and animism 100,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”

Show tree: Totemism 50,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”

Show four: Shamanism 30,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”

Show five: Paganism 12,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”

Show six: Emergence of hierarchy, sexism, slavery, and the new male god dominance: Paganism 7,000-5,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Capitalism) (World War 0) Elite and their slaves!

Show seven: Paganism 5,000 years old: progressed organized religion and the state: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Kings and the Rise of the State)

Show eight: Paganism 4,000 years old: Moralistic gods after the rise of Statism and often support Statism/Kings: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (First Moralistic gods, then the Origin time of Monotheism)

Prehistory: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” the division of labor, power, rights, and recourses: VIDEO

Pre-animism 300,000 years old and animism 100,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”: VIDEO

Totemism 50,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”: VIDEO

Shamanism 30,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism”: VIDEO

Paganism 12,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Pre-Capitalism): VIDEO

Paganism 7,000-5,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Capitalism) (World War 0) Elite and their slaves: VIEDO

Paganism 5,000 years old: progressed organized religion and the state: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (Kings and the Rise of the State): VIEDO

Paganism 4,000 years old: related to “Anarchism and Socialism” (First Moralistic gods, then the Origin time of Monotheism): VIEDO

I do not hate simply because I challenge and expose myths or lies any more than others being thought of as loving simply because of the protection and hiding from challenge their favored myths or lies.

The truth is best championed in the sunlight of challenge.

An archaeologist once said to me “Damien religion and culture are very different”

My response, So are you saying that was always that way, such as would you say Native Americans’ cultures are separate from their religions? And do you think it always was the way you believe?

I had said that religion was a cultural product. That is still how I see it and there are other archaeologists that think close to me as well. Gods too are the myths of cultures that did not understand science or the world around them, seeing magic/supernatural everywhere.

I personally think there is a goddess and not enough evidence to support a male god at Çatalhöyük but if there was both a male and female god and goddess then I know the kind of gods they were like Proto-Indo-European mythology .

This series idea was addressed in, Anarchist Teaching as Free Public Education or Free Education in the Public: VIDEO

Our 12 video series: Organized Oppression : Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of power (9,000-4,000 years ago) , is adapted from: The Complete and Concise History of the Sumerians and Early Bronze Age Mesopotamia (7000-2000 BC): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szFjxmY7jQA by “ History with Cy “

Show #1: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Samarra, Halaf, Ubaid)

Show #2: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Eridu: First City of Power)

Show #3: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Uruk and the First Cities)

Show #4: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (First Kings)

Show #5: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Early Dynastic Period)

Show #6: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (King Lugalzagesi and the First Empire)

Show #7: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Sargon and Akkadian Rule)

Show #8: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Naram-Sin, Post-Akkadian Rule, and the Gutians)

Show #9: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Gudea of Lagash and Utu-hegal)

Show #10: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Third Dynasty of Ur / Neo-Sumerian Empire)

Show #11: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Amorites, Elamites, and the End of an Era)

Show #12: Mesopotamian State Force and the Politics of Power (Aftermath and Legacy of Sumer)

The “Atheist-Humanist-Leftist Revolutionaries”

Cory Johnston ☭ Ⓐ Atheist Leftist @Skepticallefty & I (Damien Marie AtHope) @AthopeMarie (my YouTube & related blog ) are working jointly in atheist, antitheist, antireligionist, antifascist, anarchist, socialist, and humanist endeavors in our videos together, generally, every other Saturday.

Why Does Power Bring Responsibility?

Think, how often is it the powerless that start wars, oppress others, or commit genocide? So, I guess the question is to us all, to ask, how can power not carry responsibility in a humanity concept? I know I see the deep ethical responsibility that if there is power their must be a humanistic responsibility of ethical and empathic stewardship of that power. Will I be brave enough to be kind? Will I possess enough courage to be compassionate? Will my valor reach its height of empathy? I as everyone, earns our justified respect by our actions, that are good, ethical, just, protecting, and kind. Do I have enough self-respect to put my love for humanity’s flushing, over being brought down by some of its bad actors? May we all be the ones doing good actions in the world, to help human flourishing.

I create the world I want to live in, striving for flourishing. Which is not a place but a positive potential involvement and promotion; a life of humanist goal precision. To master oneself, also means mastering positive prosocial behaviors needed for human flourishing. I may have lost a god myth as an atheist, but I am happy to tell you, my friend, it is exactly because of that, leaving the mental terrorizer, god belief, that I truly regained my connected ethical as well as kind humanity.

Cory and I will talk about prehistory and theism, addressing the relevance to atheism, anarchism, and socialism.

At the same time as the rise of the male god, 7,000 years ago, there was also the very time there was the rise of violence, war, and clans to kingdoms, then empires, then states. It is all connected back to 7,000 years ago, and it moved across the world.

Cory Johnston: https://damienmarieathope.com/2021/04/cory-johnston-mind-of-a-skeptical-leftist/?v=32aec8db952d

The Mind of a Skeptical Leftist ( YouTube )

Cory Johnston: Mind of a Skeptical Leftist @Skepticallefty

The Mind of a Skeptical Leftist By Cory Johnston: “Promoting critical thinking, social justice, and left-wing politics by covering current events and talking to a variety of people. Cory Johnston has been thoughtfully talking to people and attempting to promote critical thinking, social justice, and left-wing politics.” http://anchor.fm/skepticalleft

Cory needs our support. We rise by helping each other.

Cory Johnston ☭ Ⓐ @Skepticallefty Evidence-based atheist leftist (he/him) Producer, host, and co-host of 4 podcasts @skeptarchy @skpoliticspod and @AthopeMarie

Damien Marie AtHope (“At Hope”) Axiological Atheist, Anti-theist, Anti-religionist, Secular Humanist. Rationalist, Writer, Artist, Poet, Philosopher, Advocate, Activist, Psychology, and Armchair Archaeology/Anthropology/Historian.

Damien is interested in: Freedom, Liberty, Justice, Equality, Ethics, Humanism, Science, Atheism, Antiteism, Antireligionism, Ignosticism, Left-Libertarianism, Anarchism, Socialism, Mutualism, Axiology, Metaphysics, LGBTQI, Philosophy, Advocacy, Activism, Mental Health, Psychology, Archaeology, Social Work, Sexual Rights, Marriage Rights, Woman’s Rights, Gender Rights, Child Rights, Secular Rights, Race Equality, Ageism/Disability Equality, Etc. And a far-leftist, “Anarcho-Humanist.”

I am not a good fit in the atheist movement that is mostly pro-capitalist, I am anti-capitalist. Mostly pro-skeptic, I am a rationalist not valuing skepticism. Mostly pro-agnostic, I am anti-agnostic. Mostly limited to anti-Abrahamic religions, I am an anti-religionist.

To me, the “male god” seems to have either emerged or become prominent around 7,000 years ago, whereas the now favored monotheism “male god” is more like 4,000 years ago or so. To me, the “female goddess” seems to have either emerged or become prominent around 11,000-10,000 years ago or so, losing the majority of its once prominence around 2,000 years ago due largely to the now favored monotheism “male god” that grow in prominence after 4,000 years ago or so.

My Thought on the Evolution of Gods?

Animal protector deities from old totems/spirit animal beliefs come first to me, 13,000/12,000 years ago, then women as deities 11,000/10,000 years ago, then male gods around 7,000/8,000 years ago. Moralistic gods around 5,000/4,000 years ago, and monotheistic gods around 4,000/3,000 years ago.

To me, animal gods were likely first related to totemism animals around 13,000 to 12,000 years ago or older. Female as goddesses was next to me, 11,000 to 10,000 years ago or so with the emergence of agriculture. Then male gods come about 8,000 to 7,000 years ago with clan wars. Many monotheism-themed religions started in henotheism, emerging out of polytheism/paganism.

Damien Marie AtHope (Said as “At” “Hope”)/ (Autodidact Polymath but not good at math) :

Axiological Atheist , Anti-theist , Anti-religionist , Secular Humanist , Rationalist , Writer, Artist, Jeweler , Poet , “autodidact” Philosopher, schooled in Psychology, and “autodidact” Armchair Archaeology/Anthropology/Pre-Historian ( Knowledgeable in the range of: 1 million to 5,000/4,000 years ago ). I am an anarchist socialist politically. Reasons for or Types of Atheism

My Website , My Blog , & Short-writing or Quotes , My YouTube , Twitter: @AthopeMarie , and My Email: [email protected]

March 2016
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Defining Critical Thinking




Everyone thinks; it is our nature to do so. But much of our thinking, left to itself, is biased, distorted, partial, uninformed or down-right prejudiced. Yet the quality of our life and that of what we produce, make, or build depends precisely on the quality of our thought. Shoddy thinking is costly, both in money and in quality of life. Excellence in thought, however, must be systematically cultivated. Critical thinking is that mode of thinking - about any subject, content, or problem - in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards upon them. Foundation for Critical Thinking Press, 2008) Teacher’s College, Columbia University, 1941)

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Constructive skepticism, critical thinking and the...

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Ubc theses and dissertations, constructive skepticism, critical thinking and the ethics of belief rebman, john l. --> -->.

One of the primary aims of education is to enable students to secure reliable standards and procedures by which they can acquire beliefs that are, if not true, at least likely to be true. The questions of belief acquisition and the manner in which those beliefs are held, although epistemic, are also distinctively ethical. Implicit within epistemological concepts such as truth, justification and objectivity are ethical concerns such as honesty, integrity and responsibility. In response to the question “What ought I to believe?”, any serious critical thinker must examine the reasons for holding (or not holding) a belief, and ascertain whether or not they are good reasons. Good reasons involve attention to rational or intellectual standards such as evidential support, objectivity, justification and truth. My discussion of the moral dimensions of epistemological questions will follow the path delineated by W.K. Clifford (1877) in his essay “The Ethics of Belief”. Within the context of the notions of intellectual virtues and vices, I will argue that intellectual integrity and epistemic responsibility entail the acceptance of the aforementioned standards and an avoidance of credulity. Recently, however, the Enlightenment project of rationality has come under serious attack from feminist philosophers, neo pragmatists, post-modernist philosophers and proponents of the “sociology of knowledge” who, in their efforts to avoid dogmatism, claim that knowledge lacks foundations, truth is relative to culture or “conceptual scheme,” and objectivity a myth. Although a thorough treatment and discussion of the views advanced by these groups far exceeds the scope of this thesis, their claims are, I shall argue, self-refuting and entail a destructive relativism and possible descent into radical skepticism. For the most part, I will focus my criticisms on Pragmatism, particularly the variety espoused by Richard Rorty, arguably the most influential contemporary philosopher. If the extremes of radical skepticism and dogmatism are to be averted, educators must adopt the premise that knowledge is possible but at the same time accept the fact that much of what we claim to know is uncertain. Hence, many of our beliefs should be regarded as transitory and, therefore, held tentatively. I shall argue that by assuming a posture of humility in the face of knowledge claims, holding to a realist and fallibilist theory of knowledge, entertaining beliefs with a healthy skepticism and abandoning the “quest for certainty” (as Dewey has asserted), we can avoid dogmatism, indoctrination and the intellectual vice of credulity. If we value autonomous critical thinkers as an important component within a liberal democratic society, then these dispositions ought to be fostered in our students. This dispositional approach to critical thinking I refer to as constructive skepticism and will argue that it is a necessary requirement for any serious critical inquirer.

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Open-Mindedness and Skepticism in Critical Thinking

How the two traits work together..

Posted April 26, 2019

In my most recent post, 12 Important Dispositions for Critical Thinking, I presented a list of dispositions that are likely to enhance the quality of one’s thinking—specifically, disposition toward critical thinking refers to an inclination, tendency, or willingness to perform a given thinking skill (Dwyer, 2017; Facione, Facione & Giancarlo, 1997; Ku, 2009; Norris, 1992; Siegel, 1999; Valenzuela, Nieto & Saiz, 2011). Though there is overlap among some of the dispositions (e.g., inquisitiveness, truth-seeking, and resourcefulness), there are, of course, important distinctions. However, in one particular case—open-mindedness and scepticism—it almost seems that the dispositions are at odds with one another.

I received feedback on the piece, and one reader recommended that, though they agree that it's good to have an open mind, some viewpoints are simply foolish, and it would be a waste of time to dwell on them. I responded with agreement, to some extent. However, even if an idea appears foolish, sometimes its consideration can lead to an intelligent, critically considered conclusion. In this way, open-mindedness follows the same mechanics as ‘brainstorming’ ideas, in that no idea is a bad one because the ‘bad ones’ sometimes provide a foundation for a ‘good one.’ I advised, furthermore, that there are important subtleties that require consideration with respect to understanding the relationship between scepticism and open-mindedness.

To better understand this relationship, it is important to first operationally define the two dispositions. Open-mindedness refers to an inclination to be cognitively flexible and avoid rigidity in thinking; to tolerate divergent or conflicting views and treat all viewpoints alike, prior to subsequent analysis and evaluation; to detach from one’s own beliefs and consider, seriously, points of view other to one’s own without bias or self-interest; to be open to feedback by accepting positive feedback and to not reject criticism or constructive feedback without thoughtful consideration; to amend existing knowledge in light of new ideas and experiences; and to explore such new, alternative or ‘unusual’ ideas. On the other hand, seemingly, the disposition towards scepticism refers to an inclination to challenge ideas; to withhold judgment before engaging all the evidence or when the evidence and reasons are insufficient; to take a position and be able to change position when the evidence and reasons are sufficient; and to look at findings from various perspectives.

Though on a foundational level, the two dispositions may seem to reside on a kind of continuum (e.g., scepticism at one end and open-mindedness at the other end), they are distinct concepts, even if there is overlap. That is, an individual can be both sceptical and open-minded at the same time. Perhaps the key issue here is to recognise that open-mindedness doesn’t mean you have to accept divergent ideas, rather just consider them.

Even with that, isn’t consideration of a foolish idea still a ‘waste of time?' Well, the decision-making behind determining whether or not something is foolish is still consideration—some level of evaluation, no matter how easy, was required to make the decision. That’s where the scepticism comes in: rejection of the ‘foolish’ idea is the outcome of appropriate evaluation. However, knowing that the idea is foolish isn’t necessarily the end of the story. You may ask yourself whether anything can be salvaged from the bad idea or the thought process behind it, for the purpose of turning it into a good one; thus, being open-minded through idea generation, such as in the aforementioned example of the mechanics behind brainstorming. But with that, there’s more to open-mindedness than that.

Open-mindedness is about being open to changing your mind in light of new evidence. It’s about detaching from your beliefs and focusing on unbiased thinking void of self-interest. It’s about being open to constructive criticism and new ideas. People who are sceptical do all of this as well—they challenge ideas and they withhold judgment until sufficient evidence is provided—they are open to all possibilities until sufficient evidence is presented. Scepticism and open-mindedness go hand-in-hand, but they may not seem that way from the surface—not until they are adequately and comprehensively defined. Once described accordingly, it is hard not to equate both with critical thinking. Well, I’d be sceptical of it, anyway.

Dwyer, C.P. (2017). Critical thinking: Conceptual perspectives and practical guidelines. UK: Cambridge University Press.

Facione, P. A., Facione, N. C., & Giancarlo, C. A. (1997). Setting expectations for student learning: New directions for higher education. Millbrae: California Academic Press.

Ku, K. Y. L. (2009). Assessing students’ critical thinking performance: Urging for measurements using multi-response format. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 4(1), 70–76.

Norris, S. P. (Ed.). (1992). The generalizability of critical thinking: Multiple perspectives on an educational ideal. New York: Teachers College Press.

Siegel, H. (1999). What (good) are thinking dispositions? Educational Theory, 49(2), 207–221.

Valenzuela, J., Nieto, A. M., & Saiz, C. (2011). Critical thinking motivational scale: A contribution to the study of relationship between critical thinking and motivation. Journal of Research in Educational Psychology, 9(2), 823–848.

Christopher Dwyer, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the Technological University of the Shannon in Athlone, Ireland.

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A simple analysis of the Critical Thinking process involves an analysis of facts to form a judgment. HOWEVER - THINKING IS NOT AS SIMPLE AS YOU THINK!

Critical Thinking sounds like a simple procedure until Steven Novella, MD's scientific explanation of "Thinking." This academic neurologist from Yale School of Medicine gives us scientific information that complicates thinking. As the president and co-founder of the New England Skeptical Society a nonprofit educational organization dedicated to promoting the public understanding of science, his approach to the Science of Critical Thinking added a dimension to the Critical Thinking process as stated herein.

COGNITIVE BIASES & SKEPTICISM

Nobel prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman wrote it clearly in 1985, "The first principle of Critical Thinking is that you must not fool yourself - and you are the easiest person to fool!" Cognitive Bias is related to a pattern of deviation in judgment whereby our inferences about other people and situations occur...

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The Importance of Skepticism

When it comes to critical thinking, one might assume that skepticism is kind of a no-brainer. And one would be right (in my opinion, anyway). What I think is interesting is how often skepticism is perceived to conflict with open-mindedness . First, let’s look at what skepticism means, then the importance of skepticism in relation to other critical thinking skills.

PS: I wrote skepticism so many times in this post, that its starting to look really, really weird .

What is Skepticism, Really?

Skepticism has a couple of meanings. The first, pretty straight-forward, is “doubt as to the truth of something”. So when someone tells you something, if you don’t believe it right away, you are treating it with skepticism. So thinking back to the critical thinking skills we talked about in week one , in one respect, someone who doesn’t believe anything might be confused with someone who is not open-minded.

But consider this: another meaning of skepticism is the philosophy that certain knowledge is impossible. In other words, the idea that anyone can know anything for sure is impossible. So in that respect, skepticism is like, the ultimate in open-mindedness. A true skeptic may disbelieve something not because they refuse to consider the truth, but because they believe nothing can be known for sure.

Can You Be Skeptical and Open-Minded?

I think people get confused with open-mindedness, and therefore skepticism, because they think being open-minded means believing everything. Instead, I believe that being open-minded is accepting that others believe differently than I do, and being open to considering other points of view. It doesn’t mean I have to believe the same thing. Therefore, I don’t see a conflict between open-mindedness and skepticism.

Here’s an example I came across in an article I linked last week , called “ The Problem With Being Too Open-Minded “, by Steven Novella. In it, he talks about how the sometimes-fantastical beliefs held by others are many times justified by the idea that you have to “keep an open mind”. In his example, someone who believes that humans were transplanted here by our alien forebears justifies this belief by saying, “You have to keep an open mind”.

Now, I read a lot of science fiction. A LOT. But even I have a hard time swallowing that given all the scientific evidence of evolution, humans were just dropped off here by aliens. I guess it’s possible I’m wrong. Given the facts I have access to, however, I’m comfortable holding the opinion that humans were not, in fact, deposited on earth millennia ago by aliens.

Skepticism: not automatically believing in things. Even aliens.

And Why is it Important?

Skepticism is what allows us the space to investigate before taking action or making a decision. When we treat what we hear with skepticism, that gives us the necessary pause to gather more information, process what we’re hearing, and to form a more balanced opinion.

I’m not sure that you have to be a total skeptic in order to be a critical thinker. I think you just need to apply a certain degree of skepticism to what you hear and are told by others. However, in real life, whether it’s work or home, at some point we need to make a decision and move on. If we’re stuck in the idea that we can never know the truth for sure, then we may become paralyzed by the unknown.

So when it comes to critical thinking and skepticism, I say apply a healthy dose of skepticism to what you’re learning and hearing, but be careful that you don’t get stuck. Eventually, you have to make a judgement of what is most likely, or what the right direction is, and move on from there.

Let’s Get Skeptical!

So how do you apply enough skepticism but not too much?

1. Avoid taking things at face value.

When someone tells you something, you’re influenced by your own opinions, experiences, and even your level of trust with the person or entity that is giving you information. You are more likely to believe what you hear when your opinions and experiences align with what you’re being told. If you trust the person giving you information, you may also be more likely to trust the information itself. Be mindful of this, and remember that even if what you’re hearing is what you want to hear or want to believe, you should still be a little skeptical until you learn more.

2. Ask questions.

Heather talked about this in last Friday’s post . You have to ask questions to learn more. You can also ask questions to challenge what you’re hearing, or just find out more facts. Learn about the motivations of the person telling you information. Learn the facts related to what you’re being told, and do your best to separate fact from opinion. Do your research. Ask yourself questions – interrogate your own reality. Don’t just ask questions, ask probing questions. Get to the bottom of the issue, or the root of the problem.

3. Suspend judgement.

My husband teases me sometimes because when we watch a movie, I sometimes have a hard time getting into it. I sometimes laugh or make fun of it because it seems so ridiculous. At times like those, he reminds me that I need to practice suspending my disbelief. When it comes to skepticism and critical thinking, though, I firmly believe you need to suspend judgement (including automatic belief or disbelief in something). Really try not to form a firm judgement until you have more information.

4. Be willing to form an opinion (eventually).

Call it a “working theory” if that makes you feel most comfortable. The point is, collect facts before forming an opinion or making a decision, but eventually, make one . Suspending judgement is all very well, but not indefinitely. Get comfortable with the idea that you’ll never know everything. Collect the information you have, and know when enough is enough to go on with.

5. Be willing to revise.

Just because you settle on an opinion and make a decision, it doesn’t mean it will always be the right one. New information may come along. You may need to change direction. Be willing to continue investigating and finding new information, and practice being flexible enough to change your opinions if new, compelling evidence is presented.

It’s Not Personal

Applying skepticism doesn't mean passing judgement on someone as a person.

The last point I’d like to make as I wrap up is that being skeptical is not necessarily a judgement on a person. If someone treats something you tell them skeptically, it’s not always because they don’t trust you or what you’re telling them. Likewise when you are skeptical about what someone else is telling you. You will be influenced by your level of trust in the person telling you things. However, you’re not doing them or you any favors by automatically believing what they tell you. If you investigate and still arrive at the same opinion, great. If you challenge what you’re hearing and form a different opinion, that’s okay too.

Ideas take root because people are willing to believe them, and believe in them. This can be good or bad. Just because something is widely held or believed to be true doesn’t automatically make it true. It doesn’t make it untrue, either. Be willing to investigate, interrogate, then arrive at your opinion in your own time, according to your own values and beliefs.

What’s your thoughts? Something I missed? Do you have an alternative viewpoint? Share in comments!

Dianne Whitford

I believe I was put here for a purpose: to write, create, and inspire people! Therefore, most of the time, you can find me doing (or trying to do) one of those things. When I'm not vegging out to video games or stuffing my face full of cheesy poofs.

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Philosophical skepticism is interesting because there are intriguing arguments for it despite its initial implausibility. Many contemporary epistemological positions can be fruitfully presented as responding to some aspect of those arguments. For example, questions regarding principles of epistemic closure and transmission are closely related to the discussion of what we will call Cartesian Skepticism, as are views according to which we are entitled to dismiss skeptical hypotheses even though we do not have evidence against them. The traditional issue of the structure of knowledge and justification, engendering Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Infinitism, can be seen as resulting from one main argument for what we will call Pyrrhonian Skepticism. In what follows we present these two forms of skepticism and assess the main arguments for them.

1. Knowledge, Justification and Skepticism

2. two basic forms of philosophical skepticism, 3.1 consideration of cp1, 3.2 consideration of cp2, 4. contextualism, 5.1 rejecting premise 2: foundationalism, 5.2 rejecting premise 5: infinitism, 5.3 rejecting premise 3: coherentism, 5.4 rejecting premise 7: positism, 5.5 rejecting more than one premise, other internet resources, related entries.

Philosophically interesting forms of skepticism claim that we do not know propositions which we ordinarily think we do know. We should distinguish such skepticism from the ordinary kind, the claim that we do not know propositions which we would gladly grant not to know. Thus, it is a form of ordinary skepticism to say that we do not know that there are an even number of stars in the Milky Way, but it is a form of philosophical skepticism to say that we do not know that the sun will come out tomorrow. Even though our interest is in philosophical skepticism, we can start our inquiry by thinking about ordinary skepticism.

Why do we readily grant, then, that we don’t know that there are an even number of stars in the Milky Way? To begin with, the vast majority of us do not even believe that proposition, and it is widely acknowledged that knowledge requires belief. [ 1 ] But even those who believe it do not know it, even if they luck out and it is true. They do not know it because they are not justified in believing it, and knowledge requires justification. [ 2 ] Of course, they are not justified in disbelieving that proposition either. Belief and disbelief are two of the so-called doxastic attitudes that we can adopt towards a proposition. We can also, of course, not even consider a proposition, and thus not adopt any doxastic attitude towards it. But most philosophers would hold that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third possible doxastic attitude that we can adopt towards a proposition: we can suspend judgment (or withhold assent) with respect to it. Suspension of judgment is thus a bona fide doxastic attitude alongside belief and disbelief, and is not to be equated with the failure to adopt any doxastic attitude. [ 3 ] Because it is a genuine doxastic attitude, suspension of judgment (just like belief and disbelief, and unlike the failure to form any doxastic attitude) can itself be justified or unjustified. For instance, we would ordinarily think that suspension of judgment is not justified with respect to the proposition that Paris is the Capital of France, but it is with respect to the proposition that there are an even number of stars in the Milky Way.

Some arguments for philosophical skepticism target knowledge directly, not concerning themselves with justification. For instance, some argue that we do not know certain propositions because our beliefs in them are not sensitive (in a sense to be explained below), and they claim that sensitivity is a condition on knowledge—but perhaps not on justified belief. We will examine the bearing of the sensitivity condition on skeptical arguments assuming that it applies to justification. But even if an argument for philosophical skepticism targets our knowledge in a certain area while remaining silent about whether we have justified beliefs in that area, that argument will still indirectly target our justification as well. For, if the argument succeeds, then it provides us with knowledge (or at least justified belief) that we do not know a certain proposition p . And it is plausible to hold that if we know (or justifiably believe) that we do not know a proposition p , then we are not even justified in believing p .

In what follows, then, we identify skepticism with respect to a field of propositions F as the claim that the only justified attitude with respect to propositions in F is suspension of judgment. Philosophical skepticism, then, differs from ordinary skepticism at least regarding the field of propositions to which it is claimed to apply. But even within the realm of philosophical skepticism we can make an interesting distinction by appealing to the scope of the thesis.

One interesting distinction between kinds of philosophical skepticism pertains to the question whether they iterate. Thus, consider skepticism about the future: the claim that the only justified attitude with respect to propositions about the future is suspension of judgment. That kind of philosophical skepticism overlaps partly with ordinary skepticism about the future. We should all grant, for instance, that we should suspend judgment with respect to the proposition that the flip of this fair coin in the next second will come up heads, but most of us think that we should believe, not suspend judgment with respect to, the proposition that the sun will come out tomorrow. Being a skeptic with respect to the first-order proposition that the sun will come out tomorrow (that is to say, holding that the only justified attitude with respect to that proposition is suspension of judgment) can be combined with any of the three doxastic attitudes with respect to the second-order proposition that the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that the sun will come out tomorrow is to suspend judgment. Generalizing, whenever the skeptic holds that the only justified attitude with respect to a field of propositions F is to suspend judgment, we can ask them which attitude is justified with respect to the proposition that the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition in F is suspension of judgment. Perhaps the most straightforward answer here is that the only justified attitude with respect to that second-order proposition is belief. After all, isn’t skepticism with respect to F precisely the belief that we should suspend judgment with respect to any proposition in F ? We will call this combination of views—the view that we should suspend judgment with respect to any proposition in F and believe the proposition that we should suspend judgment with respect to any proposition in F —“Cartesian Skepticism”, because of the skeptical arguments investigated by Descartes and his critics in the mid-seventeenth century. Other philosophers, following an ancient tradition, refer to this view as “Academic Skepticism” (see the entry on ancient skepticism ).

But some skeptics are skeptics regarding second- (and higher-) order propositions as well as regarding first-order propositions. Following the same ancient tradition, we will call that kind of skepticism “Pyrrhonian Skepticism”. Without any claim to historical accuracy, we will take Pyrrhonian Skepticism to be absolute skepticism—the thesis that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition p . Is Pyrrhonian Skepticism so understood self-refuting? It is certainly formally consistent: no contradiction follows just from the propositions that the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that p is suspension of judgment and that the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that p is suspension of judgment is suspension of judgment (say that three times fast!). But consider the principle that whenever someone is committed to a proposition p they are also (perhaps implicitly) committed to the proposition that belief is the (or at least a) justified attitude towards p . Call this the “Commitment Iteration Principle”. If the Commitment Iteration Principle holds, then Pyrrhonian Skepticism is indeed self-refuting. For Pyrrhonian skeptics are committed to the claim that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to some proposition p . By the Commitment Iteration Principle, they are then committed to the claim that belief is a justified attitude with respect to the proposition that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to p . Therefore, if they are in addition committed to the claim that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to that very same proposition, they are committed to an inconsistent set of propositions. But Pyrrhonian skeptics need not hold the Commitment Iteration Principle. Indeed, they are committed to thinking that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to the Commitment Iteration Principle itself (and also with respect to analogous principles which may make trouble for Pyrrhonian Skepticism). Of course, Pyrrhonian Skepticism will not be acceptable to anyone who does hold the Commitment Iteration Principle—but neither will Pyrrhonian Skepticism be acceptable to anyone who holds that we should not suspend judgment with respect to some proposition. It is not clear, then, that the charge of self-refutation represents an independent indictment of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. In any case, contemporary philosophers find Pyrrhonian Skepticism interesting not because they take seriously the possibility of its truth, but rather because there are interesting arguments in its favor, the responses to which shape the contours of many contemporary epistemological theories.

We have distinguished between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian Skepticism, but we have characterized both views in terms of a generic field of propositions F . In the case of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, F includes every proposition, but we can generate different versions of Cartesian Skepticism by varying F . A prominent version of Cartesian Skepticism is external-world skepticism—i.e., Cartesian Skepticism with respect to any proposition about the “external world” (not about the subject’s own mind). [ 4 ] In what follows, we concentrate on external world Cartesian Skepticism and Pyrrhonian Skepticism.

3. The Argument for Cartesian Skepticism Employing the Closure Principle

Many contemporary philosophers take the canonical argument for Cartesian Skepticism to involve skeptical hypotheses and a Closure Principle (CP). [ 5 ] A skeptical hypothesis (with respect to a proposition p and a subject S ) is a proposition SH such that if SH were true, then: (a) S would not know p , and (b) S would not be able to distinguish SH from a situation where S knows p . The evil demon scenario that Descartes envisions at the end of his “First Meditation” functions as a near-universal skeptical hypothesis, for the demon has the power to deceive any subject regarding almost any proposition. One way in which a SH may satisfy (a) is by describing a situation where p is false, but this is not the only way. Descartes’ evil demon may induce in a disembodied subject’s mind an experience as of the subject’s own hands in front of her, as a result of which the subject believes that there are hands in front of her, while at the same time dangling some unattached hands in front of the subject (we are waiving here difficulties having to do with how to locate objects relative to disembodied subjects). The subject’s belief that there are hands in front of her is in that case true, but she still doesn’t know it. The connection between Closure principles and arguments for skepticism gets complicated if we countenance skeptical hypotheses which do not entail the falsehood of the proposition in question, and so in what follows we limit our discussion to those that do.

Letting “ h ” stand for any proposition about the external world we would ordinarily take ourselves to be justified in believing, for example, G. E. Moore’s famous “here’s a hand” (Moore 1939 [1993]), and re-using “ SH ” for a skeptical hypothesis relative to h (we leave the subject tacit), we can state the contemporary canonical CP-style argument for Cartesian Skepticism as follows:

CP1. If I am justified in believing that h , then I am justified in believing that \({\sim}\textit{SH}\).
CP2. I am not justified in believing that \({\sim}\textit{SH}\).
Therefore, I am not justified in believing that h .

CP1 follows from the following Closure Principle (letting “ Jx ” stand for the subject is justified in believing x ):

Closure Principle [ CP ]: For all propositions x and y , if x entails y , and Jx , then Jy .

(In the argument above, \(x = h\) and \(y = {\sim}SH\).)

A crucial feature of CP is that it does not depend upon employing a stringent notion of justification. Suppose that (positive) justification comes in degrees, where the lowest degree is something like mere plausibility and the highest degree is absolute certainty. CP could be recast as follows:

CP*: For all propositions, x and y , if x entails y , and Jx to degree u , then Jy to degree v (where \(u \le v)\).

There appear to be only three ways that one can respond to the CP-style skeptical argument: deny at least one premise, deny that the argument is valid, or reluctantly accept the conclusion—if neither of the first two alternatives succeeds.

Let us begin an examination of CP1 and the general closure principle, CP, of which CP1 is an instantiation. Closure certainly does hold for some properties, for example, truth. If p is true and implies q , then q is true. It just as clearly does not hold for other properties, for example being surprising. It might be surprising that Tomás is taller than his father, but it is certainly not surprising that Tomás is taller than someone, and yet the former entails the latter. What about justified belief? Does Closure hold for it?

It might be thought that the answer must be a clear “No”, for the following reasons. First, notice that every logical truth is entailed by every proposition. If Closure held for justification, then we would have to say that everybody is justified in believing every logical truth (provided that we are willing to grant that everybody is justified in believing at least one proposition). But this doesn’t seem plausible. Some logical truths are too complicated to even parse, let alone be justified in believing. If this is true, then Closure doesn’t hold for belief (that is to say, we may fail to believe propositions entailed by propositions we already believe). The existence of very complicated logical truths also underlies another worry for Closure. For to every logical entailment between propositions there corresponds a logical truth: the (material) conditional with the entailing proposition in the antecedent and the entailed proposition in the consequent. Some of these logically true conditionals will be examples of propositions that we are not justified in believing (if only because the consequent is too complicated for beings like us to even parse). In that case, we might well be justified in believing their antecedents without being justified in believing their consequents.

But it also appears that CP can easily be repaired. We can stipulate (i) that the domain of the propositions in the generalization of CP includes only contingent propositions that are within S ’s capacity to grasp and (ii) that the entailment is “obvious” to S . The skeptic can agree to those restrictions because the skeptical scenarios are posited in such a way as to render it obvious that our ordinary beliefs are false in those scenarios, and it is taken to be a contingent claim that S is in the actual circumstances as described in the antecedent. (For a full discussion of the required repairs of CP, see David & Warfield 2008 and Hawthorne 2014.)

There is one other important, required clarification of the restricted version of CP. “Justified belief” is ambiguous. It could be used to refer to a species of actually held beliefs—namely, those actually held beliefs of S that are justified. Or it could refer to propositions that S is justified in believing—regardless of whether S does indeed believe them. Following Roderick Firth, the distinction between actually held justified beliefs and propositions one is justified in believing, regardless of whether they are actually believed, is often marked by distinguishing between doxastic and propositional justification (see Firth 1978). If CP is to be acceptable, “justified in believing” in the consequent must be used so as to refer to propositional justification for a reason already cited, i.e., that Closure does not hold for belief. In other words, one of S ’s actual beliefs, p , might be justified and S still fail to believe some proposition that is entailed by p . [ 6 ]

We are now in a position to ask: Does the restricted form of closure hold? There are at least three types of argument against closure in the literature: alleged counterexamples, alleged unpalatable consequences, and incompatibility with allegedly plausible epistemological theories. In the remainder of this section we examine one exemplar of each of these.

Fred Dretske and others have produced cases in which they believe CP fails. [ 7 ] Dretske writes:

You take your son to the zoo, see several zebras, and, when questioned by your son, tell him they are zebras. Do you know they are zebras? Well, most of us would have little hesitation in saying that we did know this. We know what zebras look like, and, besides, this is the city zoo and the animals are in a pen clearly marked “Zebras.” Yet, something’s being a zebra implies that it is not a mule and, in particular, not a mule cleverly disguised by the zoo authorities to look like a zebra. Do you know that these animals are not mules cleverly disguised by the zoo authorities to look like zebras? If you are tempted to say “Yes” to this question, think a moment about what reasons you have, what evidence you can produce in favor of this claim. The evidence you had for thinking them zebras has been effectively neutralized, since it does not count toward their not being mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras. (Dretske 1970: 1015–1016)

Dretske is speaking of knowledge rather than justified beliefs, but that seems irrelevant since the issue concerns the supposed lack of a sufficient source of evidence or reasons for the claim that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule.

The crucial thing to note about this proposed counterexample is that it works only if the Closure Principle entails that the very same source of evidence that justifies S in believing that the animals are zebras must justify S in believing that they are not cleverly disguised mules. Since the evidence for the former has been “effectively neutralized”, it is not available for the latter. Now, in response one could claim that once the question of whether the animals are disguised mules has been raised, the evidence is “effectively neutralized” for both the former and the latter, and S is no longer justified in believing that the animals are zebras. Thus, it could be held that this example could actually be used to support CP. Nevertheless, let us grant that the evidence for the claim that the animals are zebras cannot be used to show that they are not cleverly disguised mules. Still, it could be argued that this would not force giving up CP.

Such an argument could begin by recalling that CP claimed merely that whenever a subject is justified in believing p , then that subject is justified in believing q . CP does not require that the subject have the same evidence for p as she does for q . Dretske’s purported counterexample seems to require that CP implies that the adequate source of evidence is the same for both propositions.

No doubt this constraint sometimes correctly portrays the relevant evidential relationships when some proposition entails some other proposition. For example, suppose I have adequate evidence for the claim that Anne has two brothers. Then it would seem that the very same evidence would be adequate for believing that Anne has at least one brother. But the defender of CP, and more particularly the Cartesian Skeptic, could point out that closure does not require this to hold for every case.

There are two other possibilities. First, one may hold that when p entails q and there is some evidence e for p , it is p itself that is evidence for q . For example, it may be held that given that I have adequate evidence for believing that 2 is a prime number, I can use that very proposition (that 2 is a prime number) as an adequate reason for believing that there is at least one even prime. (See Klein 1981, 1995, and 2000, but see below for reasons for doubting that this is a genuine possibility.) Second, there are cases where the order is reversed because q serves as part of the evidence for p . For example, suppose that I am justified, ceteris paribus , in believing that (pure) water is present if I am justified in believing that there is present, at standard temperature and pressure, a clear, odorless, watery-tasting and watery-looking fluid that contains hydrogen and oxygen. This pattern is typical of abductive inferences, and is often referred to as “inference to the best explanation”. (See Vogel 1990, 2014b for a discussion of Cartesian Skepticism and inference to the best explanation.) In addition, there are cases in which it seems that some contraries of h need to be eliminated prior to h ’s being justified. For example, reconsidering the zebra-in-the-zoo case, it seems to be true that if I had some good reason to think that the animals are cleverly disguised mules, such a contrary would need to be eliminated before I would be justified in believing that the animals were zebras. [ 8 ]

It could also be argued that CP has unacceptable consequences. Of course, one of those unacceptable consequences may well be Cartesian Skepticism itself, but to point that out in the present context would be dialectically unhelpful. It has been argued, however, that CP by itself has far-reaching skeptical consequences. Notice that the argument for Cartesian Skepticism under consideration contains CP2 as an essential premise. The present concern is that CP by itself (and therefore CP1, if justified on the basis of CP), without help from CP2, has skeptical consequences. If that were true, that would be a reason to be wary of CP, for it would be a much stronger principle than advertised.

The argument can be presented as a conflict between CP, on the one hand, and three other principles. Those three other principles are, allegedly, beyond reproach, and so CP is to be blamed for the conflict. The first principle in question may be thought of as enshrining the possibility of knowledge (and justification) by ampliative inference:

Ampliativity : It is possible for a subject S to be justified in believing h on the basis of evidence e even if S does not have independent justification (of at least the same degree of S ’s justification for believing h ) for believing a proposition p such that p and e together entail h .

Ampliativity would be true if, for example, we can be justified in believing the conclusion of an inductive argument (say, that all emeralds are green) on the basis of believing its premises (say, that a properly selected group of emeralds have been observed to be green), without in addition being independently justified in believing any other proposition which, together with those premises, entails the conclusion (such as, for example, the proposition that if a properly selected sample of emeralds have all been green, then all emeralds are green).

The next principle is in conflict with what we presented above as an alternative possibility to Dretske’s interpretation of the evidential structure of CP. Dretske’s counterexample works, we said, only if CP holds that whatever justifies the subject in believing p is also what justifies her in believing q . But there are two other possibilities. Maybe the evidential relation is reversed: whatever justifies us in believing q justifies us in believing p . Or maybe, we said, p itself, and not whatever justifies us in believing p , justifies us in believing q . The next principle goes directly against this possibility:

Mere Lemmas : If S is justified in believing p on the basis of some evidence e , then p itself can justify S in believing some other proposition q only if e justifies S in believing q .

We call the principle “Mere Lemmas” because the idea behind it is that if a proposition is a mere lemma, in the sense that it derives all of its justification from some prior evidence e , then it doesn’t have justificatory powers of its own, independent of the justificatory powers of e . Suppose, for instance, that you start out by knowing that Jim has a pet, but you don’t know what kind of pet it is (the example is from Pryor 2004). Then you come to know that it is a hairless pet. Now you become justified (perhaps to a small degree) in believing that Jim’s pet is a hairless dog. That is to say, whatever degree of justification you had before to believe that Jim’s pet is a hairless dog, you are now somewhat more justified in believing that same proposition. That Jim’s pet is a hairless dog of course entails that Jim’s pet is a dog. But your justification for believing that Jim’s pet is a hairless dog cannot in any way be transmuted into justification for believing that Jim’s pet is a dog. Whatever degree of justification you had before for believing that Jim’s pet is a dog, you are now less justified in believing that same proposition (because hairless dogs are a small minority of hairless pets).

But what about the example with which we introduced the idea that, sometimes, when e is evidence for p , then p itself can be evidence for q ? The example was the following: we can have adequate evidence for believing that 2 is a prime number, and then that proposition itself (that 2 is a prime number) can justify us in believing that that there is at least one even prime number. But, when examined more closely, this is not an obvious counterexample to Mere Lemmas. For, what could our adequate evidence that 2 is a prime number be? Presumably, it would be that 2 is divisible only by 1 and 2. That just is the definition of what it means for 2 to be a prime number, however, so some may balk at the idea that it counts as evidence for the proposition in question (rather than being identical with it). In any case, it would not count as a counterexample to Mere Lemmas. For if we have no evidence for the proposition that 2 is a prime number, then the condition for the application of Mere Lemmas is not satisfied. [ 9 ] If, on the other hand, our evidence is that 2 is divisible only by 1 and 2, then that proposition itself is obviously evidence for the proposition that an even number is prime.

Our final principle is the following:

Entailment : If p entails q , then q cannot justify S in disbelieving p .

The idea behind this principle is that if p entails q , then should q turn out to be true then things are as p says they are, and so we can hardly use q as evidence against p . We return to Entailment below, but first we show how these three principles are in conflict with CP.

Assume, with Ampliativity, that a subject S is justified in believing a proposition h on the basis of some evidence e without having independent justification for believing any other proposition p such that p together with e entails h . Notice that h obviously entails h or not-e . Therefore, by CP, S is justified in believing h or not-e . But, of course, e together with h or not-e entails h . Therefore, if S is justified in believing h on the basis of e , then there is a proposition which S is justified in believing and which together with e entails h .

Notice that this is close to, but not quite, the negation of Ampliativity. For Ampliativity denies that there will be any such proposition which S is independently justified in believing, and for all we have said S ’s justification for believing h or not-e is not independent. Independent of what? Of S ’s justification for believing h itself. For all we have said so far, S might be justified in believing h or not-e on the basis of h , or on the basis of e itself.

But, given Mere Lemmas, h cannot justify S in believing any proposition unless e does. Therefore, the only option left open, short of denying Ampliativity, is to argue that e itself justifies S in believing h or not-e . But that is incompatible with Entailment. For notice that for e to justify S in believing h or not-e is for e to justify S in disbelieving its negation, i.e., e and not-h . But, of course, e and not-h entails e , and so the entailment principle has it that e cannot justify S in disbelieving e and not-h —i.e., e cannot justify S in believing h or not-e .

Although this particular reconstruction is our own (for more on it, see Comesaña forthcoming), some philosophers have taken arguments similar to it to count against CP (see, for example, Huemer 2001 and Sharon & Spectre 2017, and cf. Comesaña 2017). However, others have argued against Entailment (see, for example, Pryor 2014a,b and Vogel 2014b), and yet others have argued that denying Ampliativity itself is not as absurd as it might sound (Comesaña 2014a,b). The argument cannot, therefore, be taken to be a conclusive blow against CP.

Finally, some epistemological theories are in conflict with CP. [ 10 ] Robert Nozick’s account of knowledge is the best such example. Roughly his account is this (Nozick 1981: 172–187):

S knows that p iff :

S believes p ;
if p were true, S would believe p ;
if p were not true, S would not believe p .

Nozick called his account a “tracking” account of knowledge because whenever S knows that \(p, S\)’s beliefs track p . Think of a guided missile tracking its target. If the target were to move left, the missile would move left. If the target were not to move left, the missile would not move left. According to the tracking account of knowledge our beliefs must track the truth if we are to have knowledge.

There is one important clarification of conditions 3 and 4 that is discussed by Nozick, namely, that the method by which S acquires the belief must be held constant from the actual world to the possible world. A doting grandmother might know that her grandchild is not a thief on the basis of sufficiently good evidence, but would still believe that he wasn’t a thief, even if he were, because she loves him. So, we must require that the grandmother use the same method in both the actual and the near possible worlds, for, otherwise, condition (4) would exclude some clear cases of knowledge. This is not the place to provide a full examination of Nozick’s account of knowledge. [ 11 ] What is crucial for our discussion is that it is easy to see that, if Nozick’s account is correct, closure will fail for knowledge in just the kind of case that the Cartesian Skeptic is putting forward because of condition (4). Suppose S knows that there is a chair before her. Would she know that she is not in a skeptical scenario in which it merely appears that there is a chair? If the fourth condition were a necessary condition of knowledge, she would not know that because if she were in such a scenario, she would be fooled into thinking that she wasn’t. Thus, either condition (4) is too strong or CP fails.

There are some reasons for thinking that condition (4) is too strong. Consider, for instance, this case in the literature: You put a glass of ice-cold lemonade on a picnic table in your backyard. You go inside and get a telephone call from a friend and talk for half an hour. When you hang up you remember that you had left the ice-cold lemonade outside exposed to the hot sun and come to believe that it isn’t ice-cold anymore. It would seem that you could know that. Indeed, if it were false, that could only be due to some bizarre circumstance. Thus, if the lemonade were still ice-cold, you would believe that it wasn’t (see Vogel 1987: 206). The moral of this (and similar) cases seems to be that sensitivity is not a correct condition on knowledge.

There is much more to say about CP and CP1, but we will move on to considering the argument’s other premise.

CP2 claims that we are not justified in denying the skeptical hypothesis—in other words, that we are not justified in believing that we are not being deceived. What arguments can be given for CP2? It is tempting to suggest something like this: The skeptical scenarios are developed in such a way that it is assumed that we could not tell that we were being deceived. For example, we are asked to consider that there is an Evil Genius “so powerful” that it could (1) make me believe that there were hands when there were none and (2) make it such that I could not detect the illusion. But the skeptic must be very careful here. She cannot require that in order for S to know (or be justified in believing) something, say x , that if x were false, she would not still believe x . We have just seen (while examining Nozick’s account of knowledge) that this requirement is arguably too strong. So the mere fact that there could be skeptical scenarios in which S still believes that she is not in such a scenario cannot provide the skeptic with a basis for thinking that she fails to know that she is not (actually) in a skeptical scenario. But even more importantly, were that a requirement of knowledge (or justification), then we have seen that closure would fail and, consequently, the basis for the first premise in the CP-style argument for Cartesian Skepticism would be forfeited. [ 12 ]

Ernest Sosa has argued for three interrelated theses regarding CP2 and Nozick’s sensitivity condition: (i) that sensitivity can be easily confused with a different condition on knowledge (which Sosa calls safety); (ii) that while sensitivity is not a correct necessary condition on knowledge, safety is; (iii) finally, that our belief in the negation of skeptical hypotheses is safe despite being insensitive. [ 13 ]

Nozick’s sensitivity condition is a subjunctive conditional : if p were false, S would not believe it. The usual way in which such conditionals are evaluated is by assuming that there is an ordering of possible worlds according to how much they resemble the actual world. A subjunctive conditional \(A \rightarrow B\) is true if and only if B is true in the closest (or all the closest) possible worlds where A is true. According to this semantics, subjunctive conditionals do not contrapose (the contrapositive of a conditional if A, B is if not-B, not-A ). Thus, suppose that we flip a coin to decide whether you or I will strike this match: heads you strike it, tails I do. The coin comes up head, you strike the match and it lights. In this situation, it is true that if I had struck the match, it would have lit. But it doesn’t seem to be true that if the match hadn’t lit then I wouldn’t have struck it. The match might have failed to lit because it was wet while either of us struck it. In the possible worlds terminology, the closest possible world where I strike the match is a world where it lights, but there are possible worlds where the match doesn’t light and I strike it that are as close to actuality as are worlds where the match doesn’t light and you strike it.

After noticing the failure of subjunctives to contrapose, Sosa proposed that we should replace Nozick’s sensitivity condition with its contrapositive, which Sosa calls a ‘safety’ condition. The following formulation seems to capture Sosa’s intent:

Safety : S ’s belief that p based on e is safe if and only if S would not easily believe that p based on e without it being so that p (in symbols, S believes that p on basis \(e \rightarrow p\)). (Sosa 2002) [ 14 ]

Now, one initial worry about safety as a condition on knowledge is that, given that belief and truth are also necessary for knowledge, safety will always be (in this context) a true-true conditional (that is to say, both its antecedent and consequent will be true). This means that Sosa cannot accept the possible worlds semantics for subjunctive conditionals briefly sketched above, at least if we assume that every world is closer to itself than any other word. For when we have a true-true conditional, the closest world where the antecedent is true will be the actual world, and so every such conditional will be true (and, hence, any condition formulated by such conditionals will be trivially satisfied). [ 15 ] Rather, Sosa understands the truth-conditions for the relevant conditions as requiring that the consequent be true in all nearby possible worlds where the antecedent is true.

Sosa’s idea, then, is that we can explain away the temptation to think that CP2 is true by noticing that although safety and sensitivity are easily confused with one another, my belief that I am not the victim of a skeptical scenario is insensitive but safe, and that whereas sensitivity is not a condition on knowledge, safety is.

But is safety a condition on knowledge? Several authors have thought that, just as there are counterexamples to sensitivity, there are counterexamples to safety as well. Here is one (taken from Comesaña 2005b):

Halloween Party : There is a Halloween party at Andy’s house, and I am invited. Andy’s house is very difficult to find, so he hires Judy to stand at a crossroads and direct people towards the house (Judy’s job is to tell people that the party is at the house down the left road). Unbeknownst to me, Andy doesn’t want Michael to go to the party, so he also tells Judy that if she sees Michael she should tell him the same thing she tells everybody else (that the party is at the house down the left road), but she should immediately phone Andy so that the party can be moved to Adam’s house, which is down the right road. I seriously consider disguising myself as Michael, but at the last moment I don’t. When I get to the crossroads, I ask Judy where the party is, and she tells me that it is down the left road.

That case is a counterexample to safety insofar as we agree that I know that the party is at the house down the left road, and yet it could very easily have happened that I have that same belief on the same basis without it being so that the belief was true.

So far, we have argued that there are dangers in defending CP2 by appealing to the sensitivity condition, and that Sosa’s attack on CP2 might itself be subject to doubt. What else can be said for or against CP2?

Let’s go back to the rough idea that there is some kind of epistemic symmetry between what we take to be the actual case and a skeptical scenario. Of course, if we were the victims in a skeptical scenario, we wouldn’t know that we are not (if only because it would be false, but perhaps not only because of that). Given symmetry, even if we are not victims of a skeptical scenario, we do not know that we are not. Moreover, we know all of this. As we suggested in section 1, if we know that we don’t know that p , then we are not even justified in believing that p . Therefore, CP2. Every step in this argument can be challenged, but there is no doubt that many philosophers find something along these lines at least worth thinking about. Let us take a closer look at the first step, the claim that there is an epistemic symmetry between the good case and the skeptical scenario.

What can this alleged symmetry amount to? One idea is that we have the same evidence in both cases. According to a Cartesian account of this common evidence, it consists in mental states of the subject, such as her experiences. By construction, the subject has the same experiences in the skeptical scenario as she does in the good case. But some philosophers, most notably Williamson 2000, have denied that we have the same evidence in the good and the skeptical case. According to Williamson, our evidence is constituted not by our experiences, but by what we know. Given that in the good case we know more propositions that in the bad case, we have more evidence in the good case than we do in the skeptical case. In the good case, for instance, we know mundane propositions such as the proposition that we have hands. Given that knowledge entails justification, in the good case we are justified in believing that we have hands. Given CP, in the good case we are justified in believing that we are not in the skeptical case. This account of evidence entails that the relation of indiscriminability between the good case and the skeptical case is not symmetric: victims of a skeptical scenario cannot distinguish the skeptical scenario from the good case (for all they know, they are in the good case, and for all they know, they are in the skeptical case), but subjects in the good case can distinguish between the cases (they know that they are in the good case, and—again, given CP—they know that they are not in the skeptical case). [ 16 ]

But even those contemporary philosophers who grant that our epistemic position with respect to external world propositions is the same in the normal case as in the skeptical scenario can object to the symmetry thesis. For even granting (as we must) that in the skeptical scenario we do not know that we are not in the skeptical scenario, it doesn’t follow that in the ordinary case we do not know that we are not in the skeptical scenario, not even assuming that we have the same evidence in both cases. To begin with, an obvious difference between the normal case and the skeptical scenario is that in the skeptical scenario the proposition in question (that we are not in the skeptical scenario) is false, whereas in the normal case it is true. Given that knowledge requires truth, we can explain why we lack knowledge in the skeptical scenario by appealing to this truth condition on knowledge, rather than to the paucity of our evidence. In other words, our evidence for thinking that we are not in the skeptical scenario, this reply holds, is good enough to know that proposition, if only it were true. Now, the skeptic can then reply that not all skeptical scenarios are such that external worlds propositions are false in them. For instance, if I am right now dreaming that I have hands I do not thereby know that I have hands, even though I do have hands while dreaming. We noted above that the introduction of skeptical hypotheses which do not entail the falsity of external world propositions complicates the CP argument, but let us here bracket that issue. For, in addition to truth, knowledge plausibly requires other non-evidential conditions. In the wake of the Gettier problem, for instance, many philosophers have accepted that besides belief, justification and truth, the right kind of relation between the truth of the proposition and the belief must hold, and arguably it is this that fails in the dreaming scenario, rather than (again) the paucity of our evidence (see entry on the analysis of knowledge ). Therefore, it can be held that there is an asymmetry between the good case and the skeptical scenario even if we grant that we have the same evidence in both cases.

The Cartesian skeptic can nevertheless raise an uncomfortable question at this point: what is this alleged evidence in favor of the proposition that we are not in a skeptical scenario? One tempting answer is that the evidence in question consists precisely of those external world propositions which are the target of the Cartesian argument. I know that I have hands, and, according to this view, that very proposition is my evidence for the proposition that I am not a handless brain in a vat. But recall our discussion of Dretske’s mule case. There we pointed out that Dretske is, in effect, assimilating Closure and Transmission principles—i.e., assuming that the only way in which Closure principles can hold is if some evidence e is evidence both for p and any q entailed by p . We noted then that there is at least another possibility: it might be that we must be antecedently justified in believing q in order to be justified in believing some p which entails it. And indeed, it seems plausible that this is the direction of the evidential relation between external world propositions and the negation of skeptical hypotheses: we cannot be justified in believing external world propositions unless we have antecedent justification for believing the negation of skeptical hypotheses (but cf. Pryor 2000).

Another alternative is to say that no evidence justifies us in believing the negations of skeptical hypotheses, but that we are nevertheless justified in believing them. On one version of this view, put forward by Crispin Wright 2004, our entitlement to accept that we are not in a skeptical scenario does not depend on our having any kind of evidence, either empirical or a priori (see also Coliva (2015) for a development of a view in this neighborhood). Indeed, we are entitled to accept those propositions because unless we were we would not be justified in believing any proposition. Notice two important terminological points in the statement of Wright’s view: he doesn’t think that we are justified in believing that we are not in a skeptical scenario, but that we are entitled to accept that proposition. What are the differences between justification and entitlement, on the one hand, and belief and acceptance, on the other? Roughly, what we are calling justification Wright calls “warrant”. He thinks that there are two kinds of warrant: we can be warranted in believing a proposition because we have an evidential justification for it (where the evidence consists of the propositions we are warranted in believing or accepting), or we can be entitled to accept it even in the absence of any justification for them. As for the difference between belief and acceptance, Wright is prepared to grant that to count as a belief an attitude must be evidence-based, and so entitlements cannot be entitlements to believe. To be entitled to accept a proposition, for Wright, is to be justified in behaving (where “behavior” is understood broadly, to include cognitive inferential behavior, for instance) approximately as one would if one believed the proposition.

On another version of the view, although we do not have empirical evidence for the proposition that we are not in a skeptical scenario, we do have a kind of justification for it which does not rest exclusively on the fact that if we didn’t then we wouldn’t be justified in believing anything. Stewart Cohen 2010 has argued that our justification for believing that we are not in a skeptical scenario derives from the rationality of certain inferential rules (see also Wedgwood 2013). One such rule justifies us in concluding (defeasibly) that there is something red in front of us if we have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of us. Now, we can use that rule “online”, when we do in fact have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of us, or “offline”, assuming for the sake of argument that we have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of us to see what follows from it. According to the rule in question, it follows (again, defeasibly) that there is something red in front of us. We can now cancel the assumption by concluding (defeasibly) with the following conditional: if I have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of me, then there is something red in front of me. Notice that this conditional is incompatible with one specific skeptical hypothesis: the hypothesis that (for whatever reason) I have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of me but there is nothing red in front of me.

So far, we have looked at reasons for and against the two premises of the CP argument for Cartesian Skepticism. A different kind of approach to the argument requires some setup. Philosophers routinely distinguish between sentences and the propositions expressed by some of them. Sentences are language-dependent entities whereas propositions are (something like) the informational content of some of those language-dependent entities (see entry on propositions ). Thus, we distinguish between the proposition that it is raining and the English sentence It is raining . That very same proposition can be expressed by other sentences, such as the Spanish sentence Está lloviendo . Moreover, which proposition a given sentence expresses (if any) can depend on contextual factors—that is to say, the same sentence may express one proposition when produced in a given a context, and a different one when produced in a different context. Thus, when Tomás says that it is raining he expresses the proposition that it is raining in Tucson on May 14, 2019, whereas when Manolo said “Está lloviendo” last week, he expressed the proposition that it was raining in Mar del Plata on May 10, 2019.

The contextualist response to the argument for Cartesian Skepticism rests on the claim that which propositions the sentences used in that argument express is also a context-sensitive matter. Different contextualists would fill in the details in different ways—here we follow most closely the contextualism of Cohen 1987, 1988, 2000, 2005, 2014a,b, but see also Lewis 1996, DeRose 1992, 1995, 2002, 2004, 2005 and Stine 1976. Notice, to begin with, that justification comes in degrees: one can be more justified in believing one proposition than another. But there is also such a thing as being justified tout court . In this respect, it can be argued that “justified” is like “tall”, in that we can make sense both of comparative uses, such as when we say that Tomás is taller than his mother, and of non-comparative ones, such as when we say that Jordan is tall. Notice also that which proposition is expressed by a non-comparative use of “tall” does not float free from what would be appropriate comparative uses. Thus, when I say “Jordan is tall”, what I say is true provided that Jordan is taller than the average subject in the relevant contrast class. Thus, if Jordan is a fifth-grader, then what I said would be true if Jordan is taller than the average fifth-grader, whereas if Jordan is an NBA player, then what I said would be true if Jordan is taller than the average NBA player (who plays in Jordan’s position, perhaps). Similarly, the contextualist claims that when I say that I am justified in believing a proposition, what I say is true if and only if my degree of justification for believing the proposition is higher than a contextually set threshold. That threshold, moreover, can vary with the conversational context. Thus, if we are doing epistemology and thinking about the requirements for justification, the threshold required for an utterance of “I am justified in believing I have hands” goes up to the point where few (if any) of us would count as having said something true, whereas in an everyday context the threshold goes down to the point where most of us would count as having said something true.

According to contextualism, then, there is no single proposition expressed by the sentences used in the CP-based argument for Cartesian Skepticism. Rather, there are many such propositions. Two interesting ones are the propositions expressed in everyday contexts, where CP2 as well as the conclusion of the argument express false propositions, and those expressed in heightened-scrutiny contexts, where both CP2 as well as the conclusion of the argument express true propositions. CP1 (as well as CP itself) always expresses a true proposition, as long as we do not change contexts mid-sentence. Thus, the contextualist response to the CP-based argument is that it is at least two arguments: a sound one, when produced in heightened-scrutiny contexts, and one with a false premise (and a false conclusion) when produced in ordinary contexts. Contextualism is thus a more concessive response to the skeptic than the ones we have canvassed so far, for it concedes that the sentences used in the argument for Cartesian Skepticism can be used to express propositions which constitute a sound argument.

But even though Contextualism represents a concessive answer to skepticism, it is certainly not concessive enough in the eyes of the skeptic. For the contextualist simply asserts that, in ordinary contexts, we are justified in rejecting skeptical hypotheses. But recall that the skeptic’s idea was that CP2 is true even when we have in mind even minimally demanding standards for justification. In other words, the skeptic claims that we are not justified in believing the negation of skeptical hypotheses even a little bit, not just that we do not meet a very stringent standard for justification. Now, the skeptic might well be wrong about this, but the contextualist, qua contextualist, does not have any argument for his trademark claim that we do have some justification for believing the negation of skeptical hypotheses. In this respect, contextualism as a response to the skeptic is parasitic on some independent argument to the effect that we do have that kind of justification.

A related issue regarding Contextualism pertains to its relevance to skepticism. Grant, if only for the sake of argument, that Contextualism regarding knowledge and justification attributions is true. That is to say, grant that there are multiple properties that, say, “justified” could refer to. Couldn’t skeptics, and epistemologists more generally, be interested in a subset (perhaps just one) of them? If so, the interesting epistemological arguments would pertain to the conditions under which that property is instantiated, and Contextualism would fall by the wayside. For a debate regarding this and related issues, see Conee 2014a,b and Cohen 2014a,b.

A view which is related to, but crucially different from, Contextualism goes under various names in the literature: “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism”, “Interest Relative Invariantism” or views which admit of “pragmatic encroachment” (see Fantl and McGrath 2002, 2007, 2009; Hawthorne 2003; and Stanley 2005). Whereas the contextualist thinks that the same sentence attributing justification can express different propositions depending on the context in which it is produced, the subject-sensitive invariantist thinks that the proposition expressed is invariant, but its truth-value depends on features of the subject which can vary (such as how important it is to the subject that the belief in question be true). Very roughly, a version of subject-sensitive invariantism has it that a sentence of the form “ S is justified in believing p ” invariantly expresses a proposition which entails that S ’s justification for believing p is at least high enough for S to be rational in acting as if p is true. Notice that whether it is rational for S to act as if p is traditionally thought to depend on two things: the degree of justification S has for believing that p (or, perhaps more commonly in the context of decision theory, which degree of belief, or credence, S is justified in assigning to p ), and S ’s preferences. Thus, the more sensitive S ’s preferences are with respect to whether p is true, the more justified in believing p S must be for the proposition that S is justified ( tout court ) in believing p to be true. For instance, if nothing much hangs, for S , on whether there is orange juice in the house, a faint memory of having seen some in the fridge might be enough for it to be true that S is justified in believing that there is orange juice in the house. On the other hand, if S is diabetic and needs to ingest some sugar quickly, that same faint memory might not be enough for that same proposition to be true. Notice the difference between Contextualism and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism: the contextualist might say that the same sentence (that S is justified in believing that there is orange juice in the house) expresses two different propositions (one true, the other false) depending on whether the conversational context includes the information that S is diabetic and needs to ingest sugar; the subject-sensitive invariantist, on the other hand, holds that the sentence in question always expresses the same proposition, but that very proposition is true in the first case but false in the second.

Subject-Sensitive Invariantism has been subject to a number of criticisms (see McGrath 2004; DeRose 2002, 2004, 2005; Cohen 2005; Comesaña 2013; Anderson and Hawthorne, 2019a,b), but the general approach has also been ably defended (see the previously cited work by Fantl and McGrath). Nevertheless, the same issue that arose with respect to Contextualism seems to arise here. The Subject-Sensitive Invariantist needs an independent argument to the effect that we can be justified at least to a minimal degree in believing the negations of skeptical hypotheses, for otherwise his trademark claim that propositions attributing us justification for believing such claims are true is itself unjustified.

5. Pyrrhonian Skepticism

We turn now to Pyrrhonian Skepticism. [ 17 ] We remind the reader that our main interest here is not historical (for which see the entry on ancient skepticism ), but rather systematic: we want to canvass the legacy of Pyrrhonian Skepticism for contemporary epistemology, and in so doing we set aside even the most cursory exegetical interest.

Recall that, according to Pyrrhonian Skepticism, suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition (yes, including the proposition that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition). We are interested here in whether there are good arguments for such a view. We begin by recalling the tri-partite distinction between belief, disbelief and suspension of judgment. If we identify disbelief in a proposition with belief in its negation, then we are left with two attitudes within the realm of coarse-grained epistemology: belief and suspension of judgment. We assume also that the arguments to follow are addressed to someone who has an interest in, and has considered, the propositions in question. Otherwise, there is always the possibility of not taking any attitude whatsoever towards a proposition. Such lack of an attitude cannot itself be (epistemically) justified or not. But if the subject is to take an attitude, then the argument for Pyrrhonian Skepticism has it that suspension of judgment is the only justified one.

The Pyrrhonian skeptics sought suspension of judgment as a way of achieving calm ( ataraxia ) in the face of seemingly intractable disagreement. The Pyrrhonians had a number of ways, or “modes”, to induce suspension of judgment. The importance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism to contemporary epistemology derives primarily from these modes, and in particular from a subset of them referred to collectively as “the modes of Agrippa”. There are five modes associated with Agrippa, but three of them are the most important: the mode of hypothesis (or unsupported assertion), the mode of circularity (“reciprocal”), and the mode of regression to infinity. The three modes of Agrippa function together in the following way. Whenever the dogmatist (Sextus refers to those who are not skeptics as “dogmatists”, and we will follow him in this) asserts his belief in a proposition \(p_1\), the Pyrrhonian will challenge that assertion, asking the dogmatist to justify \(p_1\), to give reasons for thinking that it is true. The dogmatist will then either decline to answer the challenge or adduce another proposition \(p_2\) in support of \(p_1\). If the dogmatist refuses to answer the challenge, the Pyrrhonian will be satisfied that the only justified attitude to take with respect to \(p_1\) is to suspend judgment, because no reason for it has been given (thus appealing to the mode of hypothesis). If the dogmatist adduces another proposition \(p_2\) in support of \(p_1\), then either \(p_2\) will be identical to \(p_1\) or it will be a different proposition. If \(p_2\) is the same proposition as \(p_1\), then the Pyrrhonian will also suspend judgment with respect to \(p_1\), because no proposition can support itself (thus appealing to the mode of circularity). If, on the other hand, \(p_2\) is different from \(p_1\), then the Pyrrhonian will ask the dogmatist to justify his assertion of \(p_2\). And now either the dogmatist offers no reason in support of \(p_2\), or offers \(p_2\) itself or \(p_1\) as a reason, or adduces yet another proposition \(p_3\), different from both \(p_1\) and \(p_2\). If the dogmatist offers no reason for \(p_2\), then the Pyrrhonian will invoke the mode of hypothesis again and suspend judgment in accordance with it; if either \(p_2\) itself or \(p_1\) are offered as reasons to believe in \(p_1\), then the Pyrrhonian will invoke the mode of circularity and suspend judgment in accordance with it (because not only can no proposition be a reason for believing in itself, but also no genuine chain of reasons can loop); and, finally, if the dogmatist offers yet another proposition \(p_3\), different from both \(p_1\) and \(p_2\), as a reason to believe \(p_2\), then the same three possibilities that arose with respect to \(p_2\) will arise with respect to \(p_3\). The dogmatist will not be able to continue offering different propositions in response to the Pyrrhonian challenge forever—eventually, either no reason will be offered, or a proposition that has already made an appearance will be mentioned again. The Pyrrhonian refers to this impossibility of actually offering a different proposition each time a reason is needed as “the mode of infinite regression”. The three Pyrrhonian modes, then, work in tandem in order to induce suspension of judgment with respect to any proposition whatsoever.

The Pyrrhonian use of the three modes of Agrippa in order to induce suspension of judgment can be presented in the form of an argument, which has been called “Agrippa’s trilemma”. It is at least somewhat misleading to present the Pyrrhonian position in terms of an argument, because when someone presents an argument they are usually committed to the truth of its premises and its conclusion, whereas Pyrrhonian skeptics would suspend judgment with respect to them. Nevertheless, presenting an argument for Pyrrhonian Skepticism doesn’t do much violence to this skeptical position, because what is important is not whether the Pyrrhonians themselves accept the premises or the validity of the argument, but rather whether we do. If we do, then it seems that we ourselves should be Pyrrhonian skeptics (and if we do become Pyrrhonian skeptics as a result of this argument, we can then start worrying about what to do with respect to the fact that an argument whose premises we believed—and perhaps still believe—to be true convinced us that we are not justified in believing anything). If we do not think that the argument is sound, then we stand to learn something interesting about the structure of an epistemological theory—because each of the premises of the apparently valid argument looks plausible at first sight.

Before presenting a reconstruction of Agrippa’s trilemma we need to introduce some definitions. Let’s say that a belief is inferentially justified if and only if it is justified (at least in part) in virtue of its relations to other beliefs. A justified basic belief , by contrast, is a belief that is justified but not in virtue of its relations to other beliefs. An inferential chain is a set of beliefs such that every member of the set is allegedly related to at least one other member by the relation “is justified by”. Agrippa’s trilemma, then, can be presented thus:

If a belief is justified, then it is either a basic justified belief or an inferentially justified belief.
There are no basic justified beliefs.
If a belief is justified, then it is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain.
All inferential chains are such that either (a) they contain an infinite number of beliefs; or (b) they contain circles; or (c) they contain beliefs that are not justified.
No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an infinite inferential chain.
No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to a circular inferential chain.
No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain that contains unjustified beliefs.
There are no justified beliefs.

Premise 1 is beyond reproach, given our previous definitions. Premise 2 is justified by the mode of hypothesis. Step 3 of the argument follows from premises 1 and 2. Premise 4 is also beyond reproach—the only remaining possible structure for an inferential chain to have is to contain basic justified beliefs, but there are none of those according to premise 2. Premise 5 is justified by appeal to the mode of infinite regression, and premise 6 is justified by appeal to the mode of circularity. Premise 7 might seem to be a truism, but we will have to take a closer look at it.

It is interesting to note that Agrippa’s trilemma is perfectly general; in particular, it applies to philosophical positions as well as to ordinary propositions. In fact, when Agrippa’s trilemma is applied to epistemological theories themselves, the result is what has been called “the problem of the criterion” (see Chisholm 1973).

Many contemporary epistemological positions can be stated as a reaction to Agrippa’s trilemma. In fact, all of premises 2, 5, 6 and 7 have been rejected by different philosophers at one time or another. We examine those responses in what follows.

Foundationalists claim that there are basic justified beliefs—beliefs that are justified but not in virtue of their relations to other beliefs. In fact, according to foundationalism, all justified beliefs are either basic beliefs or are justified (at least in part) in virtue of being inferentially related to a justified belief (or to some justified beliefs). This is where foundationalism gets its name: the edifice of justified beliefs has its foundation in basic beliefs.

But how do foundationalists respond to the mode of hypothesis? If a belief is not justified by another belief, then isn’t it just a blind assertion? If basic beliefs are justified but not by other beliefs, then how are they justified? What else besides beliefs is there that can justify beliefs?

To this last question, many foundationalists reply: experience (we are talking here about empirical knowledge; a priori knowledge raises interesting problems of its own, and it is of course also subject to Agrippa’s trilemma). To a rough first approximation that glosses over many important philosophical issues, experiences are mental states that, like beliefs, aim to represent the world as it is, and, like beliefs too, can fail in achieving that aim—that is, experiences can misrepresent. Nevertheless, experiences are not to be identified with beliefs, for it is possible to have an experience as of, e.g., facing two lines that differ in length without having the belief that one is facing two lines that differ in length—a combination of mental states that anyone familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion will recognize.

There are three important questions that any foundationalist has to answer. First, what kinds of beliefs do experiences justify? Second, how must inferentially acquired beliefs be related to basic beliefs in order for them to be justified? Third, in virtue of what do experiences justify beliefs?

With respect to the first question, we can distinguish between traditional foundationalism and moderate foundationalism. Traditional foundationalists think that basic beliefs are beliefs about experiences, whereas moderate foundationalists think that experience can justify beliefs about the external world. Take, for example, the experience that you typically have when looking at a tomato under good perceptual conditions—an experience that, remember, can be had even if no tomato is actually there. [ 18 ] A moderate foundationalist would say that that experience justifies you in believing that there is a tomato in front of you. The traditional foundationalist, on the other hand, would say that the experience justifies you only in believing that you have an experience as of a tomato in front of you. You may well be justified in believing that there is a tomato in front of you, but only inferentially.

A traditional argument in favor of traditional foundationalism relies on the fact that whereas you can be mistaken regarding whether there is a tomato in front of you when you have an experience as of facing a tomato, you cannot, in the same situation, be mistaken regarding whether you are undergoing such an experience. From the point of view of traditional foundationalism, this fact indicates that the moderate foundationalist is taking an unnecessary epistemic risk—the risk of having a foundation composed of false beliefs.

The moderate foundationalist can reply that the traditional foundationalist must undertake a similar risk. For, while it is true that if one is undergoing a certain experience then one cannot be mistaken in thinking that one is undergoing that experience, one can still be mistaken about one’s experiences—for instance, perhaps one can believe that one is in pain even if the experience that one is undergoing is actually one of feeling acutely uncomfortable. And if it were just as difficult to distinguish between the true and the false in the realm of beliefs about our own experiences as it is in the realm of beliefs about the external world, then we could be wrong about which of our own beliefs are basically justified and which are not. If this kind of meta-fallibilism is accepted, then why not accept the further kind according to which basic justified beliefs can be false? Of course, the resolution of this dispute depends on whether, as the moderate believes, we can be mistaken about our own experiences.

What about our second question: how must basic beliefs be related to inferentially justified beliefs? Here too there are two different kinds of foundationalism: deductivism and non-deductivism. According to the deductivist, the only way in which a (possibly one-membered) set of basic justified beliefs can justify another belief is by logically entailing that other belief. In other words, there has to be a valid argument at least some of whose premises are basic justified beliefs [ 19 ] and whose conclusion is the inferentially justified belief in question. Given that the argument is valid, the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion—it is impossible for all the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. Non-deductivism allows relations other than logical entailment as possible justificatory relations. For instance, many foundationalists will claim that good inductive inferences from basic justified beliefs provide their conclusions with justification—even though inductive arguments are not valid, that is, even though it is possible for all the premises of a good inductive argument to be true while its conclusion is false. Although these are independent distinctions, traditional foundationalists tend to be deductivists, whereas moderate foundationalists tend to be non-deductivists. Notice that for a traditional, deductivist foundationalist, there cannot be false justified beliefs. Many contemporary epistemologists would shy away from this strong form of infallibilism, and take that consequence to be an argument against the conjunction of traditional foundationalism and deductivism.

The question that is most interesting from the point of view of Pyrrhonian Skepticism is our third one: what is it about the relation between an experience and a belief that, according to the foundationalist, allows the former to justify the latter? (Analogous questions apply to non-foundationalist positions too, and the discussion to follow is not restricted to the specific case of foundationalism.) There are three different proposals about how to answer this question that are the most prominent. Let’s call the principles that assert that a subject is justified in having a certain belief given that she is undergoing a certain experience, “epistemic principles”. Our third question can then be stated as follows: what makes epistemic principles true?

The first proposal, which we shall call “primitivism”, claims that the question cannot have an intelligible answer. There is no more basic fact in virtue of which epistemic principles obtain. They describe bedrock facts, not to be explained in terms of anything else, but are instead to be used to explain other facts. Epistemological theorizing, according to the primitivist, ends with the discovery of the correct epistemic principles (for views along these lines, see Chisholm 1966 [and also the second and third editions: 1977, 1989] and Feldman & Conee 1985).

The other two positions are non-primitivist. Internalist non-primitivism holds that epistemic principles are true in virtue of facts about ourselves—for instance, one prominent internalist view is that which epistemic principles are true for a given subject is determined by which epistemic principles that subject would accept under deep reflection (see Foley 1993). [ 20 ] Externalist non-primitivism holds that epistemic principles are true in virtue of facts that are not about ourselves—for instance, one prominent externalist view is that certain experiences provide justification for certain beliefs because the obtaining of those experiences is reliably connected to the truth of those beliefs (that is, it couldn’t easily happen that those experiences obtain without those beliefs being true; see Goldman 1979).

Both externalists and internalists think that primitivists are overlooking real facts, whereas primitivists think that there are fewer things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in non-primitivist philosophy. Within the non-primitivist camp, externalists think that internalists have too subjective a conception of epistemology—to some extent, thinking it so, or being disposed to think it so under conditions of deep reflection, makes it so for the internalist. Internalists, for their part, are likely to think that externalists are no longer engaged in the same project that both skeptics and internalist epistemologists are engaged in, the project of determining “from the inside” whether one’s beliefs are justified or amount to knowledge, because the obtaining of a relation between a belief of his and the external world is something that the subject is in no position to ascertain “from the inside”.

Infinitism, the claim that infinite evidential chains can provide justification to their members, is the answer to Agrippa’s trilemma that has received the least attention in the literature. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that infinitism has to deal with what might seem like formidable obstacles. For instance, it seems that no one actually has an infinite number of beliefs. To this objection, the infinitist is likely to reply that actually occurring beliefs are not needed, only implicit beliefs that are available to the subject in order to continue constructing his inferential chain if called upon to do so (by others or by himself). The plausibility of this reply depends on whether good sense can be made of the notion of implicit belief and the notion of an implicit belief’s being available for a subject. A second apparently formidable problem for infinitism has to do with the fact that the mere appeal to a new belief, regardless of its epistemic status, cannot provide justification to the belief we started out with. In other words, infinitism seems to run afoul of the following principle:

Principle of inferential justification : If S is justified in believing p on the basis of S ’s belief that q , then S is justified in believing q .

The infinitist might reply that he does not run afoul of that principle, because the beliefs adduced in support of the initial beliefs are themselves justified by beliefs further down the chain. But what goes for the initial set of beliefs goes, it seems, for longer chains. If the appeal to a single unjustified belief cannot do any justificatory work of its own, why would appealing to a large number of unjustified beliefs do any better? Even leaving that problem aside, the infinitist, like the coherentist, maintains that justification can arise merely in virtue of relations among beliefs. Infinitists will then have to respond to many of the same objections that are leveled against coherentism—in particular, they would have to respond to the isolation objection mentioned in the next section. (See Aikin 2011 and Klein 1999, 2007 for defenses of infinitism; and see Turri & Klein 2014; Aikin & Peijnenburg 2014; and Peijnenburg & Wenmackers 2014 for collections of essays which defend or criticize various forms of infinitism.)

Coherentists reject two related features of the picture of evidential reasons that underlies Agrippa’s trilemma. The first feature is the idea that justification is an asymmetrical relation: if a belief \(p_1\) justifies a different belief \(p_2\), then \(p_2\) does not justify \(p_1\). The second feature is the idea that the unit of justification is the individual belief. Putting these two rejections together, the coherentist believes that justification is a symmetrical and holistic matter. It is not individual beliefs that are justified in the primary sense of the word, but only complete systems of beliefs—individual beliefs are justified, when they are, in virtue of belonging to a justified system of beliefs. The central coherentist notion of justification is best taken to be a comparative one: a system of beliefs B1 is better justified than a system of beliefs B2 if and only if B1 has a greater degree of internal coherence than B2. One crucial question that coherentists have to answer, of course, is what it takes for one system of beliefs to have a greater degree of coherence than another. Many coherentists have thought that explanatory relations will be crucial in elucidating the notion of coherence: the more explanatorily integrated a system is, the more coherence it displays (see Quine & Ullian 1970 [1978] and BonJour 1978).

The main objection that coherentists have to answer has been called “the isolation objection”. The objection centers on the fact that, according to the coherentist, the justification of a system of beliefs is entirely a matter of relations among the beliefs constituting the system. But this runs against the strong intuition that experience has a very important role to play in the justification of beliefs. To illustrate the problem, suppose that you and I both have a highly coherent set of beliefs—your system, it is safe to assume, contains the belief that you are reading, whereas mine doesn’t, and it contains instead the belief that I am swimming (because, let us suppose, I am swimming right now). Suppose now that we switch systems of beliefs—somehow, you come to have my set of beliefs and I come to have yours. Given that coherence is entirely a matter of relations among beliefs, your system will be as coherent in my mind as it was in yours, and vice-versa. And yet, our beliefs are now completely unjustified—there you are, reading, believing that you are swimming, and here I am, swimming, believing that I am reading. In other words, certain transformations that preserve coherence in a system of beliefs do not seem to preserve justification.

In reply, coherentists have argued that it is possible to give experience a role without sacrificing the idea that coherence is entirely a matter of relations among beliefs—one idea is to require that any minimally acceptable system of beliefs contain beliefs about the experiences that the subject is undergoing (see BonJour 1985 and Lehrer 1990). It is fair to say that there is no agreement regarding whether this move can solve the problem.

One position that can be traced back to some ideas in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (Wittgenstein 1969)—and, perhaps, also to Ortega’s Ideas y Creencias (Ortega y Gasset 1940)—is that evidential chains have to terminate in beliefs that are not properly said to be either justified or unjustified. This position, which we shall call “Positism” (not to be confused with “positivism”), shares many features with Foundationalism: for instance, both positists and foundationalists agree that inferential chains have to be finite and non-circular. But, whereas the foundationalist thinks that the starting points of inferential chains are beliefs that are justified by something other than beliefs, the positist thinks that the starting points of inferential chains are beliefs that are not justified by anything—they are posits that we have to believe without justification. Despite this difference between the positist and the foundationalist, the positions are structurally similar enough that analogues of the questions posed to the foundationalist can be asked of the positist. [ 21 ]

First, then, which beliefs are such that they are not justified and yet are the starting points of every inferential chain—in other words, how do we identify which are the posits? One answer that can be gleamed from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty , which we will call “relativistic Positism”, is that this is a matter that is relative both to time and society, because what the posits are is determined by some function of the actual positing practices of the members of one’s society at a certain time. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the proposition that no one has been to the moon was a posit for a certain long period of time—it was a proposition that no one felt the need to justify, and that was presupposed in many justificatory practices. For obvious reasons, though, that proposition can no longer appropriately function as a posit. Other epistemologists, “non-relativistic positists”, think that which beliefs are properly posited depends on some objective truth about which beliefs have to be presupposed in order to engage in the practice of justifying beliefs at all. One prime candidate for playing this role is the first-person belief that I am not being deceived by an evil demon into thinking that I am a normally embodied and situated human being (this is the view advocated by Wright 2004 that we already alluded to in section 3.2).

The second question, regarding how posits must be related to inferred beliefs in order to justify them, can receive answers that are completely analogous to the foundationalists’.

The third question, applied to positism, is the question why certain beliefs are properly posited. Relativistic positists answer that this is so because of a certain societal fact: because they are taken to be so by an appropriate sub-sector of a certain society at a certain time. Non-relativistic positists answer that a certain belief is properly taken as a posit just in case every justificatory act that we engage in presupposes that the belief in question is true.

One objection that positists of both sorts have to face is that they are transforming a doxastic necessity into an epistemic virtue—that is, they are concluding that certain beliefs can properly serve as the starting points of inferential chains because that is how in fact they are treated (relativistic Positism) or because otherwise it wouldn’t be possible to engage in inferential practices at all (non-relativistic Positism). The Pyrrhonian skeptic, of course, will reply that the mere fact that most members of a society accept a certain belief without justification, or even the fact that if we don’t do so then we cannot justify anything else, doesn’t mean that it should be accepted without justification.

Perhaps the most interesting recent development in relation to Pyrrhonian Skepticism is that more and more epistemologists are arguing that the proper way to reply to Agrippa’s trilemma is to combine some of the positions that, for ease of exposition, we have presented as mutually exclusive. Thus, for example, many contemporary epistemologists put forward theories that contain elements of both Foundationalism and Coherentism (see, for instance, Haack 1993). It is a testament to the endurance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism that philosophers continue in this way to grapple with it.

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Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato

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6 6 Skepticism and Concepts: Can the Skeptic Think?

Published: September 2012
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It is argued that, among ancient anti-skeptical objections, one charge stands out as particularly damning to skeptical philosophy: without forming beliefs, the skeptic cannot think . More specifically, the charge says that conceptual thought involves holding things to be a certain way, and that is, it involves something the skeptics say they do not. This charge is under-explored, and Sextus almost hides it, perhaps quite aware that it is especially hard to respond to. Surely, if the skeptic cannot think the skeptic cannot investigate, and that means, the skeptic is no skeptic. I argue that PH 2 and M 8 offer different strategies, and that PH 2 succeeds in offering a response—a response that also explains a crucial passage in PH 1, according to which the skeptic can perceive and think through the guidance of nature (1.23–4).

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What is the Difference between Critical Thinking and Skepticism?

Critical thinking and skepticism are two concepts that have gained immense popularity in the current era of information overload. These two terms are often used interchangeably, but they are not the same. Critical thinking and skepticism are both crucial for individuals who want to improve their analytical skills, but they approach problems and issues in different ways.

While critical thinking involves analyzing and evaluating information objectively, skepticism involves questioning information and claims to determine their validity.

Both critical thinking and skepticism are essential in helping individuals make sound decisions and judgments, but it is important to understand the differences between them.

1. Critical thinking involves analysis, synthesis

Critical thinking involves the ability to evaluate evidence, arguments, and claims, to identify assumptions and biases, and to consider alternative perspectives and solutions. It requires the use of logic, reasoning, and systematic thinking to assess the quality and credibility of information. Synthesizing information involves combining different ideas and perspectives to create a new understanding or solution.

Critical thinking enables individuals to make informed decisions based on evidence and sound reasoning, rather than relying on assumptions or personal beliefs.

2. Skepticism is a questioning attitude

In the realm of critical thinking, skepticism is a fundamental aspect that separates it from other modes of thought. Skepticism is a questioning attitude that involves a critical evaluation of claims and the evidence supporting them. It is a vital tool for assessing the validity and reliability of information and arguments.

Skepticism is not the same as cynicism or disbelief; rather, it is a method that encourages a healthy dose of doubt and inquiry. A skeptic is not someone who automatically rejects everything they hear, but rather someone who questions things thoughtfully and considers the evidence before making a conclusion.

3. Critical thinking is a process

Critical thinking is a process that involves the systematic evaluation of information through careful analysis and reasoning. It is a discipline that requires individuals to approach problems and issues with a rational and objective mindset.

Critical thinking involves questioning assumptions, evaluating evidence, and considering alternative perspectives to arrive at informed conclusions. It is a structured and deliberate approach to problem-solving that requires individuals to apply their knowledge and skills to complex situations. Critical thinking is an essential skill in both personal and professional contexts, as it enables individuals to make well-informed decisions and navigate complex issues with confidence.

In contrast, skepticism is an attitude of doubt or disbelief towards a particular claim or belief. While skepticism can be a useful tool for questioning assumptions and challenging conventional wisdom, it is not a systematic process for evaluating information and arriving at well-informed conclusions.

4. Skepticism is a position

Critical thinking and skepticism are two concepts that are often used interchangeably, but in fact, they have distinct differences. Skepticism is a position, a stance, a mode of inquiry or a methodology that involves questioning or challenging claims, beliefs, or assumptions, and demanding evidence, reasoning, and coherence in support of them. It is not a rejection of all claims or the absence of beliefs, but rather a healthy dose of doubt in the face of inadequate or insufficient evidence.

Skepticism is not a dogmatic or closed-minded approach, but an open-minded and intellectually curious one that seeks to discover and understand the truth. It is a way of thinking that values critical scrutiny, logical consistency, and empirical verification.

Skeptics are not cynics or nihilists, but rationalists who search for good reasons to accept or reject ideas based on their merits. Thus, skepticism is an essential component of critical thinking, which involves the systematic evaluation and analysis of arguments, evidence, and claims, and the development of informed and reasoned judgments about them.

5. Critical thinking is objective

Critical thinking and skepticism are often used interchangeably, but they are distinct concepts. Critical thinking is the process of objectively analyzing and evaluating information to form a reasoned judgment.

Unlike skepticism, critical thinking is not concerned with doubt or disbelief, but rather with considering all available evidence and arguments in a neutral and unbiased way. In other words, critical thinking is about applying reason and logic to determine what is true and what is not, regardless of personal beliefs or opinions. To be a critical thinker, one must be willing to question assumptions, challenge ideas, and consider alternative perspectives. Therefore, critical thinking is objective in nature, as it aims to arrive at a conclusion based on evidence and reason rather than personal biases or emotions.

6. Skepticism is subjective

In the context of critical thinking and skepticism, it is important to understand that skepticism is subjective. What one person may view as skepticism, another may view as cynicism or even outright denial. Skepticism is a mindset that involves questioning and scrutinizing claims and evidence before accepting them as true.

However, the level of skepticism applied can vary from person to person, and may be influenced by personal beliefs, biases, and experiences. It is important for individuals practicing skepticism to remain aware of their own potential biases and to strive for objectivity in their questioning and analysis of information. This is where critical thinking can play a valuable role, as it provides a structured approach to evaluating information and making informed decisions based on evidence and logical analysis.

7. Critical thinking is disciplined inquiry

Critical thinking is a cognitive process that entails actively analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating information to arrive at a well-reasoned conclusion. Critical thinking is also a disciplined approach to inquiry that requires individuals to apply intellectual standards such as clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, and logic in their analysis of issues and problems.

Compared to skepticism, which is a disposition or attitude of doubt or disbelief towards claims or arguments, critical thinking is a systematic and deliberate process of evaluation that seeks to uncover the truth or validity of a claim or argument. Therefore, critical thinking is an essential skill that enables professionals to make informed decisions, solve complex problems, and evaluate evidence and arguments.

8. Skepticism is doubt and disbelief

When discussing critical thinking and skepticism, it is important to understand what each term means. Skepticism is a state of doubt and disbelief, often used in the context of questioning the validity of claims or evidence. It involves a healthy dose of skepticism towards information and ideas, as well as a willingness to challenge assumptions.

On the other hand, critical thinking involves using reasoning and analysis to evaluate and assess information in order to form a well-informed opinion or conclusion. While skepticism and critical thinking are related, they are not interchangeable terms. Skepticism is a component of critical thinking, but it is not the entirety of the process. Critical thinking also involves actively seeking out information, considering multiple perspectives, and making logical connections between ideas.

To sum up, critical thinking and skepticism are two distinct but interconnected approaches to understanding and evaluating information. Critical thinking involves analyzing and evaluating information in a systematic and logical manner, while skepticism involves questioning assumptions and claims, and demanding evidence and proof.

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PMC10672018

Critical Thinking, Intelligence, and Unsubstantiated Beliefs: An Integrative Review

Associated data.

This research did not involve collection of original data, and hence there are no new data to make available.

A review of the research shows that critical thinking is a more inclusive construct than intelligence, going beyond what general cognitive ability can account for. For instance, critical thinking can more completely account for many everyday outcomes, such as how thinkers reject false conspiracy theories, paranormal and pseudoscientific claims, psychological misconceptions, and other unsubstantiated claims. Deficiencies in the components of critical thinking (in specific reasoning skills, dispositions, and relevant knowledge) contribute to unsubstantiated belief endorsement in ways that go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. Specifically, people who endorse unsubstantiated claims less tend to show better critical thinking skills, possess more relevant knowledge, and are more disposed to think critically. They tend to be more scientifically skeptical and possess a more rational–analytic cognitive style, while those who accept unsubstantiated claims more tend to be more cynical and adopt a more intuitive–experiential cognitive style. These findings suggest that for a fuller understanding of unsubstantiated beliefs, researchers and instructors should also assess specific reasoning skills, relevant knowledge, and dispositions which go beyond what intelligence tests test.

1. Introduction

Why do some people believe implausible claims, such as the QAnon conspiracy theory, that a cabal of liberals is kidnapping and trafficking many thousands of children each year, despite the lack of any credible supporting evidence? Are believers less intelligent than non-believers? Do they lack knowledge of such matters? Are they more gullible or less skeptical than non-believers? Or, more generally, are they failing to think critically?

Understanding the factors contributing to acceptance of unsubstantiated claims is important, not only to the development of theories of intelligence and critical thinking but also because many unsubstantiated beliefs are false, and some are even dangerous. Endorsing them can have a negative impact on an individual and society at large. For example, false beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic, such as believing that 5G cell towers induced the spread of the COVID-19 virus, led some British citizens to set fire to 5G towers ( Jolley and Paterson 2020 ). Other believers in COVID-19 conspiracy theories endangered their own and their children’s lives when they refused to socially distance and be vaccinated with highly effective vaccines, despite the admonitions of scientific experts ( Bierwiaczonek et al. 2020 ). Further endangering the population at large, those who believe the false conspiracy theory that human-caused global warming is a hoax likely fail to respond adaptively to this serious global threat ( van der Linden 2015 ). Parents, who uncritically accept pseudoscientific claims, such as the false belief that facilitated communication is an effective treatment for childhood autism, may forego more effective treatments ( Lilienfeld 2007 ). Moreover, people in various parts of the world still persecute other people whom they believe are witches possessing supernatural powers. Likewise, many people still believe in demonic possession, which has been associated with mental disorders ( Nie and Olson 2016 ). Compounding the problems created by these various unsubstantiated beliefs, numerous studies now show that when someone accepts one of these types of unfounded claims, they tend to accept others as well; see Bensley et al. ( 2022 ) for a review.

Studying the factors that contribute to unfounded beliefs is important not only because of their real-world consequences but also because this can facilitate a better understanding of unfounded beliefs and how they are related to critical thinking and intelligence. This article focuses on important ways in which critical thinking and intelligence differ, especially in terms of how a comprehensive model of CT differs from the view of intelligence as general cognitive ability. I argue that this model of CT more fully accounts for how people can accurately decide if a claim is unsubstantiated than can views of intelligence, emphasizing general cognitive ability. In addition to general cognitive ability, thinking critically about unsubstantiated claims involves deployment of specific reasoning skills, dispositions related to CT, and specific knowledge, which go beyond the contribution of general cognitive ability.

Accordingly, this article begins with an examination of the constructs of critical thinking and intelligence. Then, it discusses theories proposing that to understand thinking in the real world requires going beyond general cognitive ability. Specifically, the focus is on factors related to critical thinking, such as specific reasoning skills, dispositions, metacognition, and relevant knowledge. I review research showing that that this alternative multidimensional view of CT can better account for individual differences in the tendency to endorse multiple types of unsubstantiated claims than can general cognitive ability alone.

2. Defining Critical Thinking and Intelligence

Critical thinking is an almost universally valued educational objective in the US and in many other countries which seek to improve it. In contrast, intelligence, although much valued, has often been viewed as a more stable characteristic and less amenable to improvement through specific short-term interventions, such as traditional instruction or more recently through practice on computer-implemented training programs. According to Wechsler’s influential definition, intelligence is a person’s “aggregate or global capacity to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment” ( Wechsler 1944, p. 3 ).

Consistent with this definition, intelligence has long been associated with general cognitive or intellectual ability and the potential to learn and reason well. Intelligence (IQ) tests measure general cognitive abilities, such as knowledge of words, memory skills, analogical reasoning, speed of processing, and the ability to solve verbal and spatial problems. General intelligence or “g” is a composite of these abilities statistically derived from various cognitive subtests on IQ tests which are positively intercorrelated. There is considerable overlap between g and the concept of fluid intelligence (Gf) in the prominent Cattell–Horn–Carroll model ( McGrew 2009 ), which refers to “the ability to solve novel problems, the solution of which does not depend on previously acquired skills and knowledge,” and crystalized intelligence (Gc), which refers to experience, existing skills, and general knowledge ( Conway and Kovacs 2018, pp. 50–51 ). Although g or general intelligence is based on a higher order factor, inclusive of fluid and crystallized intelligence, it is technically not the same as general cognitive ability, a commonly used, related term. However, in this article, I use “general cognitive ability” and “cognitive ability” because they are the imprecise terms frequently used in the research reviewed.

Although IQ scores have been found to predict performance in basic real-world domains, such as academic performance and job success ( Gottfredson 2004 ), an enduring question for intelligence researchers has been whether g and intelligence tests predict the ability to adapt well in other real-world situations, which concerns the second part of Wechsler’s definition. So, in addition to the search for the underlying structure of intelligence, researchers have been perennially concerned with how general abilities associated with intelligence can be applied to help a person adapt to real-world situations. The issue is largely a question of how cognitive ability and intelligence can help people solve real-world problems and cope adaptively and succeed in dealing with various environmental demands ( Sternberg 2019 ).

Based on broad conceptual definitions of intelligence and critical thinking, both intelligence and CT should aid adaptive functioning in the real world, presumably because they both involve rational approaches. Their common association with rationality gives each term a positive connotation. However, complicating the definition of each of these is the fact that rationality also continues to have a variety of meanings. In this article, in agreement with Stanovich et al. ( 2018 ), rationality is defined in the normative sense, used in cognitive science, as the distance between a person’s response and some normative standard of optimal behavior. As such, degree of rationality falls on a continuous scale, not a categorical one.

Despite disagreements surrounding the conceptual definitions of intelligence, critical thinking, and rationality, a commonality in these terms is they are value-laden and normative. In the case of intelligence, people are judged based on norms from standardized intelligence tests, especially in academic settings. Although scores on CT tests seldom are, nor could be, used to judge individuals in this way, the normative and value-laden basis of CT is apparent in people’s informal judgements. They often judge others who have made poor decisions to be irrational or to have failed to think critically.

This value-laden aspect of CT is also apparent in formal definitions of CT. Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) defined critical thinking as “the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal-directed.” The positive conception of CT as helping a person adapt well to one’s environment is clearly implied in “desirable outcome”.

Robert Ennis ( 1987 ) has offered a simpler, yet useful definition of critical thinking that also has normative implications. According to Ennis, “critical thinking is reasonable, reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” ( Ennis 1987, p. 102 ). This definition implies that CT helps people know what to believe (a goal of epistemic rationality) and how to act (a goal of instrumental rationality). This is conveyed by associating “critical thinking” with the positive terms, “reasonable” and “reflective”. Dictionaries commonly define “reasonable” as “rational”, “logical”, “intelligent”, and “good”, all terms with positive connotations.

For critical thinkers, being reasonable involves using logical rules, standards of evidence, and other criteria that must be met for a product of thinking to be considered good. Critical thinkers use these to evaluate how strongly reasons or evidence supports one claim versus another, drawing conclusions which are supported by the highest quality evidence ( Bensley 2018 ). If no high-quality evidence is available for consideration, it would be unreasonable to draw a strong conclusion. Unfortunately, people’s beliefs are too often based on acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. This is a failure of CT, but is it also a failure of intelligence?

3. Does Critical Thinking “Go Beyond” What Is Meant by Intelligence?

Despite the conceptual overlap in intelligence and CT at a general level, one way that CT can be distinguished from the common view of intelligence as general cognitive ability is in terms of what each can account for. Although intelligence tests, especially measures of general cognitive ability, have reliably predicted academic and job performance, they may not be sufficient to predict other everyday outcomes for which CT measures have made successful predictions and have added to the variance accounted for in performance. For instance, replicating a study by Butler ( 2012 ), Butler et al. ( 2017 ) obtained a negative correlation ( r = −0.33) between scores on the Halpern Critical Thinking Appraisal (HCTA) and a measure of 134 negative, real-world outcomes, not expected to befall critical thinkers, such as engaging in unprotected sex or posting a message on social media which the person regretted. They found that higher HCTA scores not only predicted better life decisions, but also predicted better performance beyond a measure of general cognitive ability. These results suggest that CT can account for real-world outcomes and goes beyond general cognitive ability to account for additional variance.

Some theorists maintain that standardized intelligence tests do not capture the variety of abilities that people need to adapt well in the real world. For example, Gardner ( 1999 ), has proposed that additional forms of intelligence are needed, such as spatial, musical, and interpersonal intelligences in addition to linguistic and logical–mathematical intelligences, more typically associated with general cognitive ability and academic success. In other theorizing, Sternberg ( 1988 ) has proposed three additional types of intelligence: analytical, practical, and creative intelligence, to more fully capture the variety of intelligent abilities on which people differ. Critical thinking is considered part of analytical skills which involve evaluating the quality and applicability of ideas, products, and options ( Sternberg 2022 ). Regarding adaptive intelligence, Sternberg ( 2019 ) has emphasized how adaptive aspects of intelligence are needed to solve real-world problems both at the individual and species levels. According to Sternberg, core components of intelligence have evolved in humans, but intelligence takes different forms in different cultures, with each culture valuing its own skills for adaptation. Thus, the construct of intelligence must go beyond core cognitive ability to encompass the specific abilities needed for adaptive behavior in specific cultures and settings.

Two other theories propose that other components be added to intelligent and rational thinking. Ackerman ( 2022 ) has emphasized the importance of acquiring domain-specific knowledge for engaging in intelligent functioning in the wide variety of tasks found in everyday life. Ackerman has argued that declarative, procedural, and tacit knowledge, as well as non-ability variables, are needed to better predict job performance and performance of other everyday activities. Taking another approach, Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) have proposed that critical thinking is essentially the adaptive application of intelligence for solving real-world problems. Elsewhere, Butler and Halpern ( 2019 ) have argued that dispositions such as open-mindedness are another aspect of CT and that domain-specific knowledge and specific CT skills are needed to solve real-world problems.

Examples are readily available for how CT goes beyond what IQ tests test to include specific rules for reasoning and relevant knowledge needed to execute real-world tasks. Take the example of scientific reasoning, which can be viewed as a specialized form of CT. Drawing a well-reasoned inductive conclusion about a theory or analyzing the quality of a research study both require that a thinker possess relevant specialized knowledge related to the question and specific reasoning skills for reasoning about scientific methodology. In contrast, IQ tests are deliberately designed to be nonspecialized in assessing Gc, broadly sampling vocabulary and general knowledge in order to be fair and unbiased ( Stanovich 2009 ). Specialized knowledge and reasoning skills are also needed in non-academic domains. Jurors must possess specialized knowledge to understand expert, forensic testimony and specific reasoning skills to interpret the law and make well-reasoned judgments about a defendant’s guilt or innocence.

Besides lacking specific reasoning skills and domain-relevant knowledge, people may fail to think critically because they are not disposed to use their reasoning skills to examine such claims and want to preserve their favored beliefs. Critical thinking dispositions are attitudes or traits that make it more likely that a person will think critically. Theorists have proposed numerous CT dispositions (e.g., Bensley 2018 ; Butler and Halpern 2019 ; Dwyer 2017 ; Ennis 1987 ). Some commonly identified CT dispositions especially relevant to this discussion are open-mindedness, skepticism, intellectual engagement, and the tendency to take a reflective, rational–analytic approach. Critical thinking dispositions are clearly value-laden and prescriptive. A good thinker should be open-minded, skeptical, reflective, intellectually engaged, and value a rational–analytic approach to inquiry. Conversely, corresponding negative dispositions, such as “close-mindedness” and “gullibility”, could obstruct CT.

Without the appropriate disposition, individuals will not use their reasoning skills to think critically about questions. For example, the brilliant mystery writer, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who was trained as a physician and created the hyper-reasonable detective Sherlock Holmes, was not disposed to think critically about some unsubstantiated claims. Conan Doyle was no doubt highly intelligent in cognitive ability terms, but he was not sufficiently skeptical (disposed to think critically) about spiritualism. He believed that he was talking to his dearly departed son though a medium, despite the warnings of his magician friend, Harry Houdini, who told him that mediums used trickery in their seances. Perhaps influenced by his Irish father’s belief in the “wee folk”, Conan Doyle also believed that fairies inhabited the English countryside, based on children’s photos, despite the advice of experts who said the photos could be faked. Nevertheless, he was skeptical of a new theory of tuberculosis proposed by Koch when he reported on it, despite his wife suffering from the disease. So, in professional capacities, Conan Doyle used his CT skills, but in certain other domains for which he was motivated to accept unsubstantiated claims, he failed to think critically, insufficiently disposed to skeptically challenge certain implausible claims.

This example makes two important points. Conan Doyle’s superior intelligence was not enough for him to reject implausible claims about the world. In general, motivated reasoning can lead people, even those considered highly intelligent, to accept claims with no good evidentiary support. The second important point is that we would not be able to adequately explain cases like this one, considering only the person’s intelligence or even their reasoning skills, without also considering the person’s disposition. General cognitive ability alone is not sufficient, and CT dispositions should also be considered.

Supporting this conclusion, Stanovich and West ( 1997 ) examined the influence of dispositions beyond the contribution of cognitive ability on a CT task. They gave college students an argument evaluation test in which participants first rated their agreement with several claims about real social and political issues made by a fictitious person. Then, they gave them evidence against each claim and finally asked them to rate the quality of a counterargument made by the same fictitious person. Participants’ ratings of the counterarguments were compared to the median ratings of expert judges on the quality of the rebuttals. Stanovich and West also administered a new measure of rational disposition called the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) scale and the SAT as a proxy for cognitive ability. The AOT was a composite of items from several other scales that would be expected to measure CT disposition. They found that both SAT and AOT scores were significant predictors of higher argument analysis scores. Even after partialing out cognitive ability, actively open-minded thinking was significant. These results suggest that general cognitive ability alone was not sufficient to account for thinking critically about real-world issues and that CT disposition was needed to go beyond it.

Further examining the roles of CT dispositions and cognitive ability on reasoning, Stanovich and West ( 2008 ) studied myside bias, a bias in reasoning closely related to one-sided thinking and confirmation bias. A critical thinker would be expected to not show myside bias and instead fairly evaluate evidence on all sides of a question. Stanovich and West ( 2007 ) found that college students often showed myside bias when asked their opinions about real-world policy issues, such as those concerning the health risks of smoking and drinking alcohol. For example, compared to non-smokers, smokers judged the health risks of smoking to be lower. When they divided participants into higher versus lower cognitive ability groups based on SAT scores, the two groups showed little difference on myside bias. Moreover, on the hazards of drinking issue, participants who drank less had higher scores on the CT disposition measure.

Other research supports the need for both reasoning ability and CT disposition in predicting outcomes in the real world. Ren et al. ( 2020 ) found that CT disposition, as measured by a Chinese critical thinking disposition inventory, and a CT skill measure together contributed a significant amount of the variance in predicting academic performance beyond the contribution of cognitive ability alone, as measured by a test of fluid intelligence. Further supporting the claim that CT requires both cognitive ability and CT disposition, Ku and Ho ( 2010 ) found that a CT disposition measure significantly predicted scores on a CT test beyond the significant contribution of verbal intelligence in high school and college students from Hong Kong.

The contribution of dispositions to thinking is related to another way that CT goes beyond the application of general cognitive ability, i.e., by way of the motivation for reasoning. Assuming that all reasoning is motivated ( Kunda 1990 ), then CT is motivated, too, which is implicit within the Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) and Ennis ( 1987 ) definitions. Critical thinking is motivated in the sense of being purposeful and directed towards the goal of arriving at an accurate conclusion. For instance, corresponding to pursuit of the goal of accurate reasoning, the CT disposition of “truth-seeking” guides a person towards reaching the CT goal of arriving at an accurate conclusion.

Also, according to Kunda ( 1990 ), a second type of motivated reasoning can lead to faulty conclusions, often by directing a person towards the goal of maintaining favored beliefs and preconceptions, as in illusory correlation, belief perseverance, and confirmation bias. Corresponding to this second type, negative dispositions, such as close-mindedness and self-serving motives, can incline thinkers towards faulty conclusions. This is especially relevant in the present discussion because poorer reasoning, thinking errors, and the inappropriate use of heuristics are related to the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, all of which are CT failures. The term “thinking errors” is a generic term referring to logical fallacies, informal reasoning fallacies, argumentation errors, and inappropriate uses of cognitive heuristics ( Bensley 2018 ). Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, commonly used to simplify judgment tasks and reduce mental effort. Yet, when used inappropriately, heuristics often result in biased judgments.

Stanovich ( 2009 ) has argued that IQ tests do not test people’s use of heuristics, but heuristics have been found to be negatively correlated with CT performance ( West et al. 2008 ). In this same study, they found that college students’ cognitive ability, as measured by performance on the SAT, was not correlated with thinking biases associated with use of heuristics. Although Stanovich and West ( 2008 ) found that susceptibility to biases, such as the conjunction fallacy, framing effect, base-rate neglect, affect bias, and myside bias were all uncorrelated with cognitive ability (using SAT as a proxy), other types of thinking errors were correlated with SAT.

Likewise, two types of knowledge are related to the two forms of motivated reasoning. For instance, inaccurate knowledge, such as misconceptions, can derail reasoning from moving towards a correct conclusion, as in when a person reasons from false premises. In contrast, reasoning from accurate knowledge is more likely to produce an accurate conclusion. Taking into account inaccurate knowledge and thinking errors is important to understanding the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims because these are also related to negative dispositions, such as close-mindedness and cynicism, none of which are measured by intelligence tests.

Critical thinking questions are often situated in real-world examples or in simulations of them which are designed to detect thinking errors and bias. As described in Halpern and Butler ( 2018 ), an item like one on the “Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment” (HCTA) provides respondents with a mock newspaper story about research showing that first-graders who attended preschool were better able to learn how to read. Then the question asks if preschool should be made mandatory. A correct response to this item requires recognizing that correlation does not imply causation, that is, avoiding a common reasoning error people make in thinking about research implications in everyday life. Another CT skills test, “Analyzing Psychological Statements” (APS) assesses the ability to recognize thinking errors and apply argumentation skills and psychology to evaluate psychology-related examples and simulations of real-life situations ( Bensley 2021 ). For instance, besides identifying thinking errors in brief samples of thinking, questions ask respondents to distinguish arguments from non-arguments, find assumptions in arguments, evaluate kinds of evidence, and draw a conclusion from a brief psychological argument. An important implication of the studies just reviewed is that efforts to understand CT can be further informed by assessing thinking errors and biases, which, as the next discussion shows, are related to individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive style.

4. Dual-Process Theory Measures and Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Dual-process theory (DPT) and measures associated with it have been widely used in the study of the endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs, especially as they relate to cognitive style. According to a cognitive style version of DPT, people have two modes of processing, a fast intuitive–experiential (I-E) style of processing and a slower, reflective, rational–analytic (R-A) style of processing. The intuitive cognitive style is associated with reliance on hunches, feelings, personal experience, and cognitive heuristics which simplify processing, while the R-A cognitive style is a reflective, rational–analytic style associated with more elaborate and effortful processing ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Epstein 2008 ). As such, the rational–analytic cognitive style is consistent with CT dispositions, such as those promoting the effortful analysis of evidence, objective truth, and logical consistency. In fact, CT is sometimes referred to as “critical-analytic” thinking ( Byrnes and Dunbar 2014 ) and has been associated with analytical intelligence Sternberg ( 1988 ) and with rational thinking, as discussed before.

People use both modes of processing, but they show individual differences in which mode they tend to rely upon, although the intuitive–experiential mode is the default ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Morgan 2016 ; Pacini and Epstein 1999 ), and they accept unsubstantiated claims differentially based on their predominate cognitive style ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Epstein 2008 ). Specifically, individuals who rely more on an I-E cognitive style tend to endorse unsubstantiated claims more strongly, while individuals who rely more on a R-A cognitive style tend to endorse those claims less. Note, however, that other theorists view the two processes and cognitive styles somewhat differently, (e.g., Kahneman 2011 ; Stanovich et al. 2018 ).

Researchers have often assessed the contribution of these two cognitive styles to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, using variants of three measures: the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) of Frederick ( 2005 ), the Rational–Experiential Inventory of Epstein and his colleagues ( Pacini and Epstein 1999 ), and the related Need for Cognition scale of Cacioppo and Petty ( 1982 ). The CRT is a performance-based test which asks participants to solve problems that appear to require simple mathematical calculations, but which actually require more reflection. People typically do poorly on the CRT, which is thought to indicate reliance on an intuitive cognitive style, while better performance is thought to indicate reliance on the slower, more deliberate, and reflective cognitive style. The positive correlation of the CRT with numeracy scores suggests it also has a cognitive skill component ( Patel et al. 2019 ). The Rational–Experiential Inventory (REI) of Pacini and Epstein ( 1999 ) contains one scale designed to measure an intuitive–experiential cognitive style and a second scale intended to measure a rational–analytic (R-A) style. The R-A scale was adapted from the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale of Cacioppo and Petty ( 1982 ), another scale associated with rational–analytic thinking and expected to be negatively correlated with unsubstantiated beliefs. The NFC was found to be related to open-mindedness and intellectual engagement, two CT dispositions ( Cacioppo et al. 1996 ).

The cognitive styles associated with DPT also relate to CT dispositions. Thinking critically requires that individuals be disposed to use their reasoning skills to reject unsubstantiated claims ( Bensley 2018 ) and that they be inclined to take a rational–analytic approach rather than relying on their intuitions and feelings. For instance, Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) found that students who endorsed more psychological misconceptions adopted a more intuitive cognitive style, were less disposed to take a rational–scientific approach to psychology, and scored lower on a psychological critical thinking skills test. Further supporting this connection, West et al. ( 2008 ) found that participants who tended to use cognitive heuristics more, thought to be related to intuitive processing and bias, scored lower on a critical thinking measure. As the Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) results suggest, in addition to assessing reasoning skills and dispositions, comprehensive CT assessment research should assess knowledge and unsubstantiated beliefs because these are related to failures of critical thinking.

5. Assessing Critical Thinking and Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Assessing endorsement of unsubstantiated claims provides another way to assess CT outcomes related to everyday thinking, which goes beyond what intelligence tests test ( Bensley and Lilienfeld 2020 ). From the perspective of the multi-dimensional model of CT, endorsement of unsubstantiated claims could result from deficiencies in a person’s CT reasoning skills, a lack of relevant knowledge, and in the engagement of inappropriate dispositions. Suppose an individual endorses an unsubstantiated claim, such as believing the conspiracy theory that human-caused global warming is a hoax. The person may lack the specific reasoning skills needed to critically evaluate the conspiracy. Lantian et al. ( 2020 ) found that scores on a CT skills test were negatively correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs. The person also must possess relevant scientific knowledge, such as knowing the facts that each year humans pump about 40 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas which traps heat in the atmosphere. Or, the person may not be scientifically skeptical or too cynical or mistrustful of scientists or governmental officials.

Although endorsing unsubstantiated beliefs is clearly a failure of CT, problems arise in deciding which ones are unsubstantiated, especially when considering conspiracy theories. Typically, the claims which critical thinkers should reject as unsubstantiated are those which are not supported by objective evidence. But of the many conspiracies proposed, few are vigorously examined. Moreover, some conspiracy theories which authorities might initially deny turn out to be real, such as the MK-Ultra theory that the CIA was secretly conducting mind-control research on American citizens.

A way out of this quagmire is to define unsubstantiated beliefs on a continuum which depends on the quality of evidence. This has led to the definition of unsubstantiated claims as assertions which have not been supported by high-quality evidence ( Bensley 2023 ). Those which are supported have the kind of evidentiary support that critical thinkers are expected to value in drawing reasonable conclusions. Instead of insisting that a claim must be demonstrably false to be rejected, we adopt a more tentative acceptance or rejection of claims, based on how much good evidence supports them. Many claims are unsubstantiated because they have not yet been carefully examined and so totally lack support or they may be supported only by low quality evidence such as personal experience, anecdotes, or non-scientific authority. Other claims are more clearly unsubstantiated because they contradict the findings of high-quality research. A critical thinker should be highly skeptical of these.

Psychological misconceptions are one type of claim that can be more clearly unsubstantiated. Psychological misconceptions are commonsense psychological claims (folk theories) about the mind, brain, and behavior that are contradicted by the bulk of high-quality scientific research. Author developed the Test of Psychological Knowledge and Misconceptions (TOPKAM), a 40-item, forced-choice measure with each item posing a statement of a psychological misconception and the other response option stating the evidence-based alternative ( Bensley et al. 2014 ). They found that higher scores on the APS, the argument analysis test applying psychological concepts to analyze real-world examples, were associated with more correct answers on the TOPKAM. Other studies have found positive correlations between CT skills tests and other measures of psychological misconceptions ( McCutcheon et al. 1992 ; Kowalski and Taylor 2004 ). Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) also found that higher correct TOPKAM scores were positively correlated with scores on the Inventory of Thinking Dispositions in Psychology (ITDP) of Bensley ( 2021 ), a measure of the disposition to take a rational and scientific approach to psychology but were negatively correlated with an intuitive cognitive style.

Bensley et al. ( 2021 ) conducted a multidimensional study, assessing beginner psychology students starting a CT course on their endorsement of psychological misconceptions, recognition of thinking errors, CT dispositions, and metacognition, before and after CT instruction. Two classes received explicit instruction involving considerable practice in argument analysis and scientific reasoning skills, with one class receiving CT instruction focused more on recognizing psychological misconceptions and a second class focused more on recognizing various thinking errors. Bensley et al. assessed both classes before and after instruction on the TOPKAM and on the Test of Thinking Errors, a test of the ability to recognize in real-world examples 17 different types of thinking errors, such as confirmation bias, inappropriate use of the availability and representativeness heuristics, reasoning from ignorance/possibility, gambler’s fallacy, and hasty generalization ( Bensley et al. 2021 ). Correct TOPKAM and TOTE scores were positively correlated, and after CT instruction both were positively correlated with the APS, the CT test of argument analysis skills.

Bensley et al. found that after explicit instruction of CT skills, students improved significantly on both the TOPKAM and TOTE, but those focusing on recognizing misconceptions improved the most. Also, those students who improved the most on the TOTE scored higher on the REI rational–analytic scale and on the ITDP, while those improving the most on the TOTE scored higher on the ITDP. The students receiving explicit CT skill instruction in recognizing misconceptions also significantly improved the accuracy of their metacognitive monitoring in estimating their TOPKAM scores after instruction.

Given that before instruction neither class differed in GPA nor on the SAT, a proxy for general cognitive ability, CT instruction provided a good accounting for the improvement in recognition of thinking errors and misconceptions without recourse to intelligence. However, SAT scores were positively correlated with both TOTE scores and APS scores, suggesting that cognitive ability contributed to CT skill performance. These results replicated the earlier findings of Bensley and Spero ( 2014 ) showing that explicit CT instruction improved performance on both CT skills tests and metacognitive monitoring accuracy while controlling for SAT, which was positively correlated with the CT skills test performance.

Taken together, these findings suggest that cognitive ability contributes to performance on CT tasks but that CT instruction goes beyond it to further improve performance. As the results of Bensley et al. ( 2021 ) show, and as discussed next, thinking errors and bias from heuristics are CT failures that should also be assessed because they are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs and cognitive style.

6. Dual-Processing Theory and Research on Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Consistent with DPT, numerous other studies have obtained significant positive correlations between intuitive cognitive style and paranormal belief, often using the REI intuitive–experiential scale and the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) of Tobacyk ( 2004 ) (e.g., Genovese 2005 ; Irwin and Young 2002 ; Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Pennycook et al. 2015 ; Rogers et al. 2018 ; Saher and Lindeman 2005 ). Studies have also found positive correlations between superstitious belief and intuitive cognitive style (e.g., Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Maqsood et al. 2018 ). REI intuitive–experiential thinking style was also positively correlated with belief in complementary and alternative medicine ( Lindeman 2011 ), conspiracy theory belief ( Alper et al. 2020 ), and with endorsement of psychological misconceptions ( Bensley et al. 2014 ; Bensley et al. 2022 ).

Additional evidence for DPT has been found when REI R-A and NFC scores were negatively correlated with scores on measures of unsubstantiated beliefs, but studies correlating them with measures of paranormal belief and conspiracy theory belief have shown mixed results. Supporting a relationship, REI rational–analytic and NFC scores significantly and negatively predicted paranormal belief ( Lobato et al. 2014 ; Pennycook et al. 2012 ). Other studies have also obtained a negative correlation between NFC and paranormal belief ( Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Rogers et al. 2018 ; Stahl and van Prooijen 2018 ), but both Genovese ( 2005 ) and Pennycook et al. ( 2015 ) found that NFC was not significantly correlated with paranormal belief. Swami et al. ( 2014 ) found that although REI R-A scores were negatively correlated with conspiracy theory belief, NFC scores were not.

Researchers often refer to people who are doubtful of paranormal and other unfounded claims as “skeptics” and so have tested whether measures related to skepticism are associated with less endorsement of unsubstantiated claims. They typically view skepticism as a stance towards unsubstantiated claims taken by rational people who reject them, (e.g., Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Stahl and van Prooijen 2018 ), rather than as a disposition inclining a person to think critically about unsubstantiated beliefs ( Bensley 2018 ).

Fasce and Pico ( 2019 ) conducted one of the few studies using a measure related to skeptical disposition, the Critical Thinking Disposition Scale (CTDS) of Sosu ( 2013 ), in relation to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims. They found that scores on the CTDS were negatively correlated with scores on the RPBS but not significantly correlated with either a measure of pseudoscience or of conspiracy theory belief. However, the CRT was negatively correlated with both RPBS and the pseudoscience measure. Because Fasce and Pico ( 2019 ) did not examine correlations with the Reflective Skepticism subscale of the CTDS, its contribution apart from full-scale CTDS was not found.

To more directly test skepticism as a disposition, we recently assessed college students on how well three new measures predicted endorsement of psychological misconceptions, paranormal claims, and conspiracy theories ( Bensley et al. 2022 ). The dispositional measures included a measure of general skeptical attitude; a second measure, the Scientific Skepticism Scale (SSS), which focused more on waiting to accept claims until high-quality scientific evidence supported them; and a third measure, the Cynicism Scale (CS), which focused on doubting the sincerity of the motives of scientists and people in general. We found that although the general skepticism scale did not predict any of the unsubstantiated belief measures, SSS scores were a significant negative predictor of both paranormal belief and conspiracy theory belief. REI R-A scores were a less consistent negative predictor, while REI I-E scores were more consistent positive predictors, and surprisingly CS scores were the most consistent positive predictors of the unsubstantiated beliefs.

Researchers commonly assume that people who accept implausible, unsubstantiated claims are gullible or not sufficiently skeptical. For instance, van Prooijen ( 2019 ) has argued that conspiracy theory believers are more gullible (less skeptical) than non-believers and tend to accept unsubstantiated claims more than less gullible people. van Prooijen ( 2019 ) reviewed several studies supporting the claim that people who are more gullible tend to endorse conspiracy theories more. However, he did not report any studies in which a gullible disposition was directly measured.

Recently, we directly tested the gullibility hypothesis in relation to scientific skepticism ( Bensley et al. 2023 ) using the Gullibility Scale of Teunisse et al. ( 2019 ) on which people skeptical of the paranormal had been shown to have lower scores. We found that Gullibility Scale and the Cynicism Scale scores were positively correlated, and both were significant positive predictors of unsubstantiated beliefs, in general, consistent with an intuitive–experiential cognitive style. In contrast, we found that scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, the Scientific Skepticism Scale, and the REI rational–analytic scale were all positively intercorrelated and significant negative predictors of unsubstantiated beliefs, in general, consistent with a rational–analytic/reflective cognitive style. Scientific skepticism scores negatively predicted general endorsement of unsubstantiated claims beyond the REI R-A scale, but neither the CTDS nor the CTDS Reflective Skepticism subscale were significant. These results replicated findings from the Bensley et al. ( 2023 ) study and supported an elaborated dual-process model of unsubstantiated belief. The SSS was not only a substantial negative predictor, it was also negatively correlated with the Gullibility Scale, as expected.

These results suggest that both CT-related dispositions and CT skills are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs. However, a measure of general cognitive ability or intelligence must be examined along with measures of CT and unsubstantiated beliefs to determine if CT goes beyond intelligence to predict unsubstantiated beliefs. In one of the few studies that also included a measure of cognitive ability, Stahl and van Prooijen ( 2018 ) found that dispositional characteristics helped account for acceptance of conspiracies and paranormal belief beyond cognitive ability. Using the Importance of Rationality Scale (IRS), a rational–analytic scale designed to measure skepticism towards unsubstantiated beliefs, Stahl and van Prooijen ( 2018 ) found that the IRS was negatively correlated with paranormal belief and belief in conspiracy theories. In separate hierarchical regressions, cognitive ability was the strongest negative predictor of both paranormal belief and of conspiracy belief, but IRS scores in combination with cognitive ability negatively predicted endorsement of paranormal belief but did not significantly predict conspiracy theory belief. These results provided partial support that that a measure of rational–analytic cognitive style related to skeptical disposition added to the variance accounted for beyond cognitive ability in negatively predicting unsubstantiated belief.

In another study that included a measure of cognitive ability, Cavojova et al. ( 2019 ) examined how CT-related dispositions and the Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) were related to a measure of paranormal, pseudoscientific, and conspiracy theory beliefs. The SRS of Drummond and Fischhoff ( 2017 ) likely measures CT skill in that it measures the ability to evaluate scientific research and evidence. As expected, the unsubstantiated belief measure was negatively correlated with the SRS and a cognitive ability measure, similar to Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Unsubstantiated beliefs were positively correlated with dogmatism (the opposite of open-mindedness) but not with REI rational–analytic cognitive style. The SRS was a significant negative predictor of both unsubstantiated belief and susceptibility to bias beyond the contribution of cognitive ability, but neither dogmatism nor analytic thinking were significant predictors. Nevertheless, this study provides some support that a measure related to CT reasoning skill accounts for variance in unsubstantiated belief beyond cognitive ability.

The failure of this study to show a correlation between rational–analytic cognitive style and unsubstantiated beliefs, when some other studies have found significant correlations with it and related measures, has implications for the multidimensional assessment of unsubstantiated beliefs. One implication is that the REI rational–analytic scale may not be a strong predictor of unsubstantiated beliefs. In fact, we have recently found that the Scientific Skepticism Scale was a stronger negative predictor ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Bensley et al. 2023 ), which also suggests that other measures related to rational–analytic thinking styles should be examined. This could help triangulate the contribution of self-report cognitive style measures to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, recognizing that the use of self-report measures has a checkered history in psychological research. A second implication is that once again, measures of critical thinking skill and cognitive ability were negative predictors of unsubstantiated belief and so they, too, should be included in future assessments of unsubstantiated beliefs.

7. Discussion

This review provided different lines of evidence supporting the claim that CT goes beyond cognitive ability in accounting for certain real-world outcomes. Participants who think critically reported fewer problems in everyday functioning, not expected to befall critical thinkers. People who endorsed unsubstantiated claims less showed better CT skills, more accurate domain-specific knowledge, less susceptibility to thinking errors and bias, and were more disposed to think critically. More specifically, they tended to be more scientifically skeptical and adopt a more rational–analytic cognitive style. In contrast, those who endorsed them more tended to be more cynical and adopt an intuitive–experiential cognitive style. These characteristics go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. In some studies, the CT measures accounted for additional variance beyond the variance contributed by general cognitive ability.

That is not to say that measures of general cognitive ability are not useful. As noted by Gottfredson ( 2004 ), “g” is a highly successful predictor of academic and job performance. More is known about g and Gf than about many other psychological constructs. On average, g is closely related to Gf, which is highly correlated with working memory ( r = 0.70) and can be as high as r = 0.77 ( r 2 = 0.60) based on a correlated two-factor model ( Gignac 2014 ). Because modern working memory theory is, itself, a powerful theory ( Chai et al. 2018 ), this lends construct validity to the fluid intelligence construct. Although cognitive scientists have clearly made progress in understanding the executive processes underlying intelligence, they have not yet identified the specific cognitive components of intelligence ( Sternberg 2022 ). Moreover, theorists have acknowledged that intelligence must also include components beyond g, including domain-specific knowledge ( Ackerman 2022 ; Conway and Kovacs 2018 ) which are not yet clearly understood,

This review also pointed to limitations in the research that should be addressed. So far, not only have few studies of unsubstantiated beliefs included measures of intelligence, but they have also often used proxies for intelligence test scores, such as SAT scores. Future studies, besides using more and better measures of intelligence, could benefit from inclusion of more specifically focused measures, such as measures of Gf and Gc. Also, more research should be carried out to develop additional high-quality measures of CT, including ones that assess specific reasoning skills and knowledge relevant to thinking about a subject, which could help resolve perennial questions about the domain-general versus domain-specific nature of intelligence and CT. Overall, the results of this review encourage taking a multidimensional approach to investigating the complex constructs of intelligence, CT, and unsubstantiated belief. Supporting these recommendations were results of studies in which the improvement accrued from explicit CT skill instruction could be more fully understood when CT skills, relevant knowledge, CT dispositions, metacognitive monitoring accuracy, and a proxy for intelligence were used.

8. Conclusions

Critical thinking, broadly conceived, offers ways to understand real-world outcomes of thinking beyond what general cognitive ability can provide and intelligence tests test. A multi-dimensional view of CT which includes specific reasoning and metacognitive skills, CT dispositions, and relevant knowledge can add to our understanding of why some people endorse unsubstantiated claims more than others do, going beyond what intelligence tests test. Although general cognitive ability and domain-general knowledge often contribute to performance on CT tasks, thinking critically about real-world questions also involves applying rules, criteria, and knowledge which are specific to the question under consideration, as well as the appropriate dispositions and cognitive styles for deploying these.

Despite the advantages of taking this multidimensional approach to CT in helping us to more fully understand everyday thinking and irrationality, it presents challenges for researchers and instructors. It implies the need to assess and instruct multidimensionally, including not only measures of reasoning skills but also addressing thinking errors and biases, dispositions, the knowledge relevant to a task, and the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. As noted by Dwyer ( 2023 ), adopting a more complex conceptualization of CT beyond just skills is needed, but it presents challenges for those seeking to improve students’ CT. Nevertheless, the research reviewed suggests that taking this multidimensional approach to CT can enhance our understanding of the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims beyond what standardized intelligence tests contribute. More research is needed to resolve remaining controversies and to develop evidence-based applications of the findings.

Funding Statement

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

This research involved no new testing of participants and hence did not require Institutional Review Board approval.

Informed Consent Statement

This research involved no new testing of participants and hence did not require an Informed Consent Statement.

Data Availability Statement

Conflicts of interest.

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

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Critical thinking definition

Critical thinking, as described by Oxford Languages, is the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgement.

Active and skillful approach, evaluation, assessment, synthesis, and/or evaluation of information obtained from, or made by, observation, knowledge, reflection, acumen or conversation, as a guide to belief and action, requires the critical thinking process, which is why it's often used in education and academics.

Some even may view it as a backbone of modern thought.

However, it's a skill, and skills must be trained and encouraged to be used at its full potential.

People turn up to various approaches in improving their critical thinking, like:

Developing technical and problem-solving skills
Engaging in more active listening
Actively questioning their assumptions and beliefs
Seeking out more diversity of thought
Opening up their curiosity in an intellectual way etc.

Is critical thinking useful in writing?

Critical thinking can help in planning your paper and making it more concise, but it's not obvious at first. We carefully pinpointed some the questions you should ask yourself when boosting critical thinking in writing:

What information should be included?
Which information resources should the author look to?
What degree of technical knowledge should the report assume its audience has?
What is the most effective way to show information?
How should the report be organized?
How should it be designed?
What tone and level of language difficulty should the document have?

Usage of critical thinking comes down not only to the outline of your paper, it also begs the question: How can we use critical thinking solving problems in our writing's topic?

Let's say, you have a Powerpoint on how critical thinking can reduce poverty in the United States. You'll primarily have to define critical thinking for the viewers, as well as use a lot of critical thinking questions and synonyms to get them to be familiar with your methods and start the thinking process behind it.

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COMMENTS

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Critical thinking is, in short, self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking. It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and mindful command of their use. It entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism.
Constructive skepticism, critical thinking and the ethics of belief
1994. Description. One of the primary aims of education is to enable students to secure reliable standards and procedures by which they can acquire beliefs that are, if not true, at least likely to be true. The questions of belief acquisition and the manner in which those beliefs are held, although epistemic, are also distinctively ethical.
Open-mindedness & Scepticism in Critical Thinking
In my most recent post, 12 Important Dispositions for Critical Thinking - as the title suggests, I presented a list of dispositions that are likely to enhance the quality of one's thinking ...
Critical Thinking: Scientific Skepticism
Critical Thinking sounds like a simple procedure until Steven Novella, MD's scientific explanation of "Thinking." This academic neurologist from Yale School of Medicine gives us scientific information that complicates thinking. As the president and co-founder of the New England Skeptical Society a nonprofit educational organization dedicated to ...
Importance of Skepticism in Critical Thinking
Skepticism has a couple of meanings. The first, pretty straight-forward, is "doubt as to the truth of something". So when someone tells you something, if you don't believe it right away, you are treating it with skepticism. So thinking back to the critical thinking skills we talked about in week one, in one respect, someone who doesn't ...
Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
The traditional issue of the structure of knowledge and justification, engendering Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Infinitism, can be seen as resulting from one main argument for what we will call Pyrrhonian Skepticism. In what follows we present these two forms of skepticism and assess the main arguments for them. 1.
6 6 Skepticism and Concepts: Can the Skeptic Think?
Skepticism, according to Sextus, is a capacity for investigation: it is the ability to set appearances (phainomena) and thoughts (noumena) into opposition (PH 1.8 f. and 131 f.). The balance ( isostheneia ) that the skeptic creates between various theses and appearances leads her to suspension of judgment ( epochē ) and thus to tranquility ...
Critical Thinking
Critical thinking, sometimes called healthy skepticism, is a learned skill, using reflective, analytical thinking to make a reasonable, rational decision on what to believe or do. Even the most intelligent people have to learn it and practise it consciously. Once learned, critical thinking helps us to resist emotional appeals that might ...
What is the Difference between Critical Thinking and Skepticism?
Critical thinking enables individuals to make informed decisions based on evidence and sound reasoning, rather than relying on assumptions or personal beliefs. 2. Skepticism is a questioning attitude. In the realm of critical thinking, skepticism is a fundamental aspect that separates it from other modes of thought.
Critical Thinking as a Source of Respect for Persons: A critique
Critical thinking has come to be defined as and aligned with 'good' thinking. It connects to the value placed on rationality and agency and is woven into conceptions of what it means to become a person and hence deserve respect. Challenges to the supremacy of critical thinking have helped to provoke richer and fuller interpretations and ...
Critical Thinking, Intelligence, and Unsubstantiated Beliefs: An
A review of the research shows that critical thinking is a more inclusive construct than intelligence, going beyond what general cognitive ability can account for. ... are doubtful of paranormal and other unfounded claims as "skeptics" and so have tested whether measures related to skepticism are associated with less endorsement of ...
Psy-200 EXIT_EXAM
Quiz yourself with questions and answers for Psy-200 EXIT_EXAM, so you can be ready for test day. Explore quizzes and practice tests created by teachers and students or create one from your course material.
Using Critical Thinking in Essays and other Assignments
Share via: Critical thinking, as described by Oxford Languages, is the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgement. Active and skillful approach, evaluation, assessment, synthesis, and/or evaluation of information obtained from, or made by, observation, knowledge, reflection, acumen or conversation, as a guide to ...