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J.L. Austin and John Searle on Speech Act Theory

J.L. Austin and John Searle developed Speech Act Theory and argued that our language does not only describe reality but that it can be used to perform acts.

The average number of words we speak on a daily basis remains a contested matter. Some have argued that the average is around 16,000 words, while more modest researchers refer to 5,000. Of course, culture, sample size, and sociodemographic variables influence the answer. One thing is certainly true: the number of spoken words we use is not trivial. And this is without adding the number of text messages, tweets, and other written posts that are part of our habits.

What do we do with these words? Some are historically memorable, like those of US president Ronald Regan during a speech in West Berlin in 1987: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”. Others are kept as literature treasures, like those found in Shakespeare or Gabriel García Márquez . It seems clear that with words we do not only describe the world and refer to things, but we transform reality.  This was the intuition that J. L. Austin, a British philosopher of language, explored during his Harvard lectures in 1995. His philosophy became greatly influential and constituted the beginning of Speech Act Theory.

The Origins of Speech Act Theory: J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein 

Austin and the later Wittgenstein were interested in how we use language rather than speculating about its abstract nature. In the Philosophical Investigations , published posthumously in 1953, Wittgenstein observed that language was like a toolbox: hammers and screwdrivers are an analogy to the different functions words can have (2009, op. § 11). What type of functions/usages can we find?

The Austrian philosopher believed there is no such thing as a static list of usages. From giving orders and describing a state of affairs, to making jokes and promises, the usages are countless : “Countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, and ‘sentences’.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, op. § 23a). The emphasis on “countless” ( unzählige in German) means that one cannot simply make a taxonomy of usages; put differently, there are not easy to categorize.

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Languages come into and go into existence. Some are born while others “become obsolete and forgotten” (Wittgenstein, 2009, op. § 23a). Historical linguists support this idea: it is only in historical practices that one finds the unfolding of language (Deutscher, 2006, p. 9 & 114). Contrary to Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin argued that classifying them could indeed be possible. That effort became the core of his Harvard lectures in 1995 from which Speech Act theory emerged.

What Are Speech Acts?

Austin made a provisional division between constative and performative sentences. While constative sentences had truth value (can be true or false), performatives were successful or not, or like Austin wrote, happy or unhappy (2020, p. 18).

Consider the sentence: ‘A water molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom”. Clearly, this sentence is describing the world. It is stating a fact that can be true or false. But what fact is being described by Ronald Regan’s “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”? The second utterance is performative because it is neither true nor false. As a request, it could be either felicitous or infelicitous (another terminology for happy or unhappy). A request is felicitous when it changes the future such that the request is observed.

We can now define speech acts as, precisely, the act of uttering performative sentences. Later in his lectures, Austin realized that everything we say is, to various extents, performative, so he abandoned the distinction to develop a general theory of speech acts (Huang, 2014, p. 126). Austin introduced new distinctions to elucidate what is happening when someone says something: every utterance (locution) has an illocutionary act and a perlocutionary effect . Let us consider them quickly.

The Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Force of a Speech Act

The illocutionary act refers to the type of speech act that is being performed, this is, the function that the speaker intends to fulfill. The perlocutionary part, on the other hand, is the effect that an utterance could have on the hearer or addressee (Huang, 2014, p. 128).

As an illustration, recall that on December 8, 1941, the US Congress declared war on the Empire of Japan responding to the previous attack on Pearl Harbor . President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed congress. In his discourse, one can distinguish illocutionary acts: promises (to the US) and warnings (to Japan), also including his requests for the state of war to be recognized.

We can speculate about the perlocutionary effects: some people were moved and excited, while others could have experienced fear and anxiety, as it was now clear that the United States would join World War II . The perlocutionary effect, therefore, does not depend on the intention of the speaker. I cannot say “I hereby scare you” or “I hereby convince you”.

Classifying Speech Acts

Focusing on the illocutionary act, J.L. Austin was ready to classify speech acts. He did this by using performative verbs that make the illocutionary act explicit (e.g., ‘I declare’, ‘I promise’). He ended up with six types: verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives (Austin, 2020, p. 166). The following table summarizes and explains his classification.

John Searle’s Speech Act Theory

Austin’s classification of speech acts was closely examined and greatly improved by his student John Searle. In his book Expression and Meaning (1979), instead of focusing on performative verbs, he distinguishes twelve dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts differ from one another. However, he decides to build his taxonomy mainly around two: the illocutionary point and the direction of fit (Searle, 1979, p. 5) 1 .

To begin, the illocutionary point is the purpose of the utterance. The illocutionary point of a description is different from, let us say, a command ; but a request and a command have the same illocutionary point: “both are attempts to get the hearer to do something” (Searle, 1979, p. 3). Searle’s illocutionary point is part of Austin’s illocutionary act. In any case, there is something more that distinguishes illocutionary acts, namely, their direction of fit. To explain it Searle uses an example made by Elizabeth Anscombe.

Imagine that a husband goes to the grocery store with a list of things to buy. At the same time, he is being followed by a detective who is observing which products he is acquiring and writing them on a list as well. In the end, both the husband and the detective will have the same list (both contain the same items). Yet, they are different:

“In the case of the shopper’s list, the purpose of the list is, so to speak, to get the world to match the words; the man is supposed to make his actions fit the list. In the case of the detective, the purpose of the list is to make the words match the world; the man is supposed to make the list fit the actions of the shopper.” (Searle, 1979, p. 3).

What Searle is stressing by using Anscombe’s example, is that speech acts (words) relate in different ways to reality (the world). Searle introduces a notation, such that ‘(↓)’ represents a word-to-world direction of fit (that of the detective), and ‘(↑)’ stands for a world-to-word direction of fit (that of the husband). Considering the illocutionary point and the direction of fit I can now summarize Searle’s taxonomy.

Searle is conscious of the additional requirement for non-linguistic institutions to exist so that ‘directive speech acts’ are successful (happy). A command, for example, is obeyed once the speaker is in a position of authority over the hearer (Searle, 1969, p. 66). This point was made in the Harvard Lectures as well (Austin, 2020, p. 18). In the case of ‘Expressives’ the direction of fit is presupposed because when one congratulates or expresses condolence there is already an antecedent speech act that is being assumed (Searle, 2010, p. 12).

For Searle, the most interesting speech acts are ‘Declarations”. Declarations bring about correspondence between the propositional content of an utterance and reality, this is, they create reality by representing it . In this sense when the proper authority in an appropriate context says “I declare you husband and wife” the content of that utterance is now real; this is why there is a double direction of fit (↕).

The Future of Speech Act Theory

Speech Act Theory is deeply influential in the modern philosophy of language, linguistics, social theory, Critical Theory , and discourse studies, among others. Some have tried to extend the classification of speech acts based on Searle (Ballmer & Brennenstuhl, 1981). The most challenging part about speech acts is, nevertheless, that they are not necessarily linguistic, this is, one can perform a speech act by gesture or by pointing at things. Additionally, some speech acts can be nested, such that the question ‘where is the salt?’ contains, in the context of dinner, a nested directive: ‘pass the salt’ or ‘please pass the salt’.

The most important idea to remember from speech act theory is this: in speaking we are not only describing things, but we are also performing actions and interacting with reality. We can commit ourselves to promises, we can influence the behavior of others, and we can choose to declare war.

Austin, J. L. (2020). How to do things with words (Kindle Ver). Barakaldo Books.

Ballmer, T., & Brennenstuhl, W. (1981). Speech Act Classification . Springer Verlag.

Deutscher, G. (2006). The Unfolding of Language. The evolution of mankind’s greatest invention . London: Arrow Books.

Huang, Y. (2014). Pragmatics (Second). Oxford University Press.

Searle, J. (1979). Expression and Meaning . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J. (2010). Making the Social World . Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical Investigations . (G. E. M. Anscombe, Ed.) (4th ed.). Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

1 The third dimension is also relevant although we will not discuss it here: the expressed psychological state.

The Economic Effects of the Cold War: Conservatism Plus Deficit Spending

By Andres Felipe Barrero MA Philosophy, MSc Philosophy, Ph.D. Candidate Andrés has a background in philosophy from Universidad de la Salle in Bogotá, Colombia, where he finished his undergraduate and master`s studies. He completed a second master's at Universität Hamburg, Germany, where he wrote about philosophical theories of Modernity and Secularization. Currently, he is a Ph.D. Candidate at Universität Bremen. His fields of interest include the Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science, Social Theory, Discourse Studies, Corpus Linguistics, and Natural Language Processing.

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speech act theory

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• University of Minnesota - Center for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition - Pragmatics and Speech Acts
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Speech Acts

speech act theory , Theory of meaning that holds that the meaning of linguistic expressions can be explained in terms of the rules governing their use in performing various speech acts (e.g., admonishing , asserting, commanding, exclaiming, promising, questioning, requesting, warning). In contrast to theories that maintain that linguistic expressions have meaning in virtue of their contribution to the truth conditions of sentences where they occur, it explains linguistic meaning in terms of the use of words and sentences in the performance of speech acts. Some exponents claim that the meaning of a word is nothing but its contribution to the nature of the speech acts that can be performed by using it. Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin provided important stimuli for the theory’s development.

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Article contents

Speech acts.

• Mitchell Green Mitchell Green Philosophy, University of Connecticut
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.013.200
• Published online: 29 March 2017

Speech acts are acts that can, but need not, be carried out by saying and meaning that one is doing so. Many view speech acts as the central units of communication, with phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic properties of an utterance serving as ways of identifying whether the speaker is making a promise, a prediction, a statement, or a threat. Some speech acts are momentous, since an appropriate authority can, for instance, declare war or sentence a defendant to prison, by saying that he or she is doing so. Speech acts are typically analyzed into two distinct components: a content dimension (corresponding to what is being said), and a force dimension (corresponding to how what is being said is being expressed). The grammatical mood of the sentence used in a speech act signals, but does not uniquely determine, the force of the speech act being performed. A special type of speech act is the performative, which makes explicit the force of the utterance. Although it has been famously claimed that performatives such as “I promise to be there on time” are neither true nor false, current scholarly consensus rejects this view. The study of so-called infelicities concerns the ways in which speech acts might either be defective (say by being insincere) or fail completely.

Recent theorizing about speech acts tends to fall either into conventionalist or intentionalist traditions: the former sees speech acts as analogous to moves in a game, with such acts being governed by rules of the form “doing A counts as doing B”; the latter eschews game-like rules and instead sees speech acts as governed by communicative intentions only. Debate also arises over the extent to which speakers can perform one speech act indirectly by performing another. Skeptics about the frequency of such events contend that many alleged indirect speech acts should be seen instead as expressions of attitudes. New developments in speech act theory also situate them in larger conversational frameworks, such as inquiries, debates, or deliberations made in the course of planning. In addition, recent scholarship has identified a type of oppression against under-represented groups as occurring through “silencing”: a speaker attempts to use a speech act to protect her autonomy, but the putative act fails due to her unjust milieu.

• performative
• illocutionary force
• communicative intentions
• perlocution
• felicity condition
• speaker meaning
• presupposition
• indirect speech act
• illocutionary silencing

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• > John Searle
• > Searle's speech act theory

Book contents

• Frontmatter
• Introduction
• Part I Philosophy of language
• 1 Searle's speech act theory
• 2 Searle's taxonomic theory
• 3 Non-standard speech acts and speech activity
• 4 Metaphor and fiction
• Part II Philosophy of mind
• Part III Philosophy of society and other matters
• Bibliography

1 - Searle's speech act theory

from Part I - Philosophy of language

John Searle's first major work, Speech Acts , appeared in 1969. By then, the tradition of language analysis within which it was framed had matured. Indeed, it was already in the second stage of development.

The first stage was strongly influenced by the many accomplishments of science. By the end of the nineteenth century, the revolutionary notion of “natural selection” developed by Charles Darwin in his The Origins of the Species in 1859 and The Descent of Man in 1871 had taken hold. Soon after, in 1905, Albert Einstein presented his special theory of relativity to the world, followed by his general theory in 1916. About the same time, electrons and other subatomic particles were discovered, and Max Planck and Niels Bohr developed their versions of the atomic and quantum theories. Science was on the move. If the changes in science that Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Harvey and others had brought about in earlier centuries were revolutionary, the more recent changes toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth were equally revolutionary.

The newer revolution differed from the older one in many ways. Science now was more mature. It had a history of success in many areas both on the theoretical as well as the practical level of engineering and medicine. Instruments of observation and measurement were more sophisticated than in the past. The newer science also had a broader base since psychology and the other social sciences had joined the family.

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• Searle's speech act theory
• Nick Fotion , Emory University
• Book: John Searle
• Online publication: 05 February 2013
• Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653157.002

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Speech Act Theory | Overview, Types & Pragmatics

Nicole has a bachelor’s degree in education and a master’s degree in speech-language pathology.

Rahman is a TV News Anchor with a Master's Degree in Strategic Communications and Leadership.

Table of Contents

What is speech act theory, lesson summary, what are the five types of speech act.

There are five types of speech acts that define the various purposes of speech. The categories of speech acts are assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations.

Who proposed the speech act theory?

John L. Austin, a British philosopher of language, first introduced speech act theory. The theory was later advanced by American philosopher John Searle.

Speech act theory can be defined as the idea that language contains meaning beyond just the definition of the words that are used. Language is a tool to perform various functions, also called speech acts . Speech act theory suggests that the meaning of what we say is influenced by the type of speech it is, the structure of the utterance, and the context in which it is used. It also explains how speech can create an action or outcome. This theory is part of the field of pragmatics , which is the study of how language is used in a social context.

A speech act is any utterance that serves a function in communication. For example, speech can be used to make statements, ask questions, apologize, describe, or persuade, among many other uses. In a speech act, words are used to do something, not just to say something.

John L. Austin, a British philosopher, first introduced speech act theory in his 1959 book How to Do Things with Words . This published series of lectures defined his theory about performatives. This is a type of speech in which a person's words are causing something to happen and not just making a statement. Rather than simply describing or stating facts, some words perform an action or create something new. For example, when both people in a marriage ceremony say "I do," they are causing the marriage to happen. Other examples of performatives include naming a ship and making a bet.

American philosopher John Searle continued to advance the speech act theory by drawing on Austin's work as well as that of philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein , Geoffrey Midgley, H. Paul Grice, P.F. Strawson, John Rawls , and William P. Alston. Searle defined different types of speech acts as described in the next section.

Austin described three main actions related to speech acts, and Searle expanded on these ideas. Locution refers to the specific words of a verbal or written message. In other words, it is the meaning of what is stated. The illocutionary act is related to the speaker's intention, or what the person who is communicating the message wants to have happen. For example, consider the question, "Can you open the window?". The objective of asking this question is to have the listener open the window. The speaker is not asking if it is possible for the listener to open the window. Instead, their intention goes beyond the literal meaning of the words in order to prompt someone to perform an action. Finally, the perlocutionary act of speech refers to the effect that the words have on the receiver of the message, the person who hears or reads those words. When a person hears the statement, "Can you open the window?", they may then execute that request by opening a window.

Types of Speech Act

Searle defined five types of speech acts:

• Assertives - Statements that provide information, state a conclusion, or express the belief of the speaker. Examples of assertive speech acts include "Ottawa is the capital city of Canada" and "She is an honest person."
• Directives - This type of speech is attempting to cause someone else to do something. Commands, requests, and invitations are types of directives, such as "Could you come over for dinner this weekend?"
• Commissives - Words that commit the speaker to an action in the future, such as making a promise or an offer. "I will drive you to school" is an example of a commissive speech act.
• Expressives - Speech that expresses a feeling or emotion. An example of an expressive speech act is "I'm sorry for missing your birthday."
• Declarations - Like Austin's performatives, these speech acts create a change in the world or cause something to happen. For example, "You're fired" or "I declare you husband and wife" are declarations.

The various types of speech acts describe the illocutionary act, or the result that the speaker intends to achieve with their remarks.

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• 0:02 Exploring Pragmatics
• 1:23 The Theory of Speech Acts
• 3:27 Five Types of Speech Acts
• 4:40 Lesson Summary

Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that deals with the use of language in social communication. It explores how the context in which something is said can influence the meaning of words.

Pragmatics includes three major communication skills: using language, changing language, and following rules.

• Using language involves putting words together for a specific reason or to achieve a certain goal. For example, greeting someone by saying "hello" or requesting something are just two examples of using language.
• Changing language refers to adjusting one's vocabulary or grammatical structure to be appropriate for the audience. A professor would likely give more background information and speak in a simplified way if they were giving an introductory lecture in a classroom than they would if they were having a conversation with professional colleagues who have the same advanced level of knowledge. People also speak differently when communicating with children compared to adults.
• Following rules is related to observing common conventions for conversation. For example, taking turns in a conversation, using facial expressions and eye contact, and staying on topic are rules that speakers follow when communicating with others. These and other communication rules are influenced by cultural norms and traditions.

The first skill in this list, using language, is the pragmatic skill that is directly related to the speech act theory.

Speech act theory states that speech is used to achieve some kind of outcome or objective. That is, the purpose of communication is to do something. It is also the theory that each word has a speech or illocutionary act. John L. Austin, a British philosopher, first described speech act theory, and American philosopher John Searle advanced the field. A speech act is any utterance that serves a function. Austin and Searle defined three different components of every speech act: the locutionary act , or the meaning of the specific words used; the illocutionary act , or what the speaker intends to do; and the perlocutionary act , or what the listener interprets from the words. Speech act theory, therefore, explains the relationship between the speaker and the listener in communication.

There are five different categories of speech acts, or illocutions. Assertive speech acts provide information. Directives command or request an action. Commissive speech acts make a promise for the future. Expressives convey an emotion or feeling. Finally, declarations cause something to happen or create a change. Speech act theory is part of the study of pragmatics , which deals with how speech is used in a social context. There are three major pragmatic communication skills: using language, changing language, and following rules. The skill of using language to achieve an outcome is directly related to speech act theory.

Video Transcript

Exploring pragmatics.

When you see the word pragmatics, it may have scared you or made you think that it involves a complex theory. Although you may not have realized it, you have been using pragmatics since you were a child. Simply, pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that deals with language and how we use it in conversation. Pragmatics deals with three major communication skills: using language, changing language, and following certain rules.

Let's take a look at those major skills:

• Following Rules : Using the basic rules of polite conversation, such as taking turns in conversation, steering the conversation in a new direction, and reading facial expressions and eye contact.
• Changing Language : Adapting what you're saying and how to a particular situation or setting, such as filling in the details for someone who doesn't know much about the topic you're discussing, speaking differently in a class setting than you would in a bar, and speaking to a child differently than you would an adult.
• Using Language : Putting words to use for a specific reason or goal, such as greeting, requesting, and informing.

Using language is mentioned last, since this is the pragmatic skill that is most closely related to speech act theory. However, understanding the basis of pragmatics helps us to better understand the theory and makes our overall communication that much stronger.

The Theory of Speech Acts

At one time or another, we have all heard someone speaking and have wondered if there are hidden messages behind what they are saying. Whether you know it or not, sometimes the intent of what we are trying to say is just as important as or more important than what we are saying. It's establishing that relationship between the person who is speaking and the one who is listening.

The earliest ideas of speech act theory were defined by British philosopher John L. Austin in his 1959 book, 'How to Do Things with Words'. It's a simple title but it's true. We are always using words to get things done. Sometimes it's to convey emotion or other times it's to get others to perform a task.

However we use words, at the basis of it all, we are trying to get something accomplished. American philosopher John Searle further advanced the idea and research of speech acts theory . Simply, he believed that each time that a word or phrase was spoken it was a speech or illocutionary act that could be placed in several different categories.

Although Searle extensively researched this theory, his hypothesis was based on the work and ideas of several other thinkers. Searle also used the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. C. J. Midgley, H. Paul Grice, P.F. Strawson, John Rawls, and William P. Alston to further expand on his theories.

Of course, remember, Austin defined what was called the illocutionary act, or the act of speaking and its meaning. An example would be if someone arrived late to a 10:00 a.m. meeting and the host said, 'Oh this must be the new 10 o'clock'. This is actually not a request for the time but a rebuke to the person getting to the meeting late.

Think about it. How often have you received a text message on your phone, seen a Facebook post or a Tweet and responded only to find out that how you interpreted the message wasn't really how it was intended, although this written communication is a different form of speech. Searle believed that if we could classify different categories of speech acts, then we could communicate more effectively.

Five Types of Speech Acts

The five types of speech acts that are theorized in speech act theory are:

• Commissives
• Expressives
• Declarations

Let's define them:

• Assertive Speech Acts : These speech acts are statements that express belief or describe something about the world around us, such as John is going to the store.
• Directives : These speech acts are used to relay an order, command or request. Directive acts demand or order. For example, Go to the store, Tamara.
• Commissive Speech Acts : These speech acts are promises, vows or pledges. Commissive speech acts commit or promise to do something. For example, I will go to the store.
• Expressive Speech Acts : These speech acts express or share an emotion, like, Thank you, Tamara, for picking up the vegetables from the store.
• Declarative Speech Acts : This kind of speech act signifies a change. A person, place or thing changes after the speech act is made, such as in type or status. For example, I declare you man and wife , or The U.S.A. declared war on Germany.

Every day, in all parts of our lives, when we open our mouths, we are making speech acts. Today, since a great deal of our communication takes place without face to face or phone interaction we are forced to pay closer attention to words to understand the message that they are trying to convey. Understanding these speech acts can make us much better communicators and work to enhance our overall productivity.

The speech act theory simply states that the words that we speak are put into five different categories. Those categories are assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, and declarative acts. If we work to understand the meaning behind speech acts, we can become much better listeners and speakers.

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Oratory Club

Public Speaking Helpline

What are the Types of Speech Acts?

Speech acts can be categorized into three types: locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts. In a locutionary act, words are used to make a statement or convey meaning.

Illocutionary acts involve the intention behind the speech, such as making a request or giving an order. Perlocutionary acts focus on the effect the speech has on the listener, like convincing or persuading them. Speech acts have different types, namely locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts.

As the name suggests, locutionary acts involve the use of words to communicate meaning or make a statement. In contrast, illocutionary acts are centered around the intentions behind the speech, such as making a request or giving an order. Lastly, perlocutionary acts focus on the impact the speech has on the listener, such as influencing or persuading them in some way. Understanding these different types of speech acts is crucial for effective communication and interaction.

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Table of Contents

Assertive Speech Acts

When it comes to communication, we often use speech acts to convey our intentions and meanings. One such type of speech act is the assertive speech act. In this section, we will explore the definition, examples, and characteristics of assertive speech acts.

Definition And Examples

An assertive speech act, also known as a constative speech act, is used to state or convey factual information or beliefs. It aims to present an accurate representation of reality through statements that are true or false. Assertive speech acts can take various forms, including making statements, reporting facts, providing explanations, or expressing opinions.

Here are a few examples to illustrate assertive speech acts:

• Statement: “The sun rises in the east.”
• Fact Report: “According to the latest research, global warming is increasing.”
• Explanation: “Rainbows occur when sunlight is refracted and reflected by water droplets in the air.”
• Opinion: “In my opinion, smartphones have revolutionized the way we communicate.”

Characteristics

Assertive speech acts possess distinctive characteristics that set them apart from other types of speech acts:

• Truth-oriented: Assertive speech acts aim to convey information that is either true or false, reflecting objective reality.
• Factual in nature: These speech acts are centered around presenting facts, data, evidence, or personal beliefs.
• Verifiability: In most cases, assertive speech acts can be verified or proven through evidence, logical reasoning, scientific methods, or personal experiences.
• Intentional and deliberate: Speakers consciously intend to state or assert something, often with the goal of informing, persuading, or expressing their viewpoint.
• Subject to revision: Unlike certain speech acts, such as directives or commissives, assertive speech acts are open to revision or change when new evidence or information emerges.

Understanding assertive speech acts and their characteristics is crucial for effective communication. It enables us to convey information accurately, express our beliefs and opinions, and engage in meaningful discussions.

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Directive Speech Acts

Directive speech acts are a type of speech act in which the speaker intends to get the listener to do something or to influence the listener’s behavior in some way. These speech acts are typically characterized by imperatives, requests, or suggestions. In this section, we will explore the definition and examples of directive speech acts as well as their important characteristics.

A directive speech act is an utterance that is intended to prompt the listener to take a specific action. It involves making a request or giving an instruction to the listener. These speech acts are designed to elicit a response or to bring about a change in the listener’s behavior. They can be classified into various categories, including commands, requests, suggestions, and warnings.

Let’s take a look at some examples of directive speech acts:

• A mother telling her child, “Please clean your room.”
• A teacher instructing the students, “Open your textbooks to page 25.”
• A boss telling an employee, “Finish the report by the end of the day.”
• A friend suggesting, “Why don’t we go out for dinner tonight?”
• A sign warning, “Do not enter without permission.”

Directive speech acts possess a set of characteristics that distinguish them from other types of speech acts. Understanding these characteristics can help us comprehend the intention behind a speaker’s utterance and the impact it may have on the listener. Some key characteristics of directive speech acts are:

• Imperative Forms: Directive speech acts often employ imperative verb forms, such as “clean,” “open,” “finish,” or “do not enter.” These forms convey a sense of command or instruction to the listener.
• Assertiveness: Directive speech acts are typically more assertive in nature than other types of speech acts. They are direct and straightforward, aiming to influence the listener’s behavior without room for ambiguity.
• Intentional: Directive speech acts are purposeful; the speaker intends to bring about a specific action from the listener. The intention behind the speech act is to influence the listener’s behavior or to achieve a desired outcome.
• Power Dynamics: Directive speech acts often involve a power dynamic between the speaker and the listener. For example, a boss giving instructions to an employee or a teacher instructing students. This power dynamic can shape the effectiveness of the directive speech act.
• Context-Dependent: The interpretation of directive speech acts heavily relies on the context in which they occur. The same utterance can have different implications depending on factors like the relationship between the speaker and listener, cultural norms, and the specific situation.

Understanding the characteristics of directive speech acts can help us analyze the underlying intentions and implications of a speaker’s request or instruction. It allows for a deeper understanding of the power dynamics and influence within a given interaction.

Commissive Speech Acts

In the realm of speech acts, commissives are a particularly interesting type. Commissive speech acts are rooted in the realm of promises, commitments, and pledges. When someone makes a commissive statement, they are expressing their intention to carry out a specific action or fulfill a certain obligation in the future. This category of speech acts can have a profound impact on interpersonal relationships and communication dynamics, as they involve making explicit commitments or promises.

A commissive speech act is a type of utterance where the speaker commits themselves to carrying out a future action or fulfilling a certain obligation. It is a declaration of intent or a promise made by the speaker. Here are a few examples to illustrate this type of speech act:

• “I promise I will help you move next weekend.”
• “I swear I will finish this project by the deadline.”
• “I commit to attending the meeting on Friday.”

Commissive speech acts have several distinct characteristics that set them apart from other types of speech acts:

• Future-oriented: Commissive statements refer to actions or obligations that will be fulfilled in the future.
• Intentional: The speaker consciously expresses their intention to carry out the promised action.
• Volitional: Commissives emphasize the speaker’s willingness and commitment to fulfill their promise.
• Binding: Once a commissive statement is made, it creates an expectation and obligation for the speaker to follow through with their commitment.

The power of commissive speech acts lies in their ability to establish trust and reliability within interpersonal relationships. When someone makes a promise or commitment, it creates a sense of accountability and enhances trust between individuals.

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Expressive Speech Acts

Speech acts are expressive forms of communication that can be categorized into various types. These include assertive acts that make statements, directive acts that give commands, commissive acts that make commitments, expressive acts that convey emotions, and declarative acts that change the state of affairs.

Frequently Asked Questions Of What Are The Types Of Speech Acts?

What are the 5 basic types of speech acts.

The 5 basic types of speech acts are: assertives (making assertions or stating facts), directives (giving commands or making requests), commissives (making promises or commitments), expressives (expressing feelings or attitudes), and declaratives (declaring something and causing a change in the world).

What Are The 4 Different Speech Acts?

The 4 different speech acts are assertives, directives, commissives, and expressives. Assertives state facts or provide information. Directives give instructions or requests. Commissives commit to future actions. Expressives convey emotions or feelings.

What Are The 3 Types Of Speech Act And Their Functions?

The three types of speech acts are locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. Locutionary acts refer to the literal meaning of words. Illocutionary acts express intentions, such as making requests or giving orders. Perlocutionary acts aim to influence the thoughts or actions of others.

What Are The 7 Functions Of Speech Act?

The 7 functions of speech act include stating, commanding, questioning, promising, expressing gratitude, apologizing, and complimenting. These functions help individuals communicate their intentions and convey specific messages in various social interactions.

What Are The Different Types Of Speech Acts?

Speech acts are classified into five main categories: assertive, directive, commissive, expressives, and declaratives. Each type serves a different purpose in communication.

To summarize, understanding the different types of speech acts is crucial for effective communication. By recognizing the distinctions between assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, and declarative speech acts, individuals can better navigate social interactions and convey their intentions clearly. Whether in personal or professional settings, mastering these speech acts can enhance relationships, facilitate agreements, and ensure mutual understanding.

By continually honing these skills, we can become more successful communicators in our daily lives.

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John Langshaw Austin

John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960) was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He made a number of contributions in various areas of philosophy, including important work on knowledge, perception, action, freedom, truth, language, and the use of language in speech acts. Distinctions that Austin draws in his work on speech acts—in particular his distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts—have assumed something like canonical status in more recent work. His work on knowledge and perception places him in a broad tradition of “Oxford Realism”, running from Cook Wilson and Harold Arthur Prichard through to J.M. Hinton, M.G.F. Martin, John McDowell, Paul Snowdon, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. His work on truth has played an important role in recent discussions of the extent to which sentence meaning can be accounted for in terms of truth-conditions.

1. Life and Work

2.1 language and philosophy, 2.2 language and truth, 2.3 speech acts and truth, 3.1 knowledge, 3.2 sensory perception, 4.1 actions and excuses, 4.2 freedom and ability, primary literature, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Austin was born in Lancaster, England 26 March 1911 to Geoffrey Langshaw Austin and his wife Mary Austin (née Bowes-Wilson). The family moved to Scotland in 1922, where Austin’s father was Secretary of St. Leonard’s School, St. Andrews.

Austin took up a scholarship in Classics at Shrewsbury School in 1924, and, in 1929, went on to study Classics at Balliol College, Oxford. In 1933, he received a First in Literae Humaniores (Classics and Philosophy) in 1933 and was elected to a Fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford. He undertook his first teaching position in 1935, as fellow and tutor at Magdalen College, Oxford.

Austin’s early interests included Aristotle, Kant, Leibniz, and Plato (especially Theaetetus ). His more contemporary influences included especially G.E. Moore, John Cook Wilson, and H.A. Prichard. (Austin attended Prichard’s undergraduate lectures with such vigour that Prichard is reported to have made an unsuccessful attempt to exclude him.) It’s plausible that some aspects of Austin’s distinctive approach to philosophical questions derived from his engagement with the last three. All three philosophers shaped their views about general philosophical questions on the basis of careful attention to the more specific judgments we make. And they took our specific judgments (for instance, in Moore’s case, “I know that I have hands”) to be, in general, more secure than more general judgments (for instance, again in Moore’s case, “I know things about external reality”). Moreover, there are some continuities of doctrine, especially with Cook Wilson and Prichard, which align Austin with an “Oxford Realist” school of philosophy. The core components of the latter view are, first, that perception and knowledge are primitive forms of apprehension and, second, that what we apprehend are ordinary elements of our environments that are independent of our apprehending them. (All three thinkers were at one or another time committed to versions of both components of the position but for complex reasons sometimes wavered about the second. See e.g., Travis and Kalderon 2013.)

During the Second World War, Austin served in the British Intelligence Corps. It has been said of him that, “he more than anybody was responsible for the life-saving accuracy of the D-Day intelligence” (reported in Warnock 1963: 9). Austin left the army in September 1945 with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was honoured for his intelligence work with an Order of the British Empire, the French Croix de Guerre, and the U.S. Officer of the Legion of Merit.

Austin married Jean Coutts in 1941. They had four children, two girls and two boys.

After the War, Austin returned to Oxford. He became White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1952. In the same year, he took on the role of delegate to Oxford University Press, becoming Chairman of the Finance Committee in 1957. His other administrative work for the University included the role of Junior Proctor (1949–50), and Chairman of the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy (1953–55). He was president of the Aristotelian Society 1956–57. He gave the William James Lectures in Harvard in 1955 (a version of the lectures was published as How to Do Things With Words – see 1962b in the Bibliography). He invented the card game CASE in 1951.

During this period, Austin edited H.W.B. Joseph Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz (1949) and produced a translation of Gottlob Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik , so that it could be set as an exam (1950). Austin wrote little and published less. Much of his influence was through teaching and other forms of small-scale engagement with philosophers. He also instituted a series of “Saturday Morning” discussion sessions, which involved detailed discussions of a number of philosophical topics and works, including Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics , Frege’s Grundlagen , Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations , Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception , and Noam Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures .

Austin died in Oxford on 8 February 1960.

(For more detail about Austin’s life, work, and influences see Ayer 1978; Baldwin 2010; Berlin 1973b; Dancy 2010; Garvey 2014; Gustaffson 2011; Hacker 2004; Hampshire 1960; Travis and Kalderon 2013; Marion 2000a,b, 2009; Passmore 1957; Pears 1962; Pitcher 1973; Searle 2014; Urmson and Warnock 1961; Urmson 1967; Warnock 1963, 1973a; Warnock 1989: 1–10.)

2. Language and Truth

In this section, we’ll look at Austin’s views about the role of the study of language in philosophy more generally. It is common to count Austin as an “Ordinary Language Philosopher”, along with, for example, Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Strawson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. However, although each of these thinkers was sometimes concerned, in one or another way, with our use of ordinary language, it is far from clear what in addition to that the label is supposed to entail. And it is equally unclear that the various thinkers so-labelled deserve to be grouped together.

Austin cared about language for two main reasons. First, language use is a central part of human activity, so it’s an important topic in its own right. Second, the study of language is an aide—indeed, for some topics, an important preliminary—to the pursuit of philosophical topics. Many of Austin’s most distinctive reflections on the use of language arise in the course of discussion of other topics (see especially his “A Plea for Excuses” 1957).

One route to understanding Austin’s general approach to philosophy is provided by reflection on the following comment by Stuart Hampshire:

[Austin] was constitutionally unable to refrain from applying the same standards of truth and accuracy to a philosophical argument, sentence by sentence, as he would have applied to any other serious subject-matter. He could not have adopted a special tone of voice, or attitude of mind, for philosophical questions. (Hampshire 1960: 34)

In short, it mattered to Austin that, in attempting to make out positions and arguments, philosophers should meet ordinary standards of truth, accuracy, and so forth. On the one hand, this presented a general challenge to philosophers, a challenge that they might easily fail to meet. The challenge is either to make use of an ordinary vocabulary, or ordinary concepts, in order to make claims or judgments that are, according to ordinary standards, at least true (or accurate, etc.); or to do the serious work required to set up an appropriate technical vocabulary and then use it to say things that are by appropriate standards true (accurate, etc.). On the other hand, it provided Austin with what he took to be a reasonably secure approach to general philosophical questions: first, find a connection between those general philosophical questions and the more specific claims or judgments that we ordinarily make and take ourselves to be secure in making; second, make sufficiently many of the relevant claims or judgments, in a sufficient variety of circumstances, in order to address the general philosophical questions.

Austin held that, in their hurry to address general philosophical questions, philosophers have a tendency to ignore the nuances involved in making and assessing ordinary claims and judgments. Among the risks associated with insensitivity to the nuances, two stand out. First, philosophers are liable to miss distinctions that are made in our ordinary use of language and that are relevant to our concerns and claims. Second, failure to exploit fully the resources of ordinary language can make philosophers susceptible to seemingly forced choices between unacceptable alternatives. Here Austin warns:

It is worth bearing in mind…the general rule that we must not expect to find simple labels for complicated cases…however well-equipped our language, it can never be forearmed against all possible cases that may arise and call for description: fact is richer than diction. (1957: 195)

On Austin’s view, language is likely to be well designed for the ends to which it is ordinarily put. But special, or especially complicated, cases may require special treatment. This is apt to be an especial liability when it comes to the question whether a sentence can be used in a particular circumstance to state something true or false:

We say, for example, that a certain statement is exaggerated or vague or bold, a description somewhat rough or misleading or not very good, an account rather general or too concise. In cases like these it is pointless to insist on deciding in simple terms whether the statement is “true or false”. Is it true or false that Belfast is north of London? That the galaxy is the shape of a fried egg? That Beethoven was a drunkard? That Wellington won the battle of Waterloo? There are various degrees and dimensions of success in making statements: the statements fit the facts always more or less loosely, in different ways on different occasions for different intents and purposes. (1950a: 129–130)

Austin makes two points here. First, when faced with a putative choice of this sort, we should not insist on deciding in simple terms whether a statement is true or false (or whether an expression applies or fails to apply to something). Some cases are complicated, and, in some of those cases, we are capable of meeting some of the complications by saying more: “Well, it is true that Belfast is north of London if you understand that claim in the following way….” Second, the complications can take different forms, and can matter in different ways, on different occasions. Given the prior course of our conversation, and our specific intents and purposes in discussing the issue, it might be manifest that, on that particular occasion, we will understand the complications, without a need for their articulation, so that the following is fine as it stands: “Yes, it is true that Belfast is north of London.”

Austin’s summarised his view of the role of attention to ordinary language in philosophy thus:

First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method. (1957: 181–182) [ 1 ]

Austin holds, then, that an important preliminary to philosophising on at least some topics—for instance, where the topic is “ordinary and reasonably practical”—would be the detailed study of the language we use to speak on that topic, and of the way that we use it.

Austin didn’t think that the investigation of language was more than a preliminary to theorising, either in philosophy or science. He wasn’t averse to theory construction, even if its outcome were potentially revisionary (see e.g., 1957: 189). His concern was only that such theorising should be properly grounded, and that it should not be driven, for example, by an initial failure to keep track of distinctions that we mark in our ordinary use of language. Further, Austin draws an important distinction between “words and facts or things,” and he seems to suggest that we have ways of investigating the world—that is, facts and things—which can bypass the “blinkers” sometimes imposed on us by our words. We’ll return to Austin’s distinction between the world, including facts—which Austin thinks of as particular or concrete—and words, including the statements we make in using words, in section 2.2 . And we’ll return to Austin’s idea that we can have unblinkered awareness of the world—unblinkered, that is, by the linguistic or judgmental capacities that we bring to bear on what we experience—in section 3.1 .

It’s fair to say that Austin’s work has been caught up in the stampede away from broadly ordinary language-based approaches to philosophical questions. The work of Paul Grice, collected in his Studies in the Way of Words (1989), has played an important role in the negative assessment of such approaches, including aspects of Austin’s work. One central idea in Grice’s work is that the ways in which we use language—crudely, the pairings of situations and sentences that we find appropriate or inappropriate, or what we would or wouldn’t say in those situations—is not a simple function of the nature of the respective situations and the correctness conditions with which the sentences are associated. Rather, judgments about appropriateness are driven also by, for example, our sensitivities to the demands of rational co-operation with our conversational partners. And it has been thought that, in one or another way, ordinary language philosophers, including Austin, have been insensitive to the additional parameters to which judgments of appropriateness are beholden (for early attacks of this sort, see Ayer 1967 and Searle 1966). It is beyond the scope of this entry to attempt to assess either the extent to which Austin should really be seen as a target of such objections or, if he should, whether they demonstrate weaknesses in his work. However, in pursuing any such assessment, it is important to note that Austin’s exploitation of ordinary language is never driven by simple appeal to whether, in a situation considered as a whole, we would take it to be simply appropriate or inappropriate to use some sentence or other. Rather, Austin is—as we are—sensitive to more fine-grained appraisals of uses of bits of language and, when he judges that an utterance on an occasion would be false or nonsensical, he intends that judgment to contrast with less damaging negative appraisals—for example, about what it would be merely inappropriate or impolite to say. Moreover, Austin is sensitive to the specific features of situations upon which we base one or another more fine-grained appraisal of uses of sentences. As he stresses, “It takes two to make a truth” (1950a: 124 fn.1). And Austin is sensitive to the details of both participants in that and other forms of transaction between word and world. [ 2 ]

(For discussion of Austin’s approach to philosophical questions, with reference to his classification as an ordinary language philosopher, see Berlin 1973b; Cavell 1965; Garvey 2014; Grice 1989: 3–21; Gustafsson 2011; Hampshire 1960, 1965; Kaplan 2018: 1–39; Longworth 2018a; Marion 2009; Martin ms (Other Internet Resources); Pears 1962; Pitcher 1973; Putnam 1994; Quine 1965; Reimer 2018; Searle 1966; Soames 2003: 171–219; Travis 1991; Urmson 1965, 1967; Urmson and Warnock 1961; Warnock 1973a, 1989: 2–10; White 1967.)

The topic of this section is Austin’s views about truth. Austin’s views about truth are scattered throughout his work, but his most explicit discussion of the topic is in the paper “Truth” (1950a) (see also 1953, 1954ms, 1956b, 1962b, 1962c). Amongst the distinctive claims Austin makes about truth are the following:

Let’s start with (1)–(3). Austin 1950a is ostensibly responding to a proposal in Strawson 1949 according to which the function of the predicate “is true” is to facilitate the performance of acts of affirmation or agreement, and not to describe things—e.g., statements—as possessing the property of truth. For short, Strawson claimed that “is true” has a performative rather than a descriptive function. And he accused his opponents of committing the descriptive fallacy : the alleged fallacy of treating expressions, or aspects of the use of expressions, that really serve performative purposes as having (only) a descriptive purpose. [ 4 ] One of Austin’s aims was to defend the view that the predicate “is true” has a descriptive function (perhaps in addition to its having one or more performative functions). In pursuing that aim, Austin also made a number of distinctive proposals about the descriptive function of the truth predicate. [ 5 ]

Let’s turn, then, to the core of Austin’s account of truth. Austin presents his account of truth as an account of truth for statements . However, “statement” is at least two ways ambiguous, covering both historical episodes in which something is stated—what I’ll refer to as statings —and also the things or propositions that are stated therein—which I’ll refer to as what is stated . Austin isn’t especially careful about the distinction, but it’s possible to reconstruct much of what he says in a way that respects it (for discussion of the distinction see e.g., Cartwright 1962).

Austin’s primary interest appears to be the truth of statings . He writes of “statement” that it has “the merit of clearly referring to the historic use of a sentence by an utterer” (1950a: 121). However, statings are not ordinarily said to be true or false, except derivatively insofar as what is stated in them is true or false. Rather, statings are assessed as, for example, correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate, and so forth. However, it is plausible that stating correctly is closely associated with making a statement that is true. And Austin’s account can be understood as an account of the conditions in which statings are such that what is stated in them is true. [ 6 ]

Austin presents the core of his account of truth in the following way:

When is a statement true? The temptation is to answer (at least if we confine ourselves to “straightforward” statements): “When it corresponds to the facts”. And as a piece of standard English this can hardly be wrong. Indeed, I must confess I do not really think it is wrong at all: the theory of truth is a series of truisms. Still, it can at least be misleading. (1950a: 121)

The two obvious sources of potential misdirection in the formula that Austin endorses here are its appeal to correspondence and its appeal to facts . [ 7 ] Austin attempts to prevent our being misled by explaining how those two appeals ought to be understood. Austin’s focus in his “Truth” (1950a) is mainly on the nature of correspondence. He deals more fully with facts in his “Unfair to Facts” (1954ms).

In giving an account of correspondence, Austin makes appeal to two types of (what he calls) conventions ( as per (3) above ): [ 8 ]

• Descriptive conventions . These correlate sentences with types of situation, thing, event, etc., in the world.
• Demonstrative conventions . These correlate statements ( statings ) with historic (particular, concrete) situations, things, events, etc., in the world. (1950a: 121–122) [ 9 ]

The descriptive conventions associate sentences with (types of) ways for things to be: ways for situations, things, events, etc. to be. For instance, the sentence “The cat is on the mat” is associated with a type of way for things to be in which the cat is on the mat. A variety of different historic situations might be of that type. For instance, one historic situation of that type might involve Logos (Derrida’s cat), while a different historic situation of the same type might involve Nothing (Sartre’s cat). Similarly, cat-mat pairings that took place at different times would be different historic situations or events and yet might be of the same type.

The demonstrative conventions, by contrast, associate particular statings—themselves historic events—with some amongst the accessible historic situations, things, events, etc. Consider, for example, the following simplified case. There are two accessible situations, one of which is of the cat-on-mat type and one of which is of the dog-on-linoleum type. The descriptive conventions governing the English sentence “The cat is on the mat” do not, and cannot, determine which of the two accessible situations a speaker aims to talk about on a particular occasion. In order to achieve that, the speaker must find a way of making manifest that their goal is to select, say, the dog-on-linoleum situation. They might achieve this by, for example, their use on a particular occasion of the present tense, or by pointing, etc. (1950a: 121–126). [ 10 ]

With this machinery in place, Austin continues:

A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs [or e.g., situation, thing, event] to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it “refers”) is of a type [footnote omitted] with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions. (1950a: 122)

What does “is of a type with which” mean? Austin expands on his account in the omitted footnote:

“Is of a type with which” means “is sufficiently like those standard states of affairs with which”. Thus, for a statement to be true one state of affairs must be like certain others, which is a natural relation, but also sufficiently like to merit the same “description”, which is no longer a purely natural relation. To say “This is red” is not the same as to say “This is like those”, nor even as to say “This is like those which were called red”. That things are similar , or even “exactly” similar, I may literally see, but that they are the same I cannot literally see—in calling them the same colour a convention is involved additional to the conventional choice of the name to be given to the colour which they are said to be. (1950a: 122 fn.2)

The English sentence “This is red” is correlated by the descriptive conventions with a type of way for things to be: a type instanced by all and only those historic situations or states of affairs in which a selected thing is red. According to Austin, a stating by use of that sentence would be correct if the thing selected in the stating via the demonstrative conventions were sufficiently like standard situations or states of affairs in which a selected thing is red. So, we rely on the existence of a range of standard instances that are assumed to be of the required type. We can see that the thing selected in this stating, via the demonstrative conventions, is now in various ways similar and dissimilar from those standard instances. The question we need to answer is this: Is this thing of the same type as the standard instances with respect to its colour? That is, is it the same colour as they are? According to Austin, we cannot answer that question simply by looking. In an at least attenuated sense we must make a decision as to whether the present instance is, in relevant respects, sufficiently similar to the standard instances as to mandate treating it as of the very same type. [ 11 ]

Notice that, on Austin’s view, states of affairs (etc.) do not per se mandate that they belong to one or another type. To that extent, they do not alone determine which propositional statements are true of them. The things to which true statings correspond, then, are (in at least that sense) particulars ( see (2) above ). The things to which statings correspond, then, appear to be quite different from facts as the latter are commonly understood by philosophers. For facts are often thought of as proposition-like—as exhaustively captured by instances of the form “The fact that p ”. And it seems that elements of that type would mandate the correctness of one or another classification. Austin’s views about facts are developed a bit more fully in his “Unfair to Facts” (1954ms). There Austin makes clear, first, that he uses “facts”, with etymological precedent, to speak of particulars. Second, Austin sketches a view of propositional fact talk on which it is used as a way of indirectly denoting particulars as the elements that make the specified propositions true. However, Austin’s basic account of truth can for the most part be detached from his views about facts and fact-talk. [ 12 ]

The role for human judgment or decision in mediating the classification of particulars leaves open that their correct classification as to type might vary depending on specific features of the occasion for so classifying them ( see (4) above ). It may be, for example, that for certain purposes an historic state of affairs involving a rose is sufficiently like standard situations involving red things as to warrant sameness of classification, while for different purposes its likeness is outweighed by its dissimilarities from the standard cases. Moreover, what are counted as standard cases may vary with the purposes operative in attempting to classify, and may shift as new cases come to be counted as of a specific type. [ 13 ]

The precise ways in which our statings depend for their correctness or incorrectness on the facts can vary with variation in specific features of the occasion, in particular with variation in the intents and purposes of conversational participants. As Austin puts it,

It seems to be fairly generally realized nowadays that, if you just take a bunch of sentences…impeccably formulated in some language or other, there can be no question of sorting them out into those that are true and those that are false; for (leaving out of account so-called “analytic” sentences) the question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence is , nor yet on what it means , but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences as such are not either true or false. (1962a: 110–111. See also 40–41, 65)

And the circumstances can matter in a variety of ways, not simply by supplying, or failing to supply, an appropriate array of facts:

…in the case of stating truly or falsely, just as in the case of advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the utterance and its context are important; what is judged true in a school book may not be so judged in a work of historical research. Consider … “Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma”, remembering that Alma was a soldier’s battle if ever there was one and that Lord Raglan’s orders were never transmitted to some of his subordinates. Did Lord Raglan then win the battle of Alma or did he not? Of course in some contexts, perhaps in a school book, it is perfectly justifiable to say so—it is something of an exaggeration, maybe, and there would be no question of giving Raglan a medal for it…“Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma” is exaggerated and suitable to some contexts and not to others; it would be pointless to insist on its [i.e., the sentence’s ] truth or falsehood. (1962b: 143–144, interpolation added)

It’s important here to separate two questions. First, is the sentence “Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma” true? Second, is what is stated in using that sentence on a particular occasion, true? In order for the first question to get an affirmative answer, every use of the sentence would have to be—or issue in a statement that is—true. [ 14 ] But although the sentence can be used in a schoolbook to make a statement that is true, it might also be used in a work of historical research, or in support of Raglan’s decoration, in making a false statement. Hence, the sentence doesn’t take the same truth-value on every occasion: the sentence per se is neither true nor false. By contrast, there is no reason to deny that the things that are stated in using the sentence on occasions are true: in particular, there is no reason to deny that what is stated by the schoolbook occurrence of the sentence is true. So, the second question can be given an affirmative answer, as long as we are willing to allow that a sentence can be used to make different statements on different occasions (see also Austin’s discussion of “real” in Sense and Sensibilia (1962a: 62–77) for an array of relevant examples).

We should avoid a possible misunderstanding of Austin here. His argument shows, at most, that whatever combines with the facts to determine a particular truth-value varies from occasion to occasion. That does nothing to dislodge the natural view that a sentence can carry its meaning with it from occasion to occasion, and thus possess a literal meaning. However, if we wish to retain that idea, we must give up on the idea that sentence meaning simply combines with the facts that are being spoken about to determine truth-value: we must reject the idea that sentence meanings determine truth-conditions. Plausibly, we should also give up the idea that meaning alone determines what is stated (at least insofar as the latter determines truth-conditions). In taking this line, we would reject views of meaning according to which it is given by appeal to truth-conditions. [ 15 ]

Austin’s account gives rise to the possibility of utterances in which no truth-evaluable statement is produced:

Suppose that we confront “France is hexagonal” with the facts, in this case, I suppose, with France, is it true or false? Well, if you like, up to a point; of course I can see what you mean by saying that it is true for certain intents and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps, but not for a geographer… How can one answer this question, whether it is true or false that France is hexagonal? It is just rough, and that is the right and final answer to the question of the relation of “France is hexagonal” to France. It is a rough description; it is not a true or a false one. (1962b: 143)

What Austin characterises in his final denial is the sentence “France is hexagonal”, in relation to France. He needn’t, and doesn’t, deny that on occasion, for particular intents and purposes, one might use the sentence to state a truth. However, he suggests that, in some cases, the circumstances of utterance may be such that no truth-evaluable statement is made by the use of a sentence.

Suppose, for example, that someone uttered “France is hexagonal” out of the blue, without making manifest any intents and purposes. In that case, there would be nothing to go on, in seeking to establish whether the utterance was true or false, other than the words used, given their meanings. But those words might have been used to make a variety of statements, statements whose truth or falsehood depends on the facts in a variety of ways. Hence, unless we are willing to allow that the utterance is both true and false, we should withhold that mode of assessment: although such an utterance would involve a perfectly meaningful sentence, it would fail to be either true or false. Austin thought that our uses of words are always liable to that sort of failure, especially when we are doing philosophy. When used in cases that are out of the ordinary, or in the absence of the background required to sustain the statement of truths or falsehoods, words might—in that sense—fail us.

Austin makes no claims to generality for the account of truth that he sketches. However, it’s natural to wonder to what extent the account can naturally be extended in order to take in types of statement that he doesn’t explicitly attempt to bring within its purview. Potential pressure points here include statements whose expression involves negation (see 1950a: 128–129, 129 fn.1), quantification (see 1962b: 144), or conditionals, and statements of necessary truths. The three main options open to the defender of Austin here are the following. First, an attempt might be made to bring some cases within the purview of a natural generalization of Austin’s account (see, for example, Warnock 1989: 56–61). Second, it might be allowed that some such cases require distinctive treatment, but argued that they can still be connected with the account Austin offers as further species of the truth-genus. Third, an attempt might be made to argue that some such cases are so distinctive that the forms of positive appraisal that are appropriate to them are not really forms of appraisal as to truth. [ 16 ]

Let’s turn to (5) , the question of the extent to which Austin endorses a deflationary account of truth. The promiscuity of the classifier “deflationist” has a tendency to render the question difficult to discuss in a useful way. However, we can at least consider some ways in which Austin might be thought to give an explanatory role to truth, or to deny it such a role. It’s clear that Austin wishes to reject Strawson’s very strong form of deflationism, according to which the function of truth is exhaustively performative: saying that a statement is true amounts, precisely, to endorsing that statement oneself. Moreover, there is no sign that Austin thinks an account can be given of the expression of statements by statings that isn’t bound up with consideration of the conditions in which their stating would be subject to one or another form of positive appraisal—at the most general level, consideration of their correctness-conditions. However, Austin often characterizes truth and falsity themselves as, in effect, mere labels for positive and negative poles, respectively, in a variety of more specific forms of appraisal.

We become obsessed with “truth” when discussing statements, just as we become obsessed with “freedom” when discussing conduct. So long as we think that what has always and alone to be decided is whether a certain action was done freely or was not, we get nowhere: but so soon as we turn instead to the numerous other adverbs used in the same connexion (“accidentally”, “unwillingly”, “inadvertently”, &c.), things become easier, and we come to see that no concluding inference of the form “Ergo, it was done freely (or not freely)” is required. Like freedom, truth is a bare minimum or an illusory ideal (the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about, say, the battle of Waterloo or the Primavera ). (1950a: 130; see also 1956b: 250–251, 1957: 180)

Austin’s idea here seems to be the following. There are numerous specific forms of positive appraisal that we employ with respect to statings: they might be fair, reasonable, accurate, precise, adequate, satisfactory and so forth. (Recall that Austin would have taken each form of assessment to be occasion-bound: a matter, for example, of what would be fair and reasonable to judge on this particular occasion.) In saying that what is stated in a stating is true , we are in effect saying that the stating meets the “bare minimum” condition of being susceptible to one or another of those specific forms of positive appraisal. It’s consistent with this type of view that our conception of the natures of what we state, and of how our statings come to be expressions of those things, is bound up with our conception of the conditions in which our statings, and what we thereby state, are susceptible to one or another form of positive appraisal. To that extent, it differs from some stronger forms of deflationism on which no truth-related mode of positive appraisal plays a non-derivative explanatory role. Moreover, the view can take more or less radical forms. Its most radical form treats truth as a mere disjunction of the more specific modes of positive appraisal, with no uniform underlying commonality amongst those specific modes. That view would be a distinctive form of deflationism about truth, since it would reject the idea that truth per se plays an essential role in explanation. Its less radical form allows that truth might impose a uniform necessary condition on the specific modes of positive appraisal, and thereby play an essential role, through its government of the specific modes, in the explanation of what is stated in statings. The latter form of view wouldn’t count as an interesting form of deflationism , although it might well be an interesting position in its own right.

Austin discusses an important range of ways in which assessment as to truth can cover a variety of more fine-grained modes of appraisal in his “How to Talk” (1953). See also the discussions of this paper in Chisholm 1964 and Warnock 1989: 47–56.

(For discussion of Austin’s account of truth, see Barwise and Etchemendy 1987; Bennett 1966; Crary 2002; Davidson 1969; Grice 1989: 3–40; Hansen 2014; Kirkham 1995: 124–140; Mates 1974; Narboux 2011; Putnam 1994; Recanati 1994: 1–5, 121–130, 141–153; Searle 1966; Strawson 1950, 1965; Travis 1991, 2005, 2008: 1–18, 2011; Warnock 1973c, 1989: 45–64, 135–145, 163–4 fn.74; White 1967; C.J.F. Williams 1973.)

In this section, we’ll consider some aspects of Austin’s treatment of speech acts—things done with words (the main sources here are: 1962b, 1956b, and 1963; see also 1946: 97–103, 1950a: 130–133, 1953). The topics we’ll consider are the following.

A topic that has figured in some recent discussions, but that we won’t discuss here, is this:

Austin presents the second reason for why sentences do not conspire with the facts to determine truth-values in considering whether there is a useful distinction to be drawn between (indicative) sentences that are used to make statements—which Austin labels constatives —and sentences that are useable in the performance of some act—which Austin labels performatives (or sometimes performatory ) ( topic (2) above ). [ 17 ] Austin’s opening list of examples of putative performatives includes: “I take … to be my lawfully wedded …”—as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony; “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth ”—as uttered when smashing a bottle against the stern; “I give and bequeath my watch to my brother”—as occurring in a will; “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow” (1962b: 5). About these examples, Austin writes:

In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing…[fn. Still less anything that I have already done or have yet to do.]…or to state that I am doing it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. (1962b: 6)

Austin is sometimes read as seeking to defend this view of performatives. However, four features of his presentation suggest that his view is not so straightforward. First, Austin presents the issue as concerning the classification by use of utterances of types of sentence , and we have already seen that he is in general sceptical about alleged associations between sentences and their occasional uses. Second, Austin fails here, and elsewhere, to offer serious arguments for his assertion that none of the cited utterances is either true or false. Third, Austin’s assertion is made using the apparently performative form, “I assert … ”—a form that appears, moreover, to falsify the generalisation that performatives lack truth-values. Finally, Austin issues the following warning in a footnote, two pages earlier: “Everything said in these sections is provisional, and subject to revision in the light of later sections” (1962b: 4 fn.1).

Austin goes on to discuss two apparently quite different modes of assessment for utterances of the two apparently different types. Constatives, as already noted, are assessed along the dimension of truth and falsehood. By contrast, performatives are assessed along dimensions of happiness and unhappiness , or felicity and infelicity . Taking the example of an utterance of “I take … to be my lawfully wedded … ”, and simplifying Austin’s discussion, there are two main sorts of unhappiness, or infelicity, to which this performative is liable. First, there are misfires :

…if we…utter the formula incorrectly, or if…we are not in a position to do the act because we are…married already, or it is the purser and not the captain who is conducting the ceremony, then the act in question, …marrying, is not successfully performed at all, …[it] is not achieved. (1962b: 15–16)

Second, there are abuses : in these cases, the act is performed, but insincerely, perhaps for example in instituting a marriage of convenience.

It’s important to see that, even if it were true, in general, that some things done using performatives—e.g., marrying, naming, bequeathing, and betting—are neither true nor false, but rather are subject to assessment as happy or unhappy, it would not follow that truth is out of the picture. That would depend, not only on the basic claim that actions of those types per se are not true or false, but also on the claim that particular actions of those types are not also of other types that are assessable as true or false. And Austin recognised that actions can be of more than one type (or, perhaps, that distinct actions might be performed simultaneously):

To say that I believe you ‘is’ on occasion to accept your statement; but it is also to make an assertion, which is not made by the strictly performatory utterance “I accept your statement”. (1950a: 133)

In the examples that Austin cites, things are done that are not assessable as true or false—marrying, naming, betting, etc. But as Austin points out, those examples might also involve other things being done—e.g., the making of statements—that are, or involve things that are, assessable as true or false. However, even though this undermines Austin’s provisional characterisation of performatives, the possibility that we might sometimes do more than one thing in using a performative puts pressure on the idea that there is a simple connection between sentences and the various things we do in using them.

I’ve suggested that Austin’s view of the putative distinction between performatives and constatives is less straightforward than it might at first seem. And the structure of Austin (1962b) bears out that assessment. Although much of the book seems to be devoted to pursuit of a distinction between performatives and constatives, none of the attempts succeeds. It is possible, but implausible, that in the course of the lectures Austin found that he was unable to draw a distinction that he thought should be drawn. A more plausible interpretation is that Austin’s purpose is not to draw such a distinction. Rather it is to argue—through the failures of various attempts to draw the distinction—that there is no such simple distinction—no sorting of sentences into those apt for performative, and those apt for constative, use.

Austin argues against the distinction by appeal to the fact that the same forms of assessment are applicable to utterances apparently of both sorts:

…unhappiness…seems to characterize both kinds of utterance, not merely the performative; and…the requirement of conforming or bearing some relation to the facts, different in different cases, seems to characterize performatives… (1962b: 91)

Attempts to make a statement are liable both to misfires and abuses. For example, an attempt to make a statement using “France is hexagonal” might misfire if there were no such country as France, or (as discussed above) if no suitable intents and purposes were manifest (1962b: 47–52). And an attempt might be an abuse if the speaker failed to believe that France was hexagonal. Attempts at performative utterance are liable to assessment either in terms of truth or falsehood, or in terms similarly dependent on conformity with the facts: my utterance of “I warn you that the bull is about to charge” may be liable to criticism as mistaken rather than unhappy if the bull is not about to charge (1962b: 55). More generally, it is often impossible to decide, just from the words a speaker uses, whether their utterance is susceptible to one or another form of assessment. And there are cases like “I state that …” which seem to satisfy all formal and lexical requirements for being performative, and yet are used in utterances “…which surely are the making of statements, and surely are essentially true or false” (1962b: 91). (Austin’s ideas here also bear on topic (4) above .)

(For discussion of Austin’s views about performative utterances, see Bach 1975; G. Bird 1981; Black 1963; Cohen 1964, 1974; Forguson 1966; Heal 1974; Hornsby 1988, 2006; Jack 1981; Lemmon 1962; Lewis 1972; Schiffer 1972; Sinnott-Armstrong 1994; Tsohatzidis 2018; Urmson 1977; Warnock 1973b, 1989: 105–151.)

From the wreckage of the initial distinction, Austin assembles a new model ( topic (3) above ). The new model is founded on distinctions among various kinds of thing speakers do—various acts they perform—when they produce an utterance.

• The locutionary act : the production of an utterance that can be classified by its phonetic, grammatical, and lexical characteristics, up to sentence meaning (the phatic act). It is also the performance of an act that can be classified by its content (the rhetic act)—a feature distinctively of acts of speech. If I promise that I’ll be home for dinner and then promise that I’ll work late , my actions are instances of two different locutionary acts: one with the content that I’ll be home for dinner, and one with the content that I’ll work late (1962b: 94–98).
• The illocutionary act : an act classifiable not only by its content—as with the locutionary act—but also by its force (stating, warning, promising, etc.). If I promise that I’ll be home for dinner and later state that I’ll be home for dinner, my actions are instances of the same locutionary act: both actions involve the content that I’ll be home for dinner. However, my actions are instances of different illocutionary acts: one has the force of a promise, while the other has the force of a statement (1962b: 98–101).
• The perlocutionary act : an act classifiable by its “ … consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons … ”. If I warn that the ice is thin, and so perform one illocutionary act, I may thereby perform a variety of perlocutionary acts: I may persuade someone to avoid it, or encourage someone to take a risk, and so forth (1962b: 101).

Austin’s interest in the types of act so distinguished was “…essentially to fasten on the second, illocutionary act and contrast it with the other two…” (1962b: 103). What did Austin think was important about the illocutionary act? And what did he think were the dangers inherent in failing to mark it off from the other types?

Austin appears to have thought that the various modes of assessment that he discusses—e.g., true/false, happy/unhappy—apply most fundamentally to the illocutionary act, rather than the locutionary or the perlocutionary act. [ 18 ] One point is that Austin thought that philosophers have had a tendency to view some assessments as to happiness (or felicity) as really applying to perlocutionary acts, so as not bearing on the specifically linguistic things that speakers are up to. Another point—and perhaps the point of primary importance—is that Austin thought that philosophers have had a tendency to view assessments as to truth as applying most fundamentally to locutionary acts. Moreover, he thought that philosophers had conceived locutionary acts, not as abstractions from illocutionary acts, but rather as things that might be done without any illocutionary purpose, just by virtue of the linguistic expressions employed or their meanings. By contrast, Austin held that locutionary acts are abstracted from instances of illocutionary acts, and that assessment as to truth is directed most fundamentally to the illocutionary act. (We’ll consider below a stronger and a weaker reading of the idea that assessment as to truth applies most fundamentally to the illocutionary act.)

For Austin, then, assessment as to truth is of a piece with various forms of assessment as to happiness, etc., and like those forms it is the assessment of an act with respect to its goodness or badness. Thus Austin’s discussion of illocutionary acts is bound up with his other discussions of the ways in which assessment of utterances as to truth is dependent upon specific features of the circumstances of utterance. He writes:

The truth or falsity of statements is affected by what they leave out or put in and by their being misleading, and so on. Thus, for example, descriptions, which are said to be true or false or, if you like, are “statements”, are surely liable to these criticisms, since they are selective and uttered for a purpose. It is essential to realize that “true” and false’, like “free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right and proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. (1962b: 144–145)

According to Austin, there is more involved in any such assessment than a simple comparison of requirements imposed by linguistic meaning with the facts. Reflection on the assessment of actions in which we speak and the speech acts that classify them indicates two things: first, the distinction between assessment as to happiness and assessment as to truth is ultimately unprincipled; and, second, some mixture of various types of assessment applies to all, or nearly all, utterances. These ideas appear to be the basis for a cryptic claim of Austin’s ( mentioned above as topic (4) ). Exploiting the various modes of appraisal to distinguish five very general classes of speech act verbs, Austin writes that

They are…quite enough to play Old Harry with two fetishes which I admit to an inclination to play Old Harry with, viz. (1) the true/false fetish, (2) the value/fact fetish. (1962b: 151)

Austin’s cryptic suggestion appears to be to the effect that, in one or another way, classifications of utterances along the true-false dimension, or according to whether they are expressions of fact or expressions of value, is—for at least some purposes—too crude. The suggestion is susceptible of a weaker and a stronger reading. On the weaker reading, the suggestion is to the effect that, when the assessment of an utterance is at issue, it is essential to consider the force or forces that attach to the illocutionary act or acts thereby performed. Since various such acts may have been performed, and since assessment of each act involves consideration of a mix of facts and values, there is no clean way of sorting utterances on the basis either of whether or not their primary mode of assessment is on the true-false dimension, or of whether their primary function is the expression of fact, rather than the expression of value. That leaves open that, with respect to at least some speech acts, a locutionary core—a proposition, or propositions, or propositional-like element—may be assessed in a way that makes no reference to force, for example, along the true-false dimension. On the stronger reading, the claim would be that it is not possible to detach a locutionary core from the force with which it is expressed in such a way that that core can be assessed without reference to force. On its stronger reading, Austin’s suggestion would have to contend with an aspect of what is known as the Frege-Geach problem: the challenge of explaining logical connections amongst speech acts with different forces where those connections appear to depend upon their sharing (elements of) a locutionary core (see Geach 1965).

(For discussion of Austin’s distinction amongst locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts see Bach 1975; Bach and Harnish 1979; G. Bird 1981; Black 1963; Cerf 1966; Chisholm 1964; Cohen 1964, 1974; Fiengo 2018; Forguson 1966, 1973; Furberg 1969; Garvey 2014; Geach 1965; Hornsby 1988, 1994, 2006; Katz 1986; Moltmann 2018; Schiffer 1972; Searle 1968, 1969; Strawson 1964a, 1973; Urmson 1977; Vendler 1972; Warnock 1973b, 1989: 105–151. For discussion specifically of the interaction of Austin’s views about the natures of speech acts with his views about truth, see Crary 2002; Quine 1965; Travis 2011; Warnock 1989: 140–150, 163–164 fn. 74.)

3. Knowledge and Perception

Austin’s main discussions of knowledge and perception take place in “Other Minds” (1946) and Sense and Sensibilia (1962a; see also “Unfair to Facts” [1954ms], which overlaps with parts of the lecture series on which Sense and Sensibilia was based that are excised from the book, and “Ifs and Cans” [1956a: 230]). [ 19 ] Stated more baldly than would have been acceptable to Austin, and reconstructing slightly, his distinctive views in this area include the following.

A consequence of (3) and (4) is that foundationalism is undercut: there are no foundational claims that are especially infallible; and there are no non-foundational claims that are distinctively fallible. It is possible for our judgmental capacities to misfire with respect to any subject matter, including e.g., our own feelings or experiences. And it’s possible for their exercise to be sufficiently reliable to give rise to knowledge about ordinary matters, e.g., that there is a pig before one.

Three further side claims that have assumed some importance in recent work are the following.

Let’s begin with some of what Austin says in support of (1) . In his “Other Minds” (1946), Austin sketches a distinction between knowing and believing through appeal to the different kinds of challenges that are appropriate to claims to know versus claims to believe. First, Austin points out that one who claims to know may be challenged to explain how they know, while someone who claims to believe may be challenged to explain why they believe. The consequences of failing adequately to meet those challenges are also different: in the first case, the consequences might include that the subject does not know; in the second, the consequence might include, not the subject doesn’t believe , but that they oughtn’t to believe. Later, Austin indicates a further basis for the distinction between knowing and believing:

…saying “I know”…is not saying “I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the same scale as believing and being sure, even to being quite sure”: for there is nothing in that scale superior to being quite sure. (1946: 99)

Importantly, and moving on to claim (2) , Austin holds that knowledge is the upshot of the successful exercise of judgmental capacities—which he thinks of as essentially language involving—in appropriate circumstances: the successful exercise of (judgmental) acumen given (perception- or testimony-based) opportunity . The following two passages are central to understanding Austin’s views in this area:

Any description of a taste or sound or smell (or colour) or of a feeling, involves (is) saying that it is like one or some that we have experienced before: any descriptive word is classificatory, involves recognition and in that sense memory, and only when we use such words (or names or descriptions, which come down to the same) are we knowing anything, or believing anything. But memory and recognition are often uncertain and unreliable. (1946: 92). …sensa [the things we sense or perceive] are dumb, and only previous experience enables us to identify them. If we choose to say that they “identify themselves” (and certainly “recognizing” is not a highly voluntary act of ours), then it must be admitted that they share the birthright of all speakers, that of speaking unclearly and untruly. (1946: 97)

We perceive various things, features, events, and states of affairs. The things we perceive are not presented to us as already classified into types. Yet propositional knowledge essentially involves classification: for example, we know that that thing is a pig . In order to know, we must exercise judgmental capacities, taking stands with respect to the ways the things, features, events, and states of affairs are. We must classify the elements into types based on their similarities with elements that we have already classified into types. (Notice that Austin’s view that these elements are particulars, articulated in his “Truth” (1950a) and “Unfair to Facts” (1954ms), figures essentially here.)

Returning to (1) , let’s consider what Austin says about the conditions in which a subject would fail to know. Austin’s discussion is haunted by the following condition: “If I know , I can’t be wrong ”. He never quite endorses the condition. He admits at one point that its third person counterpart makes sense , but characterizes the sense it makes by appeal to a prohibition on saying “I know it is so, but I may be wrong” (1946: 98).

It’s clear that Austin would reject the claim that it is a necessary condition on knowing that it be impossible for one to have been wrong—impossible, that is, for one to have exercised the same capacities in the same circumstances and to have judged incorrectly. For given that he holds that judgmental capacities are inherently fallible ( (3) above ), it would follow that we can never know anything.

The human intellect and senses are, indeed, inherently fallible and delusive, but not inveterately so. Machines are inherently liable to break down, but good machines don’t (often). It is futile to embark on a “theory of knowledge” which denies this liability: such theories constantly end up by admitting the liability after all, and denying the existence of “knowledge”. (1946: 98)

What Austin says here is consistent with the operation of the capacities being reliable in some circumstances, and with their reliable operation being such as to give rise to knowledge. So it is open to Austin to hold a view on which knowledge requires that the particular exercises of the capacity to judge on which they are based couldn’t have occurred and yet the output judgment be mistaken. And it is open to him to hold that if the exercise of judgmental capacities is to give rise to knowledge, those capacities must be reliable in the circumstances in which they are exercised and given the way they are exercised on that occasion (e.g., carefully). However, Austin doesn’t make fully explicit that his view about knowledge includes either component. And some of what he says—especially in discussion of his performative proposal about the use of “I know”—is in tension with the first claim, on which knowing is incompatible with being mistaken. [ 20 ] (It’s possible that Austin viewed his “Ifs and Cans” (1956a) discussion of abilities as providing further illumination concerning the proper understanding of the formula “If one knows, one can’t be wrong”.)

One potential consequence of Austin’s account concerns foundationalism. Foundationalism typically involves the following three claims. First, many of the ordinary judgments that we make—for example, judgments to the effect that there is a pig here—are inherently risky in the following sense. It’s possible for us to make such judgments mistakenly, even in cases in which we operate as carefully as possible. Second, some of the judgments we make, or could make, are not inherently risky: for example, where we are careful only to judge about how things presently appear to us, the judgments we make carry no risk of error. Third, then, if our aim is to achieve absolute security, we should avoid judgments of the first sort except insofar as they are securely based upon judgments of the second sort. (On one view of this type, the second sort of judgment would be taken to provide evidence on which judgments of the first sort are based.) Austin’s account undermines the first two components of this view. The first component is undermined because, although it is always possible to judge incorrectly, there are ordinary cases in which our judgments about our environment are, in fact, absolutely secure ( (4) above ):

…if I watch or some time an animal a few feet in front of me, in a good light, if I prod it perhaps, and sniff, and take note of the noises it makes, I may say, “That”s a pig’; and this too will be “incorrigible”, nothing could be produced that would show that I had made a mistake…if the animal then emerges and stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of collecting evidence; its coming into view doesn’t provide me with more evidence that it’s a pig, I can now just see that it is, the question is settled. (1962a: 114–115)

The second component is undermined because there is no type of judgment, and no type of subject matter, with respect to which error is impossible ( (3) above ). In order to have propositional knowledge even about what I am experiencing right now, I must classify it together with other things of the same type. And that requires the exercise of capacities that are inherently fallible: I may not have had enough experiences of things of the same sort to classify this one securely; I may not have attended to what I am experiencing with sufficient care; I may fail adequately to remember similar things that I experienced earlier; and so forth (1946: 90–97; 1962a: 104–131).

Ordinary challenges to judgments or claims, including claims to know, are sometimes invitations to detail our credentials —our possession of appropriate acumen in making judgments of the type in question. Sometimes, however, they are invitations to detail our facts —the features of the circumstance that figure in our judging in the way that we do. For example, we might claim to know that that presented thing is a goldfinch “by the shape of its head”. If we were to detail our facts in that sort of way, then we might be open to further challenge: someone might claim that that’s not enough of a basis on which to judge that the presented thing is a goldfinch. In addition to emphasizing the role of special acumen in this type of case—not just anyone can tell a goldfinch by the shape of its head—Austin makes two important claims about such potential challenges to our facts. First, Austin claims that, in order for such a challenge to be appropriate, the challenger must have in mind some more or less definite lack, for example by pointing out that birds other than goldfinches have heads of that shape. Second, Austin writes:

Enough is enough: it doesn’t mean everything. Enough means enough to show that (within reason, and for present intents and purposes) it “can’t” be anything else, there is no room for an alternative, competing description of it. It does not mean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch. (1946: 84.)

There are at least three, non-exclusive ways of reading Austin’s claim here. The first is as the claim that what suffices for this here to be a goldfinch may not be enough with respect to anything in any circumstance. There may be other birds, or other things, with heads of the same shape. However, we might still know full well that there are no such birds, and no such things, here; or we may know enough about this thing to know it isn’t a bird of that sort, or one of those other things, even though we haven’t specified how we know in answer to the initial challenge. That is, we may know that this isn’t a stuffed goldfinch—given the rest of what we know, and the circumstances in which we judge—even though what we explicitly point to in answer to challenges doesn’t alone rule out the possibility. The second way of reading Austin here is as allowing that we can know that this is a goldfinch, even though we know that if it’s a stuffed goldfinch, then it is not a goldfinch, and we don’t know that it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch. We are entitled—either in general, or in circumstances of this sort—to assume or rely upon its not being a stuffed goldfinch, even though that is something we can’t rule out and don’t know (see Kaplan 2011 for development of the second way of reading Austin’s views in this area). The third way of reading the passage is as claiming that the range of possibilities can vary from occasion to occasion for judging or claiming that one knows that this is a goldfinch. On the third reading, it might be impossible , on this occasion, for the presented thing to be a stuffed goldfinch, even though there are other occasions on which it would be a possibility. Hence, our facts do not need to foreclose on that possibility on this occasion, although there might be other occasions on which our facts would need to do so. (Travis 2005 develops the third approach. See Millar 2005 for objections.)

Let’s turn, then, to (7)–(9) , focusing attention on (9) , the view that utterances of the form “I know that such-and-such” serve a performative and not a descriptive function. This is puzzling for at least two reasons: first, the claim that “I know” lacks a descriptive function is apt to seem obviously false; and second, it is unclear what, if any, function the claim has in Austin’s account as a whole.

The main focus of objection to Austin here isn’t the claim that “I know that such-and-such” can, on occasion, serve distinctive performative functions. Rather, the concern with Austin’s proposal is focused on two more specific claims. First, it is focused on the claim that “I know that such-and-such” always and only serves a distinctive performative function and so is never at the service of self-description. Second, it is focused on the claim that, in cases in which “I know that such-and-such” is used to serve a performative function, neither the felicity conditions of using the sentence in that way, nor the truth of what, if anything, one thereby states, depend in turn on whether the speaker knows that such-and-such.

Austin is misled here, I think, due to three factors. First, he is misled by similarities between saying “I know that such-and-such” and saying “I promise that such-and-such” or “I swear that such-and-such”. But the cases are importantly different. For example, unlike the case of promising, in which saying “I promise…” in appropriate circumstances makes it so that one has promised…, saying “I know that such-and-such” does not make it so that one knows. Now, as Austin later saw, it is possible to develop an account on which saying “I know that such-and-such” can serve more than one purpose and so can function well with respect to one such purpose while functioning poorly with respect to others (see e.g., 1950a: 133 and 1962b). Accordingly, it would be possible to develop a view on which, for example, saying “I know that such-and-such” in cases in which one does not know would be improper qua statement (since saying it doesn’t remove the deficit by making it so that one knows), while properly serving the purpose of giving an audience one’s assurance. However, and this is the second reason for which Austin is misled, he had not in “Other Minds” (1946) yet attained the later perspective on which that is a clear possibility. Since he nonetheless believes that “I know that such-and-such” serves purposes other than statement making, he is forced to efface its statement-making function. Finally, and more speculatively, it seems that Austin is misled due to his attempting to build into his account a response to a doctrine, common to his Oxford Realist predecessors Cook Wilson and Prichard, according to which whether one knows or merely believes something is transparent to one. (For discussion of that feature of Cook Wilson’s and Prichard’s views, see Longworth 2018b, Travis and Kalderon 2013 and Travis 2005.) Although Austin rejects the letter of the doctrine, he retains its spirit in attempting to provide an account on which avowals of the form “I know that such-and-such” can never be false. (For further discussion of Austin’s performative proposal, see Warnock 1989: 24–33, Lawlor 2013.)

(For critical engagement with Austin’s work on knowledge, see Ayer 1967; Baz 2011; Chisholm 1964; Hetherington 2018; Kaplan 2011, 2018; Lawlor 2013, 2018; Leite 2011; Longworth 2018b, Marion 2000a,b; Martin ms (Other Internet Resources); Millar 2005; Putnam 1994; Soames 2003: 171–193; Stroud 1984: 39–82; Travis 2005; Travis and Kalderon 2013; Warnock 1989: 32–44; M. Williams 1996: 135–171.)

Let’s turn now to Austin’s views specifically about perception ( (5) and (6) above ). Once we have detailed the facts on which a perception-based judgment of ours relies, a more general challenge arises concerning our access to those facts. In order to exploit the bird’s head shape as the basis for our judgment that it is a goldfinch, it is arguable that we must be able to see (or perhaps feel) the bird and its shape. On some views of perception, however, birds and their shapes are not amongst the things that one can perceive. Austin’s main aim in Sense & Sensibilia is to undermine considerations that have been offered in favour of the general doctrine that, as he puts it,

…we never see or otherwise perceive (or “sense”), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sense, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.). (1962a: 2)

Central to those considerations are those organized by versions of what is known as the argument from illusion ( (6) above ). [ 21 ] The version of the argument that Austin criticizes can be reconstructed as follows. (i) There are cases of illusion in which we have a sensory experience as of seeing something of some sort with specific features but in which nothing has those specific features. This might be because, although we experience something of the sort in question, the thing we experience lacks the features in question; or it might be because we don’t experience a thing of the sort in question at all. (ii) In those cases, there must be something we experience that has the features in question. Call the things we experience in such cases sense-data . (iii) Since the cases in which we experience sense-data include cases in which no material things of the sort in question, or with the features in question, are experienced, it follows that sense-data are not (in general) material things, or elements in the environment independent of the individual experiencer. It follows that, in the cases in question, we experience things (or directly experience things) that are distinct from material things and we do not thereby experience (or directly experience) material things. (iv) Now it is a general principle about experiences that if we cannot discriminate the objects of two experiences on the basis of introspection, then those experiences must have objects of the same sort. Hence, if one experience has only sense-data as its objects, and not material things, and a second experience has as its objects something that we cannot discriminate on the basis of introspection from the objects of the first experience, then the second experience also has sense-data rather than material things as its objects. (v) Since every experience stands in the required relation to an experience with only sense-data as its objects, every experience has sense-data rather than material things as its objects. Hence, we never experience—or never directly experience—material things

Austin objects to every step in the argument just reconstructed. Amongst other complaints, he argues that key terms in the argument have not been properly defined or explained—for instance, “material thing” and “sense-data” (1962a: 4, 7–14, 55), and “directly” (1962a: 14–19). And he objects to the general principle, to which appeal was made in (iv), pointing out that there are no grounds for thinking that we cannot have experiences with different kinds of object that we nonetheless can’t discriminate on the basis of introspection. For instance, we might experience a bar of soap that looks just like a lemon, and be in a position where we couldn’t discriminate the soap from the lemon on the basis of introspection. Nonetheless, we would hold that the two experiences have different kinds of objects (1962a: 50–52). [ 22 ] However, what are perhaps his most important complaints target (i) and (ii) by exploiting the distinction, initially articulated in “Other Minds” (1946), between two elements in perceptually based judgment: the opportunity afforded by sensory perception and judgmental acumen.

The distinction between sensory perception and judgmental acumen enables Austin to distinguish between central cases of illusion and central cases of delusion , and also to sketch explanations of what is going on in those cases that do not make appeal to sense-data. Austin takes the defender of (i) and (ii) to argue as follows. First, consider an illusion, for example a stick that looks bent but really isn’t. Such an illusion has two key features. First, it clearly involves a distinctive sensory experience. Second, the distinctive sensory experience that it involves is apt to give rise to an erroneous perceptual judgment, to the effect that the stick is bent. Now one way of explaining the erroneous perceptual judgment is to view it as dictated by the sensory experience—that is, to view it as accurately representing features presented in the experience: the bent-ness of that which is experienced. Since the stick is not in fact bent, and that which is experienced is bent, we have reason to claim that that which is experienced is not identical with the stick. What we experience is sense-data rather than a stick. Moreover, we might also consider more extreme cases in which we make erroneous perceptual judgments: cases of delusion or hallucination. For example, there is the case in which an alcoholic person judges that pink rats are visible, when in fact there are none. Now, given the proposed account of the case of illusion, that case cannot be distinguished from the case of delusion by appeal to the fact that, in the former, an environmental feature is experienced while, in the latter, there is no suitable environmental feature to be experienced. It therefore seems natural to treat the two cases as of the same basic type, and to offer the same type of explanation for both. Thus, one might be tempted to view the rat-delusion as having the following three features. First, it involves a distinctive sensory experience. Second, the distinctive sensory experience that it involves dictates an erroneous perceptual judgment to the effect that pink rats are visible. Third, that judgment is dictated because it accurately represents features present in the experience.

Austin responds as follows. First, he exploits the role of judgmental acumen in perceptual judgment in order to provide an alternative explanation of cases of illusion (or more generally of things looking ways that they are not). He allows that some things really do look the way they are sometimes taken to be—the stick looks bent, even though it is not in fact bent. But he holds that those looks are not private features of individual’s experiences. For example, they are available to other perceivers and might be recorded in a photograph. (Austin discusses talk about how things look, and distinguishes it from talk about how things seem —which he associates with judgment rather than with experience, in Sense and Sensibilia (1962a: 33–43). See also Jackson 1977: 30–49; Martin 2010; Travis 2004.) However, the way the stick looks, just as much as features like the stick’s straightness, can be the basis for perceptual judgments. We can explain why someone is prone to judge that the stick is bent by appeal to the stick’s looking bent, rather to anything’s being bent, together with the ways in which exercises of judgmental acumen can respond erroneously to looks. More generally, there needn’t be anything in particular—any specific feature of what is experienced or any specific look—that figures in explaining why individuals are prone to make a specific type of judgment on the basis of the experience. For the explanation for each individual’s judgment will depend, not only on what they experience, but also on the types of judgmental capacities that they have. In support of this form of explanation, Austin notes that not everyone would be inclined to judge that the stick is bent. For example, noting the presence of water, those whose judgmental capacities are sufficiently well trained might withhold judgment about the stick’s shape (Hinton 1973: 114ff includes a useful discussion of some of Austin’s claims about illusions).

Standard cases of illusion or misleading appearance of the sort we’ve just considered involve sensory experiences of ordinary things and their features, including their looks, feels, and so forth. However, because the connection between what is experienced and what one judges on its basis is not straightforward—because judgmental acumen is involved in moving from one to the other—there is no general way to read back from the judgments someone is prone to make to specific features of their sensory experiences. Because such cases of illusion involve experience of ordinary things, while standard cases of delusion do not, we thus have a ground on which to distinguish the two sorts of case. For example, we have grounds to distinguish the case in which someone erroneously judges that a submerged stick is bent from the case of the alcoholic person who judges that pink rats are visible. But having distinguished the cases in that way, we are liable to become open to two new questions. First, should we allow that the judgment in the delusory case is based on sensory experience? Perhaps, for example, some cases of delusion involve dysfunction in the systems responsible for perceptual judgment of a sort that give rise to perceptual judgments in the absence of any sense-experiential basis for those judgments. Second, even if we allow that a particular delusory judgment is based upon sensory experience, should we allow that it involves sensory experience of anything other than elements that are present in the deluded subject’s environment? Perhaps some cases of delusion involve dysfunctional judgmental responses to what is seen or heard. For example, an alcoholic subject judgment that a pink rat is visible might be a disordered response to an experience of a shadow. Unless we are forced to answer both questions affirmatively, we lack the basis for an argument that the deluded subject experiences anything distinct from the ordinary things and features that they can see, hear, etc.

Austin doesn’t suggest that there could be no grounds for giving affirmative answers to either of those questions. Moreover, it is very plausible that such grounds can be provided. It is plausible, for example, that there are distinctive sensory experiences involved in what we call seeing double, or seeing afterimages, that cannot be explained simply by appeal to what is present in subjects’ environments. And it is plausible that genuine sensory hallucinations are possible—indeed, it is plausible that such hallucinations might figure in explaining the alcoholic person’s judgment. However, although the style of response just considered is indecisive against such additional developments of the argument, the resources that it deploys will surely figure in serious engagement with those developments. Austin sketches an approach to issues raised by such experiences by attempting to give an account of the reports we are inclined to make in such cases—“I see two pieces of paper”, “I see pink rats”. Austin’s sketch aims to explain how such reports can be non-committal about the nature of the experiences so-reported, and in particular about whether such experiences have objects at all (1962a: 84–103). It is here in particular that Austin comes close to endorsing a form of disjunctivism about perception (see Soteriou 2009).

(For critical engagement with Austin’s work on perception, see Ayer 1967, 1969; Burnyeat 1979; Firth 1964; Forguson 1969b; Garvey 2014; Hinton 1973: 114ff; Hirst 1963; Jackson 1977; Travis and Kalderon 2013; Leite 2011; Longworth 2019, Marion 2000a,b; Martin ms (Other Internet Resources), 2000, 2010; Pears 1979; Putnam 1994; Schwartz 2004, 2018; Snowdon 2014; Soames 2003: 171–193; Thau 2004; Travis 2004; van Hulst and Cresswell 2016; Warnock 1989: 11–31.)

4. Action and Freedom

The core of Austin’s work on freedom and action is contained in “A Plea for Excuses” (1957) and developed in “Ifs and Cans” (1956a), “Three Ways of Spilling Ink” (1966), and “Pretending” (1958a). The three most distinctive features of his views in this area are the following.

Let’s begin with (1) . Austin holds that we can make progress on questions about freedom and action by descending from reflection at the general level—i.e., reflection on freedom and action, per se —to reflection on the more specific ways in which we characterize and appraise actions. Austin’s view about the general notions of acting, and of acting freely or responsibly, is structurally similar to his view about the general notion of truth: he thinks of such general notions as dimension words , grouping a range of more specific characterizations. The basic range here consists in the various specific ways in which we can characterize happenings as actions—for example, as someone running to the shop, or as their reading a book. In addition to that basic range are what Austin calls aggravations : the various specific ways in which we characterize someone as distinctively responsible for something that happens—for example, when we characterize someone as having done something on purpose, intentionally, or deliberately. The latter three aggravations are the topic of his “Three Ways of Spilling Ink” (1966).

In his “A Plea for Excuses” (1957), Austin argues that the minimal requirement for an agent to be responsible for an action of theirs is that it be incorrect to characterize the action in one or another way as something for which they were not fully responsible—as something for which they have an excuse . We might, for example, characterize a happening as an accident, a mistake, involuntary, unintentional, inadvertent, or as due (in part) to clumsiness, lack of appreciation of circumstances, or incompetence. Where an act is performed, and where no excuse is available, the action is one for which the actor counts as fully responsible. Where one or another type of excuse is available, the specific type of excuses that are available mitigate in one or another specific way the subject’s responsibility for the occurrence of an action or its consequences, and so the extent to which the action is to be counted as free. An excuse may do this by mitigating in various ways the subject’s responsibility either for an action considered as a whole, or for proper sub-components of the action, or for consequences of the action, or by indicating ways in which a happening is not (a paradigmatic case of) an action. The varieties of pretending that Austin discusses in his “Pretending” (1958a) are of importance to him, at least in part, because they provide for some distinctive forms of excuse. For instance, one might seek to excuse what appeared to be an action of type A by claiming that the agent was only pretending to A , pretending to be A -ing, or pretending that they were A -ing. (One of Austin’s aims in the paper is to distinguish those ways of pretending.)

One of Austin’s central aims in considering the variety of excuses and aggravations is to shed light on the inner composition of responsible action: the division between an action and its consequences; the decomposition of an action into its various sub-components or phases; and what Austin calls the machinery of action:

…the detail of the complicated internal machinery we use in “acting”—the receipt of intelligence, the appreciation of the situation, the invocation of principles, the planning, the control of execution and the rest. (1957: 179)

Turning now to (2) , Austin thinks that there is a range of normal or standard cases of attributions of action with respect to which modification, by appeal either to aggravations or excuses, is impermissible. With respect to such normal or standard cases, it suffices, in order to characterize the agent’s role within them, simply to say what the agent did. To add that the agent did the thing, for example, either voluntarily or involuntarily would be inappropriate, incorrect, or even senseless. Austin summarizes this idea in the slogan, “No modification without aberration”. Amongst the supporting examples he gives are the following:

I sit in my chair, in the usual way—I am not in a daze or influenced by threats or the like: here, it will not do to say either that I sit in it intentionally or that I did not sit in it intentionally, nor yet that I sat in it automatically or from habit or what you will. It is bedtime, I am alone, I yawn: but I do not yawn involuntarily (or voluntarily!), nor yet deliberately. To yawn in any such peculiar way is just not to just yawn. (1957: 190) [ 23 ]

Austin holds that modifiers like “voluntarily” and “involuntarily” are used to assert the respective presence and absence of specific elements in the general machinery of action. (He suggests that such apparent pairs do not invariably target the very same specific elements. See 1957: 189–193.) Austin thinks that philosophers have tended to assume that, given that someone has done a specific thing, it will always be a further question whether those pieces of machinery are present or absent. Moreover, philosophers have aligned that question with the question whether the actor was responsible for what they did or acted freely. Those philosophers have in effect been making the following pair of assumptions. They’ve assumed, first, that there is a single type of piece of machinery such that for any action, the action will be free and responsible just in case it involves that machinery. Second, they’ve assumed that the various aggravations serve indiscriminately to mark the presence of the required type of machinery, while the various excuses serve to mark its absence.

Characteristically, Austin suggests that the situation is more complicated. In particular, although he thinks that, in normal or standard cases, actors are responsible for what they do and act freely, he holds that what makes that so can vary from case to case: different types of machinery can account for freedom and responsibility with respect to different types of action. He holds moreover that different aggravating and excusing modifiers target different pieces of machinery. And, finally, he holds that the appropriate use of a modifier doesn’t depend only upon the presence or absence of instances of the type of action-machinery that it targets. In addition, it depends upon whether the targeted machinery figures in normal cases of actions of the type in question. [ 24 ]

(For discussion of Austin’s views about actions and excuses see Forguson 1969a; Heintz 1981; Holdcroft 1969; Laugier 2018; Narboux 2011; New 1966; Petrie 1971; Searle 1966; Zimmerman 2004; Warnock 1989: 65–79; White 1967.)

Let’s turn now to Austin’s discussion of whether determinism is compatible with free action ( (3) above ). One general form of excuse for doing something would be that one couldn’t avoid doing it. Similarly, a general excuse for failing to do something—failing to apply one’s brakes, for example—would be that one couldn’t do it. Excuses of that general type have figured centrally in discussions of human freedom and the bearing of determinism on whether we ever act freely. Suppose that, wherever an excuse of this form is correctly applicable, we are not responsible for the action targeted by the excuse and did not act freely. If this supposition were correct, a demonstration that there are no things that we do that we could have avoided doing, and no things that we do not do that we could have done, would amount to a demonstration that we are never responsible for doing, or refraining from doing, what we do and, so, never act freely. And some philosophers have held that determinism provides the basis for such a demonstration.

Such a demonstration might take the following form. The all-in claim that someone could have done something at t requires that the circumstances at t are consistent with their doing that thing at t . But according to determinism, the circumstances, C , at t determine that one set of events, E , occurs at t rather than any others. That is, according to the thesis of determinism, it couldn’t be that ( C & not- E ). Now, given that what the individual in question in fact did at t (/refrained from doing at t ) is a member of E , it couldn’t have been that C and yet they failed to do it (/failed to refrain from doing it). Hence, because of C , it’s not the case that they could have avoided doing what they did (/refraining from doing it).

Austin considers this issue in his “Ifs and Cans” (1956a). There, he discusses and rejects attempts in G.E. Moore 1912 and Nowell-Smith 1954 to provide accounts of what we can do on which it being true that we can do things (/refrain from doing them) is compatible with its being determined by our circumstances that we don’t in fact do them (/refrain from doing them). Austin thinks that his objections to the accounts on which he focuses provide partial support to the view that our ordinary claims about what we can do are incompatible with determinism.

The first proposal of Moore’s that Austin considers is that the claim that someone, S , can do something, A , is equivalent to the following claim: S will A , if S chooses to A . Austin argues that Moore’s first proposal is based on a mistaken view about the functioning of the claims of the form: “ S can A , if S chooses”. [ 25 ] The second proposal of Moore’s that Austin considers is the claim that “ S can A ” is equivalent to a claim of the form “If it were that C , then S would B ”. For example, “I could have holed the putt” might be taken to be equivalent to “If I had tried to hole the putt, I would have succeeded in holing the putt.” Here again, it seems that the proposal might be of service in sidestepping the challenge posed by determinism. Suppose that in actual circumstances C , I don’t try to hole the putt. According to determinism, it follows that it is impossible that ( C and I do try to hole the putt). But that is consistent both with its being possible, in slightly different circumstances, that I try to hole the putt, and with it being the case that, if I were to try, I would succeed. Austin doesn’t pursue the proposal in detail, though his discussion of Nowell-Smith pursues connected issues (219–230). However, in a footnote, Austin presents an important putative counterexample:

Consider the case where I miss a very short putt and kick myself because I could have holed it. It is not that I should have holed it if I had tried: I did try, and missed. It is not that I should have holed it if conditions had been different: that might of course be so, but I am talking about conditions as they precisely were, and asserting that I could have holed it. There is the rub. (1956a: 218 fn.1)

Austin’s thought here is that attributions of this sort manifest our belief that,

…a human ability or power or capacity is inherently liable not to produce success, on occasion, and that for no reason (or are bad luck and bad form sometimes reasons?). (218: 218 fn.1)

Now a committed determinist would claim that the events that constitute such failures must be determined—and in that sense explained—by the circumstances at and before the failure. But Austin believes—for reasons in effect considered above—that the existence of such an explanation would make it the case that, in fact, the golfer could not have made the putt in the circumstances as they precisely were.

We have here, then, a point at which Austin expresses his view that ordinary attributions of ability, power, and capacity are incompatible with the thesis of determinism. In response, the compatibilist is forced, I think, to deny that its being true that a golfer could have holed the putt, or even that he could have holed the putt in precisely the same conditions, entails that he would have holed the putt in a perfect duplicate of the actual world. Leaving that issue to one side, Austin presents the proposed analysis with a case of masking —a case in which, although ability is retained, successful exercise of the ability is somehow precluded, for instance by outside interference (for discussion of masking, see A. Bird 1998; Clarke 2009; Fara 2008; and Johnston 1992). The challenge facing the defender of the analysis is to spell out the analysis so as to cope with masking. Arguably, meeting the challenge depends upon provision of a non-circular specification of all possible masks. Austin would, I think, claim that it is impossible to meet the challenge. For on his view, abilities are sometimes masked brutely , without any specifiable mask. Even if he is wrong about that, it remains an open question whether the challenge can be met, or whether the endless heterogeneity of potential masks makes it impossible to provide an explanatory specification.

(For discussion of Austin views about freedom and ability see Ayers 1966; Clarke 2009; Kaufman 1963; Locke 1962; New 1966; Nowell-Smith 1960; Pears 1973; Thalberg 1969; Warnock 1989: 80–97.)

(Where a paper of Austin’s is contained in Austin 1979, page references in the text are to that volume.)

• Austin, J.L., 1930s–1940s, “The Line and the Cave in Plato’s Republic ”, reconstructed from notes by J.O. Urmson, in Austin 1979: 288–304. doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0013
• –––, 1939ms/1967, “Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle”, in J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed.) Aristotle , New York: Doubleday: 261–296; reprinted in Austin 1979: 1–31. doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0001
• –––, 1939, “Are There A Priori Concepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Supplementary Volume 18: 83–105; reprinted in Austin 1979: 32–54. doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0002
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• –––, 1977, “Performative Utterances”, in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling Jr., and H.K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume II), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 120–127. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00033.x
• Urmson, J.O. and G.J. Warnock, 1961, “J.L. Austin”, Mind , 70(278): 256–257; reprinted as ‘Comments’ on Hampshire (1960) in Fann 1969: 22–32. doi:10.1093/mind/LXX.278.256
• van Hulst, Chrissy and Max Cresswell (eds.), 2016, “A.N. Prior on Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia : A reconstruction from Prior’s manuscripts”, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 4(4): 1–12. doi:10.15173/jhap.v4i4.2809
• Vendler, Zeno, 1972, Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology , Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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• –––, 1962, “Truth and Correspondence”, in Calvin Dwight Rollins (ed.), Knowledge and Experience , Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 11–20.
• –––, 1963, “John Langshaw Austin: A Biographical Sketch”, Proceedings of the British Academy ; reprinted in Fann 1969: 3–21.
• –––, 1964, “A Problem about Truth”, in Pitcher 1964: 54–67.
• –––, 1973a, “Saturday Mornings”, in Berlin 1973a: 31–45.
• –––, 1973b, “Some Types of Performative Utterance”, in Berlin 1973a: 69–89.
• –––, 1973c, “Truth: or Bristol Revisited II”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Supplementary Volume 47: 135–145.
• –––, 1989, J.L. Austin , London: Routledge.
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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Martin, M.G.F., 2007, “ Austin: Sense & Sensibilia Revisited ”, online manuscript.
• A recording of Austin’s voice (1959)
• Wikipedia Entry for J.L. Austin

abilities | action | Ayer, Alfred Jules | compatibilism | contextualism, epistemic | epistemic closure | free will | Grice, Paul | incompatibilism: arguments for | knowledge: analysis of | Moore, George Edward | moral responsibility | perception: the disjunctive theory of | perception: the problem of | pragmatics | Prichard, Harold Arthur | sense data | speech acts | states of affairs | Strawson, Peter Frederick | tropes | truth | truth: deflationism about | Wilson, John Cook

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Cora Diamond, Ruth Groff, Henry Hardy, Barry Lee, Hemdat Lerman, Matthew Soteriou, Peter Sullivan, Charles Travis, and Jonathan Westphal.

Copyright © 2021 by Guy Longworth < G . H . Longworth @ warwick . ac . uk >

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5 Types of Speech Acts

• Published: July 2018
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Classical speech act theory, in the tradition of Austin and Searle, is based on a picture of propositional content due to Frege. This picture takes propositions to be the primary bearers of truth conditions, and it incorporates a sharp distinction between content and force. In this paper I defend an alternative picture of propositional content, on which the primary bearers of truth conditions are the actions we perform in thinking and speaking about the world. Propositions are types of these actions, and they inherit their truth conditions from them. This picture abandons the distinction between content and force and it leads to a three-way distinction between different kinds of propositions. Here I explore the consequences of this alternative picture for the nature and taxonomy of speech acts.

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• Speech Acts

'Language describes the world around us'.  That's the common view.  A sentence (for example, 'it's cold in here, isn't it?') describes a situation.  But is there more going on than that?  When we speak, are we only ever  describing  the world around us?  Or are we also somehow 'acting within it'. 

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Flashcards in Speech Acts 141

What is a speech act?

An action that is performed in saying something.

Who introduced the concept of speech act theory in his book  How to do things with words ?

J. L Austin

J. R Searle classified speech acts into 5 categories.  What are they?

Declarations, assertives, expressives, directives, and commissives. 

According to Austin and Searle, there are three main actions related to speech acts: locutionary act, illocutionary act and what?

Perlocutionary act.

Which speech act aims to change the behavior of others?

Locutionary act

Illocutionary act

Perlocutionary act

C.  Perlocutionary act.

According to Searle's 5 types of speech acts, what is the purpose of commissives ? 

The speaker is committing to do something in the future.

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Frequently Asked Questions about Speech Acts

A speech act is an action that is performed in saying something. We perform speech acts all of the time! For example, when we offer an apology, extend an invitation, make a complaint, or give a compliment.

What is speech act theory?

Speech act theory is concerned with the way words can be used to not only give information but also to perform certain actions.  The theory, created by J. L Austin and further developed by J. R Searle, is an important subfield of pragmatics. 

What are the types of speech acts?

Searle classified the purpose of different speech acts under the following 5 categories: Declarations , Assertives , Expressives , Directives , and Commissives . 

What is a direct speech act?

In the case of pragmatics, direct speech refers to a speech act that has a direct relationship between the type of sentence and the function.

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According to Searle's 5 speech acts, how would you classify wedding vows?

We carry out actions when we speak. What are these actions?

How many categories of illocutionary acts are there?

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Article Summary

• content locked 1 Levels of speech acts
• content locked 2 Communicative and conventional speech acts
• content locked 3 Types of speech acts
• content locked 4 Direct, indirect and nonliteral speech acts
• content locked 5 Philosophical importance of speech act theory
• content locked Bibliography

Speech acts

Making a statement may be the paradigmatic use of language, but there are all sorts of other things we can do with words. We can make requests, ask questions, give orders, make promises, give thanks, offer apologies and so on. Moreover, almost any speech act is really the performance of several acts at once, distinguished by different aspects of the speaker’s intention; there is the act of saying something, what one does in saying it, such as requesting or promising, and how one is trying to affect one’s audience.

The theory of speech acts is partly taxonomic and partly explanatory. It must systematically classify types of speech acts and the ways in which they can succeed or fail. It must reckon with the fact that the relationship between the words being used and the force of their utterance is often oblique. For example, the sentence ‘This is a pig sty’ might be used nonliterally to state that a certain room is messy, and further to demand indirectly that it be tidied up. Even when this sentence is used literally and directly, say to describe a certain area of a farmyard, the content of its utterance is not fully determined by its linguistic meaning – in particular, the meaning of the word ‘this’ does not determine which area is being referred to. A major task for the theory of speech acts is to account for how speakers can succeed in what they do despite the various ways in which linguistic meaning underdetermines use.

In general, speech acts are acts of communication. To communicate is to express a certain attitude, and the type of speech act being performed corresponds to the type of attitude being expressed. For example, a statement expresses a belief, a request expresses a desire, and an apology expresses a regret. As an act of communication, a speech act succeeds if the audience identifies, in accordance with the speaker’s intention, the attitude being expressed.

Some speech acts, however, are not primarily acts of communication and have the function not of communicating but of affecting institutional states of affairs. They can do so in either of two ways. Some officially judge something to be the case, and others actually make something the case. Those of the first kind include judges’ rulings, referees’ decisions and assessors’ appraisals, and the latter include sentencing, bequeathing and appointing. Acts of both kinds can be performed only in certain ways under certain circumstances by those in certain institutional or social positions.

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10.3: Indirect speech acts

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• Paul Kroeger
• Dallas International University via Language Library Press

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The Nigerian professor Ozidi Bariki describes a conversation in which he said to a friend:

“I love your left hand.” (The friend had a cup of tea in his hand). The friend, in reaction to my utterance, transferred the cup to his right hand. That prompted me to say: “I love your right hand”. My friend smiled, recognized my desire for tea and told his sister, “My friend wants tea”… My friend’s utterance addressed to his sister in reaction to mine was a representative, i.e. a simple statement: “my friend wants a tea”. The girl rightly interpreted the context of the representative to mean a directive. In other words, her brother (my friend) was ordering her to prepare some tea. (Bariki 2008)

This brief dialogue contains two examples of indirect speech acts. In both cases, the utterance has the form of a simple statement, but is actually intended to perform a different kind of act: request in the first case and command in the second. The second statement, “My friend wants tea,” was immediately and automatically interpreted correctly by the addressee. (In African culture, when an older brother makes such a statement to his younger sister, there is only one possible interpretation.) The first statement, however, failed to communicate. Only after the second attempt was the addressee able to work out the intended meaning, not automatically at all, but as if he was trying to solve a riddle.

Bariki uses this example to illustrate the role that context plays in enabling the hearer to identify the intended speech act. But it also shows us that context alone is not enough. In the context of the first utterance, there was a natural association between what was said ( your left hand ) and what was intended (a cup of tea); the addressee was holding a cup of tea in his left hand. In spite of this, the addressee was unable to figure out what the speaker meant. The contrast between this failed attempt at communication and the immediately understood statement My friend wants tea , suggests that there are certain principles and conventions which need to be followed in order to make the illocutionary force of an utterance clear to the hearer.

We might define an indirect speech act (following Searle 1975) as an utterance in which one illocutionary act (the primary act) is intentionally performed by means of the performance of another act (the literal act). In other words, it is an utterance whose form does not reflect the intended illocutionary force. My friend wants tea is a simple declarative sentence, the form which is normally used for making statements. In the context above, however, it was correctly interpreted as a command. So the literal act was a statement, but the primary act was a command.

Most if not all languages have grammatical and/or phonological means of distinguishing at least three basic types of sentences: statements, questions, and commands. The default expectation is that declarative sentences will express statements, interrogative sentences will express questions, and imperative sentences will express commands. When these expectations are met, we have a direct speech act because the grammatical form matches the intended illocutionary force. Explicit performatives are also direct speech acts.

An indirect speech act will normally be expressed as a declarative, interrogative, or imperative sentence; so the literal act will normally be a statement, question, or command. One of the best-known types of indirect speech act is the Rhetorical Question, which involves an interrogative sentence but is not intended to be a genuine request for information.

Why is the statement I love your left hand not likely to work as an indirect request for tea? Searle (1969; 1975) proposes that in order for an indirect speech act to be successful, the literal act should normally be related to the Felicity Conditions of the intended or primary act in certain specific ways. Searle restated Austin’s Felicity Conditions under four headings: preparatory conditions(background circumstances and knowledge about the speaker, hearer, and/ or situation which must be true in order for the speech act to be felicitous); sincerity conditions (necessary psychological states of speaker and/or hearer); propositional content (the kind of situation or event described by the underlying proposition); essential condition (the essence of the speech act; what the act “counts as”). These four categories are illustrated in Table 10.1 using the speech acts of promising and requesting.

Generally speaking, speakers perform an indirect speech act by stating or asking about one of the Felicity Conditions (apart from the essential condition). The examples in (7) show some sentences that could be used as indirect requests for tea. Sentences (7a–b) ask about the preparatory condition for a request, namely the hearer’s ability to perform the action. Sentences (7c–d) state the sincerity condition for a request, namely that the speaker wants the hearer to perform the action. Sentences (7e–f) ask about the propositional content of the request, namely the future act by the hearer.

(7) a. Do you have any tea?

b. Could you possibly give me some tea?

c. I would like you to give me some tea.

d. I would really appreciate a cup of tea.

e. Will you give me some tea?

f. Are you going to give me some tea?

All of these sentences could be understood as requests for tea, if spoken in the right context, but they are clearly not all equivalent: (7b) is a more polite way of asking than (7a); (7d) is a polite request, whereas (7c) sounds more demanding; (7e) is a polite request, whereas (7f) sounds impatient and even rude.

Not every possible strategy is actually available for a given speech act. For example, asking about the sincerity condition for a request is generally quite unnatural: # Do I want you to give me some tea ? This is because speakers do not normally ask other people about their own mental or emotional states. So that specific strategy cannot be used to form an indirect request.

We almost automatically interpret examples like (7b) and (7e) as requests. This tendency is so strong that it may be hard to recognize them as indirect speech acts. The crucial point is that their grammatical form is that of a question, not a request. However, some very close paraphrases of these sentences, such as those in (8), would probably not be understood as requests in most contexts.

(8) a. Do you currently have the ability to provide me with tea?

b. Do you anticipate giving me a cup of tea in the near future?

We can see the difference quite clearly if we try to add the word please to each sentence. As we noted in Chapter 1, please is a marker of politeness which is restricted to occurring only in requests; it does not occur naturally in other kinds of speech acts. It is possible, and in most cases fairly natural, to add please to any of the sentences in (7), even to those which do not sound very polite on their own. However, this is not possible for the sentences in (8). This difference provides good evidence for saying that the sentences in (8) are not naturally interpretable as indirect requests.

(9) a. Could you possibly give me some tea, please?

b. Will you give me some tea, please?

c. I would like you to give me some tea, please.

d. Are you going to give me some tea (?please)?

e. Do you currently have the ability to provide me with tea (#please)?

f. Do you anticipate giving me a cup of tea in the near future (#please)?

The contrast between the acceptability of (7b) and (7e) as requests vs. the unacceptability of their close paraphrases in (8) suggests that the form of the sentence, as well as its semantic content, helps to determine whether an indirect speech act will be successful or not. We will return to this issue below, but first we need to think about a more fundamental question: How does the hearer recognize an indirect speech act? In other words, how does he know that the primary (intended) illocutionary force of the utterance is not the same as the literal force suggested by the form of the sentence?

Searle suggests that the key to solving this problem comes from Grice’s Cooperative Principle. If someone asks the person sitting next to him at a dinner Can you pass me the salt?, we might expect the addressee to be puzzled. Only under the most unusual circumstances would this question be relevant to the current topic of conversation. Only under the most unusual circumstances would the answer to this question be informative, since few people who can sit up at a dinner table are physically unable to lift a salt shaker. In most contexts, the addressee could only believe the speaker to be obeying the Co-operative Principle if the question is not meant as a simple request for information, i.e., if the intended illocutionary force is something other than a question.

Having recognized this question as an indirect speech act, how does the addressee figure out what the intended illocutionary force is? Searle’s solution is essentially the Gricean method of calculating implicatures, enriched by an understanding of the Felicity Conditions for the intended speech act. Searle (1975) suggests that the addressee might reason as follows: “This question is not relevant to the current topic of conversation, and the speaker cannot be in doubt about my ability to pass the salt. I believe him to be cooperating in the conversation, so there must be another point to the question. I know that a preparatory condition for making a request is the belief that the addressee is able to perform the requested action. I know that people often use salt at dinner, sharing a common salt shaker which they pass back and forth as requested. Since he has mentioned a preparatory condition for requesting me to perform this action, I conclude that this request is what he means to communicate.”

So it is important that we understand indirect speech acts as a kind of conversational implicature. However, they are different in certain respects from the implicatures that Grice discussed. For example, Grice stated that implicatures are “non-detachable”, meaning that semantically equivalent sentences should trigger the same implicatures in the same context. However, as we noted above, this is not always true with indirect speech acts. In the current example, Searle points out that the question Are you able to pass me the salt? , although a close paraphrase of Can you pass me the salt? , is much less likely to be interpreted as a request (# Are you able to please pass me the salt? ). How can we account for this?

Searle argues that, while the meaning of the indirect speech act is calculable or explainable in Gricean terms, the forms of indirect speech acts are partly conventionalized. Searle refers to these as “conventions of usage”, in contrast to normal idioms like kick the bucket (for ‘die’) which we might call conventions of meaning or sense.

Conventionalized speech acts are different from normal idioms in several important ways. First, the meanings of normal idioms are not calculable or predictable from their literal meanings. The phrase kick the bucket contains no words which have any component of meaning relating to death.

Second, when an indirect speech act is performed, both the literal and primary acts are understood to be part of what is meant. In Searle’s terms, the primary act is performed “by way of” performing the literal act. We can see this because, as illustrated in (10), the hearer could appropriately reply to the primary act alone (A1), the literal act alone (A2), or to both acts together (A3). Moreover, in reporting indirect speech acts, it is possible (and in fact quite common) to use matrix verbs which refer to the literal act rather than the primary act, as illustrated in (11–12).

(10) Q: Can you (please) tell me the time? A1: It’s almost 5:30. A2: No, I’m sorry, I can’t; my watch has stopped. A3: Yes, it’s 5:30.

(11) a. Will you (please) pass me the salt? b. He asked me whether I would pass him the salt.

(12) a. I want you to leave now (please). b. He told me that he wanted me to leave.

In this way indirect speech acts are quite similar to other conversational implicatures, in that both the sentence meaning and the pragmatic inference are part of what is communicated. They are very different from normal idioms, which allow either the idiomatic meaning (the normal interpretation), or the literal meaning (under unusual circumstances), but never both together. The two senses of a normal idiom are antagonistic, as we can see by the fact that some people use them to form (admittedly bad) puns:

(13) Old milkmaids never die — they just kick the bucket. 7

Birner (2012/2013: 196) points out that under Searle’s view, indirect speech acts are similar to generalized conversational implicatures. In both cases the implicature is part of the default interpretation of the utterance; it will arise unless it is blocked by specific features in the context, or is explicitly negated, etc. We have to work pretty hard to create a context in which the question Can you pass the salt? would not be interpreted as a request, but it can be done. 8

Searle states that politeness is one of the primary reasons for using an indirect speech act. Notice that all of the sentences in (7), except perhaps (7f), sound more polite than the simple imperative: Give me some tea! He suggests that this motivation may help to explain why certain forms tend to be conventionalized for particular purposes.

7 Richard Lederer (1988) Get Thee to a Punnery. Wyrick & Company.

8 Searle (1975: 69) suggests that a doctor might ask such a question to check on the progress of a patient with an injured arm.

Locutionary Act Definition in Speech-Act Theory

The Act of Making a Meaningful Utterance

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• M.A., Modern English and American Literature, University of Leicester
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In speech-act theory , a locutionary act is the act of making a meaningful utterance , a stretch of spoken  language  that is preceded by silence and followed by silence or a change of  speaker —also known as a locution or an utterance act. The term locutionary act was introduced by British philosopher J. L. Austin in his 1962 book, " How to Do Things With Words ." American philosopher John Searle later replaced Austin's concept of a locutionary act with what Searle called the propositional act—the act of expressing a proposition. Searle outlined his ideas in a 1969 article titled " Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language ."

Types of Locutionary Acts

Locutionary acts can be broken into two basic types: utterance acts and propositional acts. An utterance act is a speech act that consists of the verbal employment of units of expression such as words and sentences, notes the  Glossary of Linguistic Terms . Put another way, utterance acts are acts in which something is said (or a sound is made) that may not have any meaning, according to " Speech Act Theory ," a PDF published by Changing Minds.org.

By contrast, propositional acts are those, as Searle noted, where a particular reference is made. Propositional acts are clear and express a specific definable point, as opposed to mere utterance acts, which may be unintelligible sounds.

Illocutionary vs. Perlocutionary Acts

An illocutionary act refers to the performance of an act in saying something specific (as opposed to the general act of just saying something), notes Changing Minds, adding:

"The illocutionary force is the speaker's intent. [It is] a true 'speech act' such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking."

An example of an illocutionary act would be:

"The black cat is stupid."

This statement is assertive; it is an illocutionary act in that it intends to communicate. By contrast, Changing Minds notes that perlocutionary acts are speech acts that have an effect on the feelings, thoughts, or actions of either the speaker or the listener. They seek to change minds. Unlike locutionary acts, perlocutionary acts are external to the performance; they are inspiring, persuading, or deterring. Changing Minds gives this example of a perlocutionary act:

"Please find the black cat."

This statement is a perlocutionary act because it seeks to change behavior. (The speaker wants you to drop whatever you are doing and go find her cat.)

Speech Acts With Purpose

Locutionary acts may be simple utterances devoid of meaning. Searle refined the definition of locutionary acts by explaining they should be utterances that propose something, have meaning, and/or seek to persuade. Searle identified five illocutionary/perlocutionary points:

• Assertives: Statements that may be judged true or false because they aim to describe a state of affairs in the world
• Directives: Statements that attempt to make the other person's actions fit the propositional content
• Commissives: Statements that commit the speaker to a course of action as described by the propositional content
• Expressives: Statements that express the sincerity condition of the speech act
• Declaratives: Statements that attempt to change the world by representing it as having been changed

Locutionary acts, therefore, should not simply be meaningless bits of speech. Instead, they should have purpose, either seeking to bolster an argument, express an opinion, or cause someone to take action.

Locutionary Acts Do Have Meaning

Austin, in a 1975 update of his book "How to Do Things With Words," further refined the notion of locutionary acts. Explaining his theory, Austin said that locutionary acts, in and of themselves, did indeed have meaning, stating:

"In performing a locutionary act, we shall also be performing such an act as:

Asking or answering a question;

Giving some information or an assurance or a warning;

Announcing a verdict or an intention;

Pronouncing a sentence;

Making an appointment, an appeal, or a criticism;

Making an identification or giving a description."

Austin argued that locutionary acts did not need further refinement into illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Locutionary acts by definition have meaning, such as providing information, asking questions, describing something, or even announcing a verdict. Locutioinary acts are the meaningful utterances humans make to communicate their needs and wants and to persuade others to their viewpoint.

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Dental implants are medical devices surgically implanted into the jaw to restore a person's ability to chew or their appearance. They provide support for artificial (fake) teeth, such as crowns, bridges, or dentures.

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When a tooth is lost due to injury or disease, a person can experience complications such as rapid bone loss, defective speech, or changes to chewing patterns that result in discomfort. Replacing a lost tooth with a dental implant can significantly improve the patient's quality of life and health.

Dental implant systems consist of a dental implant body and dental implant abutment and may also include an abutment fixation screw. The dental implant body is surgically inserted in the jawbone in place of the tooth's root. The dental implant abutment is usually attached to the implant body by the abutment fixation screw and extends through gums into the mouth to support the attached artificial teeth.

Figure 1. Structure of The Dental Implant System

Before choosing dental implants, talk to your dental provider about the potential benefits and risks, and whether you are a candidate for the procedure. Things to consider:

• Your overall health is an important factor in determining whether you are a good candidate for dental implants, how long it will take to heal, and how long the implant may stay in place.
• Ask your dental provider what brand and model of dental implant system is being used and keep this information for your records.
• Smoking may affect the healing process and decrease the long-term success of the implant.
• The healing process for the implant body may take several months or longer, during which time you typically have a temporary abutment in place of the tooth.

After the dental implant procedure:

• Carefully follow the oral hygiene instructions given to you by your dental provider. Regularly cleaning the implant and surrounding teeth is very important for long-term success of the implant.
• Schedule regular visits with your dental provider.
• If your implant feels loose or painful, tell your dental provider right away.

Dental implants can significantly improve the quality of life and the health of a person who needs them. However, complications may sometimes occur. Complications can occur soon after dental implant placement or much later. Some complications result in implant failure (usually defined as implant looseness or loss). Implant failure can result in the need for another surgical procedure to fix or replace the implant system.

Benefits of Dental Implant Systems:

• Restores the ability to chew
• Restores cosmetic appearance
• Helps keep the jawbone from shrinking due to bone loss
• Preserves the health of the surrounding bone and gums
• Helps keep adjacent (nearby) teeth stable
• Improves quality of life

Risks Associated with Dental Implant Systems:

• Damage to surrounding natural teeth during implant placement
• Injury to the surrounding tissues during surgery, such as sinus perforation
• Injury during surgery (for example, fracture of surrounding jawbone)
• Inadequate function, such as feeling like the teeth do not bite together normally
• A sensation that the tooth is loose or twisting in place resulting from an abutment screw loosening
• due to systemic infection, which may be more likely in patients with uncontrolled diabetes
• due to local infection in bone and gums supporting the implant body
• due to delayed healing, which may be more likely in patients who smoke
• Difficulty cleaning the gums around the implant, resulting in poor oral hygiene
• Untreated periodontal disease
• Post-surgical numbness due to nerve impingement or damage
• Always notify health care providers and imaging technicians that you have dental implants before any magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) or x-ray procedures. Dental implants can distort or interfere with these images. FDA is not aware of any adverse events reported for MRI or x-ray procedures with dental implants.

Ways Dental Implants are Evaluated for Safety

Dental implants systems are typically made of materials that follow international consensus standards of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or ASTM International. These standards have details of what makes a safe material. Most dental implant systems are made of titanium or zirconium oxide. Other materials such as gold alloys, cobalt-based alloys, titanium alloys, or ceramic materials are sometimes used. The safety profiles of these materials are well-known.

Dental implant systems are evaluated according to international consensus standards. Biocompatibility testing, to show that bodily contact with the device does not cause complications like irritation or allergic reaction, is part of the evaluation that helps ensure the materials in the dental implant system are safe and do not cause adverse effects when implanted in people.

For manufacturers to market dental implant systems in the United States, they must first show the FDA their systems are as safe and as effective as dental implant systems already on the market.

Reporting Dental Implant System Problems to the FDA

Prompt reporting of adverse events can help the FDA identify and better understand the risks associated with medical products. If you have problems associated with your dental implant system including the dental implant body, the dental abutment, or the dental abutment screw, we encourage you to file a voluntary report through MedWatch , the FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting program.

To help us learn as much as possible about the adverse events associated with dental implant systems, please include the following information in your report, if available:

• Date of device implantation
• Identification of dental implant system used
• Description of the problem including date of onset, and any diagnosis and follow-up treatment
• Description of medical or surgical interventions taken, including prior interventions, if any
• Pertinent medical and dental history
• American Dental Association (ADA), "PatientSmart Patient Education Center: Dental Implants"
• American Academy of Periodontology (AAP), "Dental Implants"

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Republican presidential candidate former President Donald Trump speaks during a campaign rally in Wildwood, N.J., May 11, 2024

Does Trump want to repeal the ACA, as Biden says? Tracking his changing stance over the years

If your time is short.

Former President Donald Trump has said several times over the years that he wants to replace the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare — most recently in December. 

Trump has since walked back this stance, writing on social media in March that he "isn’t running to terminate" the health care law, but instead wants to make it "better" and "less expensive."

Trump hasn’t said how he would do this, and health care policy experts said it’s difficult to know where he stands without a detailed plan. 

President Joe Biden has repeatedly warned voters on the campaign trail that his opponent, former President Donald Trump, would take away their health care if he regains the White House. "MAGA Republicans have tried to get rid of the Affordable Care Act more than 50 times, and Trump is still determined to do it," Biden said May 19 in Detroit. "In his words, he wants to ‘terminate’ the Affordable Care Act, which would deny 3 million Black Americans health insurance, deny protections for preexisting conditions for millions more Americans. But we’re going to deny Trump." Biden has made similar statements in speeches , interviews and ads and has featured clips of Trump calling the ACA, also known as Obamacare, a "disaster" and saying that Trump "wants to terminate it." Former President Barack Obama signed the ACA into law in 2010.

Trump campaigned on a promise to repeal Obamacare in 2016; a promise we rated Broken. He kept that anti-ACA position throughout his term, even after Republican senators, notably the late-Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., voted against repealing the health care law in 2017. In July 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a case from Republican-led states and the former Trump administration that had asked justices to block the law. In late 2023, Trump renewed his vow to replace Obamacare multiple times.

In March, Trump publicly announced a change in position. He wrote on Truth Social that he doesn’t want to terminate the ACA, but instead wants to make it "better."

"I’m not running to terminate the ACA," Trump wrote in his March 26 post. Instead, he said he would make the law "MUCH BETTER, STRONGER, AND FAR LESS EXPENSIVE."

The Biden campaign responded by telling PolitiFact that Trump’s single post on improving Obamacare needs to be compared with his repeated threats to dismantle it.

"Here is a fact Truth Social posts and transparently false spin from his campaign can’t fix: Donald Trump tried to repeal the Affordable Care Act and rip away health care from millions when he was president — and has promised to do it again. Repeatedly," Ammar Moussa, Biden-Harris campaign director of rapid response, wrote in an email. Trump’s campaign did not respond to a request for comment.

Trump said multiple times on Truth Social in November and December that he would try to replace Obamacare, before backtracking in March. 

"The cost of Obamacare is out of control, plus, it’s not good Healthcare. I’m seriously looking at alternatives," Trump wrote Nov, 25 on Truth Social . "We had a couple of Republican Senators who campaigned for 6 years against it, and then raised their hands not to terminate it. It was a low point for the Republican Party, but we should never give up!" On Nov. 29 he wrote, "I don’t want to terminate Obamacare, I want to REPLACE IT with MUCH BETTER HEALTHCARE. Obamacare Sucks!!!" On Dec. 25 : "Obamacare is too expensive, and otherwise, not good healthcare. I will come up with a much better, and less expensive, alternative! People will be happy, not sad!" 

But after Biden started to release ads resurfacing Trump’s promises to get rid of Obamacare, Trump in March accused Biden of misinforming on his position, and shared his new stance that vowed to improve on the health care program. 

Featured Fact-check

PolitiFact asked Trump’s campaign whether the former president stands by his March statement. We also asked for more details about his policy on the ACA. The campaign did not reply. Trump released a policy platform called "Agenda 47" for a second White House term, but it doesn’t address Obamacare.

Health policy experts told PolitiFact that, without a detailed plan, Trump could theoretically approach the ACA in several ways. Other conservatives have written proposals that involve overhauling the health care system, including dismantling many of Obamacare’s provisions — but it’s not known if Trump will adopt any of those tactics.

Ultimately, experts said, it comes down to whether he prioritizes it; if he gets the support of key health care industry players; how many Republicans are on board, and the level of control they have in Congress. Thomas Miller, a senior fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute who researches health care policy and the Affordable Care Act, said a second Trump administration would be more likely to reinstitute some of the things it did before, and make more regulatory or administrative changes, rather than go the legislative route. "There aren't that many great legislative opportunities because people haven't done the work, they haven't built the roster of ready-to-go bills and popularized them," Miller said. "So, that’s why they go back to codify regulations so they can be more permanent, or stretch things a little more on the margins; but that's not the same as something transformational."

The Affordable Care Act is highly popular among Americans in 2024, a February KFF poll found.  A record 21.3 million people sought individual health insurance plans through the ACA during the most recent open enrollment period.

"Trump’s plan would be in favor of what works for him politically," Miller said. Trump, he said, doesn't appear to hold a deep set of "beliefs in the health care or health policy space. He has that for other issues, but not as much for the health care area, so other people fill in the blanks for him." Sabrina Corlette, a research professor and co-director of the Center on Health Insurance Reforms at Georgetown University, said she wouldn’t expect the same sweeping repeal attempt that Trump tried before because the political support isn’t there. Still, she said, he could dismantle it a little at a time.

Corlette also pointed out that the law is massive — it covers insurance reforms, preexisting condition protections, marketplace plans, Medicare and Medicaid regulations, tax law provisions, and more — further complicating making determinations on what Trump would or could do. 

"It’s hard to know what you can take away from Trump’s statement with respect to the ACA," Corlette said. "But I think people can make the assessment that a number, maybe not all, but a number of the ACA’s insurance reforms — like the insurance minimum benefits and pre-existing condition protections —  if not fully repealed, those could be rolled back so that insurers will have a lot more flexibility to charge more or deny certain types of care."

Biden said Trump wants to terminate the Affordable Care Act.

In 2016, Trump campaigned on a promise to repeal and replace the ACA. In the White House, Trump supported a failed effort to do just that. In the years since, he has repeatedly stated his intent to dismantle the health care law, including in campaign stops and social media posts throughout 2023. In March, however, Trump signaled a change in stance, publishing one Truth Social post in which he said that he wasn’t running to terminate the ACA but to make it "better" and "less expensive."

Trump hasn’t released other details or said how he would do this. His campaign platform includes nothing on the ACA. And his campaign didn’t answer our questions about his plan. Health care policy experts identified an array of possible changes — some big, some small — that could be executed under another Trump administration but said a sweeping repeal likely isn’t in the cards due to a lack of support. After years of Trump’s anti-ACA rhetoric and action, the former president’s stated change of position represents an important detail that Biden’s statement fails to acknowledge. We rate it Half True.

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The Principles of the Truth-O-Meter

Our Sources

The White House, Remarks by President Biden at a Campaign Event | Detroit, MI , May 19, 2024 

YouTube, Terminate | Biden-Harris 2024 , May 10, 2024

PolitiFact, Trump-O-Meter: Repeal Obamacare , Updated July 15, 2020

The Associated Press, ‘Obamacare’ survives: Supreme Court dismisses big challenge , June 17, 2021 

CNN, GOP Obamacare repeal bill fails in dramatic late-night vote , July 28, 2017 

Truth Social, Donald Trump post , Nov. 25, 2023

Truth Social, Donald Trump post , Nov. 29, 2023

Truth Social, Donald Trump post , Dec. 25, 2023 

Truth Social, Donald Trump post , March 26, 2024

The Associated Press, Trump says he will renew efforts to replace ‘Obamacare’ if he wins a second term , Nov. 27, 2023

NBC News, Trump doubles down, saying ‘Obamacare Sucks’ and must be replaced , Nov. 29, 2023   

DonaldJTrump.com, Agenda 47 , Accessed May 28, 2024 Republican Study Committee FY 2025 Budget Proposal Health care, Accessed May 29, 2024 

Time, Trump Built His Brand Bashing Obamacare. Now It’s More Popular Than He Is. , April 2, 2024 

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Historic 21.3 Million People Choose ACA Marketplace Coverage , Jan. 24, 2024. 

Email interview, Ammar Moussa, Biden-Harris campaign director of rapid response, May 28-29, 2024

Phone interview, Sabrina Corlette, a research professor and co-director of the Center on Health Insurance Reforms at Georgetown University, May 29, 2024 Phone interview, Thomas Miller, a senior fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute who researches health care policy and the Affordable Care Act, May 29, 2024

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