essay on changing trends in family

Coronavirus Disease 2019

How the pandemic changed family dynamics, the potential impact of covid-19 on adolescents’ social development..

Posted August 2, 2021 | Reviewed by Abigail Fagan

• Take our Your Mental Health Today Test
• Find a therapist near me
• The social effects of quarantine hit younger adolescents particularly hard, derailing typical development.
• During COVID-19, family was more influential than friends during a developmental period when the opposite would normally be true.
• Siblings may have functioned as a buffer against the social effects of quarantine for older adolescents.

The social landscape has looked wildly different over the past year and a half. Because of the quarantines and social restrictions made necessary by the COVID-19 pandemic, in-person social interactions were greatly reduced in 2020 as many found themselves spending the majority of their time at home with family, and away from friends and colleagues. Previous research has already connected quarantine and increased mental health issues that have been observed during the pandemic (e.g., Chahal et al., 2020; Ghebreyesus et al., 2020).

Adolescence is a time of social exploration where peers begin to play a greater role than parents as teens move toward independence, so the disruption of this normative timeline, and particularly interactions with friends, is cause for concern (Ellis et al., 2020; Orben, Tomova, Blakemore, 2020). Cross-sectional studies on the effects of COVID-19 have shown that maintaining friendships is something children and adolescents were bothered by and that while online social connections can be beneficial, in-person interactions are more effective (Ellis et al., 2020; Orben et al., 2020).

A recent study led by Dr. Reuma Gadassi-Polack in our lab expanded what is known about the effects of COVID-19 quarantine by looking at adolescents’ social interactions and depressive symptoms before and during the pandemic (Gadassi Polack et al., in press). Researchers collected data from kids using short questionnaires completed daily, a year before COVID and again at the beginning of the pandemic. Each day, participants reported both positive and negative interactions with family members and peers and their depressive symptoms.

The study looked at 112 participants (age 8-15) who completed daily questionnaires in both the initial pre-COVID data collection (Wave 1) and the data collection during COVID (Wave 2). Researchers were able to capture information about both individual relationships and how they affect one another via “spillover,” a concept that will be discussed further below.

COVID Had Greater Negative Effects on Younger Adolescents

In typical development, we would expect to see uniform increases in interactions with peers alongside decreases in interactions with parents (e.g., Lam et al., 2012; Larson et al., 1991; Larson et al., 1996). Instead, younger (but not older) participants had significantly fewer positive interactions with peers during COVID compared to pre-COVID. For participants 13 and older, significantly more positive interactions with siblings were seen during COVID vs. before. This led to a greater negative impact on younger adolescents, who lost positive interactions with peers without gaining any positive interactions with siblings like older adolescents. In fact, younger adolescents had more negative interactions with siblings than friends or parents.

For both age groups, negative interactions with friends significantly decreased while there were no other significant decreases in other relationships. This finding presents a different facet of the move to online school: for some, this was an opportunity to escape a negative environment.

Altogether, the lack of the expected increase in interactions with friends suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic has derailed the typical trajectory of social development. The larger effect can potentially be credited to less social development as younger adolescents are experiencing the same effects earlier in development, with less social skills in place. A further implication of these results is that in-person interactions cannot be neatly substituted with virtual interaction.

Family Members Were More Influential than Friends During the Early Stages of COVID-19

Looking at a process named “spillover” allowed researchers to understand the connections within the family, family subsystems, and peer relationships. The concept of spillover is grounded in the idea that our social world is made up of subsystems, including those within the family: the mother and father is a subsystem, as is the parent and child, or the siblings. These subsystems are of course connected (e.g., the mother-father relationship is related to the mother-child relationship), but not without some boundaries . When these boundaries become weaker, interactions in one subsystem can affect interactions in other subsystems via spillover (e.g., Chung et al., 2011; Flook & Fuligni, 2008; Kaufman et al., 2020; Krishnakumar & Buehler, 2000; Mastrotheodoros et al., 2020).

For example, an argument between parents can cause each parent to be more likely to argue with their child. What began as a negative interaction in the mother-father relationship has then spilled over into the parent-child relationship. This example would be considered negative spillover, where negative occurrences in one subsystem lead to negative interactions or feelings in another. Positive spillover occurs when the same thing happens with positive occurrences. For example, being praised by their mother might cause a child to be kinder to their sibling . Then, a positive interaction in the mother-child relationship has spilled over into the sibling relationship.

COVID-19 appeared to create a more closed family system, with fewer spillover effects from outside and more inside. In other words, interactions with family members impacted interactions with friends to a lesser degree during COVID. Separate interactions with family and friends are expected to affect each other less as adolescents develop typically. However, in the context of the pandemic, this was particularly detrimental for those who already had more negative family relationships prior to COVID as there was less day-level positive spillover and increased negative spillover on the individual level.

Increase in Depressive Symptoms Related to Family Interactions

Changes were not only seen in interactions, but also in levels of depressive symptoms. Depressive symptoms increased significantly by almost 40 percent during COVID-19, regardless of age. This signifies the severity of COVID-19’s impact on adolescent mental health, above and beyond any increase in depression typically seen in development (e.g., Salk et al., 2016). The occurrence of less positive and more negative interactions with family members significantly predicted depressive symptoms during COVID-19.

More Positive than Negative Interactions and a New Role for Siblings

The effects of the social changes wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic were not wholly negative, however. Overall, most kids reported five times more positive interactions than negative interactions. Importantly, having more positive interactions with family members was associated with smaller increases in depressive symptoms during COVID.

The effect of the pandemic on sibling relationships was also more positive. Few would be surprised to hear siblings had a high number of negative interactions – much higher compared to any other relationship. However, increased positive interactions without an increase in negative interactions with siblings was seen in older adolescents, suggesting that siblings can compensate at least somewhat for the decrease in in-person peer interactions.

Combined with prior research on siblings’ positive effects on mental health and loneliness (McHale, Updegraff, & Whiteman, 2012; Wikle, Ackert, & Jenson, 2019), these results suggest that the presence of siblings is beneficial during a time of social isolation .

In general, this research shines a light on how important peer interactions are for normative development and the necessity of ensuring children and adolescents are given opportunities to spend time, especially in-person, with peers.

Take-Home Points

• Family negativity predicted the increase in depressive symptoms during COVID-19. In families with more positive interactions, there was less of an increase.
• Siblings potentially functioned as a buffer for the social effects of quarantine for older adolescents.

Anna Leah Davis, a Yale undergraduate, contributed to the writing of this blog post.

Chahal, R., Kirshenbaum, J. S., Miller, J. G., Ho, T. C., & Gotlib, I. H. (2020). Higher executive control network coherence buffers against puberty-related increases in internalizing symptoms during the COVID-19 pandemic. Biological Psychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpsc.2020.08.010

Chung, G. H., Flook, L., & Fuligni, A. J. (2011). Reciprocal associations between family and peer conflict in adolescents' daily lives. Child Development, 82, 1390–1396. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01625.x

Ellis, W. E., Dumas, T. M., & Forbes, L. M. (2020). Physically isolated but socially connected: Psychological adjustment and stress among adolescents during the initial COVID-19 crisis. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 52, 177-187. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cbs0000215

Flook, L., & Fuligni, A. J. (2008). Family and school spillover in adolescents’ daily lives. Child Development, 79, 776-787. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01157.x

Gadassi Polack, R. Sened, H., Aubé, S., Zhang, A., Joormann, J., & Kober, H. (in press) Connections during Crisis: Adolescents’ social dynamics and mental health during COVID-19. Developmental Psychology.

Ghebreyesus, T.A. (2020). Addressing mental health needs: an integral part of COVID-19 response. World Psychiatry, 19, 129–130. https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20768

Hankin, B. L., Stone, L., & Wright, P. A. (2010). Corumination, interpersonal stress generation, and internalizing symptoms: accumulating effects and transactional influences in a multiwave study of adolescents. Development and Psychopathology, 22, 217–235. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579409990368

Kaufman, T. M., Kretschmer, T., Huitsing, G., & Veenstra, R. (2020). Caught in a vicious cycle? Explaining bidirectional spillover between parent-child relationships and peer victimization. Development and Psychopathology, 32, 11-20. doi: 10.1017/S0954579418001360.

Krishnakumar, A., & Buehler, C. (2000). Interparental conflict and parenting behaviors: A meta‐analytic review. Family Relations, 49, 25-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3729.2000.00025.x

Lam, C. B., McHale, S. M., & Crouter, A. C. (2012). Parent–child shared time from middle childhood to late adolescence: Developmental course and adjustment correlates. Child Development, 83, 2089-2103. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01826.x

Larson, R., & Richards, M. H. (1991). Daily companionship in late childhood and early adolescence: Changing developmental contexts. Child Development, 62, 284-300. https://doi.org/10.2307/1131003

Larson, R. W., Richards, M. H., Moneta, G., Holmbeck, G., & Duckett, E. (1996). Changes in adolescents' daily interactions with their families from ages 10 to 18: Disengagement and transformation. Developmental Psychology, 32, 744–754. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.32.4.744

Mastrotheodoros, S., Van Lissa, C. J., Van der Graaff, J., Deković, M., Meeus, W. H., & Branje, S. J. (2020). Day-to-day spillover and long-term transmission of interparental conflict to adolescent–mother conflict: The role of mood. Journal of Family Psychology. doi: 10.1037/fam0000649.

McHale, S. M., Updegraff, K. A., & Whiteman, S. D. (2012). Sibling Relationships and Influences in Childhood and Adolescence. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 74, 913–930. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2012.01011.x

Orben, A., Tomova, L., & Blakemore, S. J. (2020). The effects of social deprivation on adolescent development and mental health. The Lancet Child & Adolescent Health. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S2352-4642(20)30186-3

Salk, R. H., Petersen, J. L., Abramson, L. Y., & Hyde, J. S. (2016). The contemporary face of gender differences and similarities in depression throughout adolescence: Development and chronicity. Journal of Affective Disorders, 205, 28-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2016.03.071

Wikle, J. S., Ackert, E., & Jensen, A. C. (2019). Companionship patterns and emotional states during social interactions for adolescents with and without siblings. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 48, 2190–2206. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-019-01121-z

Jutta Joormann, Ph.D ., is a professor of psychology at Yale University who studies risk factors for depression and anxiety disorders.

• Find a Therapist
• Find a Treatment Center
• Find a Psychiatrist
• Find a Support Group
• Find Online Therapy
• United States
• Brooklyn, NY
• Chicago, IL
• Houston, TX
• Los Angeles, CA
• New York, NY
• Portland, OR
• San Diego, CA
• San Francisco, CA
• Seattle, WA
• Washington, DC
• Asperger's
• Bipolar Disorder
• Chronic Pain
• Eating Disorders
• Passive Aggression
• Personality
• Goal Setting
• Positive Psychology
• Stopping Smoking
• Low Sexual Desire
• Relationships
• Child Development
• Self Tests NEW
• Therapy Center
• Diagnosis Dictionary
• Types of Therapy

Sticking up for yourself is no easy task. But there are concrete skills you can use to hone your assertiveness and advocate for yourself.

• Emotional Intelligence
• Gaslighting
• Affective Forecasting
• Neuroscience

Emerging Trends and Enduring Patterns in American Family Life

February 9, 2022 | Daniel A. Cox

Acknowledgments

The Survey Center on American Life of the American Enterprise Institute is grateful to the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation for its generous support of the American National Family Life Survey.

In addition, the authors would like to thank Beatrice Lee, Dana Popky, and Grace Burns for their research assistance and support with the design of the report figures; Sarah Burns and Josh Delk for their strategic insights and communications support; Abigail Guidera for her detailed oversight and administrative assistance; Rachel Hershberger for her careful and efficient editing; and Danielle Curran and Jennifer Morretta for their design and aesthetic expertise.

Executive Summary

American family life has profoundly changed over the past half century. The marriage rate is falling, women are having fewer children, and many Americans, young adults in particular, are rethinking what it means to be a family. But despite these changes, few Americans say the institution of marriage is outdated, and it remains a goal for most single Americans, who express interest in getting married one day.

The institution of marriage is evolving in important ways. Religion, which at one time was at the center of much of American family and married life, has become less prominent. Not only are interfaith unions increasingly common, so are marriages among people who have no religion. For couples married before 1972, roughly eight in 10 (81 percent) share the same faith as their partner, and just 3 percent are in secular marriages. In contrast, just over half (52 percent) of couples married in the past decade are in same-faith marriages, while 16 percent are in secular unions.

Americans still report high levels of satisfaction in their relationship with their spouse, and the social benefits of marriage remain considerable. The overwhelming number of married Americans have a positive view about their relationship with their spouse. Compared to Americans who are unmarried, married Americans are more likely to report that they have a satisfying social life and a larger group of close friends. They also say they are more satisfied with their personal health than their single peers do. Yet men appear to accrue these advantages at somewhat greater rates than women do. There is also a massive perception gap between men and women in the division of household labor. Women are far more likely than men to say they take on the lion’s share of domestic tasks, and mothers in particular say they do this when making decisions regarding their children.

The contours of American family life have changed considerably in recent years, but some of our most important formative influences remain the same. Most Americans report growing up with a sibling, and few experiences have a more unique or enduring impact than sibling relationships. Most Americans with siblings say they had a reasonably close relationship with their brothers and sisters growing up, and middle children notably report the closest relationships. Parental favoritism appears to exert a crucial role in how Americans relate to their siblings and broader feelings of social connection and kinship. Overall, 40 percent of Americans who grew up with siblings report that their parents had a favorite child. Americans who perceived their parents picked favorites feel less close to their siblings and their parents and were more likely to report feeling lonely while growing up than those who said their parents had no favorites report.

Introduction

The American family has never been a static institution. Rather, the patterns of family formation and function continue to evolve in response to the emergence of new technologies infiltrating American homes, shifting economic realities, and new cultural attitudes. Today, Americans are marrying later and having smaller families. [1] And more Americans than ever are choosing to elide either.

Despite these shifts in behavior, most young Americans still aspire to get married and have children. Few Americans report that marriage is irrelevant, and many believe that society benefits when its members prioritize having and raising children. However, how Americans think about marriage and child-rearing has changed. In their personal relationships, and even religion, Americans appear to be prioritizing individual preferences to a far greater extent.

Newly married couples are eschewing religious wedding ceremonies that connect them to existing traditions and communities, preferring instead celebrations that reflect their own personal tastes and preferences. The primacy of individual preferences also manifests itself in family life. Fewer Americans growing up today have regular meals with their family, a practice that was routine a generation ago. And Generation Z reports having lonelier childhoods than those born in earlier generations.

But not all changes in family life are exclusively the culmination of shifting personal desires; the loss of faith in formative institutions, rising cost of childcare, and feelings of economic insecurity among young adults may play a role as well. There is evidence that the extensive financial obligation raising children requires is a formidable hurdle for many Americans. Americans who are uncertain about having children cite the cost of doing so as the most important reason they would choose not to do so.

Most Americans continue to be fairly upbeat about marriage—and for good reason. Both married men and women generally feel satisfied with their spouse. In aggregate, both men and women derive considerable benefit from being married. Married Americans have more satisfying social lives and larger social networks and report greater satisfaction in their personal health. Yet men appear to accrue these advantages at somewhat greater rates than women do.

Despite signs of greater parity between men and women in taking on domestic duties, women appear to take on a far greater burden, particularly with decisions regarding children. Women report performing far more of the household chores, including cooking, cleaning, and doing laundry. Married mothers are also far more likely to say they are primarily responsible for making health decisions and planning social activities for children. The ongoing tension may be one reason women are much more likely than men to leave their marriage and, after doing so, less likely to get married again.

But despite the many changes and distinct experiences, American family life has enduring qualities. In many families, mothers remain the most important source of personal and emotional support, although there are considerable cross-cultural variations. Our siblings continue to play a crucial role during our formative years and beyond. Parental decisions and behavior can have lifelong influence. Parental favoritism, the notion that parents have a favorite child, has far-reaching negative effects on family dynamics and relationships. And parental divorce continues to disrupt American family life.

Optimism About America’s Future

After nearly two years of life under a pandemic, economic upheaval, social disconnection, and political turmoil following the 2020 election, most Americans do not feel overly optimistic about how things are going in the country. Less than half of Americans report feeling very (6 percent) or somewhat (41 percent) optimistic about the country’s future. More than half (53 percent) say they feel pessimistic about where the country is headed.

There are massive racial differences in feelings of optimism about the country’s future. White Americans are far more pessimistic about the future than Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans are. Black Americans are among the most optimistic about the direction the US is headed. Nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of Black Americans report feeling at least somewhat optimistic, as do 59 percent of Asian Americans and 55 percent of Hispanics. Only 41 percent of White Americans share this feeling of optimism about the future of the country. Six in 10 (60 percent) White Americans report feeling pessimistic.

No group expresses greater pessimism about the future of the country than White evangelical Protestants. Only one in three (33 percent) White evangelical Protestants say they feel at least somewhat optimistic about America’s future, while two-thirds (66 percent) feel pessimistic.

Short-Term Pessimists vs. Long-View Optimists

In thinking about the country’s trajectory, far more Americans believe things are getting worse rather than getting better. Nearly three-quarters (74 percent) of Americans say things in the US have mostly been getting worse, while 26 percent say that things in the country have generally been improving.

Optimists and pessimists think differently about how the country has changed. Americans who are optimistic about how things are going generally focus on the long arc of history, while those who express pessimism are more focused on recent events. The vast majority (90 percent) of Americans who say things are generally getting better in the US say this is happening slowly over time. Conversely, the majority (61 percent) of those who say things have been getting worse believe it is happening very quickly.

Community Satisfaction

Despite widespread negative views about the state of the country and its future, Americans are largely satisfied with how things are going in their own communities. More than eight in 10 (87 percent) Americans report feeling at least somewhat satisfied about the quality of life in their local community, although less than half (45 percent) say they feel very or completely satisfied. Only 14 percent of the public say they are not satisfied with the quality of life in their community.

Marriage, Children, and Family Life

The structure of American family life has undergone profound changes over the past half century. The nuclear family, which at one point served as the unchallenged cultural ideal, has slowly been replaced with a more diverse set of social arrangements. [2] While there was no one cause for this shift, a number of cultural, economic, and social changes helped bring about the rise of a more varied family structure.

First, there is the rise of single-parent households. A generation ago, the overwhelming majority of children were raised in two-parent households, but fewer children are raised in this type of household today. [3] Divorce and remarriage have become much more common even as the divorce rate peaked several decades ago. [4] Four in 10 (40 percent) marriages end in divorce, and remarriage is common, particularly among men, which frequently results in the creation of blended families. [5] As a recent report by the Pew Research Center notes, “As a result of these changes, there is no longer one dominant family form in the U.S.” [6]

One of the most important changes in American family life has likely been brought about by the decline in marriage. Over the past several decades, the marriage rate in the US has plummeted. According to an analysis from Pew Research Center, just over half (53 percent) of 25- to 54-year-olds are married—a 14 percentage point drop since 1990. [7]

Attitudes About Marriage

Despite waning participation, few Americans believe that marriage is irrelevant today. Only about one in four (26 percent) Americans believe marriage has become old-fashioned and out-of-date. Nearly three-quarters (74 percent) of the public disagree.

What’s more, these views are widely shared among the public. Although young adults today are less likely to be married than previous generations at their age were, their views of marriage roughly mirror those of the public overall. [8] Seventy-one percent of young adults (age 18 to 29) reject the notion that marriage has become old-fashioned and irrelevant—a view shared by 77 percent of seniors (age 65 and older). Views are consistent among men and women as well. Nearly identical numbers of men (73 percent) and women (74 percent) reject the idea that marriage has become a dated institution.

Perhaps due to the historic association between marriage and religion, religiously unaffiliated Americans are among the most likely to believe marriage is old-fashioned and out-of-date. Thirty-six percent of religiously unaffiliated Americans believe marriage is an outmoded institution. This view is far less common among religious Americans. For instance, less than one in five Mormons (15 percent), Jews (15 percent), and White evangelical Protestants (14 percent) say marriage is out-of-date.

Single Americans Are Not Sold on Marriage

Despite a widely held belief that marriage is still a relevant institution in American society, many of those who have never been married remain skeptical or ambivalent about getting married themselves. More than one-third (34 percent) of Americans who have never been married say they have no intention of ever doing so. Roughly two-thirds (65 percent) of unmarried Americans report that they would be interested in getting married at some point in their lives.

There is even less interest in marriage among Americans who are single and have never been married—those not currently in a committed romantic relationship or living with a partner. Sixty-one percent of singles say they would be interested in getting married someday. Perhaps because marriage is difficult to think about in the abstract, Americans who are currently in relationships are much more likely to express an interest in getting married. Roughly three-quarters (76 percent) of those who are in a relationship but have never been married say they want to get married someday.

Among single Americans, interest in marriage varies surprisingly little. Single Americans without a college education are about as likely to express an interest in marriage as those who graduated with a four-year degree (61 percent vs. 60 percent, respectively). Single men (60 percent) and women (62 percent) also report nearly equal interest in marriage. The one exception to this pattern is religion. Only half (50 percent) of religiously unaffiliated singles report being interested in getting married someday, compared to two-thirds (66 percent) of Christian singles.

Interest in marriage among Americans who have never been married also appears to diminish with age. While about three-quarters (76 percent) of young singles (age 18-29) report that they would like to get married one day, this aspiration is shared by fewer 30- to 49-year-olds (56 percent) and singles age 50 or older (39 percent).

Societal and Family Pressure

Few Americans say they feel pressured by society to get married. Among Americans who are currently single and have never been married, only 29 percent report they feel pressure from society to get married. Looking back, married Americans are about as likely to say the same, with 31 percent reporting that they felt pressure from society to get married. However, there is a notable gender difference among Americans who are already married in the amount of pressure they felt. Married women are more likely than married men to report feeling societal pressure (36 percent vs. 24 percent, respectively).

Americans report facing even less pressure from their families. Less than one in five (19 percent) Americans who have never been married, including similar numbers of women (21 percent) and men (18 percent), say they have experienced at least some pressure from family members to get married. The vast majority (80 percent) of adults who have never been married report they have not.

Disparities in Domestic Labor

A long-standing source of tension in many households is the division of household labor. There is a massive perception gap, with women far more likely than men to say they are engaged in a variety of domestic activities, such as cleaning, cooking, and doing laundry.

Among women who are currently married or living with their partner, a majority say they clean the house (65 percent), do the laundry (67 percent), or cook meals (63 percent) more often than their spouse or partner does. But differential perceptions of labor are not just limited to everyday chores. Women are more than twice as likely as men to report that they plan social activities and outings more often than their spouses do (51 percent vs. 18 percent). Men and women are about equally likely to say they usually pay bills and track household spending (52 percent vs. 54 percent), and in most households, both men (68 percent) and women (63 percent) say that their spouse or partner puts in equal effort in solving relationship problems, rather than leaving it primarily to one person. The only activities men report doing more of than their partners are yardwork and home repairs. Seventy percent of men say they do this type of work more often than their spouse does, compared to 14 percent of women who say they do this more often.

The disparity in domestic workload is particularly acute among families with children living at home. Mothers report being much more involved than fathers in activities relating to their children’s health, whether it includes scheduling doctor’s appointments or making health decisions for children. Seventy-nine percent of mothers say they are more often scheduling doctor’s appointments or making health decisions for children. Only 17 percent of fathers say they engage in these activities more often than their spouse or partner does. Mothers are also far more likely to take on scheduling responsibilities for their children. Nearly seven in 10 (69 percent) mothers say scheduling playdates and coordinating social activities for their children are activities they do more often than their spouse does. Only 11 percent of fathers say the same.

Household Labor and Relationship Satisfaction

It would be understandable if perceptions of unequal household labor resulted in lower levels of relationship satisfaction. However, the story is more complicated. For the most part, women who say they take on the lion’s share of domestic duties are not any less satisfied with their relationship. Women who report doing much more of the laundry and cleaning than their spouse or partner report being about as their relationship as other women. What’s more, this pattern holds regardless of women’s employment status.

Cooking appears to be the outlier in domestic duties. Women who report that they do more of the cooking report being less satisfied in their relationship than women who say this work is more evenly divided or a task their spouse does more often. Sixty-six percent of women who report that they do much more of the cooking say they are satisfied with their relationship, compared to 75 percent of other women. Similarly, women who do most of the yardwork and home repairs are much less satisfied with their relationship than other women are (51 percent vs. 71 percent).

For men, the relationship between division of household labor and relationship satisfaction is somewhat different. Men who report doing much more of the cooking and laundry are not any more satisfied than other men are. However, men who report doing much more of the house cleaning are significantly less satisfied in their relationships than men who say their spouse does this type of work more often or they do it roughly equally (65 percent vs. 79 percent).

Religious, Secular, and Interreligious Marriages

The American religious landscape has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past several decades. The number of Americans who are religiously unaffiliated has increased nearly sixfold over the past three decades, and Christian identity has plummeted. [9] The number of Americans belonging to non-Christian traditions, while modest in comparison, has risen dramatically.

These changes have profoundly affected the religious character of American marriages. Today, a majority (59 percent) of married Americans report having a spouse with the same religious affiliation. [10] More than one-quarter of married Americans are in an interfaith marriage (14 percent)—a union between people who have different religious traditions—or a religious-secular marriage (14 percent), in which one person identifies with a religious tradition and the other does not. Secular marriages, in which both people are religiously unaffiliated, have become increasingly common; 12 percent of marriages are among people who are both not religious.

Fifty years ago, same-faith marriages dominated the religious landscape. Over eight in 10 (81 percent) couples married before 1972 share the same religious affiliation with their spouse. More recent marriages reveal a distinctly different pattern. Among Americans married in the past decade, just over half (52 percent) are among couples who belong to the same religious tradition. More recent marriages are also far more likely to be among couples who are both secular. Only 3 percent of couples married before 1972 are in secular marriages, compared to 16 percent of couples married in the past decade.

No religious group is more likely to marry within their faith tradition than Mormons. Nearly nine in 10 (87 percent) Mormons report their spouse is also Mormon. Rates of religious homogamy are also high among Protestant religious traditions. Eighty-three percent of evangelical Protestants and about seven in 10 (72 percent) mainline Protestants report having a spouse of the same religion. A majority of Catholics (65 percent) and Jews (59 percent) also say their spouse shares their religious affiliation.

One of the most important shifts in American marriages is the rise of secular unions—marriages between couples who are not religious. Roughly six in 10 (62 percent) unaffiliated Americans have spouses who are also unaffiliated. This represents a dramatic increase from previous generations. In the 1970s, only 37 percent of Americans who were religiously unaffiliated reported having a secular spouse.

How Religious, Secular, and Interreligious Marriages Affect Belief, Belonging, and Behavior

Although interfaith unions have become more common, they are associated with overall lower levels of religious commitment. Americans in religiously mixed marriages demonstrate less religious engagement than those in same-religion relationships.

Americans in religiously mixed marriages are far less likely to attend services regularly than those married to someone who has the same religious commitments. Forty-four percent of Americans with a spouse who shares their religious affiliation attend services at least once a week. In contrast, 16 percent of Americans in interfaith marriages attend formal worships services weekly or more often, while just 1 percent of Americans in secular marriages—in which neither person identifies with a religious tradition—report attending weekly services. More than eight in 10 (81 percent) Americans in secular marriages say they never attend religious services.

Formal religious membership is also less common among those in interfaith marriages. A majority (61 percent) of Americans with a spouse who shares their religious affiliation say they are a member of a church or religious organization, compared to roughly a third (36 percent) of religious Americans whose spouse has a different religious background. Similarly, more Americans in religiously homogenous marriages (30 percent) say they are members of a prayer or bible study group, compared to 12 percent of religious Americans in interfaith marriages.

However, religious Americans in interfaith marriages are not much more likely to express religious doubts. Only 19 percent of religious Americans in religiously mixed marriages and 13 percent of those married to someone who shares their religion report they sometimes doubt whether God exists.

One possible explanation for the discrepancy in religious involvement is that people who enter interfaith relationships simply care about religion less. As a result, Americans in religiously mixed marriages may not have prioritized religious compatibility when selecting a spouse. However, the formative religious experiences—which strongly predict adult religiosity—of Americans in interfaith marriages and those in same-religion marriages are similar. For instance, equal numbers of religious Americans married to someone who shares their religion (58 percent) and those whose spouse has a different religious background (58 percent) say they attended worship services at least once a week growing up. The two groups also have comparable levels of formative religious engagement when it comes to participating in religious education programs during their childhood.

Marriage Ceremonies and Marital Satisfaction

Religious marriage ceremonies were once the norm in the US, but they have become increasingly less common. Among Americans who are married today, less than half (46 percent) say they were married by a religious leader in a church or other religious setting. Sixteen percent say they were married by a religious leader in a secular setting, and more than one-third (36 percent) report having an entirely secular service—taking place in a nonreligious setting and officiated by a nonreligious figure, either a justice of the peace, friend, or family member.

More recent marriages are much more likely to take place in secular settings and be officiated by nonreligious figures. Only 30 percent of Americans who were married within the past decade report having their ceremony in a church, house of worship, or other religious location and officiated by a religious leader. In stark contrast, more than seven in 10 (72 percent) Americans who were married at least 40 years ago report having an entirely religious service—at a religious location and with a religious leader presiding. Nearly half (49 percent) of marriages that took place within the past decade were secular services.

In part, the rise of secular marriage ceremonies is likely explained by the increasing number of secular couples getting married. A majority (58 percent) of Americans who say their partner shares their religious affiliation were married by a religious leader in a religious setting. Thirty-seven percent of Americans in interfaith marriages also describe the setting this way, but only 19 percent of secular couples opt for a religious service. More than six in 10 secular marriages took place in a nonreligious setting and were officiated by a justice of the peace (41 percent) or friend or family member (22 percent).

Overall, most Americans express a high degree of marital satisfaction, regardless of their spouse’s religious identity. However, secular couples are less likely to say they are completely satisfied. Forty-four percent of religious Americans whose spouse shares the same religion say they are completely satisfied with their relationship, compared to 32 percent of unaffiliated Americans who have a nonreligious spouse. Intriguingly, religious Americans who are married to someone who is not religious are far more likely to report being completely satisfied with their relationship than are nonreligious Americans who have a religious spouse (47 percent vs. 28 percent, respectively).

Politically Mixed Marriages

While interfaith marriages in the United States are on the rise, politically mixed marriages remain uncommon. One in five (20 percent) Americans have a spouse whose political affiliation differs from their own. [11] The vast majority (80 percent) of Americans are married to people who share their same basic political orientation.

The degree of political diversity in marriages is nearly identical among Democrats and Republicans. Only 17 percent of Democrats and 16 percent of Republicans report having a spouse who has a political identity different from their own. In contrast, about four in 10 (39 percent) political independents say their spouse has a political identity different from theirs.

Americans who identify as politically moderate are also more likely to have marriages that cross the political aisle. Moderates (28 percent) are twice as likely as both liberals (14 percent) and conservatives (14 percent) to report their spouse’s political identity is distinct.

Unlike interfaith marriages, which have become more common in recent years, the prevalence of politically mixed marriages is more stable. Thirteen percent of couples married before 1972 have dissimilar political affiliations, compared to 21 percent of those married in the past decade.

Marital Satisfaction

Having a spouse who does not share the same political orientation may lead to somewhat reduced feelings of relationship satisfaction. Republicans in mixed marriages are less likely to be very or completely satisfied in their relationship than are those married to people aligned with their politics (86 percent vs. 75 percent). There is a more pronounced gap in feeling completely satisfied. Republicans married to politically similar spouses are much more likely than those in politically mixed marriages to say they feel completely satisfied with their relationship (49 percent vs. 34 percent). Democrats married to someone who shares their politics also report greater relationship satisfaction; 74 percent of Democrats whose spouse has similar political views say they are very or completely satisfied, compared to 67 percent in politically mixed marriages.

Politically Mixed Marriages and Moderation

Being in a politically mixed marriage is associated with having less extreme political views and partisan hostility. Two-thirds (66 percent) of Democrats with a Democratic spouse say they have a very unfavorable view of the Republican Party, compared to 34 percent of Democrats in mixed marriages. Similarly, three-quarters (73 percent) of Republicans in politically homogenous marriages say they have a very unfavorable view of the Democratic Party, while less than half (46 percent) of those who have a spouse who does not share the same politics have a very negative view of the Democratic Party.

Politically mixed marriages may also soften Republicans’ views of opposing party leadership. Republicans married to other Republicans express a much more negative opinion of Joe Biden than those whose spouses have somewhat different political views (82 percent vs. 54 percent, respectively). Notably, for Democrats, negative views of Donald Trump appear to transcend marital influence. Democrats in mixed marriages are not much less likely than those in politically aligned marriages to say they have a very unfavorable view of Trump (73 percent vs. 87 percent).

Divorce, Remarriage, and the Benefits of Marriage

In the US today, divorce remains an all-too-common destination for many marriages. Forty percent of Americans who were ever married report having gotten a divorce. However, the divorce rate, which peaked in the early 1980s, has gradually declined ever since.

Consistent with recent published work, divorce is more common among Americans without a college education. [12] Among Americans who have ever been married, 30 percent of those with a college degree report they have ever been divorced. Forty-six percent of Americans without a college degree say the same.

There is little evidence that religiosity leads to lower rates of divorce. Among Americans who have ever gotten married, rates of divorce are fairly similar across religious traditions. About four in 10 (41 percent) religiously unaffiliated Americans have gotten divorced, similar to the rate of White Catholics (35 percent), Jewish Americans (37 percent), White evangelical Protestants (37 percent), and Hispanic Catholics (39 percent). White mainline Protestants (44 percent) and Black Protestants (50 percent) report somewhat higher divorce rates than other religious traditions. Mormons stand out for their relatively low rates of divorce; only 27 percent of Mormons who were ever married have gotten divorced. 

Women continue to initiate divorces at far higher rates than men do. Although a majority of Americans who have gone through a divorce perceive that they were the ones pushing for it, women report making the decision much more frequently than men do. Two-thirds (66 percent) of divorced women say it was their decision to end the marriage. Twelve percent say their former spouse made the decision, and about one in five (21 percent) say the decision was made jointly. Among divorced men, only 39 percent say it was their decision, while most say it was either their former partner’s decision (31 percent) or the decision was made jointly (30 percent).

For women, higher income appears to increase the likelihood of initiating divorce. Over three-quarters (77 percent) of women making over $100,000 a year say they decided to divorce. Although still making up a majority, women making less than $25,000 are roughly 10 percentage points less likely (68 percent) to say they initiated their divorce. Income appears to play an opposite role for men, with wealthier men less likely to seek divorce than men with lower incomes are.

Ending a marriage can be emotionally difficult, financially costly, and socially disruptive. Despite this, few Americans who have gone through the process express regret. Nearly nine in 10 (88 percent) Americans who have been divorced report that they feel they are better off than they would have been if they stayed married. Eleven percent say things would be better for them if they had remained married.

Does Parental Divorce Increase the Likelihood of Failed Marriages? There is little evidence that being raised by divorced parents greatly increases one’s likelihood of divorce or reduces one’s interest in marriage. Americans who report their parents were divorced during most of their childhood are slightly more likely to get divorced themselves compared to those whose parents remained married (45 percent vs. 39 percent). Further, unmarried adults under age 40 who were raised by married parents express nearly identical interest in marriage as those raised by parents who were divorced do (76 percent vs. 75 percent). Finally, controlling for demographic characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, educational background, household income, gender, and religious affiliation, the marital status of parents is not a significant predictor of marriage interest or divorce rates.

Relationships, Remarriage, and Marital Benefits.

Perhaps because men are more likely to experience involuntary divorce, or at least a marital dissolution that they were less involved in initiating, men are far more likely to get remarried. Among Americans who have ever gotten divorced, men are much more likely than women to be remarried (51 percent vs. 33 percent). What’s more, nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of women who have gotten a divorce and are now single express no interest in marrying again.

Compared to men, women who have gone through a divorce are less likely than men to reenter a romantic relationship. Forty-four percent of women who have been divorced and who have not remarried report they are single, compared to 27 percent of men.

Who Benefits More from Marriage?

Another possible explanation for why men are less likely to initiate divorce and are more likely to remarry is that they seem to benefit more from the arrangement than women do. Married men are far more likely than single men to report being very or completely satisfied with their social lives (52 percent vs. 30 percent). [13] They also have a larger number of close friends; single men are three times as likely as married men to say they have no close friends (15 percent vs. 5 percent). Married men report being more satisfied with their personal health than single men do (49 percent vs. 34 percent). Finally, married men are far less likely to report feeling lonely or socially isolated than single men are. Married men (56 percent) are more than twice as likely as single men (25 percent) to say they hardly ever or never feel lonely or isolated from the people around them.

Women benefit from marriage as well, but their relative gains are more modest. Less than half of married women (48 percent) report being very or completely satisfied with their social life, compared to 33 percent of single women. Forty-six percent of married women are satisfied with their personal health, compared to 35 percent of single women. There is also a more modest gap in feelings of loneliness. Nearly half (48 percent) of married women report they do not feel lonely or socially isolated, while 30 percent of single women say the same.

Behind the Baby Bust

The US birth rate reached a record low in 2020. [14] A recent Brookings Institution report notes that births have been “falling almost continuously for more than a decade.” [15] Evidence shows that the pandemic may have encouraged couples to postpone having children, which may result in a rebound as these challenges and uncertainties recede. But questions remain as to how the experience of the pandemic, and the attendant social and economic challenges, may have permanently altered how Americans think about parenthood and prioritize child-rearing.

Although most Americans have a positive view about marriage, there is considerable skepticism about the societal benefits that marriage and parenthood confer. Overall, roughly six in 10 (62 percent) Americans believe society is just as well off if people have priorities other than getting married and having children. Thirty-seven percent say society benefits when people make marriage and child-rearing priorities.

Younger Americans are least likely to see the societal value in marriage and parenthood. Forty-four percent of seniors (age 65 or older) say a society that prioritizes marriage and child-rearing is better off, while only one-quarter (25 percent) of young adults (age 18 to 29) say the same. Roughly three-quarters (74 percent) of young adults believe society is just as well off if people have other goals.

The generation gap is even larger among men. Senior men are about twice as likely as young men to say that society is better off when marriage and child-rearing are priorities (51 percent vs. 26 percent).

Liberals and conservatives are sharply at odds over the societal importance of family formation. A majority (57 percent) of conservatives believe society is better off when marriage and child-rearing are priorities, a view shared by only 19 percent of liberals.

The generational shift in attitudes cuts across ideology but is far larger among conservatives. Older liberals are somewhat more likely than young liberals to embrace the notion that society benefits when getting married and having children are priorities (23 percent vs. 15 percent). Large majorities of both age groups reject this idea. In contrast, older conservatives are far more likely than young conservatives to believe in the societal benefit of people prioritizing marriage and children (64 percent vs. 37 percent).

Who Does and Does Not Want Children? And Why?

Although young adults are not convinced of the societal benefit of prioritizing family formation, most young people without children still express an interest in starting a family at some point. A majority (56 percent) of young adults without children say they would like to have them someday. Notably, young men (55 percent) are about as likely as young women (58 percent) to express interest in becoming parents.

Younger Americans (age 18 to 39) who are in a relationship are significantly more likely than those who are single to say they want to have children (57 percent vs. 45 percent). It may be that being in a committed relationship makes the prospect of having children feel less abstract. It’s also possible that those who are prioritizing starting a family are more likely to enter a committed relationship.

For young people who are uncertain about having children, one of the most common reasons cited is the cost. Close to one in four (23 percent) younger adults (age 18 to 39) without children who are uncertain about having children say cost is a crucial factor in their thinking. Seventeen percent say they worry they would not be a good parent. About one in four younger adults say having children would be too much work (17 percent) or interfere with their professional or educational goals (9 percent). Ten percent say their decision is based on concerns about climate change, environmental problems, or the state of the world. Less than one in 10 (9 percent) younger adults cite health concerns or age as the primary reason they would choose not to have children.

Marrying Later and Smaller Families

Today, Americans are settling down and starting families later than in generations past. In 2021, the median age for first marriage was 30.4 for men and 28.6 for women. [16] Roughly five decades earlier, in 1972, the median marital age was 20.9 for women and 23.3 for men. The average age of first-time mothers has risen as well. In 2016, the average age of first-time mothers was 26, up from 21 in 1972. [17] Americans who choose to marry later in life and postpone having children may also choose to have smaller families.

Although women who decide to have children later in life are often more emotionally prepared and have greater financial stability, they may also experience more frequent health and fertility challenges. For mothers who considered having more children but ultimately decided against it, age and health issues are the most oft-mentioned reasons. More than four in 10 mothers say they chose not to have another child because they thought they were too old (17 percent) or had a health problem that would make it difficult or impossible to have another child (24 percent). Eighteen percent of mothers say cost was the deciding factor, and 12 percent say their spouse’s lack of interest was the primary reason. Only 2 percent of mothers say the decision not to have more children was due to educational or career goals.

Americans who get married earlier also report having larger families. [18] But this is mostly true for women. Nearly half (48 percent) of women who were married in their teens or early 20s have at least three children. In contrast, only 37 percent of women who were married at age 30 or later say they have at least three children. More than six in 10 (63 percent) women married in their 30s or later report having two or fewer children. This relationship holds even after accounting for other factors that might predict family size, such as religious affiliation, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, and income—but only for women. [19] For men, marital age is not a significant predictor of overall family size once controlling for other demographic characteristics.

The Challenge of Raising Children

Most Americans, even those without children, harbor no illusions about the challenges of raising a child. Using a 10-point scale (with 10 representing “very difficult” and one indicating “very easy”), most (56 percent) Americans say that raising a child to be a good person is at least somewhat difficult—ranking it seven or greater. Fourteen percent say raising a child to be a good person is “very difficult,” the top rating on the scale. Only 20 percent of the public believe child-rearing is easy, ranking it between one and four.

Although most Americans believe raising children is difficult, fewer Americans say child-rearing is more difficult today than they did a couple decades earlier. [20] In 1998, 72 percent of the public said raising children was at least somewhat difficult, rating it seven or greater on an identical 10-point scale.

Americans who perceive raising children to be more difficult express more reservations about having them. Nearly half (47 percent) of Americans without children who perceive it to be easy to raise well-adjusted people (rating it a four or less on the scale) say they want to have children someday. In contrast, among those who say raising children is difficult (a seven or greater), only 28 percent say they are definitely interested in having children.

Few Americans believe it is possible to raise children today without making major personal sacrifices. Nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of the public believe having children requires making major personal sacrifices. Twenty-three percent say it requires only minor sacrifices, and 4 percent say it requires making no personal sacrifices at all.

Formative Family Experiences

One way in which American family life appears to have changed is in how often and what ways family members spend time together. A generation ago, family meals were routine. Roughly three-quarters of baby boomers (76 percent) and 84 percent of Americans who belong to the silent generation report that they had meals together as a family every day. Fifty-nine percent of Americans who belong to Generation X say they had daily meals with their family. In contrast, less than half of millennials (46 percent) and Generation Z (38 percent) report that growing up they had meals with their family every day.

Younger Americans also report having lonelier childhoods. Thirty-nine percent of Generation Z and 35 percent of millennials report that they felt lonely at least once a week growing up. Twenty-nine percent of Americans who are part of the Generation X cohort also say they felt lonely this often during their childhood. In contrast, only 17 percent of baby boomers and 11 percent of Americans who are part of the silent generation say they felt lonely at least once a week.

American families may also be getting more political. Politics appears to be discussed with more regularity among families today than it was a generation ago. Thirty-eight percent of Americans who belong to Generation Z say they talked about politics in their family at least once or twice a month. Only one-quarter (25 percent) of baby boomers and 20 percent of members of the silent generation say politics was a topic of discussion this often.

Sibling Relationships

Few aspects of childhood have a more unique or enduring impact than sibling relationships. Nearly eight in 10 Americans grew up with at least one sibling, making them a more ubiquitous presence in early life than fathers. [21] But the ubiquity of these relationships belies what is known about their influence. Much of the debate about the influence of siblings has often centered on birth order—whether someone was an eldest, youngest, or middle child. Recent work had discounted the influence that birth order has on personality. [22] Less attention has been devoted to understanding the way having siblings alters childhood experiences and how sibling relationships are themselves affected by family dynamics such as divorce and parental favoritism.

Most Americans with siblings report that they had at least a reasonably close relationship with their brothers and sisters growing up. Roughly eight in 10 Americans with siblings say they had a very close (41 percent) or somewhat close (37 percent) relationship with them. Twenty-two percent report they were not too close or not at all close with their siblings.

Birth order may play a role in the type of relationship siblings have with each other. Middle children are generally more likely to report having a close relationship with their siblings. Nearly half (48 percent) of middle children report having a very close relationship with their siblings, compared to 40 percent of eldest children and 35 percent of youngest children.

But other family dynamics may influence the contours of sibling relationships as well. The marital status of parents during formative years may also play a role in how close siblings feel to one another. Men who grew up with divorced parents report feeling more distant from their siblings compared to men whose parents were married report. Only 29 percent of men whose parents were divorced report having a very close relationship with their siblings growing up, compared to 41 percent of men whose parents were married for most of their childhood. The relationship women have with their siblings does not appear to be affected by parental divorce in the same way.

Although many Americans describe their relationship with their siblings as being at least somewhat close in childhood, only about half (51 percent) report being very or completely satisfied with the current relationship they have with their sibling or siblings. Thirty percent report that they are only somewhat satisfied, and 18 percent report being unsatisfied with their relationship.

Even among Americans who describe their childhood relationship as being very close, only about seven in 10 (69 percent) report being very or completely satisfied with the relationship they have with their siblings as an adult. Among those who describe their formative relationship as being “somewhat close,” less than half (46 percent) report being completely or very satisfied.

There is evidence that parents may play an important role in helping establish strong sibling connections. There is a strong correlation between how satisfied Americans are with the relationship they have with their parents and their siblings. Simply put, Americans who are very or completely satisfied with the relationship they have with their parents are very likely to feel the same about their relationship with their siblings.

Parental Favoritism

Parental favoritism—the perception that there was a favorite child in the family—may be an important factor influencing the quality of sibling relationships.

Many Americans who grew up with siblings believe their parents had a favorite child. Forty percent of Americans who grew up with siblings report that their parents had a favorite child. Sixty percent say they do not believe their parents had a favorite.

Women are more likely than men to perceive parental favoritism among siblings. Close to half (45 percent) of women compared to 35 percent of men say their parents had a favorite child.

Americans raised by divorced parents are more likely to believe their parents had a favorite than are those raised by parents who were married during their formative years. More than half (51 percent) of Americans who report their parents were divorced for most of their childhood believe their parents had a favorite child. Thirty-eight percent of Americans whose parents were married perceived their parents as having a favorite.

Who’s the Favorite?

Men are much more likely than women to report being the family favorite. One-third (33 percent) of men who believe their parents picked favorites say they were the favorite in their family. Less than one-quarter (23 percent) of women believe they were their parents’ favorite.

Youngest children are generally more likely to report that they were their parents’ favorite. This is particularly true of youngest boys. Overall, 38 percent of Americans who are the youngest in their family report they were the favorite, compared to 27 percent of those who were oldest. Middle children are the least likely to say they were a favorite child; only 20 percent believe they were. Forty-four percent of men who were youngest say they were the family favorite. Women who were middle children are least likely to believe they were a favorite child; only 17 percent report that they were.

The Negative Consequences of Favoritism

Past research has shown that parental favoritism can have lasting negative effects on relationships, personal self-esteem, and feelings of social connection. [23] Americans who grew up in families that perceived their parents had a favorite were much less close to their siblings when they were growing up than were those who do not believe their parents had a favorite child. Among those who believe their parents had a favorite child, only 30 percent say they were very close to their siblings growing up. In contrast, nearly half (48 percent) of Americans who were raised in households in which parents did not have a favorite child say they felt very close to their siblings.

But it’s not just sibling relationships that may be affected. Americans are far more likely to report having a positive relationship with their parents when they did not perceive them as having a preferred child. More than two-thirds (68 percent) of Americans who say their parents did not have a favorite child report being very or completely satisfied with the relationship they have or had with their parents. Less than half (47 percent) of Americans who believe their parents had a favorite report being satisfied with their relationship. Even Americans who believe they were the favorite do not report having as close a relationship with their parents as those who say their parents did not have a favorite child. Just 55 percent of favorite children are satisfied with their relationship with their parents.

What’s more, perception of parental favoritism may have an enduring effect on sibling relationships later in life. Even as adults, Americans who perceived that their parents had a favorite child are much less likely to report being satisfied with their sibling relationship than those who believe their parents did not pick favorites report. Fifty-eight percent of Americans who say their parents did not have a favorite child are very or completely satisfied with the relationship they have with their siblings today, compared to 42 percent of those who say their parents had a favorite.

Parental favoritism is also associated with childhood loneliness. Americans who report that their parents had a favorite child are far more likely to report that they felt lonely growing up. Forty percent of Americans who believe their parents had a favorite report feeling lonely at least once a week growing up, compared to 18 percent of those who believe their parents did not.

Being thought of as less preferred is strongly associated with educational expectations as well. More than half (51 percent) of Americans who report they were the favorite in their family say it was expected they would go to a four-year college. Less than one-third (32 percent) of those who say they were not the favorite report it was expected they would attend college.

Birth Order, Only Children, and Childhood Loneliness

Perhaps due to their relatively close relationship to other siblings, middle children report that they felt lonely less often growing up than other Americans report. Less than one-third (30 percent) of middle children report that they felt lonely growing up at least a couple times a month. Thirty-six percent of youngest children and 41 percent of oldest children report having felt lonely this often. Only children report feeling lonely much more frequently. Nearly half (49 percent) say growing up they felt lonely at least once or twice a month.

Women who say they are only children report having felt lonely much more often during their childhood than their male counterparts did. A majority (55 percent) of women who are only children say they felt lonely at least a couple times a month growing up, compared to 42 percent of men who are only children. Nearly three in 10 (29 percent) women who are only children say they felt lonely at least a couple times a week.

Although being an only child is associated with more frequent feelings of childhood loneliness, there is little evidence to suggest these experiences have much bearing on our social lives as adults. Only children report having roughly the same number of close friends as those who grew up with siblings and are just as satisfied with their social lives today.

Despite often feeling lonely growing up, there is some evidence that middle children experience the feeling of being overlooked or forgotten. Middle children are far less likely than their siblings or Americans who were only children to say their family expected them to attend a four-year college. A majority (54 percent) of only children and about half (48 percent) of eldest children report that growing up there was a family expectation that they would go to college. Forty-three percent of youngest children report that it was expected they would attend college, but only 35 percent of middle children say this.

Growing Up, Who Do Americans Turn to for Help? Mothers

When it comes to providing personal and emotional support, no person in Americans’ formative lives is more important than mothers. Forty-one percent of Americans report that growing up, the person they would turn to first when they had a problem was their mother. Twenty-two percent of Americans say they would first turn to a friend when facing a personal problem. Only 8 percent say their father was the person they would go to before anyone else. Eleven percent report that they would go to a sibling, and 6 percent say they had another family member who was their first line of support. More than one in 10 (11 percent) Americans say they did not have anyone they could turn to when they had a problem growing up.

Who Americans first turned to when they experienced a problem growing up varies along the lines of race and ethnicity, gender, and religion. Asian Americans (30 percent) are far less likely to say their mother was the first person they would turn to than Hispanic (39 percent), Black (42 percent), or White Americans (42 percent). In contrast, no group is more likely to turn to their mothers for help during their formative years than Black men. Close to half (46 percent) of Black men say their mother was the first person they would go to when they had a personal problem.

White women (27 percent) are more likely than White men (19 percent) to turn to friends growing up. White men are more than twice as likely as White women to say their father was the first person they would turn to with a problem (12 percent vs. 5 percent, respectively).

For Black and Hispanic women, siblings—especially sisters—seem uniquely important. Seventeen percent of Black women and 15 percent of Hispanic women say they would first turn to a sibling when they had a problem. [24] Asian Americans are most likely to report leaning on a close friend. Twenty-eight percent of Asian Americans say they relied most on a close friend when confronted with a problem.

No group is more likely to rely on their father for support during their childhood than White evangelical men. Seventeen percent of White evangelical men say their father was the person they would turn to first if they had a problem as a child. Only 6 percent of White evangelical women say the same. But White evangelical women are about twice as likely as men to say they would seek out help from a close friend before anyone else (27 percent vs. 14 percent).

Family Estrangement

Although American politics appears more contentious than ever, few Americans report that political differences have harmed their relationship with a family member. Only 11 percent of Americans report that they have stopped talking to a family member because of something they said about government and politics.

However, twice as many Americans report having become estranged from a family member over a disagreement about their personal opinions or beliefs. Twenty-two percent of Americans say they have stopped talking to a family member because their personal beliefs were offensive or hurtful.

Americans who identify as atheist or as gay, lesbian, or bisexual are far more likely to have become estranged from family members than other Americans have. More than one in three (35 percent) atheists and nearly four in 10 (38 percent) gay, lesbian, or bisexual Americans report having ceased talking to a family member because they found their views hurtful or offensive.

About the Author

Daniel A. Cox is a senior fellow in polling and public opinion at the American Enterprise Institute and the director of the Survey Center on American Life. He specializes in survey research, politics, youth culture and identity, and religion.

Survey Methodology

The survey was designed and conducted by the American Enterprise Institute. Interviews were conducted among a random sample of 5,030 adults (age 18 and older), with oversamples of respondents who identified as belonging to the Church of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormon) and Jewish respondents living in the United States, including all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Interviews were conducted both online using a self-administered design and by telephone using live interviewers. All interviews were conducted among participants using a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the national US adult population run by NORC at the University of Chicago. Interviewing was conducted between November 23 and December 14, 2021.

Weighting was accomplished in two separate stages. First, panel base weights were calculated for every household based on the probability of selection from the NORC National Frame, the sampling frame that is used to sample housing units for AmeriSpeak. [i] Household level weights were then assigned to each eligible adult in every recruited household. In the second stage, sample demographics were balanced to match target population parameters for gender, age, education, race and Hispanic ethnicity, division (US Census definitions), housing type, telephone usage, and religion. The parameter for religious affiliation was derived from the 2020 American National Social Network Survey. The telephone usage parameter came from an analysis of the National Health Interview Survey. All other weighting parameters were derived from an analysis of the US Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey. The sample weighting was accomplished using an iterative proportional fitting (IFP) process that simultaneously balances the distributions of all variables. Weights were trimmed to prevent individual interviews from having too much influence on the results.

The use of survey weights in statistical analyses ensures that the demographic characteristics of the sample closely approximate the demographic characteristics of the target population. The margin of error for the survey is +/– 1.87 percentage points at the 95 percent level of confidence. The design effect for the survey is 1.83.

[1] US Census Bureau, “Historical Marital Status Tables,” November 2021, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/marital.html ; and Bryan Walsh, “The Great Population Growth Slowdown,” Vox, January 5, 2022, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/1/5/22867184/us-census-population-growth-slowdown-migration-birth-death .

[2] Paul Hemez and Chanell Washington, “Percentage and Number of Children Living with Two Parents Has Dropped Since 1968,” US Census Bureau, April 12, 2021, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/04/number-of-children-living-only-with-their-mothers-has-doubled-in-past-50-years.html.  

[3] Hemez and Washington, “Percentage and Number of Children Living with Two Parents Has Dropped Since 1968.”

[4] Gretchen Livingston, Kim Parker, and Molly Rohal, “Four-in-Ten Couples Are Saying ‘I Do,’ Again: Growing Number of Adults Have Remarried,” Pew Research Center, November 14, 2014, 8–9, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2014/11/14/chapter-1-trends-in-remarriage-in-the-u-s/ .

[5] Daniel Cox, “Emerging Trends and Enduring Patterns in American Family Life,” AEI Survey Center on American Life, February 9, 2022, https://www.americansurveycenter.org/research/emerging-trends-and-enduring-patterns-in-american-family-life/.

The American Community Survey calculates a similar divorce rate, though it uses a slightly different method. According to a recent release, “Among ever-married adults 20 years and over, 34% of women and 33% of men had ever been divorced.” See US Census Bureau, “Number, Timing and Duration of Marriages and Divorces,” press release, April 22, 2021, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/marriages-and-divorces.html .

[6] Pew Research Center, “Parenting in America,” December 17, 2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/ .

[7] Richard Fry and Kim Parker, “Rising Share of U.S. Adults Are Living Without a Spouse or Partner,” Pew Research Center, October 5, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2021/10/05/rising-share-of-u-s-adults-are-living-without-a-spouse-or-partner/ .

[8] US Census Bureau, “Number, Timing and Duration of Marriages and Divorces.”

[9] See the General Social Survey 1972–2021 data at GSS Data Explorer, website, gssdataexplorer.norc.org.  

[10] Americans were categorized as having a spouse of the same religion if they identified their spouse as having the same religious tradition as themselves (e.g., respondent is Catholic and their spouse is Catholic). In this analysis, evangelical Protestantism and mainline Protestantism are considered distinct religious affiliations. Americans who are married to someone of a different denomination (e.g., Baptist and Methodist) are not defined as being in an interfaith marriage. 

[11] This analysis identifies politically congruent relationships as those between Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents with spouses who are Democrats or lean Democrat. Republicans’ relationships are similarly defined.

[12] US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Marriage and Divorce: Patterns by Gender, Race, and Educational Attainment,” October 2013, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/pdf/marriage-and-divorce-patterns-by-gender-race-and-educational-attainment.pdf ; and Eli J. Finkel, “Educated Americans Paved the Way for Divorce—Then Embraced Marriage,” Atlantic , January 8, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/01/education-divide-marriage/579688/ .

[13] “Single” is defined in this report as being unmarried, not having a cohabitating partner, and not being in a committed romantic relationship.

[14] Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin, and Michelle J. K. Osterman, “Births: Provisional Data for 2020,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, May 2021, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/vsrr012-508.pdf.

[15] Melissa S. Kearney and Phillip Levine, “Will Births in the US Rebound? Probably Not.,” Brookings Institution, May 24, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/24/will-births-in-the-us-rebound-probably-not/ .

[16] US Census Bureau, “Historical Marital Status Tables,” November 2021, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/marital.html . 

[17] Quoctrung Bui and Claire Cain Miller, “The Age That Women Have Babies: How a Gap Divides America,” New York Times , August 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/04/upshot/up-birth-age-gap.html .

[18] This analysis includes only those who never got divorced and are currently married to their spouse.

[19] These results were based on a Poisson regression model predicting the number of children that women reported having.

[20] Gallup Organization, “Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll # 1998-9807019: Parenting/Politics,” Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1998, https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/study/31088350 .

[21] Brian Knop, “One in Six Children Live with a Half Sibling Under 18,” US Census Bureau, January 27, 2020, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/01/more-children-live-with-half-siblings-than-previously-thought.html .

[22] Susan Newman, “Does Your Birth Order Actually Matter?,” Psychology Today , November 17, 2015, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/singletons/201511/does-your-birth-order-actually-matter .

[23] Leah Campbell, “What Happens to Kids When Parents Play Favorites?,” Healthline,April 12, 2019, https://www.healthline.com/health-news/what-happens-to-kids-when-parents-play-favorites.

[24] The majority of Americans who said they were most likely to turn to a sibling growing up identified this person as a sister.

Related Materials

American National Family Life Survey Topline Questionnaire

#ezw_tco-2 .ez-toc-widget-container ul.ez-toc-list li.active::before { background-color: #ffffff; } Table of Contents

Survey reports.

Daniel A. Cox, Kyle Gray, Kelsey Eyre Hammond May 28, 2024

An Unsettled Electorate: How Uncertainty and Apathy Are Shaping the 2024 Election

A survey of more than 6,500 US adults focused on the 2024 presidential election reveals a pessimistic and unsettled American electorate fractured by education, ideology, class, and gender.

Daniel A. Cox, Kelsey Eyre Hammond, Kyle Gray November 9, 2023

Generation Z and the Transformation of American Adolescence: How Gen Z’s Formative Experiences Shape Its Politics, Priorities, and Future

This report explores the foundational differences between American generations through their formative adolescent experiences.

Daniel A. Cox, M. Anthony Mills, Ian R. Banks, Kelsey Eyre Hammond, Kyle Gray September 28, 2023

America’s Crisis of Confidence: Rising Mistrust, Conspiracies, and Vaccine Hesitancy After COVID-19

America is experiencing a crosscutting crisis of expertise and scientific distrust accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic that poses significant challenges to democratic debate and public decision-making

Daniel A. Cox, Brent Orrell, Kyle Gray, Jessie Wall September 14, 2023

The Social Workplace: Social Capital, Human Dignity, and Work in America, Volume II

The Social Workplace, Volume II examines Americans’ expectations and experiences surrounding work, the workplace, and key job-related priorities such as pay and interpersonal connections.

In the news

August 16, 2024

The GOP had already mostly lost unmarried women. Then came JD Vance.

August 18, 2024

Concern for religion’s future in America grows as young women stop attending church

August 19, 2024

Why Trump Appeals to Young Men

Young Men Are Turning to Trump. Why?

• Student Opportunities

About Hoover

Located on the campus of Stanford University and in Washington, DC, the Hoover Institution is the nation’s preeminent research center dedicated to generating policy ideas that promote economic prosperity, national security, and democratic governance. 

• The Hoover Story
• Hoover Timeline & History
• Mission Statement
• Vision of the Institution Today
• Key Focus Areas
• About our Fellows
• Research Programs
• Annual Reports
• Hoover in DC
• Fellowship Opportunities
• Visit Hoover
• David and Joan Traitel Building & Rental Information
• Newsletter Subscriptions
• Connect With Us

Hoover scholars form the Institution’s core and create breakthrough ideas aligned with our mission and ideals. What sets Hoover apart from all other policy organizations is its status as a center of scholarly excellence, its locus as a forum of scholarly discussion of public policy, and its ability to bring the conclusions of this scholarship to a public audience.

• Peter Berkowitz
• Ross Levine
• Michael McFaul
• Timothy Garton Ash
• China's Global Sharp Power Project
• Economic Policy Group
• History Working Group
• Hoover Education Success Initiative
• National Security Task Force
• National Security, Technology & Law Working Group
• Middle East and the Islamic World Working Group
• Military History/Contemporary Conflict Working Group
• Renewing Indigenous Economies Project
• State & Local Governance
• Strengthening US-India Relations
• Technology, Economics, and Governance Working Group
• Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region

Books by Hoover Fellows

Economics Working Papers

Hoover Education Success Initiative | The Papers

• Hoover Fellows Program
• National Fellows Program
• Student Fellowship Program
• Veteran Fellowship Program
• Congressional Fellowship Program
• Media Fellowship Program
• Silas Palmer Fellowship
• Economic Fellowship Program

Throughout our over one-hundred-year history, our work has directly led to policies that have produced greater freedom, democracy, and opportunity in the United States and the world.

• Determining America’s Role in the World
• Answering Challenges to Advanced Economies
• Empowering State and Local Governance
• Revitalizing History
• Confronting and Competing with China
• Revitalizing American Institutions
• Reforming K-12 Education
• Understanding Public Opinion
• Understanding the Effects of Technology on Economics and Governance
• Energy & Environment
• Health Care
• Immigration
• International Affairs
• Key Countries / Regions
• Law & Policy
• Politics & Public Opinion
• Science & Technology
• Security & Defense
• State & Local
• Books by Fellows
• Published Works by Fellows
• Working Papers
• Congressional Testimony
• Hoover Press
• PERIODICALS
• The Caravan
• China's Global Sharp Power
• Economic Policy
• History Lab
• Hoover Education
• Global Policy & Strategy
• Middle East and the Islamic World
• Military History & Contemporary Conflict
• Renewing Indigenous Economies
• State and Local Governance
• Technology, Economics, and Governance

Hoover scholars offer analysis of current policy challenges and provide solutions on how America can advance freedom, peace, and prosperity.

• China Global Sharp Power Weekly Alert
• Email newsletters
• Hoover Daily Report
• Subscription to Email Alerts
• Periodicals
• California on Your Mind
• Defining Ideas
• Hoover Digest
• Video Series
• Uncommon Knowledge
• Battlegrounds
• GoodFellows
• Hoover Events
• Capital Conversations
• Hoover Book Club
• AUDIO PODCASTS
• Matters of Policy & Politics
• Economics, Applied
• Free Speech Unmuted
• Secrets of Statecraft
• Capitalism and Freedom in the 21st Century
• Libertarian
• Library & Archives

Support Hoover

Learn more about joining the community of supporters and scholars working together to advance Hoover’s mission and values.

What is MyHoover?

MyHoover delivers a personalized experience at  Hoover.org . In a few easy steps, create an account and receive the most recent analysis from Hoover fellows tailored to your specific policy interests.

Watch this video for an overview of MyHoover.

Log In to MyHoover

Forgot Password

Don't have an account? Sign up

Have questions? Contact us

• Support the Mission of the Hoover Institution
• Subscribe to the Hoover Daily Report
• Follow Hoover on Social Media

Make a Gift

Your gift helps advance ideas that promote a free society.

• About Hoover Institution
• Meet Our Fellows
• Focus Areas
• Research Teams
• Library & Archives

Library & archives

Events, news & press.

The Changing American Family

During the past 20 years, the American family has undergone a profound transformation. By Herbert S. Klein .

For all the changes in fertility and mortality that Americans have experienced from the colonial period until today, there has been surprisingly little change in the structure of the family until the past quarter century. Until that point, the age of marriage changed from time to time, but only a minority of women never married and births outside marriage were traditionally less than 10 percent of all births.

But this fundamental social institution has changed profoundly since 1980. In fact, if one were to define the most original demographic feature in the post-1980 period in the United States, it would be the changes that were occurring in both families and households for all sections of the national population. The traditional American family has been undergoing profound transformations for all ages, all races, and all ethnic groups. Every aspect of the American family is experiencing change. These include the number of adults who marry, the number of households that are formed by married people, the number of children that are conceived, the economic role of mothers, the number of non-family households, and even the importance of marriage in accounting for total births.

The proportion of persons over 15 years of age who had never married reached historic levels in 2000 when a third of the men and a quarter of the women were listed as never having married. The decline in marriage among whites is occurring at a slower pace than among blacks, but both are experiencing rising trends in unmarried adults. By 2000, 22 percent of adult white women and 42 percent of adult black women had never married. This rise in the ratio of persons never married is also reflected in historical changes in the relation between families and households. Non-family households had always existed as a small share of the total households in the United States, usually made up of elderly persons with no families left. But now they are formed by young adults, many of whom never married, or by older persons who no longer reside with children. Also, the proportion of two-parent households, even in family households with children, is on the decline, as single-parent-plus-children households are on the rise. As late as 1960, at the height of the Baby Boom, married families made up almost three-quarters of all households; but by the census of 2000 they accounted for just 53 percent of them, a decline that seems to have continued in the past few years. Non-family households now account for 31 percent of households, and families headed by a single parent with children account for the rest, making up to 27 percent of all such families with children. Black families experienced the fastest decline of dual-parent households; by the end of the century married couples with children accounted for only 4 out of 10 of all black family households with children. But no group was immune to this rising trend of single-parent households.

More older people than ever before are also living alone or without other generations present. Declining mortality and morbidity, the development of Social Security and other retirement benefits, all meant that older persons could financially live alone and were generally healthier and lived longer than in earlier periods. A change in cultural values during the second half of the twentieth century seems to have increased the value of privacy among older adults. In 1910, for example, most widows over 65 years of age lived with their children; only 12 percent lived alone. By 1990, almost 70 percent of such widows were living alone. There was also a major rise in “empty nest” households, with elderly couples no longer having resident children of any age. Extended family arrangements were progressively disappearing for the majority of the population. There were also more couples surviving into old age than ever before, so that by 2000 more than half of the adults over 65 who resided in independent households lived with their spouses. With better health and more income, more elderly persons have the ability and the desire to “buy” their privacy as never before.

Not only have family households been on the decline, as a consequence of the rise of single-person and childless-couple households, but even women giving birth are now having far fewer children, are spacing them further apart, and are ending their fertility at earlier ages than ever before, which has brought fertility levels in the United States to their lowest level in history. In the colonial period the average woman produced more than seven children during the course of her lifetime. Since the 1970s the rate has been under two children for the majority non-Hispanic white population. The national fertility total currently barely reaches its replacement level; fluctuated between 2.0 and 2.1 children per woman over the past quarter century; by 2000 non-Hispanic white women were averaging just 1.8 children. Among all groups it was only the Hispanic women—who are at a total fertility rate of 2.5 children—who are above the replacement level. Even among Hispanic women, it is primarily Mexican-American women, the largest single group, which maintained very high fertility rates. Cuban-American women were close to the non-Hispanic whites, and the Puerto Rican women were closer to the fertility patterns of non-Hispanic black women.

Although the U.S. fertility rate declined to the lowest level in history, single women now make up an increased percentage of those having children. The rapid and very recent rise in births outside marriage means that married women no longer are the exclusive arbiters of fertility. Whereas at mid-century such extramarital births were an insignificant phenomenon, accounting for only 4 percent of all births, by 2000 they accounted for a third of births, and that proportion is rising. Although all groups experienced this change, non-Hispanic whites experienced a slower rise than all other groups. Although some have thought this to be a temporary aberration in historic patterns, the increasing illegitimacy rates in Europe suggest that North America is following modern advanced Western European trends.

In the 1970s, when the issue began to be perceived by the public as one of major concern, it was the teenagers who had the highest rates of births outside marriage, and those births seemed to be rising at the time. But by the end of the century older women’s rates of illegitimacy were highest and rising; those for teenage girls were falling in both relative and absolute numbers. That this increase of births outside marriage was not due to poverty per se can be seen in the fact that the United States was not unique in this new pattern of births and the declining importance of traditional marriage. Other wealthy countries, such as Sweden, have also experienced this trend. Although Sweden in 1950 had fertility patterns comparable to those of the United States, by the end of the century its rate of non-marital births was more than half of all births. Even such Catholic countries as Spain and Portugal had arrived at 16 percent and 22 percent illegitimacy rates, respectively, and France was up to 38 percent by 1996. Thus the belief that this was a temporary or uniquely North American development does not appear to be the case. The factors influencing these trends everywhere in the modern industrial world seem to be the same—late marriages, women increasing their participation in the workforce and thus having higher incomes, and changing beliefs in the importance and necessity of marriage. These changes seem to be affecting all Europe and North America at approximately the same time.

This trend is also reflected in the changing economic role of women even in dual-parent households with children. The traditional family with a single male breadwinner working alone to sustain the family is no longer the norm. By the end of the century, only one in five married couples had just a single male breadwinner working outside the home. Among married couples with children under six years of age, only 36 percent had the mother staying at home with the children and not working, and in families where women had given birth to a child during the previous year, the majority of these mothers at the end of the year were working outside the home—more than half of them in 2000 compared to just under one third in 1967. Not only were more women in the workforce—a ratio that was constantly on the rise through the second half of the century—but the vast majority of married mothers with young children were working outside the home by 2000.

All of these changes are having an impact on U.S. fertility rates. Not only is formal marriage no longer the exclusive arbiter of fertility, but more and more women are reducing the number of children they have. This is not due to women forgoing children. In fact, there has been little change in the number of women going childless, which has remained quite steady for the past 40 years. This decline in fertility is due to the fact that women are deliberately deciding to have fewer children. They are marrying later, thus reducing their marital fertility, they are beginning childbearing at ever later ages, they are spacing their children farther apart, and they are terminating their fertility at earlier ages. Not only did the average age of mothers having their first children rise by 2.7 years from 1960 to 1999, but it rose significantly for every subsequent child being born as well, while the spacing between children also increased. Although the average age of mothers at first birth for the entire population was now 24.9 years, for non-Hispanic white women it was 25.9 years.

Clearly the American family, like all families in the Western industrial countries, is now profoundly different from what it had been in the recorded past. It typically is a household with few children, with both parents working, and with mothers producing their children at ever older ages. At the same time, more adults than ever before are living alone or with unmarried companions and more women than ever before are giving birth out of wedlock. These trends have profoundly changed the American family and are unlikely to be reversed any time soon.

Adapted from chapter 8 of A Population History of the United States, by Herbert S. Klein, published by Cambridge University Press, 2004 (845.353.7500).

View the discussion thread.

Join the Hoover Institution’s community of supporters in ideas advancing freedom.

CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE IN INDIA | Sociology Optional for UPSC Civil Services Examination | Triumph IAS

Table of Contents

CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE IN INDIA

(relevant for sociology syllabus: paper 1 –  systems of kinship:- contemporary trends, family and marriage in india), (relevant for gs syllabus: paper1-  effects of globalization on indian society ).

• Families have both structure and function. Like the skeleton and muscles in a body, the structure is what gives a family it’s size and shape. Also, like organs within the body that perform necessary functions to keep the body working, there are certain necessary functions that keep families healthy. It sees society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability.
• It asserts that our lives are guided by social structures, which are relatively stable patterns of social behaviour. Social structures give shape to our lives – for example, in families, the community, and through religious organizations and certain rituals, or complex religious ceremonies, give structure to our everyday lives. Each social structure has social functions or consequences for the operation of society as a whole.
• Social structures consist of social relationships, as well as any social institutions within a society. One example of a social structure is a social class (upper-class, middle-class, and poor). Another example of a social structure is the different levels of government. Family, religion, law, economy, and class are all social structures.

INDIA AND ITS FAMILY STRUCTURE

• India has a rich family structure with a patrilineal background, which help the family members to sustain a life with kinship groupings. Earlier, mostly joint families were found where family members live together under one roof. They all mutually work, eat, worship and co-operate each other in one or the other way.
• This also helps the family to get strong mentally, physically and economically, the children also get to know about the values and traditions of the society from their grandparents and elders. The family system has given a lot of importance in India and has worked more often to make the bonding among families stronger.
• The family system has given a lot of importance in India and has worked more often to make the bonding among families stronger . Meanwhile, urbanization and westernization had its influence on the basic structure of the Indian family structure. The division of the joint family into smaller units is not the symbol of people rejecting this traditional structure. The circumstances and conditions also made the need for people to split the family.
• The family as a social institution has been undergoing change. Both in its structure and functions changes have taken place. In India, as in many traditional societies, the family has been not only the centre of social and economic life but also the primary source of support for the family members.
• The increasing commercialization of the economy and the development of the infrastructure of the modern state have introduced a significant change in the family structure in India in the 20th century. Especially, the last few decades have witnessed important alterations in family life.
• India’s fertility rate has fallen, and couples have begun to bear children at a later age. At the same time, life expectancy has increased, resulting in more elderly people who need care. All of these changes are taking place in the context of increased urbanization, which is separating children from elders and contributing disintegration of family-based support systems.

FACTORS AFFECTING FAMILY STRUCTURES

• Change in Fertility: An inevitable outcome of declining fertility rates and increasing age at first birth in most of the countries in the world, including India, is a reduction in family size. Fertility declined due to the combined effect of substantial socio-economic development achieved during the last two decades and the effective implementation of family planning programmes.
• Hence, it has become irrational for many people to have large families as the cost of children is increasing. In traditional societies, where human labour was a source of strength to the family, more children were preferred to fewer. But as the economic contribution from the children in a family decreased, because of a move away from agriculture, the need for large numbers of children decreased.
• Improvements in health care and child survival also contributed. The emphasis was on the quality of life rather than the number of children, a new concept added to the family.
• CHANGE IN AGE OF MARRIAGE: In many countries in the world where significant declines infertility are being experienced, reductions in the proportion of people never married have often coincided with or preceded declines in marital fertility. A substantial increase in the proportions never married, among both males and females, at young ages, has been noted in many countries. A consequence of the increase in the proportion of never-married young adults is the gradual upward trend of the average age at marriage. Postponement of marriage among females resulted in the postponement of childbearing with a reduction in family size.
• CHANGE IN MORTALITY : Mortality declines, particularly infant mortality, everywhere preceded the decline of fertility. Improved survival rates of children mean that when women reached the age of 30 they increasingly had achieved the completed family size they desired. Earlier, much larger numbers of births were required to achieve the desired completed family size.
• In the last three decades, infant mortality has declined significantly in every country and this trend undoubtedly influenced the fertility decline. Mortality decline, followed by fertility decline, altered the age structure of the population and also the structure within individual families.
• MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION : It is no longer the case that all marital unions, whether formal or informal reach final dissolution through death. A considerable proportion of unions are disrupted suddenly for reasons such as desertion, separation or divorce. An obvious failure in a family relationship is where husband and wife cease to live together.
• Those women who are divorced at latter ages mostly remain single for the rest of their lives and live with their dependents. The idea that when a couple has children it will be less likely to divorce is widely accepted in most societies. However, it is believed that in the last couple of years even in most of the Asian cultures, including India, a growing proportion of divorces involve couples with young children (Goode 1993).
• PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: The commercialization process which opened markets in many developing countries has succeeded in replacing the traditional co-operation in the economic relationship, with that of competition.
• In this process, the social institutions in these countries found themselves in conflict with the key aspects of the new economic systems. The economics of the family and the sexual division of labour within the family is very much determined by opportunities in the labour market. The developing economies of system India have facilitated the freeing of women from household chores and their entrance to the labour market.
• The declining ability of men to earn a ‘family wage’ along with the growing need for cash for family maintenance has resulted in an increasing number of female members (particularly the wife) in the family engaging in economic activities (Lloyed and Duffy 1995).
• Talcott Parsons, theoretical insights on the family have attracted widest attention and deliberation. Parsons (1954, 1956) argues that modern industrial society has led to the growth of what he calls “isolated nuclear family”. This family is structurally isolated as it does not form an integral part of the wider kinship group.

To master these intricacies and fare well in the  Sociology Optional Syllabus,  aspiring sociologists might benefit from guidance by the  Best Sociology Optional Teacher  and participation in the  Best Sociology Optional Coaching.  These avenues provide comprehensive assistance, ensuring a solid understanding of sociology’s diverse methodologies and techniques.

changing family structure changing family structure, age of marriage, contemporary trends contemporary trends, family and marriage in India family and marriage in India, family planning family planning, family support system family support system, fertility rate fertility rate, globalization globalization, India India, joint family joint family, kinship kinship, marriage dissolution marriage dissolution, mortality mortality, Sociology Sociology, urbanization urbanization, westernization westernization

Why Vikash Ranjan’s Classes for Sociology?

Proper guidance and assistance are required to learn the skill of interlinking current happenings with the conventional topics.  VIKASH RANJAN SIR  at  TRIUMPH IAS  guides students according to the Recent Trends of UPSC, making him the  Best Sociology Teacher  for  Sociology Optional UPSC.

At Triumph IAS, the  Best Sociology Optional Coaching  platform, we not only provide the best study material and applied classes for  Sociology for IAS  but also conduct regular assignments and class tests to assess candidates’ writing skills and understanding of the subject.

Choose  T he Best Sociology Optional Teacher  for IAS Preparation?

At the beginning of the journey for  Civil Services Examination  preparation, many students face a pivotal decision – selecting their optional subject. Questions such as “ which optional subject is the best? ” and “ which optional subject is the most scoring? ” frequently come to mind. Choosing the right optional subject, like choosing the  best sociology optional teacher , is a subjective yet vital step that requires a thoughtful decision based on facts. A misstep in this crucial decision can indeed prove disastrous.

Ever since the exam pattern was revamped in 2013, the UPSC has eliminated the need for a second optional subject. Now, candidates have to choose only one  optional subject for the UPSC Mains , which has two papers of 250 marks each. One of the compelling choices for many has been the sociology optional. However, it’s strongly advised to decide on your optional subject for mains well ahead of time to get sufficient time to complete the syllabus. After all, most students score similarly in General Studies Papers; it’s the score in the optional subject & essay that contributes significantly to the final selection.

“A sound strategy does not rely solely on the popular Opinion of toppers or famous YouTubers cum teachers.”

It requires understanding one’s ability, interest, and the relevance of the subject, not just for the exam but also for life in general. Hence, when selecting the best sociology teacher, one must consider the usefulness of  sociology optional coaching  in  General Studies, Essay, and Personality Test.

The choice of the optional subject should be based on objective criteria, such as the nature, scope, and size of the syllabus, uniformity and stability in the question pattern, relevance of the syllabic content in daily life in society, and the availability of study material and guidance. For example, choosing the  best sociology optional coaching  can ensure access to top-quality study materials and experienced teachers. Always remember, the approach of the UPSC optional subject differs from your academic studies of subjects. Therefore, before settling for  sociology optional , you need to analyze the syllabus, previous years’ pattern, subject requirements (be it ideal, visionary, numerical, conceptual theoretical), and your comfort level with the subject.

This decision marks a critical point in your  UPSC – CSE journey , potentially determining your success in a career in IAS/Civil Services. Therefore, it’s crucial to choose wisely, whether it’s the optional subject or the  best sociology optional teacher . Always base your decision on accurate facts, and never let your emotional biases guide your choices. After all, the search for the  best sociology optional coaching  is about finding the perfect fit for your unique academic needs and aspirations.

Follow us :

🔎 https://www.instagram.com/triumphias

🔎 www.triumphias.com

🔎https://www.youtube.com/c/TriumphIAS

🔎 https://t.me/VikashRanjanSociology

Find More Blogs

194 comments

• Pingback: Children Helping Parents in Selling Articles Not Child Labour | TriumphIAS
• Pingback: SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY- Sociology the Discipline: Relevant for Sociology Paper-1 | TriumphIAS
• Pingback: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE & SOCIETY-Relevant for Sociology Paper-I : Politics & Society - TriumphIAS
• Pingback: Fundamentalism :Relevant for Sociology Paper-I -Religion and Society - TriumphIAS
• Pingback: PAROCHIALISATION AND UNIVERSALISATION - TriumphIAS
• Pingback: Dr. B.R. AMBEDKAR - TriumphIAS
• Pingback: FOLKWAYS, MORES, CUSTOMS, SANCTIONS- Sociology as Science: Relevant for Sociology Paper-1 - TriumphIAS
• Pingback: International Women's Day
• Pingback: Sociology Fundamental Concepts: SOCIETY, CULTURE, ETC.
• Pingback: Understanding Gender Sociology
• Pingback: Gender Bias in American Society
• Pingback: Liberal Feminism: Understanding the Concept and Its Key Principles
• Pingback: Socialist Feminism - Empowering Women through Intersectional Analysis of Gender and Class in Socialist Feminism | A Comprehensive Guide for UPSC Sociology Optional Students
• Pingback: Postmodern Feminism: Challenging Fixed Gender Categories and Embracing Diversity
• Pingback: Feminism: Recognizing Intersectionality and Building Solidarity
• Pingback: Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage and Sociological Perspectives on Divorce in India
• Pingback: Hunger in India: Causes, Impacts and Ways to Address the Problem
• Pingback: Bhutan Relationship: Present Status, Challenges, and Importance for India
• Pingback: Understanding the Landscape of Work & Economy in India: Industrial Development to Organizational Structures
• Pingback: Understanding the Role and Challenges of Cooperative Societies in India
• Pingback: Data Governance: Navigating the Landscape of Data Governance
• Pingback: Karl Marx and the Dialectics of Historical Materialism
• Pingback: Understanding Military Ethics: Just War Theory and Beyond
• Pingback: Contribution and Criticism of Historical Materialism to Sociological Theory
• Pingback: Ethics in Public Relations: Guiding Principles and Unethical Practices
• Pingback: Addressing Malnutrition in India: Enhancing Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)
• Pingback: Understanding Self-Concept through Symbolic Interactionism
• Pingback: Harnessing the Potential of India's Electronics Manufacturing Industry
• Pingback: Distinguishing Leaders, Administrators, and Reformers: Impact on Human Values
• Pingback: Understanding Talcott Parsons' Pattern Variables in Role Theory
• Pingback: Harnessing India's Demographic Dividend: Opportunities, Challenges, and Strategic Reforms.
• Pingback: Role of Parents and Teachers in Child Development. Roles of a Good Parent
• Pingback: Managers vs Leaders: Unraveling the Contrast for Organizational Success | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Father's Role in Child's Development: An Integral Role in Shaping a Child's Future | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Economic Data: Its Pivotal Role and Challenges in Policy Making and the Impact of ESG Considerations | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Essential Values for Civil Service: Foundation for Effective Public Service | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Empowering Women in IP | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Understanding Attitude: An In-depth Study of its Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioural Components | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Attitudes and Behavior: Unraveling Social Influence and Public Service Values | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Defence Diplomacy : A Deep Dive into India's Growing Defence Strategy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Bridging the Gap of Public Administration: Enhancing the Relationship between the Public and Administration in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: E-Waste Management in India: Challenges, Practices and the Road to Sustainability | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Understanding the Definition of the Situation: Role in Social Order and Symbolic Interaction | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Cooperative Based Economic Development: Empowering the Cooperative Movement | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Exploring Deprivation: Unveiling Social Inequality and the Path towards Inclusivity | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Unpacking Freebie Politics: Implications for Economy and Sustainable Development | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Methodology in Sociology | Sociology Optional for UPSC Civil Services Examination | Triumph IAS #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Women's Health in India: Priorities, Challenges, and Initiatives | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Unraveling the Depth of Interpretive and Qualitative Approaches in Sociology | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Bureau of Police Research and Development: Its Role in National Security | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Striving for Enhanced Road Safety: Global Goals, Indian Measures and the Way Forward | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Symbolic Interactionism Sociology: Understanding Human Behavior through Meaningful Symbols and Social Interaction | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Life quality should be Great Rather than long | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Phenomenology: The Art of Understanding Social Reality through Personal Perception. | Sociology Optional for UPSC Civil Services Examination | Triumph IAS #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Casteism, Communalism, Regionalism: Understanding the Challenges to India's Development: Understanding the Challenges to India's Development | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Ethnomethodology: Understanding Social Order, Indexicality, and the Documentary Method | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Simplicity is the Ultimate Sophistication: A Deep Dive into the Art of Simplicity | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Shadow of Internet Shutdowns: Causes, Impacts, and Arguments in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Feminist Methodology: Approaches, Criticisms, and Transformations in Sociological Research | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Infrastructure Development: The Cornerstone of Economic Growth | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Ethical Research Principles and Related Concerns: A Comprehensive Overview | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Becoming a Woman: Exploring Gender Beyond Biology | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Reliability and Validity in Research: A Comparative Analysis of Quantitative and Qualitative Methods | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Imperative of Gender-Responsive Urban Planning in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Insights into Case Studies and Life Histories in Sociological Research | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Understanding Sampling Methods in Sociological Research | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Unity in Diversity: The Essence of India's Composite Culture | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Understanding Social Surveys: Types, Methods, and Importance | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Blue Revolution: Enhancing India's Fisheries Sector for Economic Growth | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Joy is The Simplest Form of Gratitude | Keval N Mehta Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 206
• Pingback: Swati Sharma Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 15
• Pingback: Historical Sources: Understanding Their Significance and Types in Sociology | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Balancing Privileges and Principles: The Key to Ethical Living | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Gunjita Agarwal Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 26
• Pingback: Inclusive Growth Economics: Elements, Challenges, and Its Significance in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Maniya Verma Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 258
• Pingback: Understanding El Niño and La Niña: Effects on Global Climate and Indian Monsoon | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Navigating Economic Challenges for India's Future Growth | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Communalism & Casteism: Challenges to the national integration. | Kritika Goyal Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 14
• Pingback: Methodology, Values, and Objectivity in Sociological Research | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Combining Methods and Triangulation in Sociological Research | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Climate Change: Challenges for Women Farmers in Agriculture | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Tug of War Between Individual Rationality and Collective Insanity | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP): Insights and Significance | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Internet is becoming the town square for the global village of tomorrow | Yash Kumar Sharma Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 196
• Pingback: Understanding Growth and Development: Concepts and Challenges | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Himanshu Bhaskar Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 Rank 308
• Pingback: Globalizing Indian society Myth or reality | Jarad Partik Anil Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 112
• Pingback: Understanding Poverty in India: Causes, Estimation, and Challenges | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Mauryan Art and Architecture: A Remarkable Legacy of Ancient India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Addressing Crime Against Minors: Causes, Impact, and Solutions | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Sufism in India: A Historical Overview of Major Sufi Orders and Their Influence | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Various Forms of Environmental Movement | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The lack of money is the root of all evil | Anirudha Pandey Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 64
• Pingback: Immanuel Kant and Deontological Ethics: Understanding the Categorical Imperative and Moral Philosophy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Sanskriti Somani UPSC | An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind | Sanskriti Somani UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 49
• Pingback: Maniya Verma UPSC Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 258
• Pingback: The Golden Age of Gupta Empire: Artistic Legacy and Cultural Impact | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Tackling Food Inflation in India: Supply Chain Challenges and Solutions | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Urban Heat Island Effect: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Urban Planning in the Indus Valley Civilization: Its Modern Relevance | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Dynamics of Attitude Change: Affective, Behavioral, and Cognitive Components | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Positive Attitude in Civil Servants: Why It Matters and How to Cultivate It | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Caste Census in India: A Comprehensive Guide to its History, Importance, and Challenges Sociology Optional UPSC | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Green Gold: Forests as Blueprints for Economic Brilliance | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Financial Inclusion in India: Challenges and Pathways to a More Inclusive Economy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Black Carbon: The Unseen Threat to Glaciers and Climate in the Himalayas | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Exploring Cultural Relativism: A Balanced View on Ethics, Morality, and Social Norms | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: India-Africa Relations: Navigating Challenges and Opportunities in a Time of Turmoil | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Explain Leela Dube Concept of Seed and Earth: Gender Construction in Hindu Society? | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Clash of Perspectives: Science's Triumphs over Romanticism in History | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Exploring Conscience: A Deep Dive into Joseph Butler's Perspective and Its Critiques | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Unlocking Earth's Secrets: The Role of Seismic Waves in Understanding Earth's Interior Layers | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Role of Ecology and Environment in Sustained Economic Development | Keval N Mehta Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 206 | Keval N Mehta Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 206
• Pingback: Hidden Blunders: The Environmental and Cultural Crisis Ravaging the Himalayas | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Development in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Central Information Commission: The Guardian of Right to Information in India| #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Beyond Comfort Zones: Embracing Life's True Voyage | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Pillars of Social Ethics: A Guide to Navigating Complex Societal Dynamics | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: In the context of changing Indian society, how do you view Andre Beteille’s conceptions of harmonic and disharmonic social structures? | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Abhinav Siwach Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 12
• Pingback: Sociological Analysis of Freebies as a Political Tool in UPSC Sociology Optional Paper | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Swati Sharma Air 15 UPSC Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 Rank 15 | Copy 12
• Pingback: Navigating the Complex Terrain of Integrity Pact in India's Public Procurement | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Unlocking the Potential of Organic Fertilizers in India's Agricultural Sector | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Treaty of Versailles: A Comprehensive Look at Its Lasting Impacts on Global History | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Sociological Analysis Demand of Scheduled Castes Status BY MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS UPSC Sociology | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Ranjit Guha’s Approach to Subaltern Studies: Significance and Criticisms | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: PM-PRANAM Scheme: A Turning Point for India's Fertilizer Subsidies and Sustainable Agriculture? | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Sanskriti Somani Copy | No Culture can live if it attempts to be exclusive | UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 49
• Pingback: Green Chemistry and Its Role in Transforming Agrarian India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Sociological Analysis of Artificial Intelligence: Benefits, Concerns, and Future Implications | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Moderate Phase of Indian Nationalism: Goals, Leaders, and Legacy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Significance of Emotional Intelligence in Administration | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Gunjita Agarwal UPSC Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 26 | Copy 14
• Pingback: The Sociology of Gotra and Its Complex Relationship with the Caste System in India - TriumphIAS
• Pingback: Climate Change: A Sociological Analysis of Causes, Impacts, and Solutions | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Food Processing Sector in India: Challenges, Opportunities, and Impact on Farmers | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Same-Sex Marriage in India: Legal Challenges, Societal Impact, and Government's Stand | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Post-1857 Revolt: Transformations in Indian Governance and British Colonial Strategy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Role and Influence of Pressure Groups in Modern Governance | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Manan Bhat Sociology Copy | No Culture can live if it attempts to be exclusive | UPSC CSE 2022
• Pingback: Earthquake Swarms: Characteristics, Foreshocks, and Aftershocks | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Evolution of Indian Bronze Sculpture: The Golden Age of Chola Artistry | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Tackling the Crisis of Malnutrition in India: Causes, Effects, and Solutions | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: S.V Siva Prakash IRS UPSC Soicology | March of the Science and Erosion of Human Values | UPSC CSE 2022
• Pingback: Dikshita Joshi UPSC Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 58 | Copy 16
• Pingback: New Education Policy 2020: Sociological Significance of Vocationalization and Skill Development in Indian Education | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Current affairs 12 Sep 2023 Important News | for GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Indian Caste System: A Challenge and Opportunity for Sociology in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Rajat Yadav | Infrastructure investment, in science is an investment in jobs, in health, in economic growth, and developmental solutions | Copy UPSC CSE 2022 RANK 111
• Pingback: S.C. Dube's Contributions and Criticisms in the Study of Indian Villages | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Navigating the Challenges and Impacts of the Digital India Program on the Indian Economy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Louis Dumont's Ideological Focus in Understanding Indian Society through HOMO HIERARCHICUS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Inclusion of the African Union in the G20: Implications and Prospects Under India’s Presidency | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Current affairs 14 Sep 2023 Important News | for GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Comparing M.N. Srinivas and S.C. Dube: Diverse Perspectives on Indian Village Life UPSC Sociology | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: The Role of Indian Saints in Social Reforms and Awareness: An Exploration Based on G.S. Ghurye’s Indian Sadhus| #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Download Essay Paper 2023 UPSC Mains Essay Question Paper | Triumph IAS
• Pingback: Communalism in India: A Detailed Sociological Analysis and the Role of Media | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Synthetic Human Embryos: Navigating the Ethical and Regulatory Labyrinth of Biotechnology’s Newest Frontier | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Interlinking of Rivers in India: Boon or Bane for Indian Agriculture | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Download GS 1 Paper 2023 UPSC Mains GS 1 Question Paper | Triumph IAS
• Pingback: Current affairs 16 Sep 2023 Important News | for GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Carbon Markets: A Comprehensive Guide to Emission Trading and India's Strategy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Current affairs 18 Sep 2023 Important News | for GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Ethical Dimensions and Reform Strategies for Addressing Police Misconduct and Brutality | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Current affairs 19 Sep 2023 Important News | for GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Download Sociology Paper 1 2023 | Triumph IAS - TriumphIAS
• Pingback: Current affairs 20 Sep 2023 Important News | for GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Gender Disparity in Science: A Deep Dive into India’s Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar Prize | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Ethical Challenges and Best Practices in Digital Privacy and Data Security for the Public Sector | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Air Pollution in India: A Looming Crisis Impacting Health and Life Expectancy | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Swati Sharma UPSC Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 Rank 15
• Pingback: Himanshu Bhaskar UPSC | Sociology Test Copy UPSC CSE 2022 Rank 308
• Pingback: Download Sociology Paper 1 2023 | Triumph IAS [Paper-1 : SOCIOLOGY OPTIONAL ] : UPSC MAINS CIVIL SERVICES IAS EXAM 2023 QUESTION PAPER
• Pingback: Download Sociology Paper 2 2023 | Triumph IAS [Paper-2 : SOCIOLOGY OPTIONAL ] : UPSC MAINS CIVIL SERVICES IAS EXAM 2023 QUESTION PAPER
• Pingback: Sociology Paper 1 2023 | 24 SEP 2023 | Triumph IAS UPSC MAINS CIVIL SERVICES IAS EXAM 2023 QUESTION PAPER
• Pingback: Download Sociology Paper 2023 | Triumph IAS [Paper-2 : SOCIOLOGY OPTIONAL ] : UPSC MAINS CIVIL SERVICES IAS EXAM 2023 QUESTION PAPER
• Pingback: Empowering Urban Poor: BSUP and IHSD Programs in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Ethical Standards in Public Service: Challenges and Solutions | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Current affairs 26 Sep 2023 Important News | for GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Current Affairs 27 Sep 2023 Important News | GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Strengthening India-France Ties: A Look at the 25-Year Strategic Partnership | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Distinctiveness of the Feminist Method in Social Research: Features and Contributions | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: UPSC CSE 2023 ESSAY TOPICS
• Pingback: Current Affairs 28 Sep 2023 Important News | GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Mediation Act 2023: Hope for Judicial Reform in India | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Current Affairs 29 Sep 2023 Important News | GS | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Understanding Durkheim's Four Types of Suicide: Egoistic, Altruistic, Anomic, and Fatalistic
• Pingback: Ethics of Space Exploration and Commercialization: Balancing Challenges and Opportunities | #1 Best Sociology Optional Coaching
• Pingback: Sociology Paper 2 2023 | 24 SEP 2023 | Triumph IAS [Paper-2 : SOCIOLOGY OPTIONAL ] : UPSC MAINS CIVIL SERVICES IAS EXAM 2023 QUESTION PAPER
• Pingback: MARRIAGE IN INDIA - TriumphIAS

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

More From Forbes

The future of e-commerce: trends to watch in 2024.

• Share to Facebook
• Share to Twitter
• Share to Linkedin

Denis Sinelnikov is the CEO of Media Components and Curis Digital, an award-winning, full-service digital marketing agency.

E-commerce is a dynamic industry that has transformed the way we shop and conduct business. With rapid advancements in technology and changing consumer preferences, your business must stay ahead of the curve to remain competitive.

Several emerging trends are set to reshape e-commerce in 2024. I’ll focus on the ones that are worth keeping an eye on this year and then share some tips for taking advantage of them.

Which Trends To Watch

Augmented reality shopping experiences.

AR enables customers to have immersive shopping experiences from the comfort of their homes. It allows them to visualize products in a real-world context, making informed decisions before making a purchase. Ikea has been using AR technology with its app for a few years now , proving that it isn’t merely a short-lived fad.

Ikea doesn’t have to be an outlier. We have the frameworks to apply AR technology to e-commerce on a broader scale than we currently do. TikTok and Instagram filters alone prove that we can do this easily, and relatively inexpensively. What we need is for companies that can most benefit from this tech—salons, clothing retailers and more furniture and home improvement retailers—to provide this interactive and engaging shopping experience.

Blockchain For Supply Chain Transparency

Blockchain technology is not new to the e-commerce industry, but its application is evolving. While we tend to think of blockchain in terms of cryptocurrency and NFTs, it has more potential uses. A blockchain is an append-only ledger, meaning that data can be added to the chain but not removed. The accountants and security professionals among you undoubtedly recognize the term and can immediately see the transparency a blockchain ledger can provide.

Logistics companies could greatly benefit from a blockchain ledger. It would provide transparency to their shipping clients and improve communication with their contracted owner/operators. The benefits could even extend to the customers of their clients, who could use the blockchain to provide real-time updates for restocking and shipments.

Customized Loyalty Programs

Personalization has been a hallmark of e-commerce; however, its scope has been historically limited to cross-selling through product recommendations. In 2024, I want to see us bring personalization further as retailers harness data analytics and AI. This could involve large retailers offering more personalized content to users and allowing users to customize loyalty programs to meet their specific shopping habits and needs. Ultimately, increased personalization can forge stronger connections between brands and their customers.

Eco-Friendly E-Commerce

The focus on sustainability and eco-friendliness has gained momentum in recent years. In 2024, this trend will likely intensify in the e-commerce industry. Customers expect e-commerce platforms to offer eco-friendly options, reduce packaging waste and embrace sustainable practices. I want to see retailers align with these values to improve their businesses and gain a competitive edge in the market.

Stronger Security And Privacy Measures

In 2024, I see consumers gravitating toward platforms that prioritize their personal data security, and governments are likely to introduce more stringent regulations. Retailers must invest in advanced security technologies and adopt transparent practices to build trust with their customers.

More Personalized Subscription Models

Subscription services have become increasingly popular in the e-commerce industry, but in 2024, I expect retailers will offer subscriptions tailored to individual preferences, not only in terms of product selection but also in the frequency and timing of deliveries. These highly customized subscription models can enhance customer loyalty and supply a steady revenue stream for businesses.

Taking Advantage Of The 2024 Trends

Knowing the trends isn’t enough. The companies that will rise to the top in 2024 are the ones that position themselves to implement them successfully. We are well past the era of “move fast and break things.” This needs to be the year that you build consumer trust as you take advantage of these trends.

The Considerations

Before you begin jumping on these trends, you need to consider which ones fit your brand, your industry and your customer needs. Ask yourself questions before you start looking at bringing these trends into your e-commerce strategy. Here are some key questions to get you started:

• Who is our consistent customer base, and what keeps them loyal?

• What new markets do we want to expand into this year?

• What security measures do we have in place for customer data, financial data and company data?

• What weaknesses do we have in our security?

• How are we collecting data, and are we continuing to receive valuable information on customers and leads?

• Which trends match our company vision, goals and culture?

• What is our process for converting leads to customers, and how do these trends fit into this process?

The Technology

Once you have an idea of what trends you want to implement and what roadblocks may be ahead of you, let’s look at what you will need to have in place to make these trends work for you.

• Have a solid data collection strategy and software. Several of the strategies I’ve discussed revolve around customer data. If you don’t have a reliable program that can run reports, monitor customer activity and interpret data, you will fall behind on these trends. Tools like Qualtrics that use AI can help companies not only capture information but use it to create the personalized experiences consumers want.

• Improve your data encryption and security. No matter how good your current security is, you need to improve it this year. Because so many of these trends rely on consumer habits and customer data, it’s more important than ever that you can safeguard that data. Not only will the increased security improve consumer trust in your brand, but it will also protect that valuable data from competitors.

• Invest in AI technology. Investing in AI tools for security, data collection and analysis and customer service interactions is a vital step to help you take advantage of each trend we have looked at here.

E-commerce in 2024 is characterized by several trends that I expect to reshape the industry. From the integration of augmented reality and blockchain for transparency to subscription models with increased personalization and a heightened focus on sustainability, e-commerce is set to offer customers innovative and socially responsible shopping experiences. By figuring out which trends best fit their brand and then investing in technology to enable them, businesses can navigate the e-commerce world of 2024 with confidence and enthusiasm.

Forbes Agency Council is an invitation-only community for executives in successful public relations, media strategy, creative and advertising agencies. Do I qualify?

• Editorial Standards
• Reprints & Permissions

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• Eur J Popul
• v.33(2); 2017 May

Family Dynamics and Child Outcomes: An Overview of Research and Open Questions

Juho härkönen.

1 Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

Fabrizio Bernardi

2 Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy

Diederik Boertien

3 Centre for Demographic Studies, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Carrer de Ca n’Altayó, Edifici E2, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain

Previous research has documented that children who do not live with both biological parents fare somewhat worse on a variety of outcomes than those who do. In this article, which is the introduction to the Special Issue on “Family dynamics and children’s well-being and life chances in Europe,” we refine this picture by identifying variation in this conclusion depending on the family transitions and subpopulations studied. We start by discussing the general evidence accumulated for parental separation and ask whether the same picture emerges from research on other family transitions and structures. Subsequently, we review studies that have aimed to deal with endogeneity and discuss whether issues of causality challenge the general picture of family transitions lowering child well-being. Finally, we discuss whether previous evidence finds effects of family transitions on child outcomes to differ between children from different socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds, and across countries and time-periods studied. Each of the subsequent articles in this Special Issue contributes to these issues. Two articles provide evidence on how several less often studied family forms relate to child outcomes in the European context. Two other articles in this Special Issue contribute by resolving several key questions in research on variation in the consequences of parental separation by socioeconomic and immigrant background, two areas of research that have produced conflicting results so far.

Introduction

The recent decades of family change—including the increases in divorce and separation rates, single parenthood, cohabitation, and step family formation—led to an explosion in popular and academic interest in the consequences of family dynamics for children’s well-being and life chances (cf. Amato 2000 , 2010 ; Amato and James 2010 ; Ribar 2004 ; Sweeney 2010 ; McLanahan et al. 2013 ). Most notably, previous studies have found that children who do not live with both biological parents fare somewhat worse than those who do in terms of psychological well-being, health, schooling, and later labor market attainment, and differ with respect to their own family lives in adulthood. Scholars have interpreted these findings through a relatively small group of factors that include parental and children’s stress associated with family transitions, family conflict, changes in economic resources, and parenting styles. Beyond these established findings, however, several questions remain imperfectly answered.

This Special Issue on “Family Dynamics and Children’s Well-Being and Life Chances in Europe” consists of this introductory article and four empirical studies that address some of these open questions. In general, they give more nuance to the overall association between growing up with both biological parents and child outcomes. More precisely, do these associations differ according to the type of family structure studied? Are these differences in child outcomes due to causal effects of family structures and transitions, or do they reflect preexisting disadvantages between families? And finally, are all children equally affected by family structures and transitions?

In this introduction, we first introduce the theme of family dynamics and children’s outcomes by giving an overview of the findings of parental separation and child outcomes (Sect.  2 ). Parental separation has been the family transition that has attracted most attention among social scientists, and many of our examples later in the article consider this research too. In addition to summarizing the evidence on the relationship between parental separation and psychological well-being, education, social relationships, and own family lives, we discuss how parental separations have been conceptualized, an issue we return to in the subsequent sections.

Parental separation is, however, just one of the family transitions children can experience during their childhoods. The first open question that in our view requires more attention regards the effects of these other family transitions and forms, namely the number of transitions, stepfamilies, and joint residential custody after parental separation (Sect.  3 ). Two of the articles in this Special Issue contribute to this stream of research. Mariani et al. ( 2017 ) present the first European analysis of the effects of family trajectories on children born to lone mothers. Radl et al. ( 2017 ) investigate, in addition to parental separation effects, whether co-residing with siblings or grandparents is related to child outcomes and whether the latter condition the former effects.

The second open question concerns the causal status of the estimated effects (Sect.  4 ): Do family structures and their changes really affect child outcomes, or do the associations reflect some unmeasured underlying factors? This question has attracted deserved attention (e.g., Amato 2000 ; Ribar 2004 ; McLanahan et al. 2013 ), and we review some commonly used methods, using the effects of parental separation as our example. We pay attention to what effects the methods can estimate, in addition to assessing which unobserved variables the different methods adjust for. This discussion highlights the importance of thinking about methodological choices and interpretations of the results in light of the underlying theoretical model of parental separation. The article in this Special Issue by Bernardi and Boertien ( 2017 ) provides also an empirical contribution to this field.

Finally, the last question refers to the heterogeneity in the effects of family dynamics: Are the consequences of parental separation and other family transitions similar for all children? Existing evidence suggests that the answer is no (Amato 2000 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ), but the conclusions about who suffers and who does not remain imperfect, as discussed in Sect.  5 . Three of the articles of this Special Issue analyze these questions, one from a cross-national perspective (Radl et al. 2017 ), one by comparing parental separation effects by socioeconomic background (Bernardi and Boertien 2017 ), and one by immigrant background (Erman and Härkönen 2017 ).

In the final section of this introduction (Sect.  6 ), we discuss some ways forward for future research on family dynamics and children’s outcomes. Two articles in this Special Issue fulfill part of this research agenda by providing evidence on how several less often studied family forms relate to child outcomes in the European context (Mariani et al. 2017 ; Radl et al. 2017 ). The two other articles in this Special Issue (Bernardi and Boertien 2017 ; Erman and Härkönen 2017 ) contribute to the research on heterogeneous consequences of parental separation by clarifying some open questions regarding variation in these consequences by socioeconomic and immigrant background.

Parental Separation and Children’s Outcomes

In the 2000s, the share of children who experienced their parents’ separation before age 15 ranged from 10 to 12% in countries such as Bulgaria, Georgia, Italy, and Spain to 35–42% in France, Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia (Andersson et al., forthcoming). In the late 1980s/early 1990s, the corresponding figures ranged from 7 to 30% (Italy and Sweden, respectively, Andersson and Philipov 2002 ).

Parental separation changes children’s lives in many ways. Many scholars conceptualize separations as processes, which often begin way before and last well beyond the actual separation (e.g., Amato 2000 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ; Härkönen 2014 ), even if these starting and ending points can be hard to define. The pre-separation process often involves increasing estrangement and conflict between the parents. These can themselves have negative effects on children’s well-being, and parental separation might therefore already start leaving its traces even before the parents have formally broken up. Not all separations follow such a trajectory. Some families may have had long-lasting conflicts, and other separations might have ended relatively well-functioning partnerships with at least moderate levels of satisfaction (Amato and Hohmann-Marriott 2007 ). The parental separation can in such cases come as an unexpected event for children.

As a result of the separation, children cease to live full-time with both parents, which requires adjustment to the new situation and can start, intensify, or end exposure to parental conflict (Amato 2010 ; Cherlin 1999 ; Pryor and Rodgers 2001 ). Even if joint residential custody of the child post-separation (i.e., children’s alternate living with each parent) is becoming increasingly common, up to one-third and above in Sweden (Bergström et al. 2015 ), the child often receives less involved parenting from the nonresident parent (usually the father), whereas the resident parent’s (usually the mother’s) parenting styles can be affected by increasing time demands (Amato 2000 , 2010 ; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994 ; Seltzer 2000 ). Besides changes in family relationships, a breakup of a household can lead to a drop in economic resources (e.g., Uunk 2004 ). Depending on the country, separated parents may need to adjust their labor supply to meet their new time and economic demands (Kalmijn et al. 2007 ; Uunk 2004 ). Many children also need to move after their parents’ separation, which requires adjustment to a new home environment and possibly a new neighborhood and school. A separation can be followed by further changes in the family structure, such as parental re-partnering, entry of step-siblings, and sometimes, another family dissolution.

Several studies have documented that on average, the lives of children whose parents separated differ from children who lived with both of their parents throughout childhood (Amato 2000 , 2010 ; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994 ; McLanahan et al. 2013 ; Härkönen 2014 ). In the next paragraphs, we provide an overview of the associations of parental separation with some of the most commonly studied child outcomes: psychological well-being and behavioral problems, education, social relationships, and own family lives. In the subsequent sections, we will refine this basic picture by concentrating on other family forms, causality, and heterogeneity in effects.

Psychological Well-Being and Behavioral Problems

Children of divorce have lower psychological well-being and more behavioral problems than children who grew up in intact families (Amato 2001 ; Amato and James 2010 ; Gähler and Palmtag 2015 ; Kiernan and Mensah 2009 ; Mandemakers and Kalmijn 2014 ). In general, parental separation is more strongly related to externalizing than internalizing problems (Amato 2001 ), and these associations can persist, and even become stronger, into adulthood (Chase-Lansdale et al. 1995 ; Cherlin et al. 1991 ; Lansford 2009 ).

Growing up in a conflict-ridden but stable family can have more negative effects on children’s psychological well-being than parental separation (e.g., Amato et al. 1995 ; Dronkers 1999 ; Hanson 1999 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ). Kiernan and Mensah ( 2009 ) found a role for both maternal depression and economic resources when explaining the lower emotional well-being of children from separated families, whereas Turunen ( 2013 ) found that parental involvement explained part of the lower emotional well-being of children with separated parents, but economic resources did not.

Children of divorce have lower school grades and test scores (Dronkers 1992 ; Mandemakers and Kalmijn 2014 ; Grätz 2015 ), have lower school engagement (Havermans et al. 2014 ), differ in the kind of track entered in high school (Dronkers 1992 ; Jonsson and Gähler 1997 ; Grätz 2015 ), and have lower final educational attainment (Bernardi and Radl 2014 ; Bernardi and Boertien 2016a ; Gähler and Palmtag 2015 ).

Lower school grades and cognitive performance explain part, but not all of the effect of parental separation on completed education (Dronkers 1992 ). A recent study found that British children of divorce were less likely to continue to full-time upper secondary education even though the parental separation did not affect their school grades (Bernardi and Boertien 2016a ). Parental separation can therefore affect the children’s educational decisions irrespective of their school performance.

Changes in parental resources are an important explanation for the lower educational performance of the children of divorce (Bernardi and Boertien 2016a ; Jonsson and Gähler 1997 ; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994 ; Thomson et al. 1994 ). Studies that have looked into the role of parenting have found differing results, some reporting that parenting partly mediates the effect of separation on educational attainment, while others found parenting to not influence the relationship between parental divorce and school outcomes (Dronkers 1992 ).

Social Relationships

Despite the increase in shared residential custody (Bjarnason and Arnarsson 2011 ), parental separation generally reduces the child’s contact frequency and relationship quality with the nonresident parent (usually the father), with grandparents and, sometimes, the mother (e.g., Kalmijn 2012 ; Kalmijn and Dronkers 2015 ; Lansford 2009 ). These effects can last into adulthood (Albertini and Garriga 2011 ; Kalmijn 2012 ). Joint residential custody, good inter-parental relations, and good early child-father relations can improve post-separation contact with the father (Kalmijn 2015 ; Kalmijn and Dronkers 2015 ). On the other hand, parental separation can improve the relationships between siblings due to mutual support (Geser 2001 ), but does not seem to trigger more support from friends and other kin (Kalmijn and Dronkers 2015 ).

Good parent–child relationships are desirable by themselves and can also improve other child outcomes (Bastaits et al. 2012 ; Swiss and Le Bourdais 2009 ). For example, having a close relationship with the nonresident parent who engages in authoritative parenting has been found to foster children’s well-being and academic success (Amato and Gilbreth 1999 ). At the same time, contact frequency alone is less important and in some cases, the nonresident parent’s involvement may have negative effects if it increases instability and stress for the child (Laumann-Billings and Emery 2000 ), for example due to continued parental conflict (Kalil et al. 2011 ).

Own Family Lives

Children of divorce tend to start dating and have their sexual initiation earlier (Wolfinger 2005 ) and many move out of the parental home at a younger age (e.g., Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2000 ; Ongaro and Mazzuco 2009 ), often because of conflict with parents and their potential new partners (Wolfinger 2005 ). Some studies have also found that children of divorce start cohabiting earlier, are more likely to cohabit than to marry, and have partners of lower socioeconomic status (Erola et al. 2012 ; Reneflot 2009 ; but see also Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2000 ).

The most consistent family demographic finding is that children whose parents divorced are more likely to divorce themselves as adults (e.g., Diekmann and Engelhardt 1999 ; Dronkers and Härkönen 2008 ; Kiernan and Cherlin 1999 ; Lyngstad and Engelhardt 2009 ; Wolfinger 2005 ). Differences in the life course trajectories before forming the union explain part of this association (Diekmann and Engelhardt 1999 ; Kiernan and Cherlin 1999 ). Other studies have pointed out that parental separation can lead to poorer interpersonal skills and set an example of a feasible solution to relationship problems (Wolfinger 2005 ).

What About Other Family Forms?

We have so far focused on parental separation and its relation to child outcomes. Parental separation is not the only family transition children can experience. Between <5% (much of Europe) and up to 15% (Czech Republic, Russia, UK, and USA) of children are born to lone mothers (Andersson et al., forthcoming; Mariani et al. 2017 , this Special Issue). Furthermore, between 14% (Italy and Georgia) and 60% (Belgium) of European children whose parents separate end up living with a stepparent within 6 years (Andersson et al., forthcoming) and often, with step-siblings (Halpern-Meekin and Tach 2008 ). Children’s residence arrangements likewise vary, with some residing primarily with one parent (usually the mother), whereas others alternate between parents (joint residential custody). Extending the focus of research beyond parental separation is necessary to form a more comprehensive view of the effects of the changing family landscape on children’s lives (King 2009 ; Sweeney 2010 ). 1

One argument puts forward that family stability rather than family structure matters for children’s well-being (cf. Fomby and Cherlin 2007 ; Waldfogel et al. 2010 ). From this perspective, children born to lone mothers who do not experience any family transitions during their childhood (such as the entrance of a stepparent) should do better than children who were born in a two-parent family but experienced a family transition (such as parental separation). Others claim that specific family forms and movements between them do matter beyond general family instability (Magnuson and Berger 2009 ; Lee and McLanahan 2015 ). The findings of Mariani et al. ( 2017 , this Special Issue) are among those that speak against the general instability thesis and show that the types of family transitions experienced by children born to lone mothers matter for their well-being.

Stepfamilies have gained the attention of many scholars. Children in stepfamilies tend to have poorer outcomes compared to those from intact families and display patterns of well-being closer to single-parent families (Amato 1994 , 2001 ; Gennetian 2005 ; Jonsson and Gähler 1997 ; Thomson et al. 1994 ). Indeed, children in stepfamilies can even have lower psychological well-being and educational achievement than children living with a single mother (Amato 1994 ; Biblarz and Raftery 1999 ; Thomson et al. 1994 ).

Reasons for the poorer performance of children with stepparents include the added complexity in family relationships that is often introduced by the presence of a stepparent. This can lead to ambiguity in roles and to conflict in the family (Thomson et al. 1994 ; Sweeney 2010 ), which is among the reasons why having a stepparent often leads to an earlier move from the parental home, especially among girls (Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2000 ; Reneflot 2009 ). Another explanation points to the presence of step-siblings as stepparents may put less time and effort into their stepchildren than their biological ones (Biblarz and Raftery 1999 ; Evenhouse and Reilly 2004 ). However, having a stepparent can also have positive effects as (s)he can provide financial resources or help in monitoring the children (Thomson et al. 1994 ; King 2006 ; Sweeney 2010 ). Erola and Jalovaara ( 2016 ) showed how a stepparent’s SES was more predictive on adulthood SES than the nonresident father’s SES, and as predictive as the biological father’s SES in intact families. All in all, the effects of step-parenthood are complex and can differ between children who experienced a parental separation and those who never lived with their biological father (Sweeney 2010 ).

The increase in joint residential custody after parental separation has raised interest in its consequences for children. Many studies have reported that children in joint residential custody fare better than children who reside with only one of the parents (usually the mother) on outcomes such as health and psychological well-being, and contact and relationships with their parents and grandparents (Bjarnason and Arnarsson 2011 ; Turunen 2016 ; Westphal et al. 2015 ). However, questions of causality remain unresolved and parents who opt for joint custody might have been particularly selected from those with higher socioeconomic status and lower levels of post-separation conflict. Indeed, many studies find that joint custody may have negative consequences for children in case of high parental conflict (e.g., Vanassche et al. 2014 ; also, Kalil et al. 2011 ). This suggests that policy changes toward joint custody as a default solution may produce unwanted consequences.

But What About Causality?

There is a long-standing debate that concerns whether associations between family types and child outcomes reflect causal effects, or whether they are confounded by unmeasured variables. For example, parents who separate can have different (unmeasured) personality traits from those who do not. Other examples include parental unemployment, mental health, or a developing substance abuse problem, which may not only lead to separation, but also affect the parent’s children.

Researchers have used increasingly sophisticated methods to control for different unmeasured sources of bias (for reviews, Amato 2000 , 2010 ; Ribar 2004 ; McLanahan et al. 2013 ). In this section, we discuss some of these methods. We focus on studies that have estimated the effects of parental separation, which serves to illustrate some of the questions involved.

Like most similar reviews, we discuss which (un)measured confounders can be controlled for by the different methods and provide examples of studies that have used them. We also discuss some of the limitations to causal inference in these methods, particularly in light of the underlying theoretical model of parental separation that is assumed. Above, we discussed how parental separations are often theorized as processes that can follow quite different trajectories for different families (Amato 2000 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ; Härkönen 2014 ). Some separations are characterized by a downward spiral of increasing conflict, which can leave its mark on children already before the parents physically separate. Other separations end relatively well-functioning families and can come as a surprise to the children, whereas in some cases the families had high conflict levels for a long time. In this section, we discuss causal inference in light of these underlying models. In the next section, we discuss how these different types of parental separations can have different effects on children.

In addition, we engage in a related but much smaller discussion of what causal questions the different methods can be used to answer (cf., Manski et al. 1992 ; Ní Bhrolcháin 2001 ; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 ). A major issue in this regard concerns the counterfactual scenario assumed by different methods. In most studies, the estimated effects are interpreted as telling about how the parents’ physical separation (the separation event) affected the children compared to the counterfactual case in which the parents did not separate. This is, however, not the only possible effect that can be estimated, nor is this interpretation necessarily the correct one in each case.

First, knowing about the effects of the parental separation event is obviously important, but scholars, parents, counselors, and policy makers could likewise benefit from knowing about the “total” effects of parental separation that include the effects of the preceding separation process as well. Second, instead of asking what the effect of the parental separation (compared to them staying together) is, one can ask what the effect is of the parents separating at a specific point in time (the effect of postponing separation) (cf. Furstenberg and Kiernan 2001 ). Our discussion below points to these issues and suggests how some methods can be more appropriate for answering certain questions than others. Rather than providing a comprehensive discussion on this relatively uncovered topic, we wish to stimulate closer consideration of these issues in future research.

Regression Models

Before discussing methods that adjust for unmeasured confounding factors, we briefly discuss estimation of parental separation effects with linear and logistic (or similar) regression models, which are by far the most common methods used. With these methods, one compares the outcomes of children who experienced parental separation to the outcomes of children from intact families, adjusting for observed confounding variables. Because the possibilities for controlling for all factors that may bias the results are limited, the estimates from regression models cannot usually be interpreted as causal effects (e.g., McLanahan et al. 2013 ; Ribar 2004 ).

Pre-separation parental conflict is often pointed out as an omitted variable that can threaten causal claims. Controlling for pre-separation conflict generally leads to a substantial reduction in the effect of parental separation (e.g., Hanson 1999 ; Gähler and Garriga 2013 ), suggesting that exposure to the parental conflict rather than the parental separation event is largely responsible for the poorer performance of the children of divorce. This example can be used to think about the correspondence between the specified regression model and the underlying theoretical model of parental separation. Controlling for the level of pre-separation parental conflict (or related measures of the family environment) is most appropriate if it is reasonable to assume that families’ conflict levels remain stable; comparing children from separated and intact families at similar levels of earlier conflict can then inform about how the children of divorce would have fared had the parents remained together. However, this is not obvious if the separation followed an increase in parental conflict, because the family environment may have continued to worsen had the parents not separated.

If the above and other conditions for making causal claims are met, which effects do they inform us about? A regression model that controls for pre-separation parental conflict or other related measures is best seen as telling about the effects of the parental separation event. However, an increase in parental conflict is often an inherent part of the parental separation process, and controlling for levels of parental conflict close to the parental separation would not be warranted if one is interested in understanding how exposure to the parental separation process, in addition to the separation event, affects children’s outcomes (cf. Amato 2000 ). The choice of control variables should thus be done with a consideration to the underlying model of parental separation and the effect one wants to estimate.

Sibling Fixed Effects

Sibling fixed effects (SFE) models compare siblings from the same family who differ in their experience of parental separation before a certain age or life stage, or in the amount of time spent in a specific family type (cf. McLanahan et al. 2013 ; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 ). SFE controls for factors and experiences that are shared by the siblings, such as parental SES and many neighborhood and school characteristics. This has made SFE a popular method, not least in Europe. Some SFE studies found no effects of parental separation or other family forms on educational outcomes (Björklund and Sundström 2006 ). Others have found a weak to moderate negative effect on various outcomes even in an SFE design (e.g., Ermisch et al. 2004 ; Sandefur and Wells 1999 ; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 ; Grätz 2015 ).

Comparison of siblings from the same family is a core aspect of the SFE design. This affects the data requirements and the interpretation of the results. To fix ideas, we can use an example of the effects of parental separation on children’s school grades at age 15. For an SFE analysis, one needs data on multiple siblings, some of whom experienced the parental separation before age 15 whereas others did not. This requirement reduces the effective sample size. The sibling who did not experience the parental separation is always the older one, and her grades are used to infer about the counterfactual grades of her younger sibling, had she not experienced the parental separation. SFE controls for everything shared by the siblings, but additional controls are needed to adjust for differences between them. Some of these—such as birth order and birth cohort and/or parental age (Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 )—are available in many datasets, but remaining unobserved differences (as well as measurement error) can cause important bias to the estimates (Ermisch et al. 2004 ; Frisell et al. 2012 ).

SFE models are most informative of the effects of parental separation if it is reasonable to assume that the family environment (including levels of parental conflict) would remain stable in the absence of the parental separation (Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 ). In such a case, it is most likely that the younger sibling would have experienced a similar family environment as the older sibling, had the parents not separated. The interpretation of SFE results becomes more problematic if the parental separation is the culmination of a deterioration of the family environment (such as increased parental conflict). It is likely that the family environment would have continued to deteriorate had the parents not separated, and the younger sibling would have been taking her grades in a more conflictual family (than her older sibling experienced). Without additional measures, SFE models thus generally rely on the assumption of the stability of the family environment (cf. Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 ).

SFE models estimate the effect of the event of the parental separation rather than the separation process. Because SFE models are estimated from a subsample of families that dissolved, the estimates are difficult to generalize without making additional assumptions. Also, because the estimates tell about differences between siblings who experienced parental separation but at different ages, or experienced a different amount of time in a separated family, the estimates are best interpreted as effects of the timing of the separation, as argued in detail by Sigle-Rushton and colleagues (2014).

Longitudinal Designs

Research with longitudinal data has been more applied  in the USA than in Europe (McLanahan et al. 2013 ), possibly because of data access issues. Such data can be analyzed using many methods, but unlike with SFE, these methods can only be used to analyze outcomes that are measured more than once. Similar to SFE models, longitudinal studies generally report weaker effects on child outcomes of parental separation and other family transitions than found in cross-sectional analyses.

Lagged Dependent Variables

In lagged dependent variable (LDV) analyses, one controls for the dependent variable at an earlier measurement point (before parental separation) (Johnson 2005 ; McLanahan et al. 2013 ). The idea is to adjust for initial differences in outcomes between children from separated and intact families. LDV is mostly used in cohort and other studies with just two or few measurement points. Early examples include studies in Britain, which found that although children of divorce had lower psychological well-being already pre-divorce, parental divorce had negative long-term effects (Cherlin et al. 1991 ; Chase-Lansdale et al. 1995 ). Limitations of LDV models include that the estimates are sensitive to omitted variables that affect both the separation and the pre-separation outcome, as well as measurement error in the latter (Johnson 2005 ).

The pre-separation measurement point can correspond poorly to the stages of the parental separation process, especially in cohort studies in which measurements are often done several years apart. LDV models are therefore most appropriate if the differences in the outcome between children who experienced parental separation and those who did not can be assumed to be stable. If one assumes that the child’s well-being deteriorated prior to the separation, the lagged dependent variable can capture part of the effect of the separation process. However, if the measurements are taken several years apart, it is even more difficult than usual to tell whether the outcome was measured before or during the pre-separation deterioration in well-being and consequently, how the estimated coefficient should be interpreted.

Individual Fixed Effects

Individual fixed effects (IFE) models are based on comparing individuals before and after the parental separation and in effect, use individuals as their own control groups to control for time-constant unobserved factors. In an early British IFE study, Cherlin et al. ( 1998 ) concluded that experience of parental separation had weak to moderate negative effects on adulthood psychological well-being, and Amato and Anthony ( 2014 ) reported similar effects on educational, psychological, and health outcomes in the USA. Other American studies have used IFE designs to analyze the effects of the number of transitions (e.g., Fomby and Cherlin 2007 ), of different family transitions (e.g., Lee and McLanahan 2015 ), or combined SFE and IFE approaches (Gennetian 2005 ).

IFE methods estimate the effect of parental separation if it is reasonable to assume that the child whose parents separated would have experienced similar (age-specific) outcomes in the absence of separation as observed before the separation (Aughinbaugh et al. 2005 ). Again, this is most feasible if the child’s level of well-being can be assumed to have remained stable. This is less likely if the child’s well-being began to deteriorate already before the separation, because this deterioration could have continued had the parents not separated. Two US studies attempted to address this issue by tracing behavioral problems and academic achievement before and after the parental separation (Aughinbaugh et al. 2005 ) and by using a triple-difference approach, which compares trends (and not just levels) in the outcome between children from separated and intact families (Sanz-de-Galdeano and Vuri 2007 ). Neither study found the event of parental separation to have appreciable effects.

Furthermore, as in SFE models, IFE effects are estimated only from those children who actually experienced the separation. This generally means a reduction in sample size. For the same reason, IFE results generalize primarily to that group.

Placebo Tests and Growth-Curve Models

Longitudinal data can also be used to conduct “placebo tests,” that is, to analyze whether future separation (e.g., t  + 1) predicts earlier outcomes ( t , or earlier). Bernardi and Boertien (in this Special Issue) found with British data that although children who experienced parental separation before age 16 had a lower probability of transitioning to post-compulsory secondary education, this was not the case for children whose parents separated between ages 17 and 19 (i.e., after the educational transition age). This supports the view that the separation, and not the family environment that preceded it, had an effect on educational decisions.

Finally, longitudinal data have been analyzed with growth-curve models (GCM) to track trajectories in children’s outcomes. Cherlin et al. ( 1998 ) reported that the effects of parental separation on psychological problems increased through adolescence and young adulthood. Even though growth-curve models enable analysis of how effects develop, they are not immune to confounding from unmeasured variables that can affect both the initial level of well-being and its development over time (McLanahan et al. 2013 ). To address this, Kim ( 2011 ) combined matching methods with GCM and found that cognitive skills and non-cognitive traits developed negatively already through the separation period and the effects were amplified by the separation event.

Interpreting Causal Effects

Controlling for measured and unmeasured confounders practically always leads to reduced effect sizes, which means that children who experienced parental separation would have fared differently to children from intact families regardless. Some studies have found no effects, but the prevailing conclusion is that parental separation can have weak to moderate negative effects (Amato 2000 , 2010 ; McLanahan et al. 2013 ; Ribar 2004 ).

Increasing adoption of advanced methods to control for unmeasured variables improves our understanding of the consequences of family change. None of the methods are, however, completely immune to confounding by unobserved variables. Relatedly, they also correspond differently to underlying theoretical models of parental separation, which affects their interpretation.

We repeatedly mentioned how the methods are most robust if it is reasonable to assume that the family environment, and the children’s well-being, remained stable before the separation and would have remained stable in its absence. Such a scenario characterizes some separations but provides a poorer description of many others where separation was a culmination of a deteriorating family environment (Amato 2000 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ; Härkönen 2014 ). In some cases, additional (time-varying) control variables (e.g., Ermisch et al. 2004 ; Lee and McLanahan 2015 ) or more complex research designs (e.g., Sanz-de-Galdeano and Vuri 2007 ) can be used to alleviate these problems. When choosing the appropriate variables or designs, one should decide whether one is interested in the effects of the separation event or the exposure to the whole separation process. Both are relevant, and their analysis each carries specific challenges. We also discussed how some estimates might be better interpreted as indicators of the influence of the timing of parental separation (cf. Furstenberg and Kiernan 2001 ), another relevant yet different question. All in all, scholars should pay attention to which effects their methods estimate and think of this in light of the underlying theoretical model of parental separation or other family dynamics they are interested in (cf. Manski et al. 1992 ; Ní Bhrolcháin 2001 ).

For Whom, When, and Where are Family Transitions Most Consequential?

Most studies reviewed above analyzed what happens on average . Whereas the finding that children growing up in non-traditional families have different outcomes is very consistent, this result hides a large variation in effects at the individual level. A minority of children suffer from a parental separation, but a somewhat smaller minority shows improvements in well-being and performance, and even if parental separation can be a taxing experience associated with sadness and feelings of loss, a large minority or even a majority of children do “just fine” without robust effects in either direction (Amato 2000 , 2010 ; Amato and Anthony 2014 ; Amato and James 2010 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ). Next, we discuss how this heterogeneity in effects is related to pre-separation parental conflict and children’s and parents’ socio-demographic attributes. After that, we review what is known about variation in the effects over time and cross-nationally.

For Whom Does It Matter?

Which children are more likely to suffer from parental separation than others? Studies both from the USA (Amato et al. 1995 ; Hanson 1999 ; Booth and Amato 2001 ) and Europe (Dronkers 1999 ) have found that pre-separation parental conflict moderates the effects of the separation. Parental separation can be beneficial for children from high-conflict families, but is more likely to have negative effects when parental conflict was low and the separation came as a relative surprise.

Other studies have analyzed variation in the effects of parental separation by demographic characteristics. Although some studies have found gender-specific effects, most have not, leading Amato and James ( 2010 ) to conclude that the gender differences in effects are modest at most. Similar variation in findings characterizes research on effects of stepfamilies (Sweeney 2010 ).

Child’s age at parental separation has been another moderator of interest. Breakups occurring while children are adults have no or the smallest effects (Cherlin et al. 1998 ; Kiernan and Cherlin 1999 ; Furstenberg and Kiernan 2001 ; Lyngstad and Engelhardt 2009 ). Studies on educational outcomes often find the effects to be most pronounced when parents divorced close to important educational decision points (Jonsson and Gähler 1997 ; Lyngstad and Engelhardt 2009 ; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 ). Otherwise, findings differ in their conclusions about the childhood stages most sensitive to family disruption, and the specific pattern of heterogeneity is likely to depend on the outcome studied.

Recently, scholars have become increasingly interested in whether effects of parental separation differ by parental socioeconomic status (Augustine 2014 ; Grätz 2015 ; Mandemakers and Kalmijn 2014 ). Although having resources can help families to deal with family transitions, children from resourceful families could also lose more from parental separation (Bernardi and Radl 2014 ; Bernardi and Boertien 2016a ). In line with these contrasting predictions, empirical results are mixed, with some findings pointing to stronger negative effects in families with high (Augustine 2014 ; Grätz 2015 ; Mandemakers and Kalmijn 2014 ) or low socioeconomic status (Bernardi and Boertien 2016a ; Bernardi and Radl 2014 ; Biblarz and Raftery 1999 ; Martin 2012 ; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994 ). Bernardi and Boertien ( 2017 , this Special Issue) address this inconsistency. They show that methodological choices underlie part of this variation in results, but their substantive conclusion is that the negative effect of parental separation on educational choices is stronger for children whose high-socioeconomic status father moves out. The greater financial losses are an important part of the explanation, which also suggests that the results might be different for outcomes that are less responsive to financial resources.

Other studies have compared the effects of parental separation and single parenthood between ethnic, racial, and migrant groups. Many US studies have found that Black children are less affected by growing up in a non-intact family than White children (Fomby and Cherlin 2007 ; McLanahan and Bumpass 1988 ; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994 ; Sun and Li 2007 ). Some European studies have found variation in family structure effects by ethnic and immigrant background (Kalmijn 2010 , forthcoming; Erman and Härkönen, this ‘Special Issue’). In general, the family structure effects are weaker in groups in which parental separation and single motherhood are more common, which has been explained by less stigma, better ways of handling father absence, a broadly disadvantaged position with less to lose, or differential selection by unobserved factors, as argued by Erman and Härkönen in this Special Issue.

Instead of analyzing different predictors of separation separately, Amato and Anthony ( 2014 ) used several of these predictors together to, first, predict the children’s propensity to experience parental separation, and second, analyze whether parental divorce effects vary by this propensity. They found that the effects were the strongest for children with the highest risk of experiencing parental divorce, a result seemingly at odds with the above-mentioned findings of weaker effects in groups with higher separation rates.

Stability Over Time

It is straightforward to expect that the effects of family transitions on child outcomes should have waned over time. As non-traditional family forms have become more common, the social stigma attached to them should decrease (Lansford 2009 ). Children of divorce are also increasingly likely to retain close contact with both of their parents (e.g., Amato and Gilbreth 1999 ; Gähler and Palmtag 2015 ) and families and societies may have in general become better in handling the consequences of family change. Yet, several studies have reported remarkable stability in the negative associations between parental separation and educational attainment, psychological well-being, and own family dissolution risk (Albertini and Garriga 2011 ; Biblarz and Raftery 1999 ; Dronkers and Härkönen 2008 ; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2005 ; Li and Wu 2008 ; Gähler and Palmtag 2015 ). Some studies have found changing effects, but in opposite directions: a waning intergenerational transmission of divorce (Wolfinger 2005 ; Engelhardt et al. 2002 ), but a strengthening effect of parental separation on educational attainment (Kreidl et al. 2017 ).

Why this general stability? One possibility is that although some factors associated with parental separation, such as stigma, have become less common, other proximate consequences—including shock, grief, and anger over the separation of the parents (Pryor and Rodgers 2001 )—have remained stable. Another potential explanation refers to changing selection into separation. Parental separation has become increasingly associated with low levels of maternal education (Härkönen and Dronkers 2006 ). The motives for divorce have also changed over time. Fewer parental separations are today preceded by severe conflict and violence, whereas more are characterized by psychological motives and disagreements upon the division of labor (De Graaf and Kalmijn 2006 ; Gähler and Palmtag 2015 ). In general, changing selectivity of parental separation can have offset any weakening trend in its effects. The data requirements to disentangle these explanations are high, but those studies which have appropriate variables support the conclusion of a generally stable effect (Sigle-Rushton et al. 2005 ; Gähler and Palmtag 2015 ).

Cross-National Variation

Associations between family structure and child outcomes are robust in the sense that they are generally found in each country (cf. Amato and James 2010 ) and are often more similar than one might expect (Härkönen 2015 ). However, many studies have reported cross-national variation in the strength of associations (e.g., Brolin Låftman 2010 ; Radl et al. 2017 , this Special Issue). A series of studies found that countries with policies aimed at equalizing the living conditions between different types of families had smaller family structure gaps in educational achievement (Pong et al. 2003 ; Hampden-Thompson 2013 ; however, see Brolin Låftman 2010 ). Larger family structure differences have also been reported in economically more developed societies, where the nuclear family plays a more important role (Amato and Boyd 2014 ).

Dronkers and Härkönen ( 2008 ) found that the intergenerational transmission of divorce was weaker in countries where parental divorce was more common. This fits the intuition of weaker penalties when certain family behaviors are more common. However, other studies have found the opposite (Pong et al. 2003 ; Kreidl et al. 2017 ). An explanation is that in societies in which separation is uncommon, it is more often a solution to ending very troubled relationships and therefore more likely to be beneficial for the children.

Discussion and Recommendations for Future Research

We set the stage for future research in four directions. First, understanding the effects of heterogeneous family forms and transitions will be a research priority in the future as well (Amato 2010 ). Most of the research reviewed in this introduction has focused on the effects of parental separation, but scholars have been increasingly aware of and interested in the complexity of family forms in today’s societies. Some of this research was addressed in this article, and the analyses by Mariani, Özcan, and Goisis, and Radl, Salazar, and Cebolla-Boado in this Special Issue are further contributions to this topic: the former being the first to look at the outcomes of children born in lone mother families within one European country (the UK), and the latter providing a cross-national overview of the effects of various types of family structures. Future research, particularly in Europe, should continue addressing questions such as the effects of experiencing multiple family transitions and of complex family life course trajectories during childhood. Family complexity can also mean that the boundaries between family forms become blurred. An example is the increasing popularity of joint residential custody, which questions earlier divisions into single-parent and two-parent families. Understanding the effects of family forms under family complexity thus also means an update in conceptual thinking.

Second, children react to (changes in) family circumstances in remarkably different ways (e.g., Amato and Anthony 2014 ), which is hidden under the average effects reported in most studies. Three of the papers in this Special Issue address these questions and identify subgroups for which effects appear to be more limited compared to other groups such as low SES families and children from ethnic minorities. Better understanding the sources of vulnerability and resilience in the face of family change will continue to be a priority for research, and in this task, future research will benefit from combining theoretical and methodological approaches from sociology, demography, psychology, and genetics (cf. Amato 2010 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ).

Another related task for future research will be to systematize the research on variation in family structure effects across individuals and families, groups, and societal contexts. As reviewed in this article, the findings often point to confusingly different directions. Many studies, including the ones by Erman and Härkönen and Bernardi and Boertien in this Special Issue, have found that parental separation effects on educational outcomes are weaker in socioeconomic and ethnic groups where it is more frequent, but Amato and Anthony ( 2014 ) reported that the effects are more negative for children who had the highest risk of experiencing parental separation. Yet another group of studies have reported that the effects of parental separation are more negative when the parents had lower levels of conflict—and presumably, low likelihood of separating—before the separation (Amato et al. 1995 ; Dronkers 1999 ; Hanson 1999 ; Demo and Fine 2010 ). Many cross-national studies have concluded that these effects are stronger in societies in which parental separation is more common (Pong et al. 2003 ; Kreidl et al. 2017 ). At the same time, most studies continue to find that parental separation effects have remained stable even though more children have been experiencing it. Understanding these seemingly contradictory results will need theoretical development and appropriate data and designs to test them. Bernardi’s and Boertien’s study in this Special Issue provides a good example of such research.

Third, future research will undoubtedly continue employing sophisticated methods to analyze whether family structures and transitions have causal effects on children’s lives. Yet as discussed above, conceptual thought of what effects can be estimated with different methods and what effects are of most theoretical interest has not necessarily kept up with the methodological advances (for exceptions: Manski et al. 1992 ; Ní Bhrolcháin 2001 ; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2014 ). Using parental separation as our example, we distinguished between the effects of separations as events and separations as processes, as well as between the experience of separation and its timing. Researchers should pay more attention to these differences in the conceptualization of effects, which essentially boils down to the consideration of the underlying theoretical model of parental separation. Better recognition of these differences can contribute to theory-building and methodological advancement and help in formulating advice to parents, family counselors, and policy makers.

Last, these issues have implications for understanding social inequality in a time of family change. The “diverging destinies” thesis (McLanahan and Percheski 2008 ) holds that socioeconomically uneven family change, in which the retreat from stable two-parent families is happening particularly among those with low levels of education, can reduce social mobility. Yet whether this is the case depends not only on differences in family structures by socioeconomic background, but also on the strength of the effects of these family structures on the outcomes in question; if the effects are nil or weak, it does not matter who lives in which kind of family. The inequality-amplifying effects of socioeconomic differences in family structures can furthermore be shaped by heterogeneity in family structure effects (Bernardi and Boertien 2016b ). Bernardi’s and Boertien’s (2017, this Special Issue) findings, that the negative effects of parental separation are weaker for children whose parents have low levels of education, imply that the socioeconomic differences in family instability are less important in affecting intergenerational inequality than often thought. Erman’s and Härkönen’s ( 2017 , this Special Issue) results show that parental separation effects are weaker among ancestry groups where parental separation is more common suggest the same for ethnic inequalities. Together, these findings refine arguments stating that divergence in family structures will lead to an increase in inequality. Instead, the results imply that whether this happens or not is contingent on the strength of these effects and on whether they are similar across groups.

Acknowledgements

This Special Issue features research done within work package 5 (Family Transitions and Children’s Life Chances) of FamiliesAndSocieties ( www.familiesandsocieties.eu ). We thank the members of the consortium and our work package for productive collaborations and fruitful discussions during the project. We also thank the editorial team of European Journal of Population for the opportunity to publish this Special Issue and their feedback on earlier drafts. In addition, we are grateful to the reviewers for constructive comments to earlier versions to each of the articles in this Special Issue. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under Grant Agreement No. 320116 for the research project FamiliesAndSocieties and from the Strategic Research Council of the Academy of Finland (Decision Number: 293103) for the research consortium Tackling Inequality in Time of Austerity (TITA).

1 This quest will likely continue in the future; Ultee ( 2016 ) anticipated that in 2096, the book awarded for preservation of European sociological research will be called “Growing Up With Four Parents”.

Contributor Information

Juho Härkönen, Email: [email protected] , https://people.su.se/~jhr .

Fabrizio Bernardi, Email: [email protected] , http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/PoliticalAndSocialSciences/People/Professors/Bernardi.aspx .

Diederik Boertien, Email: se.bau.dec@neitreobd , http://ced.uab.es/en/directori/diederik-boertien-2/

• Albertini M, Garriga A. The effect of divorce on parent–child contacts: Evidence on two declining effect hypotheses. European Societies. 2011; 13 (2):257–278. doi: 10.1080/14616696.2010.483002. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR. The implications of research findings on children in stepfamilies. In: Booth A, Dunn J, editors. Stepfamilies: Who benefits? Who does not? Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; 1994. pp. 81–88. [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR. The consequences of divorce for adults and children. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2000; 62 (4):1269–1287. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2000.01269.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR. Children of divorce in the 1990s: An update of the Amato and Keith (1991) meta-analysis. Journal of Family Psychology. 2001; 15 (3):355–370. doi: 10.1037/0893-3200.15.3.355. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR. Research on divorce: Continuing trends and new developments. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2010; 72 (3):650–666. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2010.00723.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR, Anthony CJ. Estimating the effects of parental divorce and death with fixed effects models. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2014; 76 (2):370–386. doi: 10.1111/jomf.12100. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR, Boyd LM. Children and divorce in world perspective. In: Abela A, Walker J, editors. Contemporary issues in family studies: Global perspectives on partnerships, parenting and support in a changing world. Chichester: Wiley; 2014. pp. 227–243. [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR, Gilbreth JG. Nonresident fathers and children’s well-being: A meta-analysis. Journal of Marriage and Family. 1999; 61 (3):557–573. doi: 10.2307/353560. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR, Hohmann-Marriott B. A comparison of high- and low-distress marriages that end in divorce. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2007; 69 (3):621–638. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2007.00396.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR, James S. Divorce in Europe and the United States: Commonalities and differences across nations. Family Science. 2010; 1 (2):2–13. doi: 10.1080/19424620903381583. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amato PR, Loomis LS, Booth A. Parental divorce, marital conflict, and offspring well-being during early adulthood. Social Forces. 1995; 73 (3):895–915. doi: 10.2307/2580551. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Andersson G, Philipov D. Life-table representations of family dynamics in Sweden, Hungary, and 14 other FFS countries: A project of descriptions of demographic behavior. Demographic Research. 2002; 7 (4):67–144. [ Google Scholar ]
• Andersson, G., Thomson, E., & Duntava, A. (forthcoming). Life-table representations of family dynamics in the 21st century. Demographic Research.
• Aughinbaugh A, Pierret CR, Rothman DS. The impact of family structure transitions on youth achievement: Evidence from the children of the NLSY79. Demography. 2005; 42 (3):447–468. doi: 10.1353/dem.2005.0023. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Augustine JM. Maternal education and the unequal significance of family structure for children’s early achievement. Social Forces. 2014; 93 (2):687–718. doi: 10.1093/sf/sou072. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bastaits K, Ponnet K, Mortelmans D. Parenting of divorced fathers and the association with children’s self-esteem. Journal of Youth and Adolescence. 2012; 41 (12):1643–1656. doi: 10.1007/s10964-012-9783-6. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bergström M, Fransson E, Modin B, Berlin M, Gustafsson PA, Hjern A. Fifty moves a year: Is there an association between joint physical custody and psychosomatic problems in children? Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health. 2015; 69 (8):769–774. doi: 10.1136/jech-2014-205058. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bernardi F, Boertien D. Understanding heterogeneity in the effects of parental separation on educational attainment in Britain: Do children from lower educational backgrounds have less to lose? European Sociological Review. 2016; 32 (6):807–819. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcw036. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bernardi F, Boertien D. Non-intact families and diverging educational destinies: A decomposition analysis for Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. Social Science Research. 2016; 63 :181–191. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.09.004. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bernardi, F., & Boertien, D. (2017). Explaining conflicting results in research on the heterogeneous effects of parental separation on children’s educational attainment according to social background. European Journal of Population . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ]
• Bernardi F, Radl J. Parental separation, social origin, and educational attainment: The long-term consequences of divorce for children. Demographic Research. 2014; 30 :1653–1680. doi: 10.4054/DemRes.2014.30.61. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Biblarz TJ, Raftery AE. Family structure, educational attainment, and socioeconomic success: Rethinking the “pathology of matriarchy” American Journal of Sociology. 1999; 105 (2):321–365. doi: 10.1086/210314. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bjarnason T, Arnarsson AM. Joint physical custody and communication with parents: A cross-national study of children in 36 western countries. Journal of Comparative Family Studies. 2011; 42 (6):871–890. [ Google Scholar ]
• Björklund A, Sundström M. Parental separation and children’s educational attainment: A siblings analysis on Swedish register data. Economica. 2006; 73 (292):605–624. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00529.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Booth A, Amato PR. Parental predivorce relations and offspring postdivorce well-being. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2001; 63 (1):197–212. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2001.00197.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Brolin Låftman S. Family structure and children’s living conditions. A comparative study of 24 countries. Child Indicators Research. 2010; 3 (1):127–147. doi: 10.1007/s12187-009-9059-1. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chase-Lansdale PL, Cherlin AJ, Kiernan KE. The long-term effects of parental divorce on the mental health of young adults: A developmental perspective. Child Development. 1995; 66 (6):1614–1634. doi: 10.2307/1131900. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cherlin AJ. Going to extremes: Family structure, children’s well-being, and social science. Demography. 1999; 36 (4):421–428. doi: 10.2307/2648081. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cherlin AJ, Chase-Lansdale PL, McRae C. Effects of parental divorce on mental health throughout the life course. American Sociological Review. 1998; 63 (2):239–249. doi: 10.2307/2657325. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cherlin AJ, Furstenberg FF, Lindsay Chase-Lansdale P, Kiernan KE, Robins PK, Morrison DR, Teitler JO. Longitudinal studies of effects of divorce on children in Great Britain and the United States. Science. 1991; 252 :1386–1389. doi: 10.1126/science.2047851. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• De Graaf PM, Kalmijn M. Divorce motives in a period of rising divorce: Evidence from a Dutch life-history survey. Journal of Family Issues. 2006; 27 (4):483–505. doi: 10.1177/0192513X05283982. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Demo DH, Fine MA. Beyond the average divorce. Thousand Oaks: Sage; 2010. [ Google Scholar ]
• Diekmann A, Engelhardt H. The social inheritance of divorce: Effects of parent’s family type in postwar Germany. American Sociological Review. 1999; 64 (6):783–793. doi: 10.2307/2657402. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Dronkers J. Zullen wij voor de kinderen bij elkaar blijven? De veranderende effecten van eenoudergezinnen op de schoolloopbanen van de kinderen. Mens en Maatschappij. 1992; 67 (1):23–44. [ Google Scholar ]
• Dronkers J. The effects of parental conflicts and divorce on the well-being of pupils in Dutch secondary education. European Sociological Review. 1999; 15 (2):195–212. doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018260. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Dronkers J, Härkönen J. The inter-generational transmission of divorce in cross-national perspective: Results from the Fertility and Family Surveys. Population Studies. 2008; 62 (3):173–185. doi: 10.1080/00324720802320475. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Engelhardt H, Trappe H, Dronkers J. Differences in family policy and the intergenerational transmission of divorce: A comparison between the former East and West Germany. Demographic Research. 2002; 6 :295–324. doi: 10.4054/DemRes.2002.6.11. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Erman, J., & Härkönen, J. (2017). Parental separation and school performance among children of immigrant mothers in Sweden. European Journal of Population . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ]
• Ermisch J, Francesconi M, Pevalin DJ. Parental partnership and joblessness in childhood and their influence on young people’s outcomes. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 2004; 167 (1):69–101. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-985X.2004.00292.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Erola J, Härkönen J, Dronkers J. More careful or less marriageable? Parental divorce spouse selection and entry into marriage. Social Forces. 2012; 90 (4):1323–1345. doi: 10.1093/sf/sos073. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Erola J, Jalovaara M. The replaceable: The inheritance of paternal and maternal socioeconomic statuses in non-standard families. Social Forces. 2016; 95 (3):971–995. [ Google Scholar ]
• Evenhouse E, Reilly S. A sibling study of stepchild well-being. Journal of Human Resources. 2004; 39 (1):248–276. doi: 10.2307/3559012. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fomby P, Cherlin AJ. Family instability and child well-being. American Sociological Review. 2007; 72 (2):181–204. doi: 10.1177/000312240707200203. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Frisell T, Öberg S, Kuja-Halkola R, Sjölander A. Sibling comparison designs: Bias from non-shared confounding and measurement error. Epidemiology. 2012; 23 (5):713–720. doi: 10.1097/EDE.0b013e31825fa230. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Furstenberg FF, Kiernan K. Delayed parental divorce: How much do children benefit? Journal of Marriage and Family. 2001; 63 (2):446–457. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2001.00446.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gähler M, Garriga A. Has the association between parental divorce and young adults’ psychological problems changed over time? Evidence from Sweden, 1968–2000. Journal of Family Issues. 2013; 34 (6):784–808. doi: 10.1177/0192513X12447177. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gähler M, Palmtag EL. Parental divorce, psychological well-being and educational attainment: Changed experience, unchanged effect among Swedes born 1892–1991. Social Indicators Research. 2015; 123 (2):601–623. doi: 10.1007/s11205-014-0768-6. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gennetian L. One or two parents? Half or step siblings? The effect of family structure on young children’s achievement. Journal of Population Economics. 2005; 18 (3):415–436. doi: 10.1007/s00148-004-0215-0. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Geser W. Geschwisterbeziehungen junger Erwachsener aus Scheidungsfamilien. Zeitschrift für Familienforschung. 2001; 13 (1):23–44. [ Google Scholar ]
• Grätz M. When growing up without a parent does not hurt: Parental separation and the compensatory effect of social origin. European Sociological Review. 2015; 31 (5):546–557. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcv057. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Halpern-Meekin S, Tach L. Heterogeneity in two-parent families and adolescent well-being. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2008; 70 (2):435–451. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2008.00492.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hampden-Thompson G. Family policy, family structure, and children’s educational achievement. Social Science Research. 2013; 42 (3):804–817. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2013.01.005. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hanson TL. Does parental conflict explain why divorce is negatively associated with child welfare? Social Forces. 1999; 77 (4):1283–1316. doi: 10.2307/3005877. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Härkönen J. Divorce: Trends, patterns, causes, consequences. In: Treas JK, Scott J, Richards M, editors. The Wiley-Blackwell companion to the sociology of families. Chichester: Wiley; 2014. pp. 303–322. [ Google Scholar ]
• Härkönen J. Divorce. In: Scott RA, Kosslyn SM, editors. Emerging trends in the social and behavioral sciences. Chichester: Wiley; 2015. [ Google Scholar ]
• Härkönen J, Dronkers J. Stability and change in the educational gradient of divorce. A comparison of seventeen countries. European Sociological Review. 2006; 22 (5):501–517. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcl011. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Havermans N, Botterman S, Matthijs K. Family resources as mediators in the relation between divorce and children’s school engagement. The Social Science Journal. 2014; 51 (4):564–579. doi: 10.1016/j.soscij.2014.04.001. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Johnson D. Two-wave panel analysis: Comparing statistical methods for studying the effects of transitions. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2005; 67 (4):1061–1075. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2005.00194.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jonsson JO, Gähler M. Family dissolution, family reconstitution, and children’s educational careers: Recent evidence from Sweden. Demography. 1997; 34 (2):277–293. doi: 10.2307/2061705. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kalil A, Mogstad M, Rege M, Votruba M. Divorced fathers’ proximity and children’s long-run outcomes: Evidence from Norwegian registry data. Demography. 2011; 48 (3):1005–1027. doi: 10.1007/s13524-011-0046-z. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kalmijn M. Racial differences in effects of parental divorce and separation on children: Generalizing the evidence to a European case. Social Science Research. 2010; 39 (5):845–856. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.05.002. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kalmijn M. Long-term effects of divorce on parent-child relationships: Within-family comparisons of fathers and mothers. European Sociological Review. 2012; 29 (5):888–898. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcs066. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kalmijn M. How childhood circumstances moderate the long-term impact of divorce on father-child relationships. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2015; 77 (4):921–938. doi: 10.1111/jomf.12202. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kalmijn, M. (forthcoming). Family structure and the well‐being of immigrant children in four European countries. International Migration Review .
• Kalmijn M, Dronkers J. Lean on me? The influence of parental separation and divorce on children’s support networks in four European countries. Zeitschrift für Familienforschung/Journal of Family Research. 2015; 27 (1):21–42. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kalmijn M, Loeve A, Manting D. Income dynamics in couples and the dissolution of marriage and cohabitation. Demography. 2007; 44 (1):159–179. doi: 10.1353/dem.2007.0005. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kiernan KE, Cherlin JA. Parental divorce and partnership dissolution in adulthood: Evidence from a British cohort study. Population Studies. 1999; 53 (1):39–48. doi: 10.1080/00324720308068. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kiernan KE, Mensah FK. Poverty, maternal depression, family status and children’s cognitive and behavioural development in early childhood: A longitudinal study. Journal of Social Policy. 2009; 38 (4):569–588. doi: 10.1017/S0047279409003250. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kim HS. Consequences of parental divorce for child development. American Sociological Review. 2011; 76 (3):487–511. doi: 10.1177/0003122411407748. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• King V. The antecedents and consequences of adolescents’ relationships with stepfathers and nonresident fathers. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2006; 68 (4):910–928. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2006.00304.x. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• King V. Stepfamily formation: Implications for adolescent ties to mothers, nonresident fathers and stepfathers. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2009; 71 (4):954–968. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2009.00646.x. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kreidl M, Stípková M, Hubatková B. Parental separation and children’s education in a comparative perspective: Does the burden disappear when separation is more common? Demographic Research. 2017; 36 :73–110. doi: 10.4054/DemRes.2017.36.3. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lansford JE. Parental divorce and children’s adjustment. Perspectives on Psychological Science. 2009; 4 (2):140–152. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01114.x. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Laumann-Billings L, Emery RE. Distress among young adults from divorced families. Journal of Family Psychology. 2000; 14 (4):671–687. doi: 10.1037/0893-3200.14.4.671. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lee D, McLanahan S. Family structure transitions and child development: Instability, selection, and population heterogeneity. American Sociological Review. 2015; 80 (4):738–763. doi: 10.1177/0003122415592129. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Li LJ-CA, Wu LL. No trend in the intergenerational transmission of divorce. Demography. 2008; 45 (4):875–883. doi: 10.1353/dem.0.0030. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lyngstad TH, Engelhardt H. The influence of offspring’s sex and age at parents’ divorce on the intergenerational transmission of divorce, Norwegian first marriages 1980-2003. Population Studies. 2009; 63 (2):173–185. doi: 10.1080/00324720902896044. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Magnuson K, Berger LM. Family structure states and transitions: Associations with children’s well-being during middle childhood. Journal of Marriage Family. 2009; 71 (3):575–591. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2009.00620.x. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mandemakers JJ, Kalmijn M. Do mother’s and father’s education condition the impact of parental divorce on child well-being? Social Science Research. 2014; 44 :187–199. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2013.12.003. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Manski CF, Sandefur GD, McLanahan S, Powers D. Alternative estimates of the effect of family structure during adolescence on high school graduation. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 1992; 87 (417):25–37. doi: 10.1080/01621459.1992.10475171. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mariani, E., Özcan, B., & Goisis, A. (2017). Family trajectories and wellbeing of children born to lone mothers in the United Kingdom. European Journal of Population . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ]
• Martin MA. Family structure and the intergenerational transmission of educational advantage. Social Science Research. 2012; 41 :33–47. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.07.005. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• McLanahan S, Bumpass L. Intergenerational consequences of family disruption. American Journal of Sociology. 1988; 94 (1):130–152. doi: 10.1086/228954. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• McLanahan S, Percheski C. Family structure and the reproduction of inequalities. Annual Review of Sociology. 2008; 34 :257–276. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134549. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• McLanahan SS, Sandefur G. Growing up with a single parent, what hurts, what helps. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1994. [ Google Scholar ]
• McLanahan S, Tach L, Schneider D. The causal effects of father absence. Annual Review of Sociology. 2013; 39 :399–427. doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145704. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ní Bhrolcháin M. “Divorce effects” and causality in the social sciences. European Sociological Review. 2001; 17 (1):33–57. doi: 10.1093/esr/17.1.33. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ní Bhrolcháin M, Chappell R, Diamond I, Jameson C. Parental divorce and outcomes for children: Evidence and interpretation. European Sociological Review. 2000; 16 (1):67–91. doi: 10.1093/esr/16.1.67. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ongaro F, Mazzuco S. Parental separation and family formation in early adulthood: Evidence from Italy. Advances in Life Course Research. 2009; 14 (3):119–130. doi: 10.1016/j.alcr.2009.06.002. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pong S, Dronkers J, Hampden-Thompson G. Family policies and children’s school achievement in single- versus two-parent families. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2003; 65 (3):681–699. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2003.00681.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pryor J, Rodgers B. Children in changing families. Life after parental separation. London: Blackwell; 2001. [ Google Scholar ]
• Radl, J., Salazar, L., & Cebolla-Boado, H. (2017). Does living in a fatherless household compromise educational success? A Comparative Study of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills. European Journal of Population. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ]
• Reneflot A. Childhood family structure and reproductive behaviour in early adulthood in Norway. European Sociological Review. 2009; 27 (1):56–69. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcp055. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ribar, D. C. (2004). What do social scientists know about the benefits of marriage? A review of quantitative methodologies . IZA discussion paper 998. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
• Sandefur GD, Wells T. Does family structure really influence educational attainment? Social Science Research. 1999; 28 (4):331–357. doi: 10.1006/ssre.1999.0648. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sanz-de-Galdeano A, Vuri D. Parental divorce and students? Performance: Evidence from longitudinal data. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2007; 69 (3):321–338. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0084.2006.00199.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Seltzer JA. Child support and child access: Experiences of divorced and nonmarital families. In: Ldham JT, Melli MS, editors. Child support: The next frontier. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 2000. pp. 69–87. [ Google Scholar ]
• Sigle-Rushton W, Hobcraft J, Kiernan K. Parental divorce and subsequent disadvantage: A cross-cohort comparison. Demography. 2005; 42 (3):427–446. doi: 10.1353/dem.2005.0026. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sigle-Rushton W, Lyngstad TH, Andersen PL, Kravdal Ø. Proceed with caution? Parents’ union dissolution and children’s educational achievement. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2014; 76 (1):161–174. doi: 10.1111/jomf.12075. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sun Y, Li Y. Racial and ethnic differences in experiencing parents? Marital disruption during late adolescence. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2007; 69 (3):742–762. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2007.00403.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sweeney MM. Remarriage and stepfamilies: Strategic sites for family scholarship in the 21 st century. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2010; 72 (3):667–684. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2010.00724.x. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swiss L, Le Bourdais C. Father–child contact after separation: The influence of living arrangements. Journal of Family Issues. 2009; 30 (5):623–652. doi: 10.1177/0192513X08331023. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Thomson E, Hanson TL, McLanahan SS. Family structure and child well-being: Economic resources vs. parental behaviors. Social Forces. 1994; 73 (1):221–242. doi: 10.2307/2579924. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Turunen J. Family structure, gender, and adolescent emotional well-being. Journal of Divorce & Remarriage. 2013; 54 (6):476–504. doi: 10.1080/10502556.2013.810982. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Turunen J. Shared physical custody and children’s experience of stress. Stockholm Research Reports in Demography. 2016; 2016 :08. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ultee WC. 90 + 90 = 0? Similarities and differences between sociology 90 years ago and sociology 90 years from now. Research on Finnish Society. 2016; 9 :29–39. [ Google Scholar ]
• Uunk W. The economic consequences of divorce for women in the European Union: The impact of welfare state arrangements. European Journal of Population. 2004; 20 (3):251–285. doi: 10.1007/s10680-004-1694-0. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Vanassche S, Sodermans AK, Matthijs K, Swicegood G. Commuting between two parental households: The association between joint physical custody and adolescent well-being following divorce. Journal of Family Studies. 2014; 19 (2):139–158. doi: 10.5172/jfs.2013.19.2.139. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Waldfogel J, Craigie T-A, Brooks-Gunn J. Fragile families and child wellbeing. Future of Children. 2010; 20 (2):87–112. doi: 10.1353/foc.2010.0002. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Westphal SK, Poortman A-R, Van der Lippe T. What about the grandparents? Children’s postdivorce residence arrangements and contact with grandparents. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2015; 77 (2):424–440. doi: 10.1111/jomf.12173. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wolfinger NH. Understanding the divorce cycle: The children of divorce in their own marriages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005. [ Google Scholar ]

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World

Read our research on:

Full Topic List

Regions & Countries

• Publications
• Our Methods
• Short Reads
• Tools & Resources

Read Our Research On:

Harris Energizes Democrats in Transformed Presidential Race

2. how americans view harris, trump and biden, table of contents.

• Other findings: Both Harris and Trump are viewed more favorably than a few months ago
• Voting preferences among demographic groups
• How have voters shifted their preferences since July?
• Harris’ supporters back her more strongly than Biden’s did last month
• Large gap in motivation to vote emerges between the candidates’ younger supporters
• Harris and Trump have gained ground with their own coalitions
• Share of ‘double negatives’ drops significantly with change in presidential candidates
• Views of Biden have changed little since his withdrawal from the 2024 presidential race
• Acknowledgments
• The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Kamala Harris is viewed much more favorably today than in May, before Joe Biden withdrew from the presidential race and Harris became the Democratic nominee.

Overall, 44% of U.S. adults have a favorable view of Harris, 8 percentage points higher than in May .  

Donald Trump’s favorability rating also has improved since May, though the increase has been more modest than Harris’.

Currently, 42% have a positive opinion of the former president, up from 39% three months ago.

The improvement in Trump’s and Harris’ favorability ratings has occurred almost entirely among those in their own party. For both candidates, positive ratings among the opposing coalition remain in the single digits.

• Kamala Harris

About eight-in-ten Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (83%) view Harris favorably, while just 15% have an unfavorable opinion.

That represents a notable improvement since May, when 65% of Democrats had a positive opinion of the vice president and 32% viewed her negatively.

Views of Harris among Republicans and GOP leaners remain overwhelmingly negative. Just 9% view her favorably, while 89% have an unfavorable impression.

• Donald Trump

Trump’s favorable ratings among Republicans have increased 5 points since May (from 74% to 79%). Trump’s current rating among Republicans is at its highest point in at least two years.

Like Harris, Trump’s rating with the opposing party continues to be near-universally negative. About nine-in-ten Democrats (92%) have an unfavorable opinion of the former president.

In May of this year, a quarter of Americans held unfavorable views of Trump and Biden – the highest share expressing negative views of both major party candidates in more than three decades.

However, since Harris replaced Biden as the 2024 Democratic nominee – and with the improvement in both Harris’ and Trump’s favorable ratings – the share of these “double negatives” has declined substantially.

Today, 14% of Americans, including comparable shares of Republicans (14%) and Democrats (12%), hold negative views of both Trump and Harris.

Joe Biden remains broadly unpopular with the public: 62% of Americans have an unfavorable opinion of the president, while 37% view him favorably. Biden’s ratings have changed little over the past year.

Biden’s favorable rating among Democrats has edged up since May, from 67% to 70%. His rating among Republicans remains overwhelmingly negative (93% unfavorable) and is essentially unchanged.

Sign up for our weekly newsletter

Fresh data delivery Saturday mornings

Sign up for The Briefing

Weekly updates on the world of news & information

• Election 2024
• More Leaders
• Political & Civic Engagement

Many Americans are confident the 2024 election will be conducted fairly, but wide partisan differences remain

Joe biden, public opinion and his withdrawal from the 2024 race, amid doubts about biden’s mental sharpness, trump leads presidential race, americans’ views of government’s role: persistent divisions and areas of agreement, cultural issues and the 2024 election, most popular, report materials.

• August 2024 Presidential Preference Detailed Tables
• Questionnaire

901 E St. NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20004 USA (+1) 202-419-4300 | Main (+1) 202-857-8562 | Fax (+1) 202-419-4372 |  Media Inquiries

Research Topics

• Email Newsletters

ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER  Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of  The Pew Charitable Trusts .

© 2024 Pew Research Center