essay about philippine politics

Politics In The Philippines Essay

Politics is defined as the theory and practice of government, the interrelation between people who exercise and resist power, and the use of tactics and strategy to gain power in a certain number of people. However, a lot of deeper definitions have been correlated with the term “politics”, both in a positive and negative way. It is now said that politics is a gamble, dirty and decisive, that it already lost its noble meaning. It is once said that politics may be considered as the noblest profession, if only it is created for the service of the people.

Essay Example on About Politics In The Philippines

Ladies and gentlemen, politics covers a very comprehensive area, covering the physical, economical, social and moral aspect of a nation. And I would like to make the simplest yet profound presentation of this topic based on our very own. This is the anatomy of the Philippine Politics. The political system and the economical status are two inseparable factors on the growth of every country, and from there, we can say that we have no stable economic status because we have no stable government.

The economical status is displayed because there is the government that is supposed to manage and regulate the functions of the economy. Therefore, it is the government that plays a big part. The goal of the government MUST be to sustain its people the standard of living that every individual really deserves. But here in the Philippines, many Filipinos live in the upper class, more on the middle class, and MOST on the lowest class, just on or under the poverty line.

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“ Very organized ,I enjoyed and Loved every bit of our professional interaction ”

Why is this so? Is everything the government’s fault? Of is it the masses? Let’s dissect each of these two.

The government is supposed to be composed of the government officials only, since it is called the government. But the fact that a lot of Filipinos do not see is that aside from the gluttonous government officials who fights for power, there is also some of the elite class, the greedy businessmen who have hidden agendas as they make deeper coordination with the government transactions and processes. They both hypocritically reach their left hands to the “ordinary citizens” while their right hands are mischievously getting money from the funds of the people.

A very good example of “multi-tasking” isn’t it? But while they are too busy tricking the people, there is the police, the armed forces, and the courts that had grown inefficient to restore peace and order in the country. There are the once blue seas now black. There are the little children who go to school barefoot with rotten books in their broken bags. There is the usual Filipino family with a dozen children eating once a day under a leaking roof. You see? As the fortunate ruling class is pacifying themselves with power and luxury, the poor ones are suffering.

Now, are the masses blameless? NO. The ordinary citizens were rightfully given the bill of rights and granted with full democracy. But that doesn’t mean that they have to react violently and dogmatically. They were living with genuine sovereignty, free to speak themselves and do whatever pleases them. But that was often the misconception about freedom. They keep on exercising their own independence without even thinking and considering the rights of the other person. Just days ago, the president of the SGC of the University of the Philippines kept on barking about the inept governance of

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POLITICS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Politics in the Philippines has traditionally been dominated by clans and political bosses and patronage and is characterized by law makers that make decisions based on fiscal incentives rather that beliefs and voters that make choices based on personality rather than reasoned policies. Under the traditional “itang na loob” system of patronage, or obligation earned through favors, voters expect money or jobs in return for their political support. In many cases politician’s performance was based on dole-outs not on programs or policies. Philippine concepts about debt repayment and kinship responsibilities plays a major role in how political networks are set up and run (See FILIPINO CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY: HIYA, AMOR PROPIO Under People).

Personalities are more important than parties in Philippine politics. Movie stars and other celebrities have enjoyed considerable success. In addition1, several prominent families play a disproportionate role in politics. The support of the military and the Catholic church are key to political survival and success in the Philippines. Promises are generally not kept. Arroyo, for example, pledged to bring cheap power to the poor as a campaign pledge and then doubled power rates after she was elected. She also promised not to run for a second time but changed her mind because she said God made her decide to run.

The Philippines is known for its rough-and-tumble political scene. Politicians are rountinely killed and sometimes they even do the do the killing themselves. Every now and then it seems the entire country is on the verge of collapse because of a coup attempt, People Power protest or impeachment effort. On the day-to-day level, politicians are unable to achieve many of their goals and carry out programs they proposed due to political opposition, mainly from the ruling elite. Arroyo and her cabinet said that political fighting and sniping exhausted and frustrated them deeply.

Carlos H. Conde wrote in the New York Times, “In the Philippines, politics is a blood sport. Here, politicians often behave like gladiators: To survive they have to entertain the spectators. The turmoil from the [Arroyo] scandal has once again brought Filipinos and their unique brand of rambunctious democracy to international attention, providing a sideshow to the more pressing problems. Filipinos are no longer surprised by election fraud. Thanks to the damage Ferdinand Marcos, the dictator, did to the democratic institutions that American-style democracy helped establish after World War II, and the prevalence of an almost feudal political structure, particularly in the provinces, Filipinos have come to accept election cheating as normal. [Source: Carlos H. Conde, New York Times, July 2, 2005]

Pollster Social Weather Station and Pulse Asia.

Development of Philippines Politics After the Marcos

In 1991 Philippine politics resembled nothing so much as the "good old days" of the pre-martial law period — wide-open, sometimes irresponsible, but undeniably free. Pre-martial law politics, however, essentially were a distraction from the nation's serious problems. The parties were completely nonideological. Therefore, politicians and office-holders switched parties whenever it seemed advantageous to do so. Almost all politicians were wealthy, and many were landlords with large holdings. They blocked moves for social reform; indeed, they seemed not to have even imagined that society required serious reform. Congress acquired a reputation for corruption that made the few honest members stand out. When Marcos closed down Congress in 1972, hardly anyone was disappointed except the members themselves. *

The February 1986 People's Power Revolution, also called the EDSA Revolution had restored all the prerequisites of democratic politics: freedom of speech and press, civil liberties, regularly scheduled elections for genuine legislatures, plebiscites, and ways to ensure honest ballot counting. But by 1991 the return to irrelevant politics had caused a sense of hopelessness to creep back into the nation that five years before had been riding the euphoric crest of a nonviolent democratic revolution. In 1986 it seemed that democracy would have one last chance to solve the Philippines' deep-rooted social and economic problems. Within five years, it began to seem to many observers that the net result of democracy was to put the country back where it had been before Marcos: a democratic political system disguising an oligarchic society. *

Powerful Families in Philippine Politics

Hrvoje Hranjski of Associated Press wrote: “Philippine elections have long been dominated by politicians belonging to the same bloodlines. At least 250 political families have monopolized power across the country, although such dynasties are prohibited under the 1987 constitution. Congress — long controlled by members of powerful clans targeted by the constitutional ban — has failed to pass the law needed to define and enforce the provision. "Wherever you go, you see the names of these people since we were kids. It is still them," businessman Martin Tunac, 54, said after voting in Manila. "One of the bad things about political dynasties is they control everything, including business." [Source: Hrvoje Hranjski, Associated Press, May 13, 2013 |=|]

“School counselor Evelyn Dioquino said that the proliferation of political dynasties was a cultural issue and other candidates stood little chance because clans "have money, so they are the only ones who can afford (to run). Of course, if you have no logistics, you can't run for office." Critics worry that a single family's stranglehold on different levels of government could stymie checks against abuses and corruption. A widely cited example is the 2009 massacre of 58 people, including 32 media workers, in an ambush blamed on rivalry between powerful clans in southern Maguindanao province. |=|

Ana Maria Tabunda from the independent pollster Pulse Asia said that dynasties restrict democracy, but added that past surveys by her organization have shown that most Filipinos are less concerned about the issue than with the benefits and patronage they can receive from particular candidates. Voters also often pick candidates with the most familiar surnames instead of those with the best records, she said. "It's name recall, like a brand. They go by that," she said. |=|

The American anthropologist Brian Fegan, writing in "An Anarchy of Families," a book published in the 1990s, told the New York Times that "the Filipino family is the most enduring political unit and the one into which, failing some wider principle of organization, all other units dissolve." Filipinos look at political continuity as merely the transfer of power among family members, Fegan said. Thus, they also look at political competition in terms of rivalry between families. "A family that has once contested an office, particularly if it has once won it, sets its eye on that office as its permanent right," Fegan said. [Source: Carlos H. Conde, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2005 \~/]

Political Family Dynasties in the Philippines

Politics in the Philippines has been dominated by powerful families for as long as anyone can remember. Aquino was the wife of a opposition leader. Arroyo was the daughter of a president. In 2004, Arroyo’s son and brother-in-law held Congressional seats and five relatives of Aquino were in Congress and one was a Senator. Even the Marcos family remains powerful and influential in Philippines politics, especially in northen Luzon. Many local positions and governments are dominated by clans and powerful and wealthy families.

One Philippine political analyst told the Washington Post, “Some dynasties have made positive contributions, but by and large the dynastic system in the Philippines has stunted the growth of real democracy. It is not representative of the broad majority in any place.” Efforts to reduce the hold on power of local families by establishing term limits has meant that families hand over power from one family member to another.

The system of family dynasties has its roots in U.S. colonial rule when initially voting rights were only granted to Filipinos with property and education, allowing the landed aristocracy to attain a monopoly of power in the provinces. The United States also put in place a Congressional system that allowed families to establish local fiefdoms rather than fostering competition through an electoral list system.

This trend is beginning to change in some places. Grace Padaca, a former radio commentator, was elected governor of Isabela Province in 2004. She moved into the mansion of the former governor, from the powerful Dy family, thought he had built for himself. Padaca won by nonstop campaigning and dedicated grassroots volunteer movement.

Filipino Clans, Celebrities Dominate Midterm Polls in 2013

Hrvoje Hranjski of Associated Press wrote: “From Imelda Marcos to Manny Pacquiao, familiar names of Philippine political clans and celebrities dominated the ballots for congressional and local elections, which will gauge popular support for the president's anti-corruption drive and other reforms. [Source: Hrvoje Hranjski, Associated Press, May 13, 2013 |=|]

“Among 33 senatorial candidates are two of Aquino's relatives, Binay's neophyte daughter, Estrada's son, a son of the sitting chamber president, a son of a late president, a spouse and children of former senators and there's a possibility that two pairs of siblings will be sitting in the me house. Currently, 15 senators have relatives serving in elective positions. The race for the House is even more of a family affair. Toppled dictator Ferdinand Marcos' widow, the flamboyant 83-year-old Imelda, is expected to keep her seat as a representative for Ilocos Norte province, the husband's birthplace where the locals kept electing the Marcoses despite allegations of corruption and abuse during their long rule. Marcos' daughter, Imee is seeking re-election as governor and the son, Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr., is already a senator. Boxing star and incumbent Rep. Manny Pacquiao is running unopposed and building a dynasty of his own: his brother Rogelio is running to represent his southern district and his wife Jinkee is vying to become vice-governor for Sarangani province. |=|

Palakasan System" in the Philippine Government

Iamthur.blogspot.jp reported: “How to get a job in the Philippine Government provided that there is a vacancy? First, you must be a Filipino citizen. Then, you should have a bachelor's degree related to the job, certification of eligibility from Civil Service Commission, experience related to the job, and other documents as the office/agency concerned may require. But in these days, there is a big problem. In a partisan system if they suspect you for not voting for a certain winning candidate, your chances to get hired even though you're qualified is lame. That's sad but true. [Source: iamthur.blogspot.jp ==]

“This scenario has been the headache for long a time. The recent official that being seated on certain position will going to terminate all people that being hired under the term of previous official. I can say this because, I already witnessed this when I visit our municipality. I've noticed that there are new faces working there, and old employees are replaced already. ==

“Nowadays in Philippines, it is very difficult to acquire a job in the government. Even though you have the qualities, abilities, and capabilities that match the criteria for a certain job you're applying for, sometimes it just not enough to get the job. That's because you don't have what they call a "backer", it's a certain people in the government with a high position or ranking that supposedly one of your relatives, friends or acquaintances. There are lots of people getting hired easily in the government even though they don't have what it takes for that certain position, but they made it possible because of their contacts(red tape) in the government. It is what you called the "Palakasan System" that run for so long. It's very unfair and disappointing to those honest and deserving Filipino job-seekers who aim to work for the government. ==

“The government now is full of corrupt people. I'm still hoping that someday this system will be changed. All corrupt must be washed out, and let the honest and dignified people work for their beloved county, who looks equally to all people under their good governance.” ==

Old-Style Politics in the Philippines Countryside

Philippine politics, along with other aspects of society, rely heavily on kinship and other personal relationships. To win a local election, one must assemble a coalition of families. To win a provincial election, the important families in each town must be drawn into a wider structure. To win a national election, the most prominent aristocratic clans from each region must temporarily come together. A family's power is not necessarily precisely correlated with wealth — numbers of followers matters more — but the middle class and the poor are sought mainly for the votes that they can deliver. Rarely will they be candidates themselves. [Source: Library of Congress *]

The suspension of elections during martial law seemed at first to herald a radical centralization of power in Manila, specifically in the Marcos and Romualdez clans, but traditional provincial oligarchs resurfaced when Aquino restored elections. To the dismay of her more idealistic followers, Aquino followed her brother's advice and concluded agreements with many former Marcos supporters who were probably going to win elections anyway. About 70 percent of the candidates elected to the House of Representatives in 1987 were scions of political dynasties. They included five relatives of Aquino: a brother, an uncle, a sister-in-law, a brother-in-law, and a cousin. Another brotherin -law was elected to the Senate. The newly elected Congress passed a bill prohibiting close relatives of government officials from becoming candidates, but it did not take effect until after the 1988 local elections. Many of the same prominent families who had dominated Philippine society from the Spanish colonial period returned to power. Commonly, the same two families vie for control of provinces. The specific reason for social and political bipolarity is not known, but it nourishes feuds between rival clans that are renewed generation after generation. *

Coercion is an alternative to buying votes. Because the population of the Philippines has multiplied by a factor of nine in the twentieth century, there is not enough land to go around. As a result, tenant-landlord relationships have become more businesslike and less personal, and some old elite families now rely on force to protect their interests. Article 18 of the constitution directs the dismantling of all "private armies," but it seemed unlikely that it could be enforced. *

Failure of People in the Philippines

Jim Gomez and Oliver Teves of Associated Press wrote: “The world watched in awe in 1986 as Filipinos, clutching rosaries and flowers, mounted a human barricade against tanks and troops and brought dictator Ferdinand Marcos down without a shot. What they did gave birth to the term "people power." Fifteen years later similar forces toppled President Joseph Estrada over alleged corruption, and even now, the nation's democracy remains fragile.” In the late 2000s, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo faced impeachment proceedings over allegations of vote-rigging and corruption and declared a state of emergency to quashed a coup plot. She said the political opposition and extremists on both left and right were determined to bring down her elected government. [Source: Jim Gomez and Oliver Teves Associated Press, February 25, 2006 +^+]

“Has "people power" gotten out of hand in the island nation where it was born? Even its most prominent beneficiary, Corazon Aquino, who succeeded the ousted Marcos in 1986, thinks so. "I would still prefer that we do it through a constitutional process," she said recently when asked if she would join an uprising against Arroyo. "Things are different now, we have other options." Besides democracy, little has changed in this nation of 86 million. It remains mired in appalling poverty, rural backwardness, chronic inequality, long-running Marxist and Muslim insurgencies and chaotic politics. Imelda Marcos, the dictator's widow once reviled for the extravagance epitomized by her vast shoe collection, retains political clout and still shows up occasionally to work the Manila social circuit. +^+

“The images of "people power" are fading into history, but remain iconic: nuns kneeling in prayer in front of tanks, and unarmed civilians trying to push back military vehicles with their bare hands. Historian Maria Serena Diokno said the administrations of Aquino and Arroyo, both from wealthy landowning clans, faced the same accusations as their predecessors - human rights violations, massive corruption and failure to enforce effective land reform. +^+

Carlos H. Conde wrote in the International Herald Tribune, “If there is any consensus it is that the system has to go, says Manuel Quezon 3rd, a political analyst and historian. "The problem is, no one agrees what system to replace it with," Quezon said.Experts on politics and governance do agree, however, that the families and politicians who have a lock on government here have been the bane of Filipinos, thriving on so-called patronage politics that keeps democratic processes in a state of dysfunction. The result is a faulty electoral system, a low level of political awareness among the populace and a degree of corruption that has seriously damaged Philippine society and hobbled economic development. [Source: Carlos H. Conde, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2005 \~/]

“All of these factors conspire to push the country near the edge of chaos in a kind of cyclical pattern that has decayed what was once among the region's most promising democracies. Worse, the few new and young leaders who emerge are frequently co-opted by traditional politicians. These new leaders then establish political dynasties themselves or fortify existing ones, perpetuating a vicious circle.” \~/

Why the Powerful Family and Patronage System Endure in the Philippines

Carlos H. Conde wrote in the International Herald Tribune, “The reality here is that the same old faces, the same old families and the same old interests continue to hold sway over the political life of this country. The Philippines, which once boasted an intelligentsia that was deemed the most sophisticated in Southeast Asia, is still going through what one Filipino columnist recently called "the most drawn out political adolescence in modern history." [Source: Carlos H. Conde, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2005 \~/]

“Why do a few oligarchic families continue to dominate the political life of this former Spanish colony, in a pattern once familiar in many Latin-influenced countries? To put the question another way, why has the Philippines failed to produce a leader like Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, a figure who springs from the bottom up and who, for better or worse, ushers in new politics that, on the surface at least, promise a better life for the people? \~/

Clarita Carlos, an expert on governance and politics at the University of the Philippines, said she believed that Philippine politics merely facilitated the "circulation of elites, people who have mastered how to be economically and socially mobile by taking advantage of the limitations of the system." As a result, the Filipino political class "has become so inbred that they've become detached from the concerns of the majority," said Quezon, who is himself the grandson of a former president. \~/

“In a healthy political environment, Quezon said, the oligarchy would relinquish power to a new political class. "Sadly, this is something most Filipino oligarchs never did," he said.Steven Rood, the country representative here of The Asia Foundation and an expert on local governance, thinks it is not so much a question of why Philippine politics has the same faces but why the situation has not changed over many decades. "I would say that the basic fundamental reason is that the people who run the system are the ones benefiting enough from it that they're worried about change," Rood said. That has been the case for decades and, as Steven Rood of The Asia Foundation explained, "there's an enormous amount of historical continuity at play" in the present crisis. Rood traces this back to the period of Spanish colonization and the American colonization that followed it. \~/

"The two decades of Marcos blocked off a generation of young, emerging leaders," said Nereus Acosta, a 39-year-old congressman who teaches public policy at the Ateneo School of Government. After Marcos was toppled in 1986, the political families that he cultivated were replaced by new ones allied to the next regime, that of Corazón Aquino. As if that were not enough, the lines that at first separated Marcos and anti-Marcos politics became so blurred that it is not surprising today to find a former Marcos foe hobnobbing with the scions and friends of the former dictator. Switching sides thus became widespread. Filipino political parties had intermarried to such an extent that, today, it is difficult to know which party is allied with whom. "We're paying for this damage now," Acosta said. \~/

“Given this, Acosta said, it would be difficult for idealism to evolve. "You may have new guys coming out, yes, but unfortunately, wealth and power being so confined to a few, this new generation will have limitations," he said. There has never been a shortage of idealistic Filipinos who can provide the kind of strong leadership the country needs. "Believe me, there are many Filipinos who are competent," said Carlos, the political science professor. The problem is, officials said, once they are inside the system, they are easily compromised. \~/

Is the U.S. to Blame for the Philippines’s Political Failures

Steven Rood of The Asia Foundation told the International Herald Tribune that the Americans did not change the Filipino social structure. "They imposed a political system that allowed this social structure to gain political power," he said. "It's been the marriage of social position and political power ever since that produced essentially the same state that we have now." [Source: Carlos H. Conde, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2005 \~/]

Luis Teodoro, the executive director of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance, a political research institute in Manila, told the International Herald Tribune that the Americans had a hand in this predicament. They supported regimes led by powerful political families who, in turn, furthered American interests and helped suppress the nationalist politicians who tended to undermine them. "To a great extent, the United States is responsible for keeping these political dynasties in power," Teodoro said. Without U.S. support, he said by way of example, the regime of Ferdinand Marcos would not have lasted as long as it did and Marcos would not have been able to inflict the heavy damage on political institutions here that he is generally held responsible for. \~/

Carlos H. Conde wrote in the International Herald Tribune, “Marcos persecuted the oligarchs who went against him and befriended those who were willing to cooperate with his regime. While he used these families to prop up his regime and amass the wealth for which he would later be infamous, these families went on to exploit their ties with him, widening and strengthening their political bases and enriching themselves even more. Marcos, in turn, used these power bases, particularly in the provinces, to keep himself in the presidential palace. This resulted in a kind of political interregnum. Because the dictator, his wife, Imelda, and his closest cronies were the only kingmakers, they either corrupted young and idealistic politicians or made sure that those who could challenge them did not stand a chance. \~/

Philippine Mayor Killed at Manila Airport

Political violence is not confined to candidates running in elections that threaten the oligarchy status quo. It can strike sitting politicians—and innocent bystanders. In December 2013, Al Jazeera reported: “Gunmen have shot dead a town mayor and three other people at the airport in Manila, sending travellers fleeing for safety, authorities said. Ukol Talumpa, the mayor of the town of Labangan in Zamboanga del Sur province, was killed together with his wife, an 18-month-old baby and one other person, Al Jazeera's Jamela Alindogan reported from Manila on Friday. Four other people were wounded in the incident, airport manager Jose Honrado said. [Source: Al Jazeera, December 20, 2013]

“Honrado said that Talumpa was waiting for a ride with his family outside an airport terminal when the gunmen on a motorcycle shot him and others at close range. Airport security force chased the gunmen but they escaped on their vehicle in the heavy late-morning traffic outside the terminal, Honrado said. He added that the authorities did not know the identity of the attackers nor the motive for the attack "Government agencies are trying their best to determine the perpetrators and bring them to justice," the airport manager said. Talumpa, a member of the political opposition, won a hotly contested electoral contest for mayor of Labangan in last May's local elections. [Ibid]

Politicians in the Philippines

Personality and image count for a lot on Philippines politics. Presidential candidates have included high school drop out movie stars. In some cases they have had no public service experience before running for office. It is common in Philippine politics for movie stars, basketball players and comedians to be elected to public office. The two top vote getters in a 1992 Senate election were a former action-movie star and slapstick comedian. In the 1998 election, more than 100 candidates in national elections were former entertainers. Former police chief and Manila mayor Alfredo Lim was nicknamed "Dirty Harry" for having little respect for civil liberties.

According to everyculture.com: “Men of rank in the military also move into the political arena. Joseph Estrada, whose term as president is 1998–2004, entered the public eye as a popular film star. He then became the mayor of a large city and went on to become vice president in the Ramos administration. Previous presidents have had political or military backgrounds, with the exception of Corazon Aquino, the president from 1986 to 1992, who became politically active after her husband was assassinated. [Source: everyculture.com]

It is also not unusual for Philippines politicians to have a criminal record. The top politician on the island of Palawan, Edward Hagedorn. who has been greatly praised for his can do achievements, himself grew up as a petty criminal and became a gambling lord who was jailed for allegedly killing two policeman in a shootout and abandoned his wife and child to live with a showgirl he met at a bar. Using managment skills that he may have picked as a gangster he got roads paves, cracked down on illegal logging and fishing, and delivered on promises of bringing low-cost housing, clinics and garbage collection to remote villages. Hagedorn became so famous his life was made into a film staring future presidential candidate Edward Poe.

Ferdinand Marcos was accused of killing a man. President Joseph Estrada and popular politician and president candidate Edward Poe were popular actors. See History

Speaker Jose de Venecia: the Consumate Filipino Politician

Bong Austero wrote in his blog: “Speaker Jose de Venecia says he now wants to spend the last years of his life building his legacy to the Filipino people. The speaker is 70 years old. He is the longest-serving speaker of the House of Representatives. He could have been president of this country had it not been for the fact that someone more popular and more in touch with the common man was also running for the post in that particular election. He lost to Joseph Estrada, the actor. His running mate, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, however, won the vice presidency. Estrada would eventually get booted out of office, tried, and convicted for plunder. And as fate would have it, De Venecia’s running mate became President. [Source: bongaustero.blogspot.jp, October 22, 2007 /=]

“For quite sometime, De Venecia’s political fortunes were in limbo. But he eventually bounced back from the pits and reclaimed his seat as speaker of the House of Representatives, proof of the man’s resilience and tenacity as a political animal. This is a man who has fought many battles; a man who speaks with the wisdom of not only the aged, but of someone who has been a constant fixture in the political scene in the last four or five decades. In another time and place, when someone of De Venecia’s stature and experience speaks of moral regeneration and of the urgency of reclaiming the country’s pride and honor, we should be compelled to sit up and listen. /=\

“Sadly, this does not seem to be the case today. It has become difficult to empathize with the man. Not only because in all his TV appearances last week the speaker came across as a forlorn figure, of someone betrayed and on the brink of defeat. There was no fire in his eyes and his rhetoric lacked conviction. This is sad because what De Venecia is saying is true. This country needs moral regeneration. But corruption has not only become systemic and widespread, brazen and so unspeakably scandalous. We also know theoretical solutions and intellectual discussions won’t be enough. What we need are drastic and more effective courses of action. /=\

“It is difficult to empathize with De Venecia and his cause because despite the grand pronouncements, it is clear that the man is simply fighting for political survival. This is evident in the way De Venecia continues to hem and haw about where his political loyalties now reside. Despite thinly veiled threats about possible courses of actions that he might take if the current dispensation continues to marginalize him, we know that his main motivation is self-preservation. He wants to retire as speaker and this is only possible if he plays his cards right. It’s a political zarzuela. De Venecia is saying all the right things but unfortunately fails to buttress his rhetoric with the necessary actions indicative of moral courage. Thus, we can be forgiven for not trusting him at this point.” /=\

Political Parties in the Philippines

Political parties and leaders: 1) Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Struggle of Filipino Democrats) or LDP [Edgardo Angara]; 2) Lakas ng EDSA-Christian Muslim Democrats or Lakas-CMD [Manuel "Mar" Roxas]; 3) Liberal Party or LP [Manuel Roxas]; 4) Nacionalista Party or NP [Manuel "Manny" Villar]; 4) Nationalist People's Coalition or NPC [Frisco San Juan]; 5) PDP-Laban [Aquilino Pimentel]; 6) People's Reform Party [Miriam Defensor Santiago]; 7) Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino (Force of the Philippine Masses) or PMP [Joseph Estrada]. The United Nationalist Alliance or [UNA] - PDP-Laban and PMP coalition for the 2013 election. Political pressure groups and leaders: Black and White Movement [Vicente Romano]; Kilosbayan [Jovito Salonga] [Source: CIA World Factbook]

Philippine political parties are essentially nonideological vehicles for personal and factional political ambition. Ruling party: The Liberal Party is the party of Benigno Aquino III, the current president of the Philippines. The Liberal Party, a democratic-elitist party founded in 1946, survived fourteen years of dormancy (1972 to 1986), largely through the staunch integrity of its central figure, Senate president Jovito Salonga, a survivor of the Plaza Miranda grenade attack of September 1971. In 1991 Salonga also was interested in the presidency, despite poor health and the fact that he is a Protestant in a largely Catholic country. Former President Macapagal-Arroyo is a member of the conservative Lakas-Christian Muslim Democratic Party (Lakas-CMD).

Political parties are not that strong in the Philippines. Rewriting the constitution to eliminate term limits and establishing a strong two-party system are the reforms that are discussed most often. Politicians move from party to party as the needs of their constituencies dictate because the political parties have no ideologies. [Source: everyculture.com]

Senate - percent of vote by party for 2013 election - UNA 26.94 percent, NP 15.3 percent, LP 11.32 percent, NPC 10.15 percent, LDP 5.38 percent, PDP-Laban 4.95 percent, others 9.72 percent, independents 16.24 percent; seats by party after 2013 election - UNA 5, NP 5, LP 4, Lakas 2, NPC 2, LDP 1, PDP-Laban 1, PRP 1, independents 3; House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - LP 38.3 percent, NPC 17.4 percent, UNA 11.4 percent, NUP 8.7 percent, NP 8.5 percent, Lakas 5.3 percent, independents 6.0 percent, others 4.4 percent; seats by party - LP 110, NPC 43, NUP 24, NP 17, Lakas 14, UNA 8, independents 6, others 12; party-list 57 [Source: CIA World Factbook]

After the May 2004 election, Lakas controlled the largest faction in the House of Representatives (100 seats). Lakas-CMD has formed a governing coalition with the Liberal Party (32 seats). Others major parties in the House at that time were the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (47 seats), led by the business tycoon Eduardo Cojuangco; Struggle for Democratic Filipinos (nine seats); Nationalista Party (six seats); Akbayan (three seats); Association of Philippine Electric Co-operatives (three seats); Bayan Muna (three seats); Power of the Filipino Masses (three seats); Aksyon Demokratiko, Promdi, and Reporma, which have formed an alliance (two seats); Philippine Democratic Party (two seats); and Philippines Democratic Socialist Party (two seats).

The Communists (NPA) split among the ranks.

Political Parties After the Ouster of Marcos

Political parties grew in profusion after the Marcos martiallaw regime (1972-81) was ended. There were 105 political parties registered in 1988. As in the pre-Marcos era, most legal political parties were coalitions, built around prominent individuals, which focused entirely on winning elections, not on what to do with the power achieved. There was little to distinguish one party from another ideologically, which was why many Filipinos regarded the political system as irrelevant. [Source: Library of Congress *]

The party system in the early 1990s closely resembled that of the premartial law years when the Nacionalista and Liberal parties alternated in power. Although they lacked coherent political programs, they generally championed conservative social positions and avoided taking any position that might divide the electorate. Each party tried to appeal to all regions, all ethnic groups, and all social classes and fostered national unity by never championing one group or region. Neither party had any way to enforce party discipline, so politicians switched capriciously back and forth. The parties were essentially pyramids of patronclient relationships stretching from the remotest villages to Manila. They existed to satisfy particular demands, not to promote general programs. Because nearly all senators and representatives were provincial aristocrats, the parties never tackled the fundamental national problem — the vastly inequitable distribution of land, power, and wealth. *

Ferdinand Marcos mastered that party system, then altered it by establishing an all-embracing ruling party to be the sole vehicle for those who wished to engage in political activity. He called it the New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan). The New Society Movement sought to extend Marcos's reach to far corners of the country. Bureaucrats at all levels were welladvised to join. The New Society Movement offered unlimited patronage. The party won 163 of 178 seats in the National Assembly in 1978 and easily won the 1980 local elections. In 1981 Marcos actually had to create his own opposition, because no one was willing to run against him. *

Pro-Government Parties After Marcos

In 1978 the imprisoned former senators Benigno Aquino and Lorenzo Tañada organized a political party named Lakas ng Bayan (Strength of the Nation; also known by its abbreviated form, LABAN, meaning fight). LABAN won 40 percent of the Manila vote in parliamentary elections that year but was not given a single seat in Marcos's New Society Movement-dominated parliament. After Aquino went into exile in the United States, his wife's brother, former Congressman Jose Cojuangco, managed LABAN. Cojuangco forged an alliance with the Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP), a regional party with strength in the Visayas and Mindanao, that had been organized by Aquilino Pimentel, the mayor of Cagayan de Oro City. The unified party was thereafter known as PDP-LABAN, and it — along with UNIDO conducted Corazon Aquino's presidential campaign against Marcos. [Source: Library of Congress *]

In its early years, PDP-LABAN espoused a strongly nationalist position on economic matters and United States base rights, aspiring to "democratize power and socialize wealth." Later, after Aquino became president, its rhetorical socialism evaporated. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, PDP-LABAN had the distinct advantage of patronage. Aquino named Pimentel her first minister of local government, then summarily dismissed every governor and mayor in the Philippines. Pimentel replaced them with officers in charge known personally to him, thereby creating an instant pyramid of allies throughout the country. Some, but not all, of these officers in charge won election on their own in the January 1988 local elections. *

PDP-LABAN was not immune from the problems that generally plagued Philippine political parties. What mainly kept the party together was the need to keep Aquino in power for her full sixyear term. In June 1988 the party was reorganized as the Struggle of Filipino Democrats (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino). Speaker of the House Ramon Mitra was its first president, but he resigned the presidency of the party in 1989 in favor of Neptali Gonzales. *

In 1990 Aquino announced the formation of a movement called Kabisig (Arm-in-Arm), conceived as a nongovernmental organization to revive the spirit of People's Power and get around an obstinate bureaucracy and a conservative Congress. By 1991 its resemblance to a nascent political party worried the more traditional leadership, particularly Mitra. Part of Aquino's governing style was to maintain a stance of being "above politics." Although she endorsed political candidates, she refused to form a political party of her own, relying instead on her personal probity, spirituality, and simple living to maintain popular support. *

Opposition Parties After Marcos

The New Society Movement fell apart when Marcos fled the country. A former National Assembly speaker, Nicanor Yniguez, tried to "reorganize" it, but others scrambled to start new parties with new names. Blas Ople, Marcos's minister of labor, formed the Nationalist Party of the Philippines (Partido Nationalista ng Pilipinas) in March 1986. Enrile sought political refuge in a revival of the country's oldest party, the Nacionalista Party, first formed in 1907. Enrile used the rusty Nacionalista machinery and an ethnic network of Ilocanos to campaign for a no vote on the Constitution, and when that failed, for his election to the Senate. Lengthy negotiations with mistrustful political "allies" such as Ople and Laurel delayed the formal reestablishment of the Nacionalista Party until May 1989. Enrile also experimented with a short-lived Grand Alliance for Democracy with Francisco "Kit" Tatad, the erstwhile minister of information for Marcos, and the popular movie-star senator, Joseph Estrada. In 1991 Enrile remained a very powerful political figure, with landholdings all over the Philippines and a clandestine network of dissident military officers. [Source: Library of Congress *]

Vice President Laurel had few supporters in the military but long-term experience in political organizing. From his family base in Batangas Province, Laurel had cautiously distanced himself from Marcos in the early 1980s, then moved into open opposition under the banner of a loose alliance named the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Eventually, the UNIDO became Laurel's personal party. Aquino used the party's organization in February 1986, although her alliance with Laurel was never more than tactical. UNIDO might have endured had Aquino's allies granted Laurel more patronage when local governments were reorganized. As it was, Laurel could reward his supporters only with positions in the foreign service, and even there the opportunities were severely limited. The party soon fell by the wayside. Laurel and Enrile formed the United Nationalist Alliance, also called the Union for National Action, in 1988. The United Nationalist Alliance proposed a contradictory assortment of ideas including switching from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government, legalizing the Communist Party of the Philippines, and extending the United States bases treaty. By 1991 Laurel had abandoned these ad hoc creations and gone back to the revived Nacionalista Party, in a tentative alliance with Enrile. *

In 1991 a new opposition party, the Filipino Party (Partido Pilipino), was organized as a vehicle for the presidential campaign of Aquino's estranged cousin Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco. Despite the political baggage of a long association with Marcos, Cojuangco had the resources to assemble a powerful coalition of clans. *

In September 1986 the revolutionary left, stung by its shortsighted boycott of the February election, formed a legal political party to contest the congressional elections. The Partido ng Bayan (Party of the Nation) allied with other leftleaning groups in an Alliance for New Politics that fielded 7 candidates for the Senate and 103 for the House of Representatives, but it gained absolutely nothing from this exercise. The communists quickly dropped out of the electoral arena and reverted to guerrilla warfare. As of 1991, no Philippine party actively engaged in politics espoused a radical agenda.

Catholic Church and Politics in the Philippines

During the Spanish colonial period, the Catholic Church was extensively involved in colonial administration, especially in rural areas. With the advent of United States control, the Catholic Church relinquished its great estates. Church and state officially were separated, although the church, counting more than 80 percent of the population as members, continued to have influence when it wanted to exert it. For much of the Marcos administration, the official church, led by archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Jaime Sin, adopted a stance of "critical collaboration." This meant that although Sin did not flatly condemn Marcos, he reserved the right to criticize. Below the cardinal, the church was split between conservative and progressive elements, and some priests joined the communistdominated National Democratic Front through a group named Christians for National Liberation. Cardinal Sin was instrumental in the downfall of Marcos. He brokered the critical, if temporary, reconciliation between Aquino and Laurel and warned the Marcoses that vote fraud was "unforgivable." In radio broadcasts, he urged Manileños to come into the streets to help the forces led by Enrile and Ramos when they mutinied in February 1986. The church, therefore, could legitimately claim to be part of the revolutionary coalition. [Source: Library of Congress *]

Aquino is a deeply religious woman who has opened cabinet meetings with prayers and sought spiritual guidance in troubled times. Although there were reports that the Vatican in late 1986 had instructed Cardinal Sin to reduce his involvement in politics, Aquino continued to depend on him. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines issued a pastoral letter urging people to vote yes in the 1987 constitutional plebiscite. In March 1987, Sin announced that he was bowing out of politics, but two months later he broadcast his support for ten Aquino-backed candidates for the Senate and recommended that voters shun candidates of the left. In 1990 Sin defined his attitude toward the government as one of "critical solidarity." *

The church was very pleased with provisions of the 1987 Constitution that ban abortion and restore a limited role for religion in public education. The Constitution is essentially silent on the matter of family planning. The church used its very substantial influence to hinder government family-planning programs. Despite the fact that the population grew by 100,000 people per month in the late 1980s, Cardinal Sin believed that the Marcos government had gone too far in promoting contraception. He urged Aquino to "repeal, or at least revise" government family-planning programs. In August 1988, the bishops conference denounced contraception as "dehumanizing and ethically objectionable." For churchmen, this was an issue not to be taken lightly. One bishop called for the church to "protect our people from the contraceptive onslaught" and the bishops conference labelled rapid population growth a "nonproblem." In 1989 the United States Department of Commerce projected the Philippine population at 130 million by the year 2020 — in a country the size of California. *

Catholic Leaders and Politics in the Philippines

The Catholic church is one of the strongest institutions in the Philippines and major player in Philippine politics. Support of the Catholic church, and the military, are key to political survival and success in the Philippines. The Catholic is very involved in fighting poverty and in some cases some of its members have been involved in supporting poor tenant farmers in their battles against their rich landlords.

Priests and bishops and other religious leaders are powerful figures in the Philippines. Local priest and ministers are so highly respected that requests from them take on the power of mandates. A family considers having a son or daughter with a religious career as a high honor. Personal friendships with priests, ministers, and nuns are prized. Clerics take an active role in the secular world. An example is Brother Andrew Gonzales, the current secretary of DECS. [Source: everyculture.com]

The Catholic Church and, to a lesser extent, the Protestant churches engaged in a variety of community welfare efforts. These efforts went beyond giving relief and involved attempts to alter the economic position of the poor. Increasingly in the 1970s, these attempts led the armed forces of President Marcos to suspect that church agencies were aiding the communist guerrillas. In spite of reconciliation efforts, the estrangement between the churches and Marcos grew; it culminated in the call by Cardinal Jaime Sin for the people to go to the streets to block efforts of Marcos to remain in office after the questionable election of 1986. The resulting nonviolent uprising was known variously as People's Power and as the EDSA Revolution. [Source: Library of Congress, 1991 *]

The good feeling that initially existed between the church and the government of President Aquino lasted only a short time after her inauguration. Deep-seated divisions over the need for revolutionary changes again led to tension between the government and some elements in the churches. *

Catholics fall into three general groups: conservatives who are suspicious of social action and hold that Christian love could best be expressed through existing structures; moderates, probably the largest group, in favor of social action but inclined to cooperate with government programs; and progressives, who do not trust the government programs, are critical both of Philippine business and of American influence, and feel that drastic change is needed. In the past, progressives were especially disturbed at atrocities accompanying the use of vigilantes. They denied that they were communists, but some of their leaders supported communist fronts, and a few priests actually joined armed guerrilla bands. There appeared to be more progressives among religious-order priests than among diocesan priests. *

Cardinal Sin

Cardinal Jaime L. Sin was the top Catholic figure in the Philippines for decades until his death in 2005. Arguably one of the most powerful men in the Philippines and one of the most powerful Catholic clerics in the world, he was mentioned as a possible successor to Pope John Paul II. The son of Chinese immigrants, Cardinal Sin is well-known for his sense of humor, his name and his jokes about his name. When asked what his chances are of becoming the Pope, he says, "First of all, my name is bad." He often greets guest to his residence with "Welcome to the House of Sin" and is notorious for his bawdy comments.

Hrvoje Hranjski of Associated Press wrote: Cardinal Sin “shaped the role of the church during the country's darkest hours after dictator Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law starting in 1972 by championing the cause of civil advocacy, human rights and freedoms. Sin's action mirrored that of his strong backer, Pope John Paul II, who himself challenged communist rulers in Eastern Europe. Three years after Benigno Aquino Sr., a senator opposing Marcos, was gunned down on the Manila airport tarmac in 1983, Sin persuaded Aquino's widow, Corazon, to run for president. When massive election cheating by Marcos was exposed, Sin went on Catholic-run Radio Veritas in February 1986 to summon millions of people to support military defectors and the Aquino-led opposition. Marcos fled and Aquino, a deeply religious woman, was sworn in as president. Democracy was restored, but the country remained chaotic. [Source: Hrvoje Hranjski, Associated Press, January 3, 2013 ]

Cardinal Sin influence goes back to the Marcos era. Once when he sitting between Marcos and his wife Imelda in the back seat of the presidential limousine, Marcos asked him why he was so quiet. "Because," he said, "I feel like I am being crucified between two thieves." Marcos reportedly thought comment was funny but Imelda wouldn't speak to the cardinal for three months after that.

Michelle O'Donnell wrote in the New York Times, “Cardinal Jaime L. Sin, the powerful Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila, used his influence to champion the rights of the poor and rally the widespread popular resistance that brought down the presidencies of Ferdinand E. Marcos and Joseph Estrada Cardinal Sin led the nearly 40 million Catholics in the Philippines for almost three decades, through political upheaval that brought martial law, repressive dictatorship and democratic rule. A round-faced, bespectacled man, he was known for his sense of humor that included poking fun of his own name. But it was through his withering and unwavering public criticism of the Marcos regime in the 1980's that Cardinal Sin became an international figure. [Source: Michelle O'Donnell, New York Times, June 21, 2005 +++]

“At a time when reform-minded clergy in other developing countries were targets of assassination, Cardinal Sin tirelessly used his pulpit first as bishop, then archbishop, to attack Mr. Marcos' martial law, corruption and policies that oppressed the poor. Yet unlike Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador, a contemporary who also worked to empower the poor and was fatally shot as he delivered a homily in 1980, Cardinal Sin seemed insulated from personal harm. "If you compare him to Romero, he spoke out as much as Romero did," said the Rev. Paul L. Locatelli, the president of Santa Clara University. "He saw justice as making sure that the poor had a voice." But he was not witho Under the cardinal's tenure, the church was shaken by accusations of sexual misconduct by some of its priests, according to The Associated Press. Two years ago, Catholic bishops apologized for grave cases of sexual misconduct by priests and pledged to act on complaints. +++

During his long career, the cardinal was not without his critics. He staunchly opposed artificial means of birth control, which some critics said left the country overpopulated and mired in poverty. Under the cardinal's tenure, the church was shaken by accusations of sexual misconduct by some of its priests, according to The Associated Press. Two years ago, Catholic bishops apologized for grave cases of sexual misconduct by priests and pledged to act on complaints. +++

See Religion

Protests and Demonstrations in the Philippines

Describing a Manila protest against President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2006, Nicola Menzie of CBS wrote: “Riot police used water cannons and truncheons to break up a rally by more than 1,500 protesters as they demanded President Arroyo be removed from office. The protesters appeared emboldened by the success of similar protests in Thailand that led to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's resignation from office. The demonstrators reported several injuries as a result of police using wooden sticks, fiberglass shields and water cannon spray in order to force them away from a bridge leading to the presidential palace. Rallies have been banned in the area, which has been the scene of recent clashes between police and demonstrators. Leftist groups have vowed to continue protests and are calling for Arroyo's ouster over corruption and vote-rigging allegations. [Source: Nicola Menzie, CBS, April 6, 2006]

The next day, Fight Back! News reported: “Riot police in the Philippines attacked and broke up a demonstration by human rights activists marching near an international parliamentarians' conference. The protesters were gathering at the Malate Church in Manila en route to the Philippine International Convention Center. The police injured various people, including Catholic priests from the organization Promotion for Church People’s Response (PCPR). Baton-wielding police charged into the protesters near the conference site for the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) assembly where about 1,400 lawmakers from 145 countries were meeting. Human rights activists led by several priests and nuns marched on the conference to protest widespread human rights violations in the Philippines under the Arroyo government, including a number of recent killings of political activists. [Source: Fight Back! News, April 12, 2005]

Filipinos Grow Disillusioned with People Power Protests

The Philippine middle-class, instrumental in the overthrow of presidents Marcos and Estrada, is fed up with political turbulence and wants stability, political analysts say. In 2005, Alan Sipress wrote in the Washington Post, “Jennifer Santos's eyes gleamed as she recalled her days as a young housewife staring down government tanks ordered to the streets by longtime dictator Ferdinand Marcos. For the better part of a week in 1986, she and tens of thousands of other Filipinos, carrying flowers and rosary beads, camped along the capital's gritty Edsa Boulevard until Marcos fell. She remembered with less enthusiasm returning to the boulevard four years ago when another graft-tainted leader, Joseph Estrada, left office after a single night of protests. "By the next morning," Santos recounted, "I was in Starbucks drinking coffee, and we had a new president." [Source: Alan Sipress, Washington Post, July 10, 2005 ^/^]

“Now, that president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, is facing a crescendo of calls to step down due to allegations she cheated in national elections last year. But like the vast majority of other Edsa veterans, Santos, 44, is not very interested in joining the few protesters on the streets. "I got tired. It happens over and over again," Santos said. "Our political system never changes." Across Manila, disappointment in Arroyo is surpassed only by a weary recognition that the Philippines' celebrated protest movement known as "people power" has run its course, and that no new political savior is at hand to rally the masses. ^/^

“Only several thousand flag-waving demonstrators joined the main anti-Arroyo rally in Manila's business district. Local office workers appeared almost oblivious to the event. The six-lane Edsa Boulevard was clogged with traffic. Not a protester was in sight and the adjacent plaza at the heroic People Power monument was empty. ^/^

“Luzviminda A. Santos, 52, a compact woman with intense brown eyes and shoulder-length black hair streaked with gray, was invited by several friends to join a small anti-Arroyo demonstration Saturday morning outside the local Santo Domingo church. She told them she would try to make it, but instead stayed home drinking coffee and watching the dizzying political developments on television. "I said to myself, 'What for?' " Four years ago, Santos said, she was among the first to reach Edsa Boulevard and demand Estrada's ouster. But this time there was little idealism, and the ascension of Arroyo, a product of the wealthy landed classes, was an immediate letdown. "Everyone is fatigued now with people power. It can't snowball to people power again," she said. But now, she said her family is less interested in the current political showdown than the basketball game Sunday between the country's two premier universities. She predicted the Manila sports coliseum would attract more people this weekend than any demonstration. "Are there people in Edsa now?" she asked. "Is anything happening now? I don't even care." ^/^

Image Sources:

Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Lonely Planet Guides, Library of Congress, Philippines Department of Tourism, Compton’s Encyclopedia, The Guardian, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, AFP, Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic Monthly, The Economist, Foreign Policy, Wikipedia, BBC, CNN, and various books, websites and other publications.

Last updated June 2015

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Clan politics reign but a family is divided in the race to rule the Philippines

Julie McCarthy

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and his daughter Sara Duterte arrive for the opening of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2018. AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and his daughter Sara Duterte arrive for the opening of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2018.

A foiled succession plan, sensational allegations, and a family feud at the pinnacle of power — these are the ingredients in what promises to be a riveting race to succeed outgoing Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte.

The no-holds-barred contest scheduled for May 2022 has already produced what some observers see as an unsettling alliance: the offspring of two presidents pairing off in an unprecedented bid to run the country.

Taking full advantage of their prominence, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., has teamed up with Sara Duterte, daughter of President Rodrigo Duterte in the national election.

He is running for president in this dynastic duo, while she vies for vice president.

Are dynasties and celebrities narrowing democracy?

Political dynasties in the Philippines are nothing new.

Richard Heydarian, an expert on Philippine politics, says they are such a dominant feature in the country that between 70% and 90% of elected offices have been controlled by influential families.

But even by those standards, this Marcos-Duterte coupling takes powerful clan politics to a new level, says University of the Philippines Diliman political science professor Aries Arugay.

Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. is surrounded by supporters after attending the recount of votes in the 2016 vice presidential race at the Supreme Court. Marcos narrowly lost that contest to Leni Robredo, the current vice president. Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. is surrounded by supporters after attending the recount of votes in the 2016 vice presidential race at the Supreme Court. Marcos narrowly lost that contest to Leni Robredo, the current vice president.

Speaking at a recent online forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Arugay says second generation dynasts are behaving like a "cartel".

He says their calculus is as damaging as it is simple: "Why can't we just share power, limit competition, and make sure that the next winners of the presidential and national elections come from us?"

Then there is the celebrity factor.

Heydarian notes a narrowing of democracy in the pairing of dynasties with the celebrity class, which includes former film stars, television personalities and sports figures. He says the two elite groups monopolize national office, putting elected office beyond the reach of a lot of ordinary Filipinos who he says may have the merit and passion to serve, but are effectively blocked from fully participating.

It makes a "mockery" of democracy, Heydarian says, but it's also a trend that could be difficult to reverse.

"After all, in politics you need a certain degree of messaging, communications machinery and charisma," he said. And, he added, especially in the age of social media, "It's not for dull people."

Running on a name, not a track record

Consider Manny Pacquiao.

His stardom as one of the legends of the boxing world has catapulted him into the race for president next year. He is currently a sitting senator and is in the running for the highest office not on the power of his record in the upper chamber marked by absenteeism, but on the strength of his career as the country's most acclaimed athlete.

So prized have name recognition and celebrity status become in winning Philippine elections that observers worry it's turning democracy into the preserve of the rich and well-connected.

Marcos is part and parcel of the phenomenon, according to Manila-based analyst Bob Herrera-Lim, who notes that his undistinguished career as a senator and congressman has been no barrier to his ambition for the presidency.

"[Marcos] is running on entitlement. He is running on the weaknesses of the system," Herrera-Lim said.

Sara Duterte poses for a selfie with city hall employees in Davao city, on the southern island of Mindanao. Manman Dejeto/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Sara Duterte poses for a selfie with city hall employees in Davao city, on the southern island of Mindanao.

Marcos' vice presidential partner Sara Duterte is an accomplished politician, occupying the post her father held for decades as the mayor of Davao City, the third largest in the country. But the fact the 43-year-old First Daughter, whose work is little known outside Davao, led in a presidential opinion poll this past summer can only be put down to the power of a famous family name.

Revisionism, a PR campaign of distortion — and fond memories of the Marcos era

Bongbong Marcos is now making waves, rewriting the past and embellishing his family's legacy.

It's been 35 years since his father was ousted by a popular uprising, exiled, and exposed for rights abuses and kleptocracy.

Marcos Sr. is believed to have amassed up to $10 billion while in office, and now his son has been resuscitating the family's image with a sophisticated social media campaign.

Marcos Jr. narrates seamlessly scored videos that cast his parents, Ferdinand and Imelda, as generous philanthropists, and his father as a great innovator who made possible new strains of rice and united the archipelago with infrastructure heralded as the "Golden Age" of the Philippines.

Critics decry what they call the revisionist history and systematic airbrushing of the sins of the father's 20-year rule that turned the country into his personal fiefdom.

Marcos Sr. engaged in land-grabbing, bank-grabbing, and using dummies to hide acquisitions from public view, according to Professor Paul Hutchcroft of the Australian National University, who has written extensively on the political economy of the Philippines.

The late dictator dispensed special privileges to relatives, friends and cronies, writes Ronald Mendoza, dean of the School of Government at Ateneo de Manila University, providing them access to the booty of the state, "even as the country failed to industrialize and was eventually plunged into debt and economic crises in the mid-1980s."

Activists wear masks with anti-Marcos slogans during a rally in front of the Supreme court in Manila in 2016 as they await the high court's decision on whether to allow the burial of the late Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos at the "Cemetery of Heroes." Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Activists wear masks with anti-Marcos slogans during a rally in front of the Supreme court in Manila in 2016 as they await the high court's decision on whether to allow the burial of the late Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos at the "Cemetery of Heroes."

Yet, despite all of it, the Marcos family is not without its loyalists among both the elites and ordinary Filipinos.

At a small community market in central Manila, where fishmongers congregate amid aquariums and chopping blocks, vendors and shoppers talk about the Marcos era with a sense of nostalgia.

Chereelyn Dayondon, 49, says she likes how Marcos Sr. ran the country before and she wants that to come back. The single mother earns $80 a month directing traffic and worries that the cost of living is getting too high.

"It's not going to be enough," she says. "You never know, maybe Bongbong can change the Philippines. Let's try him out."

Meanwhile, fish seller Teodora Sibug-Nelval, 57, reminisces about the old Marcos era and memories of cheap food and law and order.

"I had a good life. I was able to send my sibling to school ... I was able to buy a house," she says.

In the pandemic, however, Sibug-Nelval lost her home and her vending stall. And now she wants her life back. She says she believes that if Marcos wins the election, "our lives will be better."

Herrera-Lim also says that many Filipinos see a confusing, chaotic political situation: "There is no clear delineations, political parties don't work for our benefit, we are looking for order."

And that, he says, is what Marcos is offering.

"Bongbong Marcos is saying that during his father's time, there was this order. There was peace in the country, which again, is a myth," he says.

The challenger to the dynasty

Leni Robredo is the current vice president of the Philippines and a liberal progressive.

A lawyer by training, Robredo co-authored an anti-dynasty bill when she served as a member of the Philippine House of Representatives.

In the Philippines, the vice president and president are elected separately and Robredo is on the opposite end of the political spectrum from President Duterte, with whom she has repeatedly sparred over human rights, the handling of the pandemic and Duterte's close ties with China.

Among the many candidates for president, including a former police chief, the mayor of Manila and Duterte's closest aide, Robredo appears to represent the greatest challenge to Bongbong Marcos.

Philippine Vice President Leni Robredo gestures to a crowd of supporters in Manila on Oct. 7, 2021, the day she filed her candidacy for the 2022 presidential race. Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Philippine Vice President Leni Robredo gestures to a crowd of supporters in Manila on Oct. 7, 2021, the day she filed her candidacy for the 2022 presidential race.

Robredo defeated Marcos Jr. for vice president in 2016, and now she has pledged that if she wins the top office, she will recover the Marcos family's plundered riches.

Alluding to Marcos' perceived popularity, Robredo told a news conference last weekend that it was "sad that the people allow themselves to be fooled" into believing Marcos would save the country when the family's ill-gotten wealth "was the reason they are poor."

Yet Robredo may need more than tough rhetoric and moral rectitude.

Marites Vitug, the editor-at-large for the online news site Rappler, whose CEO won this year's Nobel Peace Prize , said the country was witnessing the "rehabilitation of the Marcos dynasty." Young people were especially susceptible to the Marcos rebranding, she said, because there were no standard history textbooks in the Philippines that explained the Marcos martial law years.

"I was shocked to hear from some millennials that this was never discussed in class," she said.

Vitug said the odd teacher or professor may present it, but it was not systematic.

"It should have been required reading," she said.

Political economist Calixto Chikiamco adds that the revived Marcos family fortunes represent a counter-revolution to the one that ousted Marcos Sr. in 1986. That so-called Yellow Revolution was a model that Chikiamco says has failed to deliver genuine change.

"Because our politics remain dysfunctional, our economy is still not doing so well, a quarter of the workforce is unemployed ... still a large number of people go abroad to seek better opportunities. So it is a revolt against their present situation," he said.

"That's the reason the Marcoses are making a comeback."

The Duterte dynasty is a house divided

The campaign promises to be one of the Philippines' most bitterly fought contests in years, not least because the Marcos-Duterte tie-up has not won the blessing of Sara Duterte's father.

Rodrigo Duterte did make the controversial decision to allow the late dictator's remains to be moved to the "Cemetery of Heroes," a decision confirmed by the Supreme Court. But the once-friendly relations between Rodrigo Duterte and Bongbong Marcos have frayed, possibly beyond repair.

Duterte had wanted his daughter to seek the presidency, not play second fiddle, to provide him protection from the International Criminal Court investigating his violent anti-drug war. The probe has been suspended for a procedural review, but court watchers expect the case of alleged crimes against humanity to resume. Meanwhile, Chikiamco says while Sara may talk of continuing her father's policies, by declining to run for the top job, she has gone her own way.

"The daughter is fiercely independent and didn't want to be under the thumb of President Duterte. And also she could not perhaps tolerate the president's men," Chikiamco said.

A grandmother and her grandchild light a candle beside mock chalk figure representing an extra judicial killing victim during a prayer rally condemning the government's war on drugs in Manila in 2017. Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

A grandmother and her grandchild light a candle beside mock chalk figure representing an extra judicial killing victim during a prayer rally condemning the government's war on drugs in Manila in 2017.

Herrera-Lim adds that daughter and father apparently "did not see eye to eye on many things related to the family or on the governance of Davao."

Fundamentally, though, Herrera-Lim says President Duterte doesn't trust Bongbong Marcos to shield him from ICC prosecutors.

"On these matters, family is very important," he said.

And even if there were such a bargain between the two men, Herrera says Duterte would worry it might not hold.

In what analysts regard as a means to protect himself, Duterte is making a bid for a seat in the Senate in the 2022 election.

One authoritative poll shows Marcos the early frontrunner to succeed him. But not, it seems, if President Duterte has anything to say about it.

He ignited a stir earlier this month by declaring in a televised address that an unnamed candidate for president uses cocaine.

Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte. AFP/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte.

Without identifying who, he said the offender was a "very weak leader" and that "he might win hands down."

Marcos took a drug test this past week, saying he was clean. Other candidates hurriedly lined up to clear their name.

Marcos is also under attack by groups eager to have him disqualified from running at all. The Commission on Elections is reviewing four separate petitions challenging his candidacy. At least one charges that Marcos misrepresented his eligibility to seek the presidency by stating he had no criminal conviction that would bar him from office. Petitioners argue that his 1995 conviction for failing to pay taxes for several years in the 1980s ends his bid for the presidency.

The Commission on Elections announced no ballots will be printed until the petitions are decided.

The campaign that officially begins in February is already generating drama enough for some to lament that the race for president is fast becoming a "political circus."

But Richard Heydarian says circuses are not always the worst thing. "Sometimes," he says, "they can produce a magical outcome. Let's see."

Correction Dec. 16, 2021

An earlier version of this story incorrectly said Aries Arugay was a professor at Philippine University. He is with the University of the Philippines Diliman. Also, Ateneo de Manila University was misspelled as Ateno de Manila University.

Why the 2022 Philippines election is so significant

There are 10 candidates vying to replace Rodrigo Duterte as president, but only two really matter.

The Philippines goes to the polls on May 9 to choose a new president, in what analysts say will be the most significant election in the Southeast Asian nation’s recent history.

Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte leaves office with a reputation for brutality – his signature “drug war”  has left thousands dead and is being investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – economic incompetence, and cracking down on the media and his critics.

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Duterte has also been criticised for his handling of the coronavirus pandemic, which has killed at least 60,439 people in the archipelago.

There are 10 people battling to replace him, but only two stand a chance of winning.

The first is frontrunner Ferdinand Marcos Jr, popularly known as “Bongbong” and the namesake of his father, who ruled the Philippines as a dictator until he was forced from office and into exile in a popular uprising in 1986.

The second is Leni Robredo, the current vice president and head of the opposition, who has promised more accountable and transparent government and to reinvigorate the country’s democracy.

“This election is really a good versus evil campaign,” University of the Philippines Diliman political scientist Aries Arugay told Al Jazeera. “It’s quite clear. Duterte represents dynasty, autocracy and impunity. Robredo stands for the opposite of that: integrity, accountability and democracy.”

What happens on election day?

Some 67.5 million Filipinos aged 18 and over are eligible to cast their vote, along with about 1.7 million from the vast Filipino diaspora who have registered overseas.

Polling stations will open at 6am (22:00 GMT) and close at 7pm (11:00 GMT). The hours have been extended because of the coronavirus pandemic and the need to avoid queues and crowds.

Once the polls close, counting gets under way immediately, and the candidate with the most votes wins. There is no second round so the name of the new president could be known within a few hours. The inauguration takes place in June.

As well as the presidential race, Filipinos are choosing a new vice president – the position is elected separately to the president – members of congress, governors and thousands of local politicians including mayors and councillors.

Politics can be a dangerous business in the Philippines and there is the risk of violence during both campaigning and the election itself.

In one of the most horrific incidents, dozens of people were killed and buried by the roadside in 2009 by a rival political clan in what became known as the Maguindanao massacre .

Who is in the running for president?

Opinion polls suggest Marcos Jr remains in the lead although Robredo appears to be closing the gap.

The 64-year-old dictator’s son attended the private Worth School in England and studied at Oxford University – Marcos Jr’s official biography says he “graduated” but the university says he emerged with a “special diploma” in social studies.

He entered politics in the family stronghold of Ilocos Norte in 1980, and was governor of the province when his father was forced out of power and democracy restored.

In 1992, he was elected to congress – again for Ilocos Norte. Three years later, he was found guilty of tax evasion, a conviction that has dogged him ever since but does not seem to have hindered his political career.

Marcos Jr was elected a senator in 2010, and ran unsuccessfully for the vice presidency six years later when he was pipped to the post by a resurgent Robredo.

On the campaign trail, Marcos Jr has talked of “unity” but has provided little detail on his policies and has avoided media interviews and debates.

His running mate is Sara Duterte-Carpio , Duterte’s daughter, who took over as mayor of Davao City from her father and is leading the field for vice president.

Robredo is the current vice president and a human rights lawyer who got into politics in 2013 after her husband – a government minister – was killed in a plane crash.

She threw her hat into the ring at a relatively late stage, and has relied on a network of pink-clad volunteers to win over voters across the archipelago.

Thousands have turned out for her rallies, some of then standing for hours in their hot sun waiting to hear the presidential hopeful speak. Robredo, whose running mate is Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan, is running on a platform of good governance, democracy and an end to corruption.

Other candidates include champion boxer Manny Pacquiao , Manila mayor Francisco “Isko Moreno” Domagoso, and a former police chief Panfilo Lacson.

Why would a Marcos victory be controversial?

Ferdinand Marcos became president of the Philippines in 1965, winning over Filipinos with his charisma and rhetoric, and taking control of a country that appeared at the time to be one of Southeast Asia’s emerging powerhouses.

Backed by the United States, Marcos won a second term in office in 1969, but three years later he declared martial law claiming the move was necessary to “save” the nation from communists.

For the next 14 years, he ruled the country as a dictator.

More than 3,200 people were killed – their bodies often dumped by the road side as a warning to others – and even more tortured or arbitrarily jailed, according to the US academic and historian, Alfred McCoy.

Marcos’s biggest rival, Benigno Aquino, was assassinated as he got off a plane at Manila airport.

The killing shocked Filipinos at a time when they were increasingly angry at the corruption and extravagance of the Marcos regime. Even as many lived in poverty, the Marcos family bought properties in New York and California, paintings by artists including impressionist master Monet, luxury jewellery and designer clothes.

Transparency International estimated in 2004 that the couple embezzled as much as $10bn during their years in power, and Imelda , Marcos’s wife, has become a byword for excess.

But since the former dictator’s death in Hawaii in 1989, the Marcos family have sought to rehabilitate themselves, trying to portray the dictatorship as some kind of golden age.

In 2016, Duterte allowed Ferdinand Marcos to be buried in Manila’s heroes cemetery, complete with a 21-gun salute .

Now the Duterte family is allied with the Marcos one, and their bid also has the support of other politically influential dynasties in a country where blood ties are more important than any political party.

“The meteoric resurgence of the Marcoses is itself a stinging judgement on the profound failures of the country’s democratic institutions,” academic Richard Javad Heydarian wrote in a column for Al Jazeera in December. “Decades of judicial impunity, historical whitewashing, corruption-infested politics and exclusionary economic growth has driven a growing number of Filipinos into the Marcoses’ embrace.”

Many worry the election of Marcos Jr, particularly if Duterte becomes vice president as widely expected, could herald a new era of repression.

“The two are the offspring of two strongman rulers,” Arugay said. “Can we expect restraint and inclusive government? You don’t need to be a political scientist to answer that question.”

Earlier this week, some 1,200 members of the clergy of the Catholic Church endorsed Robredo and Pangilinan describing them as “good shepherds”. At least 86 percent of Filipinos are Catholic.

“We cannot simply shrug, and let the fate of our country be dictated by false and misleading claims that aim to change our history,” they said.

Will the result be accepted?

When Marcos Jr lost the vice presidential race by 263,000 votes in 2016, he challenged the result in court.

With the stakes much higher this time around, some analysts worry he could do so again if Robredo manages to pull off a victory.

The role of social media

Filipinos are avid users of social media and the platforms have played a key – and divisive – role in the election, intensifying the more toxic elements of political campaigning.

Marcos Jr and his team have been accused of using – and abusing – online platforms.

In January, Twitter suspended more than 300 accounts promoting his campaign, which it said breached rules on spam and manipulation.

Joshua Kurtantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations says Marcos Jr has also benefited from “the legacy of Duterte, who fostered the spread of disinformation and made it easier for another strongman to win”.

Senatorial race

While all eyes are on the presidential race, it is worth keeping an eye on the senate, too.

Leila de Lima, who has spent the past five years imprisoned in the national police headquarters in Manila after questioning Duterte’s drug war, is campaigning for office again.

The opposition senator is hopeful she may soon be released after two key witnesses withdrew their testimony .

De Lima was the target of vicious, misogynistic attacks by Duterte and his supporters before she was charged in 2017 with taking money from drug lords while she was justice secretary in the government of the late Benigno Aquino III .

De Lima has denied the charges and Human Rights Watch has said the case is politically motivated.

Published daily by the Lowy Institute

Philippine elections and the politics behind it

Filipino voters go to the polls to choose who will govern them but not necessarily how they will be governed.

• Philippines

While broadly similar to other presidential forms of government, the Philippines’ system of choosing its leaders does hold some nuisances which reveal deeply-rooted problems in Philippine democracy. The following are some of the long-standing realities of its politics:  

Leaders elected based on minority votes

In the country’s plurality or “first-past-the-post” system, the candidate with the highest number of votes wins, while others are left with nothing in this “winner takes all” set up. But with multiple candidates vying for a single post, “vote splitting” is inevitable. Thus, a broadly unpopular candidate who nonetheless has solid voter support can emerge victorious based on the rule of minority .

In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was elected with a single term, six-year presidency not by a majority, but with a plurality of only 39 per cent, or 16.6 million votes out of the 44 million votes cast . Duterte’s victory was made possible as votes were split among four other presidential candidates, similar to past Philippine presidents who have wielded their power on the back of a minority of voters. Without a run-off election similar to what takes place in Indonesia, the Philippines effectively elects a president with a less popular mandate who was “ picked by some but rejected by many ”.

The Philippine president and vice president are elected separately

Unlike other presidential systems such as in the United States, which field candidates on a joint ticket, the Philippines allows for split-ticket voting even when political parties push for candidates as a tandem. Split-ticket voting has become a trend in Philippine elections based on preconceived ( and misleading ) notions of providing checks and balances between the president and vice president when they are from different parties. What it tends to produce instead is a conflict of interests in terms of policy formulation and implementation.

The deeply-rooted patronage system in the Philippines bolsters money politics, especially during elections.

Moreover, the vice president’s authority is largely dependent on the president and therefore has limited power to “check” on the president. The commander-in-chief can assign a cabinet post to his/her second-in-command as a sign of “partnership for convenience” or totally isolate him/her as an indication of “open hostility”. This latter scenario aptly describes the current relationship between Duterte and Vice President Leni Robredo. Duterte sees Robredo as a critical opposition figure ( she has declared her own bid for the presidency ) and has shunned her from his administration.

A focus on candidates’ personalities rather than platforms   

This year’s election, set for 9 May, is another personality-based popularity contest for the presidency. Except for Robredo and Senator Panfilo Lacson , who are banking on their government experience, presidential candidates are emphasising their stardom and family connections to get elected – international boxing legend Manny Pacquiao , former movie actor Isko Moreno , and Ferdinand Marcos Jr , son of and namesake of the former dictator.

Such a line-up means that the candidates’ campaign narratives generally swirl around their persona. Duterte’s victory in 2016 was attributed to his well-curated “strongman” image , amplified by a solid social media campaign. Thus, charisma and mass appeal are the focus rather than policy platforms or track record. This is amply demonstrated in most campaign events that sideline substantive debates in favour of entertainment shows. “The people won’t listen if you debate an issue or present a platform,” remarked Senator Ronald dela Rosa in 2019 about his campaign rallies. “If you have said several platforms, they think this politician is just … full of words, but no action.”

Political parties serve as candidate-centric, non-ideological alliances

While they have names that describe them as “nationalist”, “democratic”, and “liberal”, the various Philippine political parties are far from being ideological organisations. Instead they are viewed as “catch-all” parties that seek to generate support from all sectors of society. In a personality-driven election promoted by non-ideological parties, Filipino voters go to the polls to choose who will govern them but not necessarily how they will be governed.

Philippine political parties rarely pay attention to their platforms but are used to perpetuate their members’ personal and clan interests . They do not rigorously select qualified candidates as they revolve around political stars seen to have the best chance of electoral victory. In some cases, parties are instantly organised to support the presidential ambition of a political personality.

The politics of personal patronage trumps development policies

The deeply-rooted patronage system  in the Philippines bolsters money politics, especially during elections. Some candidates engage in vote buying rather than promoting their platforms, others misuse public service delivery for electoral purposes instead of broader development objectives.

This tradition is partly enabled because many poor Filipinos are motivated to obtain material benefits in exchange for their votes. One recent study found “about 40 per cent of the poor said they saw vote buying take place in their community while only 20 per cent admitted to selling their votes.” Though entirely rational from the voters’ perspective, accepting “payments” for their ballots reinforces a condition of dependence and can weaken the capacity to demand accountability from their leaders. This patron-client relationship essentially prioritises short-term personal gains for both leaders and their constituencies, rather than the long-term development goals of the nation.

With this year’s polls, the Philippines can anticipate another political reset through a new clutch of leaders. Hopefully the next administration will work to address the adverse features of Philippine politics and push for institutional reforms that will make democracy work for its people.

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The evolving landscape of Philippine politics

During the first half of Marcos Sr.’s 21-year tenure (1965-1986), he laid a solid foundation for national policy. However, Congress, both then and now, lacked the courage, foresight, and patriotism to address the legislation needed to counter increasing insurgency and civil unrest. Nevertheless, Marcos Sr. introduced overdue reforms such as agrarian reform, bureaucracy restructuring, and cooperative strengthening. Additionally, his foreign policy aimed to enhance Philippine independence by opening more windows to the world while maintaining ties with the United States. Mr. Marcos, who witnessed this shift in foreign relations, is unlikely to be as beholden to Xi Jinping as Rodrigo Duterte was after being mesmerized by China’s president.

Marcos Sr. effectively used the branding of the “New Society” to instill a sense of patriotism among Filipinos. This campaign, employing ubiquitous slogans, songs, and posters, united the government, media, private sector, and communities. The emotional impact of this consciousness-molding endeavor still resonates with many Filipinos. Mr. Marcos now aims to replicate this success with his “Bagong Pilipinas” (New Philippines) campaign, which seeks to foster pride and trust in the government. The strategic theme and Marcosian style of this campaign have the potential to create a coherent image of a government moving forward.

Despite lacking the commanding presence of his father, Mr. Marcos should not be mistaken for an unwillingness to break ties with influential figures. His approach, characterized by the phrase “friends to all and enemies to none,” avoids confrontational stances at face-to-face encounters. However, this tactic resembles China’s approach toward the Philippines—“tulak ng bibig, kabig ng dibdib” (push with words but pull with action).

Duterte’s continued vocal presence through Apollo Quiboloy’s Sonshine Media Network International or SMNI, commenting on the likes of fugitive Gerald Bantag, only diminishes his stature. Associating with rogue personalities mattered little when he held the presidency, but now it paints a pathetic picture. Duterte should regain the limelight by participating in interviews with respected media personalities but the prospect is daunting due to the anticipated onslaught of online trolls.

China’s continued reliance on Duterte for support is a miscalculation. By failing to deliver on promised infrastructure and investment projects, while also neglecting a mutually beneficial arrangement in the West Philippine Sea, China undermined Duterte’s credibility. His strategy of appeasement, which appears to favor a “Philippines as a province of China” approach, has alienated the people who initially welcomed his presidency.

Despite his promising start, Mr. Marcos still faces uncertainties regarding the legitimacy of his May 2023 victory. Similar to the doubts surrounding Marcos Sr.’s presidency due to the irregular ratification of the 1973 Constitution, the legitimacy of the May 2022 results is still under some question. Additionally, his Maharlika Investment Fund poses risks, potentially endangering the public’s long-term financial security and survival. This rebranding of critical developmental and public services money as investible surplus raises concerns about a more insidious form of money laundering.

Mr. Marcos’ main adversaries are “backsliding” and the diversion of key reforms when a likely presidential successor emerges at the midpoint of his term. At this stage, the nation gravitates toward the new savior, disengaging from Mr. Marcos and preparing to shift gears, alliances, and trajectories.

The upcoming presidential election in May 2028 is expected to center around major policy issues, signaling a departure from the focus on personalities. Key areas of concern will likely include Philippine relations with China versus the US and its allies, food security and agriculture, energy, cost of living, housing availability and affordability, livelihood and education infrastructure, and law and governance. Moreover, this election will serve as a battleground between China and the US.

It is crucial to recognize the underestimated forces in nature and culture that manifest themselves with great impact. Just as rivers remember their pathways over eons, human attempts to build on floodplains often lead to destruction. Similarly, the evolving political dynamics in the Philippines, shaped by the interplay between Mr. Marcos, Duterte, and China, will undoubtedly reshape the nation’s future.

—————–

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Politics of the Philippines: From Rizal to Duterte

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Politics of the Philippines: From Rizal to Duterte by Richard Javad Heydarian LAST REVIEWED: 21 April 2021 LAST MODIFIED: 21 April 2021 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0333

The heartland of former Spanish East Indies and once America’s sole colony in Asia, the Philippines is a land of mind-bending paradoxes, where swift changes have gone hand in hand with obstinate continuities. The Southeast Asian nation witnessed the birth of Asia’s first modern nationalist movement, initially led by the progressive sections of the Creole class and the so-called ilustrado mestizos, but reaching its apogee in the final years of the 19th century under the command of (Tagalog-dominated) provincial gentry and a broad coalition of petty bourgeois nationalists. In contrast, advanced state-formation came relatively late to the island nation, which has a limited history of large-scale polities in the precolonial era compared to neighboring Indonesia (Majapahit Empire) or Cambodia (Khmer Empire). A century since the advent of ‘first Filipinos,’ the country’s nation-building project remains glaringly unfinished, hobbled by persistent ethnolinguistic divides and Islamist and Communist movements that are among the world’s longest-running such insurgencies. For almost five centuries, Catholicism stood as the dominant religion in the country, but recent decades have seen homegrown evangelical groups become major forces in the country’s political landscape with the advent of denominational ‘bloc voting.’ A major entrepot during the trans-pacific Galleon Trade, the country became a regional economic powerhouse from the late 18th century up until the mid-20th century. Building on bouts of liberal reforms during Spanish colonialism and Commonwealth institutions under American tutelage, the Philippines also boasts among the oldest democratic institutions in the postcolonial world. The past half century, however, witnessed the country’s decline to the “Sick man of Asia” following decades of political instability and absence of sustained economic development. Amidst massive inequality and rampant corruption, the country has repeatedly relapsed into various permutations of authoritarian rule, from the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship to the resurgent populism of Rodrigo Duterte in recent years. In international politics, the Philippines has undergone a similarly turbulent trajectory, repeatedly caught in between rival empires, from Spanish–American Wars in the late-19th century to its strategic flirtation with a rising China despite its formal military alliance with America. What has remained largely constant is the composition of the country’s ruling elite, thanks to its remarkable geopolitical adaptability. The upshot is a weak state enfeebled by powerful interest groups and checked by a vibrant civil society. Accordingly, the study of Philippine politics should cover its troubled nation-state-formation, cacique-dominated political economy and attendant authoritarian temptations, as well as the unique brand of populist and liberal topes in its political discourse.

Unique among its neighbors but similar to its Latin American cousins, as Anderson 2007 explains, the Philippines’ founding fathers were largely a mixture of creole, Chinese-Filipino mestizo and upwardly-mobile “Indigenous” intelligentsia, who were steeped in Enlightenment values and came of age under the shadow of post-1848 revolutionary movements in Europe. Schumacher 1973 , Joaquin 2005 , and Mojares 2006 cover the flowering of the fin de siècle “Propaganda Movement” and its main publication, La Solidaridad , in the late 19th century, while Anderson 2007 explores the nexus between Spanish anarchism, Latin American revolutions for independence, especially in Cuba, and the Philippine Revolution of 1896. The period also saw the publication of the Philippines’ most influential political novels, namely Jose Rizals’ Noli me tángere (1887) and El filibusterismo (1891), which irrevocably reshaped the country’s political imagination and its place in an emerging postcolonial world; the reprinted and English translations, Rizal 2006 and Rizal 2011 respectively, are accordingly annotated here. Guerrero y Francisco 2010 discusses the social milieu and broader political and intellectual relevance of Rizal’s works. In contrast Ileto 1997 discusses the broader role of masses and mass culture in resisting Spanish colonialism. The section also includes arguably the first work on political economy and administrative reforms by a Filipino scholar, Gregorio Sancianco Y. Goson’s El progreso de Filipinas , which was originally published in 1881 in Madrid; accordingly, Sancianco 2010 is a reprinted version of the 1923 edition of the book. On his part, another Filipino illustrado , Isabelo de los Reyes, published what is arguably the country’s first ethnographic study, the award-winning El folklore Filipino (1889), which would inform the author’s as well as his country’s radical politics and first modern labor movements in the early 20th century, from Union Obrera Democratica to the Union del Trabajo de Filipinas and its many Marxist derivatives throughout the century. De los Reyes 2012 is the English translation of the pioneering work annotated here.

Anderson, Benedict. Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination . London: Verso, 2007.

A pioneering work on the influence of international anarchism on Filipino revolutionaries, including Jose Rizal, as evidenced in his second and more radical novel, El filibusterismo , and the direct impact of late-19th-century Cuban War of Independence on the Katipunan movement and especially its leader, Andres Bonifacio, who opted for a timely armed revolt against a collapsing Spanish empire.

De los Reyes, Isabelo. El folk-lore filipino . Translated by Maria Elinora Peralta-Imson and Salud C. Dizon. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2012.

In this republished and translated edition, the author provides a pioneering critique of what, a century later, Edward Said would famously describe as “Orientalism”—namely the essentialization of Indigenous cultures through the prism of European colonialism. The work also provides deep insights into the adoption and adaptation of superstitious beliefs from the Iberian Peninsula and Europe into the Philippines; distinct, hybrid and entwined aspects of Indigenous folklore across various ethnolinguistic groups; and the Husserlian “lifeworld” of the Filipino people.

Guerrero y Francisco, Leon Ma. The First Filipino . Manila, the Philippines: Guerrero Publishing, 2010.

First published in the early 1960s, the award-winning biography of Jose Rizal by this statesman-writer remains a classic account of the late-19th-century Filipino revolutionaries and their contribution to the creation of a Philippine nationhood.

Ileto, Reynaldo. Pasyon and revolution: In Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910 . Quezon City, The Philippines: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1997.

Widely considered as a masterpiece in historical study of the emerging Philippine nation, the book analyzes the multifarious resistance to Spanish political and ideological colonialism throughout the 19th century, and, most crucially, the role and agency of masses in adapting European religious traditions to distinctly precolonial belief systems and local practices.

Joaquin, Nick. A Question of Heroes . Quezon City, The Philippines: Anvil Publishing Co, 2005.

Widely seen as the most influential Filipino novelist of the 20th century, Nick Joaquin provides a unique and unorthodox account of ten figures, from Father Jose Burgos to Artemio Ricarte, who contributed to development of the Filipino nation. The author leverages his mastery of the Spanish language and deep familiarity with original materials from the Spanish colonial era for a highly nuanced and granular analysis of the life and times of Filipino revolutionaries.

Mojares, Resil. Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T. H. Pardo De Tavera, Isabelo De Los Reyes and the Production of Modern Knowledge . Quezon City, The Philippines: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2006.

Arguably the most comprehensive analysis of the circumstances as well as the unique character of key intellectual and political figures who contributed to the creation of a common Filipino consciousness. It’s arguably the best survey of the emerging “intelligentsia” or ilustrado class in the second half of the 19th century in the Philippines.

Rizal, Jose. Noli me tángere . New York: Penguin, 2006.

In Harold Augenbraum’s authoritative translation of this late-19th-century classic, the Philippines’ preeminent founding father and most prominent novelist, Jose Rizal, provides the most devastating and consequential critique of “friarocracy,” namely the hegemonic influence of clerical establishment in Spanish-controlled Philippines. The publication of the book spurred protests and a widespread desire for greater national autonomy, if not outright independence from Madrid.

Rizal, Jose. El filibusterismo . New York: Penguin, 2011.

Building on his first novel, which remains his best known work, Rizal explores the temptations of a more radical and anarchist response to colonial oppression in the Philippines. Eerily prescient, the book seemingly foresaw the tragic outcome of a violent revolutionary movement and reflects the author’s ambivalence toward a full-fledged revolt against Spanish colonial rule—a clairvoyance for the violent, authoritarian tendencies that will emerge under a long series of Filipino strongmen and self-styled nationalists over the next century and beyond.

Sancianco, Gregorio. El Progreso De Filipinas . North Carolina: Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010.

In this republished edition, in the original Spanish, the author provides a pioneering critique of the Philippines’ political economy in the final decades of Spanish imperium. The author’s analysis of the Philippines’ colonial economy and its oppressive, extractive patterns of production would inspire future works, including Jose Rizal’s famous Sobre la indolencia de los filipinos (Manila: Nueva Era, 1890), which, in turn, served as a foundation for influential postcolonial works such as Al-Atlas’s The Myth of the Lazy Native (London: F Cass, 1977).

Schumacher, John N. The Propaganda Movement, 1880–1895: The Creation of a Filipino Consciousness, The Makers of a Revolution . Manila, The Philippines: Solidaridad, 1973.

A classic account of the ‘Propaganda Movement’ and illustrado nationalists in the final decades of the 19th century.

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Lessons and Prospects in Philippine Political Governance: Cutting Across Regimes from Marcos to Duterte

2022, Beyond the Crisis: A Strategic Agenda for the Next President

The paper is a concise assessment and snapshot of Philippine governance under seven (7) presidents covering more than five (5) decades. It is hoped that the limitation of space and time does not render injustice in gauging the state of political governance in the country. The appraisal encompasses key governance areas, among others: transparency and accountability; electoral politics; political party system; political participation; and populist politics. The essay contends the following: the lengthy absence or inadequate mechanism and national policies in addressing transparency and accountability has not controlled nor resolved corruption in government; the country’s political institutions have been corroded by personality-based governance; political party system has been weakened by dynastic and clan-based electoral politics and non-principle/ideological based political parties; political participation has been hijacked by patronage politics and elitism; and populist politics has threatened and restricted rather than expanded democratic rule. Unless structural, political, and electoral reforms leading to a more empowered government structure, democratized electoral system, principle-and-ideologically based political party system, participative and dynamic civil society, and holistic governance are consistently and unswervingly instituted, society would consequently steer towards political decay and insulate the nation-state from the people it serves.

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The paper is an assessment of Philippine political development for over three (3) decades after the fall of Marcos authoritarian rule and the dawn of democratic regimes. Against the backdrop of conceptual and discussion of political development, Philippine political development was examined based on its recent past. It argues that the country’s continuing endeavour to chisel out its national and political advancement is contingent and cannot be divorced from its quest for and vision of national identity and sense of nationhood. It further contends that the political modernization of the country requires it to transcend the inchoate sense of national consciousness, rise above the traditional politicians’ and dynastic control of the electoral system; and go beyond the less inclusive governance. Towards the end, the paper identifies a three-fold challenge: One is drawing a unified approach in bringing together various ethnic, religious, and national groups into the Philippine nation-state. Two, combining political stability with political liberalization and democratization. Political liberalization advances economic growth and development rather than contributes to political instability. And three, transforming political culture and actual political relationships to a more egalitarian, less hierarchical, and further symmetrical relationship between groups of political actors.

Shape Philippines: Voter and Civic Education Initiative Registration Campaign for the 2022 Philippine Local and National Elections

Luis Zuriel P Domingo

This is my talking points as a guest speaker at the Shape Philippines Summit 2022. In this lecture material, I provided a large quantity of information about government and governance; simultaneously, I explained the growth and development of the Philippine government at the backdrop of our political history. I hope that from a historical lens, the lessons of this lecture will empower everyone's understanding of our voter and civic education.

Philippine Journal of Public Policy

Cleo Calimbahin

Design matters. Looking at the results and the conduct of the 2019 elections, the Philippines needs to seriously consider how common and recurring challenges of elections are to be addressed. Among other things, issues of campaign finance, high cost of running for public office, and vote buying continue to persist. Campaigns and preelection conversations revolve around personalities rather than programs and policies. Less-than-ideal candidates with cases in graft courts continue to win-these range from plunder cases to violations of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. And lastly, the promising party list system has not improved the representation of marginalized and minority groups. Instead, it has become an alternative way for traditional politicians to stay in or reenter the halls of Congress. With 51 party list groups winning 61 seats in Congress, the once-promising party list system does not promote party institutionalization or proportional representation. Strong Patronage, Weak Parties, edited by Paul Hutchcroft, provides substantive information and insights on how redesigning the electoral system can lead to better electoral outcomes. The book focuses on effective ways to translate votes into seats. It provides a comparative look at how electoral system redesign can be effective with less unintended consequences. The volume examines the text and context of the pressing need for meaningful political reform in the Philippines, with the aim of presenting electoral system redesign as another option to change the way politics is done in the Philippines.

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Despite a long and rich history of democratic practices, party politics, and elections, the Philippines has institutionalized a clientelistic and patronage-based democracy within an underdeveloped economy. In 1986, a fluid multi-party system emerged following the restoration of formal democracy. While the country reverted to the pre-authoritarian presidential form of government, a multi-party system emerged during the democratic transition. The shift to a multi-party system with a plurality-based electoral system runs counter to the classic tenet of Duverger’s Law that argues that plurality-based elections tend to produce two-party systems. However, the post-authoritarian period saw the rise of ‘an anarchy of parties’ in which inter-party competition became more fluid and fragmented, especially under Rodrigo Duterte’s populist presidency. This chapter will delineate the pitfalls of the post-authoritarian presidential-based party system in the Philippines.

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The Philippines in 2022: Elections, Omicron, and a Delayed Recovery

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The nation faces a tough year, but the upcoming presidential election heralds winds of change.

Alona Nacua, right, stands with her son as she looks at their damaged house due to Typhoon Rai in Cebu city, central Philippines on Christmas Day, Saturday, Dec. 25, 2021.

The year 2021 ended tragically for the Philippines as Typhoon Rai (known locally as Odette) battered the southern part of the country, including prime tourism destinations. Recovery had barely begun when the Omicron variant once again plunged the country into panic, in addition to triggering a new set of mobility restrictions. The year 2022 is shaping up to be a tougher year, but many Filipinos are pinning their hopes on the changes that the upcoming presidential election will bring.

The election, scheduled for May 9, will give the country a new president, vice president, 12 senators, and a new term for local officials. President Rodrigo Duterte’s term will end in June and he will have no anointed successor since the candidate of his party has already backed out of the race.

The campaign period is supposed to start in February although the Omicron surge has made this uncertain. Some are even petitioning for the election to be postponed or canceled. This is unlikely to happen, but the scope of election activities is expected to be narrowed down. This will affect the interaction of candidates and voters, which could benefit incumbent officials since they have the authority to move freely even if the election campaign has yet to start.

The Commission on Elections (Comelec) will decide on various petitions, but its most important case is whether to allow former Senator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, the son and namesake of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, to run for president despite being a convicted tax evader. Marcos is leading in most pre-election surveys, but Comelec can still disqualify him and cancel his candidacy.

Because of Bongbong’s candidacy, the Marcos legacy will be intensely debated this year. Marcos will have the opportunity to defend his father, who ruled the country for two decades by imposing Martial Law in the 1970s. He should not be complacent with his high survey numbers, because aside from rivals who will engage him throughout the election period, pro-democracy forces that challenged the dictatorship will be also actively campaigning against him.

More than the Marcos issue, the pandemic will loom large in the minds of most voters. There is a general frustration over the Duterte government’s pandemic response, which has been characterized by an overreliance on prolonged militarized lockdowns. It does not help that an ongoing Senate probe is determining the culpability of Duterte officials in the signing of anomalous health supply contracts. It will not be difficult for critics to connect the corruption scandal with the medicine shortage being experienced in various urban centers. The recent declaration of several vaccine mandates could also potentially fuel street and community protests.

But public outrage is not just directed against the new restrictions but also the failure to distribute adequate relief and assistance to displaced workers and small entrepreneurs. There is a growing number of people who have expressed exasperation over the impact of urban shutdowns imposed due to COVID-19. They are joined by education stakeholders who are reeling from one of the world’s longest school closures. The Omicron variant has further delayed the reopening of schools, which means an extension of the suffering of students and educators who are enduring unreliable internet connections for distance learning classes.

In the provinces devastated by Typhoon Rai, local residents are struggling hard to rehabilitate their communities, in addition to facing the Omicron surge. One month has passed since the deadly flooding but several towns are still without water and electricity. Thousands are still in makeshift evacuation centers.

Even if Duterte has no official candidate for president, the coming election will offer a judgement vote for his presidency. His daughter is running for vice president and his party has fielded senatorial candidates. Duterte needs to address the issues mentioned above or else risk losing public support as dissatisfaction spreads in communities hit by surging infections, hunger, and poverty levels.

The Duterte government is probably ready to roll out new programs aimed at getting the nod of voters ahead of Election Day. But public anger could manifest itself not just in polling centers but also in the streets and other civic spaces, where “people power” has led to the toppling of governments in the past.

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Philippine Politics Become Even More Dangerous

Since the election, last spring, of President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has witnessed the effects of increasingly demagogic politics on its culture and institutions. While Duterte has won praise domestically and internationally for some of his efforts, including plans to resolve the southern insurgency and strategies to reduce economic inequality in the Philippines, he also has increasingly personalized politics, while dramatically undermining the rule of law. Campaigning as a demagogue, he has often governed as a demagogue, brooking little opposition and overseeing bloody policies. His war on drugs, which has descended into a bloody killing spree with few seeming constraints on the power of the security forces, is but one example of how the rule of law has deteriorated in a few months. [The New York Times has a compelling and graphic new look inside the antidrug campaign here .]. Duterte also has threatened journalists and other members of civil society, while embarking upon a foreign policy that has bewildered many Philippine security experts. The president’s mercurial style, although popular with many Philippine citizens so far, has often made it difficult to know what policy initiative---in both domestic and foreign policy---to take seriously, and which to ignore.

The country’s politics, always noisy and vibrant, have become especially dangerous, and currents of opposition to Duterte appear to be forming. After Duterte’s administration approved the burial of the body of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos in a hero’s cemetery, with little warning, anti-Duterte protests have swelled in Manila. (Although Duterte comes from a left-leaning background, he has long expressed warm feelings for the Marcos family, and Duterte’s father served in the former dictator’s cabinet.) The protests, which began as Philippine citizens realized Marcos was going to be interred, quickly spread from Manila to other parts of the country, and included not just older Filipinos who remembered the Marcos era but some younger men and women who objected to the burial, and who used the demonstrations to voice anger at some of Duterte’s dictatorial approaches to politics.

Philippines

Rodrigo Duterte

Politics and Government

As Mong Palatino notes in The Diplomat , Duterte seems to have underestimated the strong lingering anger over the Marcos era and over giving Marcos any hero’s burial. The president also seems to have underestimated the possibility that anti-Marcos burial protests could become rallying points for supporters of the previous administration, and opposition parties, to air grievances about Duterte’s policies and approach to governing. Duterte’s administration, meanwhile, has repeatedly responded to the demonstrations by calling the protesters agitators who are seeking to foment violence.

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Now, just after the burial demonstrations, a new crisis has emerged. In the Philippines, the vice president and the president are elected separately, and so the country often winds up with a vice president and president from different parties---indeed, two political figures who are major rivals and who clash, rhetorically, for the president’s whole term. This is the current situation; in the same election in which Duterte was elected president, Leni Robredo, a respected human rights lawyer and former mayor from a different party as Duterte, was elected vice-president.

Predictably, Robredo and Duterte, who is not known for his interest in human rights norms, have clashed from the first day of his administration. While she was given a Cabinet position in addition to her vice presidency---she was working as a housing secretary in the Cabinet---Robredo claims she was essentially frozen out at Cabinet meetings and her agency was ignored. Earlier this month, she quit her position as housing secretary, while retaining her post as vice president. She told reporters she had sent Duterte a letter saying “remaining in your cabinet has become untenable.” More worryingly, she publicly insinuated that the administration had been maneuvering to remove her from the vice presidency, possibly to replace her with Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the son of the former dictator and a close ally of Duterte’s. According to Bloomberg , she warned of a “plot to steal” the vice presidency from her.

There are several dangers from Robredo and Duterte becoming more publicly alienated from each other. Duterte could maneuver more aggressively to replace Robredo, though the constitutionality of such a move would prove challenging. Still, if he succeeded he might trigger much larger protests, since Robredo is nearly as popular as the president. The second, also worrying implication, is that Robredo could increasingly be seen, by many Filipinos who oppose Duterte’s brutal style of governing, as a viable alternative leader---especially if Duterte continues to abuse the rule of law. Although Duterte’s actions are dangerous, corrosive to the rule of law, and potentially dislocating to the Philippines’ safety and security, if his opponents want to challenge him they should do so in the legislature and the courts and the media. Doing so in these ways would push back against the president’s reported abuses while reinforcing the rule of law. But too often in the past, Philippine leaders have been forced from power in murky, sometimes extralegal ways---and having a vice president beloved by Duterte’s opponents exacerbate the risk of some kind of extralegal challenge to the presidency.

One does not have to look too far back for an example of a controversial, even dangerous president being removed through questionable means---with his vice president ready to take over and possibly playing a role in his ouster. In fact, this is roughly what happened to former president (and now mayor of Manila) Joseph Estrada in 2001. He was replaced by his vice president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Estrada was no role model. His removal certainly rid the Philippines of a president who did little to promote the rule of law---after stepping down following massive street protests, an impeachment, and the withdrawal of army support for him, Estrada was later convicted of graft. In office, he had weathered massive allegations of graft and widespread complaints from advisors and foes alike that he was uninterested in public policy. But Estrada’s removal, a combination of a legal process, street protests, and a kind of coup, did little to strengthen Philippine institutions or set any precedent for how to address illegal activities by a president.

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Essay on Philippine Politics Then And Now

Students are often asked to write an essay on Philippine Politics Then And Now in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Philippine Politics Then And Now

Introduction to philippine politics.

Philippine politics has a rich and complex history. It has evolved from its pre-colonial tribal governance, to Spanish colonial rule, and then to American influence. Now, it is a democratic country with a President as the head of the state.

Pre-Colonial Era

Spanish colonial era.

When the Spanish came, they changed the political system. They introduced a centralized form of government. The Spanish king was the supreme ruler. Filipinos had no say in their own governance.

American Influence

The American period introduced democracy to the Philippines. They taught Filipinos about voting and elections. This was a big change from the Spanish era where Filipinos had no political voice.

Modern Philippine Politics

Philippine politics has changed a lot over time. From tribal rule, to colonial control, to democracy, it has evolved. Despite challenges, it continues to strive for a better future.

250 Words Essay on Philippine Politics Then And Now

Introduction.

Philippine politics has seen many changes over time. From the pre-colonial times to the present, politics in the Philippines has evolved a lot.

Politics in the Past

In the past, the Philippines was ruled by a system of datu, or tribal chiefs. These leaders were chosen based on their bravery and wisdom. They made the laws and decisions for their people. This was a simple form of government, and it worked well for the small communities of the time.

Spanish and American Influence

Things changed when the Spanish and later the Americans came. They introduced a new form of government. This was more complex, with many different roles and responsibilities. There were governors, mayors, and other officials. These people were chosen by the rulers, not the people.

Modern Politics

Today, the Philippines is a democratic country. This means that the people have the power to choose their leaders. They do this through elections, where they vote for the people they think will do the best job. This system is much fairer, as it gives everyone a chance to have their say.

In conclusion, Philippine politics has come a long way from the days of the datu. While there are still challenges to overcome, the move towards democracy has been a big step in the right direction.

500 Words Essay on Philippine Politics Then And Now

The past of philippine politics.

Philippine politics has a rich history. It started during the Spanish colonial period, which lasted more than 300 years. During this time, the Philippines was ruled by Spain, and the political system was very different. The Spanish King and his appointed officials had all the power. The Filipinos had no say in the decisions made about their country.

The Present State of Philippine Politics

But there are also problems in Philippine politics today. One issue is corruption. Some politicians use their power to get money or favors. This is not fair to the people who voted for them.

Comparison Between Then and Now

But there are also similarities. Corruption was a problem in the past, and it is still a problem today. The lack of political education is also a common issue.

The Future of Philippine Politics

The future of Philippine politics depends on the people. If they learn about politics and make informed decisions, they can choose good leaders. This can help solve the problems in Philippine politics.

In conclusion, Philippine politics has changed a lot from the past to the present. There have been improvements, but there are also problems that need to be solved. The future of Philippine politics depends on the actions of the people and the government.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

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[OPINION] The unfolding reality of Philippine politics | ABS-CBN News

22 An Anarchy of Parties: The Pitfalls of the Presidential-based Party System in the Philippines

• Published: July 2024
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The Philippines is a prototypical example of a presidential or executive-centric party system. For a long time, the Philippines was cited along with the United States as the ‘purest two-party system’. However, several scholars have noted the role of the presidency and the introduction of new electoral rules in relation to the fragmentation of the party system in the post-authoritarian period. While the country reverted to the pre-authoritarian presidential form of government, a multi-party system emerged during the democratic transition. The shift to a multi-party system with a plurality-based electoral system runs counter to the classic tenet of Duverger’s Law that argues that plurality-based elections tend to produce two-party systems. Instead, the post-authoritarian period saw the rise of ‘an anarchy of parties’ in which inter-party competition became more fluid and fragmented. This chapter delineates the pitfalls of the post-authoritarian presidential-based party system in the Philippines.

Introduction

Despite a long and rich history of democratic practices, party politics, and elections, the Philippines has institutionalized a clientelistic and patronage-based democracy within an underdeveloped economy. 1 Since the first party, the Partido Federalista, was founded in 1900 during the American colonial regime, political parties have existed in some form or another. Soon afterward, from 1907 to 1941, the Nacionalista Party (NP) became the ruling party. Between 1946 and 1972, a formal two-party system developed, with the NP and its breakaway faction, the Liberal Party (LP), alternating in power. Under his Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL; New Society Movement), Ferdinand Marcos destroyed this party system and replaced it with a one-party dictatorship from 1972 to 1986. In 1986, a fluid multi-party system emerged following the restoration of formal democracy ( Teehankee, 2020a ).

While the country reverted to the pre-authoritarian presidential form of government, a multi-party system emerged during the democratic transition. The shift to a multi-party system with a plurality-based electoral system runs counter to the classic tenet of Duverger’s Law that argues that plurality-based elections tend to produce two-party systems ( Choi, 2001 ). However, the post-authoritarian period saw the rise of ‘an anarchy of parties’ in which inter-party competition became more fluid and fragmented, especially under Rodrigo Duterte’s populist presidency. This chapter will delineate the pitfalls of the post-authoritarian presidential-based party system in the Philippines.

Institutional Framework for Party Politics and Elections

The post-authoritarian party system is mandated by Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states: ‘A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article’. The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines defines a political party as ‘an [organized] group of persons pursuing the same ideology, political ideas or platforms of government and includes its branches and divisions’. The Constitution also mandates that national elections be synchronized with local elections. The President and Vice President are elected separately by a direct vote through simple plurality nationwide. Both serve a term of six years. However, a one-term limit disqualifies the President from re-election, while the Vice President can serve two consecutive terms. The Philippine Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Half of the 24 Senators are nationally elected at large every six years through a multi-member plurality system (see Table 22.1 ). After serving two consecutive terms, at least one term out is imposed on Senators. On the other hand, the House of Representatives is elected from single-member districts every three years (see Table 22.2 ). House members must serve one term out after three consecutive terms.

Moreover, the Constitution introduced a novel pathway for marginalized sectors to be represented in the corridors of power, as one-fifth of the members of the House of Representatives came to be elected via a party-list system elected from one nationwide district. The Philippines adopted a mixed electoral system incorporating a strand of proportional representation (PR), patterned after the German model: a modified version of the List PR-Niemeyer electoral formula in which ‘the number of seats a party (or organization) is entitled to is calculated based on the proportion by dividing the votes obtained by a party or organization over the total number of all votes cast for all qualified parties and organizations’ ( Agra 1997 : 3).

However, unlike the German model, the Philippine party-list elections are non-compensatory. Only political parties registered for the list system can field candidates for the PR seats, while the major parties competing for single-member districts are prohibited from fielding list candidates. Hence, the majority of the seats in the House are elected through a plurality-based electoral system. The party-list election in the Philippines is peculiar, given its low threshold of 2% and a three-seat cap for winning parties that goes against the principles of PR. As shown in Table 22.3 , between 1998 and 2022, an average of 115 party-list organizations participated in the party-list elections, and the average number of winning parties exceeded 28. This underperformance can be directly traced to basic deficiencies in the system brought about by the three-seat limit and the unclear minimum electoral threshold ( Teehankee 2019 ). The proliferation of small and fragmented party-list organizations has largely contributed to the country’s ‘anarchy of parties’.

Presidential-based Party System

The Philippines is a prototypical example of a presidential or executive-centric party system where ‘decisions to form larger parties or split into smaller ones . . . reflect their calculations about how such manoeuvres will affect their payoff in both seats and offices, weighted by their concern for each’ ( Batto and Cox 2016 : 3). For a long time, the Philippines was cited along with the United States as the ‘purest two-party system’ ( Shugart and Carey 1992 : 222). However, several scholars have noted the role of the presidency and the introduction of new electoral rules in relation to the fragmentation of the party system in the post-authoritarian period.

Kasuya (2009) observes that parties are formed around the incumbent or viable presidential candidates during and after elections. Politicians usually switch to the incumbents or viable presidential candidates to pursue pork barrel and other patronage supporters—a form of ‘presidential bandwagoning’. On the other hand, Choi (2001) argues that the party fragmentation in the post-authoritarian period resulted from the adoption of a single-term limit for presidents in the 1987 Constitution. Including such a restriction nullifies or mitigates the Duvergerian effect of the plurality rule, resulting in a multi-party system. Hicken (2016) agrees with the observation that the term limit was responsible for multi-partyism. The ban lowered the entry hurdles for presidential candidates and undercut the incumbent president’s incentives to invest in party formation.

Throughout the years, the Philippines’ post-authoritarian election processes have revealed distinct political pathologies. These include the continued dominance of political families and clans (commonly referred to as ‘political dynasties’); the existence of weak parties, as evidenced by the constant and regular practice of party switching among elected officials (colourfully dubbed ‘political turncoatism’ by the mass media); and the use of patronage, such as pork barrel, for political mobilization under the country’s presidential system ( Kasuya, 2009 ; Teehankee, 2013 , 2018 ).

In 2022, Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, Jr, the sole son and namesake of the late dictator, won the presidency by a large margin 36 years after his family was forced out of the palace by a military-backed people-power uprising. Former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo brokered an alliance between Marcos and Davao Mayor Sara Duterte, the equally feisty daughter of the populist president Rodrigo Duterte.

An Anarchy of Parties

According to Kasuya and Teehankee (2020) , the Duterte presidency has resulted in an ‘anarchy of parties’—a condition in which inter-party competition is fluid and fractured due to the president’s party ceasing to operate as a coordination instrument for establishing the party system. An anarchy of parties is characterized by party factionalism, party switching, frequent party formation, reduced administration endorsements, and party system fragmentation.

Party factionalism

The Philippine political party system evolved from elite factions. On the other hand, intra-elite competition was historically primarily driven by local land-based political clans that served as the bedrock of Philippine party politics. Later, changes in the country’s political economy influenced the nature of factional leadership within the major parties. Under Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship, the authoritarian period disrupted the factional competitions within parties, allowing non-landed politicians to mobilize their political machines both within and outside the dictator’s dominant party. Since then, many parties have been formed due to the splits and mergers of elite-based political factions that shaped the post-authoritarian multi-party system ( Teehankee 2020a ).

Every governing party in the post-authoritarian period was driven by intense factionalism. During the presidency of Duterte, the ruling political party—the PDP-Laban—was split into a faction supporting Senator Aquilino ‘Koko’ Pimentel III and Senator Emmanuel ‘Manny’ Pacquiao and one loyal to the populist strongman. Meanwhile, the second Marcos presidency is already facing intense factional rivalries between the supporters of Marcos, Jr. and those loyal to Vice President Sara Duterte (daughter of former president Duterte). Lakas Christian-Muslim Democrats (Lakas CMD; the de facto ruling party)—headed by Marcos, Jr’s cousin, House Speaker Ferdinand Martin Romualdez—is fending off a factional challenge from party stalwart and former president and speaker Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The rift has resulted in Vice President Duterte resigning from the party ( Galvez 2023 ). Meanwhile, some members of PDP-Laban who are supportive of the second Marcos presidency have switched to Lakas CMD. ( Panti 2023 ).

Party switching

Another constant element in clientelistic practices in Philippine politics is party switching. Widely practised in the Philippines, party switching often occurs twice in an election cycle: 1) pre-election party switching—when candidates file their nomination papers and raise campaign funds; and 2) post-election party switching—when elected officials affiliate themselves with the winning party to gain access to patronage ( Teehankee 2020b ). From the 8th to the 17th Congress between 1987 and 2019, an average of 32% of district representatives elected to the House shifted parties (see Table 22.4 ).

The 1987 Constitution’s introduction of a single-term limit on the presidency destabilized the legislative party system, as legislative candidates tended to align themselves with the most viable presidential contenders by switching parties. The lack of an incumbent seeking re-election and low party loyalty incentivize possible presidential candidates to establish new parties and lure legislative candidates into switching parties in exchange for access to patronage.

Frequent party formation

According to Quimpo (2008: 128), ‘[f]ar from being stable, programmatic entities, [Philippine political parties] have in practice proven to be not much more than convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split, resurrected, regurgitated, reconstituted, renamed, repackaged, recycled, or flushed down the toilet anytime’. The major post-Marcos parties were products of major factional splinters. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP, founded in 1988) was the dominant party under the administration of President Corazon Aquino. On the other hand, Lakas CMD was formed in 1991 by allies of President Aquino, who opted to support Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos and not the LDP presidential candidate.

Since 1992, several minor (often short-lived) parties have been organized around personalities who were then perceived to be viable presidential candidates. These ‘parties of one’ include the following: the People’s Reform Party (PRP) of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP; Force of the Filipino Masses) of former president Joseph Estrada; Aksyon Demokratiko (Aksyon; Democratic Action) of the late former senator Raul Roco; Progressive Movement for Devolution of Initiative (PROMDI) of former governor Emilio ‘Lito’ Osmeña; Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma (Reporma; Party for Democratic Reforms); and Bangon Pilipinas (Rise Philippines) of televangelist brother Eddie Villanueva.

These parties have become dormant after their failed bid for the presidency but are often revived occasionally to serve as a vehicle for another competitive presidential candidate. In the 2022 presidential elections, PROMDI was revived to accommodate the candidacy of former world boxing champion and senator Manny Pacquiao, Reporma was the vehicle for the second failed presidential run of the former national police chief and senator Panfilo Lacson, and Aksyon was revived to support former movie actor and Manila mayor Isko Moreno. Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, Jr, son of the late dictator, ran and won the presidency under the Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (PFP). Reestablished in 2018, the party claims to have been inspired by the Partido Federalista, the country’s first political party, founded in 1900 by Pedro Paterno and Trinidad Pardo de Tavera.

Reduced administration endorsement

From 2010 to 2016, being endorsed by the president’s party was a popular choice for politicians seeking a House seat: up to 70% of districts had a candidate affiliated with the president’s party. In the 2019 midterm elections, just 53% of House districts had at least one candidate from the dominant presidential party (see Figure 22.1 ). The election of populist strongman Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 exacerbated the country’s already fractured party system. He eschewed patronage-based political party building in favour of populist mobilization—a ‘sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action while articulating anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people’ ( Jansen 2011 : 82).

Percentage of districts that included a nominee from the president’s party

Unlike previous Philippine presidents, Duterte did not rely solely on patronage to consolidate his political support. Instead, he actively and personally endorsed candidates, defending his allies and attacking the opposition relentlessly. Ultimately, Duterte emerged as the big winner of the 2019 midterm elections. Most of the national and local candidates he endorsed won their contests for national and local positions. The election also resulted in a victory for the administration’s 9 senatorial candidates (out of 12 seats) and most of its governors, mayors, and local legislators. Despite Duterte’s high popularity at the end of his term, the percentage of politicians running under the president’s party continued to decline.

Party system fragmentation

From 1946 to 1969, the effective number of national parties in the Philippines was 2.3. This number increased to 4.3 from 1987 to 2010 in the post-authoritarian period ( Hicken 2016 ). As of 2021, there are 174 political parties registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). These parties are classified as national (49), regional (23), and provincial, city/municipal (102). Combined with the 177 party-list organizations listed in 2022, there is a total of 351 political parties in the Philippines.

As shown in Table 22.5 , the Philippine multi-party system has been fractured heavily through the years. From an effective number of electoral parties of 3.34 in 1992 to 8.22 in 2022. Moreover, the effective number of parliamentary parties has increased from 2.32 in 1992 to 7.21 in 2022. Both trends reflect the continuing fragmentation of the party system.

Major Parties in the Philippines

Based on the 2016, 2019, and 2022 election results, only six political parties are considered competitive at the national and local levels of government. These major parties are (1) Nacionalista Party (NP), (2) Liberal Party (LP), (3) Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), (4) Lakas Christian-Muslim Democrats (Lakas CMD), (5) Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), and (6) National Unity Party (NUP).

Nacionalista Party (NP)

The NP is the country’s oldest party. It was founded in 1907 as a merger of Filipino nationalist parties advocating immediate independence from American colonial rule. The NP dominated electoral politics throughout the colonial period. It continued its dominance from the inauguration of the Commonwealth government in 1935 until the establishment of the Third Philippine Republic in 1946. However, the party’s structure followed the elitist electoral process and was therefore elitist.

In 1946, a major faction split from the NP to form the LP. The rivalry between the two parties dominated Philippine politics from 1946 until 1972. Both took turns capturing the presidency, controlling both chambers of Congress, and winning local government seats. Ferdinand Marcos, who had formerly been affiliated with the LP, was elected president as a member of the NP. Marcos’ new party absorbed the bulk of the membership of both parties—the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL; New Society Movement) after he placed the country under martial law. A faction of the NP stayed with the political opposition.

The party was revived after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. Under the leadership of billionaire politician Manuel Villar, the party has grown in size and influence and is currently the second-largest party in the country. Aside from serving as House Speaker and Senate President, Villar is presently the wealthiest man in the Philippines. In the 2019 midterm elections, the party won 3 national positions (senators) and 2,682 local positions (district representatives, governors, vice governors, mayors, vice mayors, and local legislators).

Liberal Party (LP)

Founded in 1946, the LP is the second-oldest political party in the Philippines. For most of its existence, the party has formed half of the traditional two-party system that dominated the post-war period. Locked out of power upon the declaration of martial law, the remaining leaders of the party who were not co-opted by the Marcos dictatorship became staunch defenders of democracy. The party embraced mass-movement politics and played a significant role in unifying the political opposition around the candidacy of Corazon C. Aquino in 1986. After the EDSA revolution (named after the location of the largest demonstrations) that ousted the dictator, the LP played an active role in the democratic transition and consolidation in the country.

After entering into coalition with successive post-Marcos administrations, the LP captured the presidency and many congressional seats in the tightly contested national elections of 2010. The LP rode a crest of strong anti-corruption voters’ sentiment and the popularity of Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III (the son of the late democratic icon Corazon Aquino) to achieve victory. No sooner than the proclamation of Noynoy as the 15th president had been announced, defectors from the losing parties started jumping onto the LP bandwagon. Like previous dominant parties, the LP managed to attract party defectors through the promise of pork and privilege.

While the LP-led administration was able to pass several progressive socio-economic policies and legislations, it failed to fully implement its reform agenda, particularly with regard to political and electoral reforms (i.e. the political dynasty ban, freedom of information law, and political party development law, among others). The party succumbed to the necessity of money and patronage politics to ensure its stay in power. As a result, it lost its core voters and supporters, who shifted their support to illiberal populist Rodrigo R. Duterte. Soon afterwards, the LP (the ruling party from 2010 to 2016) was decimated by defection to the new ruling coalition supportive of the Duterte administration and, later, the resurgent Marcos administration.

Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban)

The PDP-Laban was forged in the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. Its earlier incarnation was a promising progressive political party rooted in social democratic ideology and organized by a cadre of seasoned activists. It was the first electoral party to require ideological training before accepting members. It was the de facto political party of Corazon Aquino during the 1986 snap presidential election and was the majority party in the early part of the Cory administration (1986–1992). It suffered its first major setback in 1991 when a major faction split to form a new party—the LDP.

The party was weakened for decades and became a minor player in Philippine politics until it successfully fielded Rodrigo Duterte to the presidency in the 2016 election. As in previous administrations, droves of national and local politicians switched parties to join the PDP-Laban. It won a dismal three seats in the House, but its number of House seats swelled to more than 200 to form a ‘supermajority’ after Duterte was elected president. In the 2019 midterm elections, the party won 4 national positions (senators) and 5,760 local positions (district representatives, governors, vice governors, mayors, vice mayors, and local legislators).

However, just like its predecessors, the dominant presidential party experienced a major factional split between the followers of President Duterte and those of Senator Aquilino ‘Koko’ Pimentel III (son of the party founder) and world boxing legend and senator Manny Pacquiao. Pacquiao ran for president in 2022. Currently, a big chunk of its remaining members switched to other political parties in pursuit of patronage.

Lakas Christian-Muslim Democrats (Lakas CMD)

The Lakas Christian-Muslim Democrats (Lakas CMD) was the country’s dominant party from 1992 to 2010. The party was founded in 1991 as a merger between the Lakas ng EDSA (Power of EDSA) and the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD). Later it also absorbed the Union of Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (UMDP) to form the Lakas NUCD-UMDP ( Teehankee 2020a ).

For the 2010 presidential elections, Arroyo engineered the merger of Lakas with her original party Kampi to form the Lakas Kampi CMD (LKC). The party was decimated and weakened by party switching due to its devastating defeat in the 2010 presidential elections. In the 2019 midterm elections, the party won 1 national position (senator) and 680 local positions (district representatives, governors, vice governors, mayors, vice mayors, and local legislators). The party used to be one of the ideological parties in the country advocating Christian-Muslim democracy. It has lost its ideological integrity through the years and has deteriorated into a patronage-based machine party.

Leyte representative Ferdinand Martin Romualdez, a nephew of former First Lady Imelda Marcos, assumed the presidency of Lakas CMD in 2013. Romualdez has been a high-profile party member since the administration of former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Under Romualdez’s leadership, the party that was inspired by the spirit of the 1986 EDSA people-power revolution supported the vice-presidential candidacy of Bongbong Marcos in 2016. Lakas CMD has become a close ally of the Duterte administration and a principal endorser of the alliance between Bongbong Marcos and Sara Duterte in the 2022 election. Romualdez was eventually elected House Speaker under the second Marcos presidency. Since 2022, Lakas CMD benefitted the most from massive party switching to regain its position as the most dominant party in the country.

Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC)

There were several attempts to revive the moribund NP in the early post-Marcos period. The post-Marcos NP was divided into four factions. Attempts were made to unify all factions of the NP in 1991. These attempts failed because of the ambitions of the faction leaders to be the NP presidential nominee in the 1992 presidential election. One of the factions, led by billionaire politician and Marcos crony Eduardo Cojuangco, formed the NPC ( Teehankee 2020a ).

The NPC has maintained its strength and number of elected national and local officials and has consistently served as a junior partner to most presidential administrations. Ideologically, it can be considered as a right-wing conservative party. The party is now identified with Cojuangco’s protégé, Filipino-Chinese billionaire Ramon Ang. Currently, it is the third-largest party in the country. In the 2019 midterm elections, the party won 1 national position (senator) and 1,908 local positions (district representatives, governors, vice governors, mayors, vice mayors, and local legislators).

National Unity Party (NUP)

The NUP was formed in 2010 by members of the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Partner of the Free Filipino abbreviated to Kampi, Tagalog for ‘ally’). Kampi was founded by former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and was merged with the Lakas CMD to form the Lakas Kampi CMD in 2010. Soon after it failed to win the 2010 presidential elections, the merged party split into three factions ( Teehankee 2020a ).

Members of the original Kampi then formed the NUP and allied with the winning coalition. Like the NPC, it has become a reliable junior partner of incumbent administrations. The party is said to be supported by billionaire Spanish-Filipino Enrique Razon, Jr—the second richest man in the Philippines. In the 2019 midterm elections, the party won 1,376 local positions (district representatives, governors, vice governors, mayors, vice mayors, and local legislators).

Citizen–Party Linkage

Citizen participation is a fundamental cornerstone of democracy. Political parties serve as vehicles for citizens to engage with and reconnect with democratic institutions and processes. Regrettably, Philippine politics is characterized by a lack of citizen–party linkage. Due to the country’s lack of party cohesion, political parties regularly break and combine into ad hoc alliances, displacing ‘democratic accountability’ in favour of ‘clientelistic accountability’. Clientelistic accountability ‘represents a transaction, the direct exchange of citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services’ ( Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007 : 2).

Political parties in the Philippines are personality-based organizations primarily organized around dominant local political clans and warlords; they are anchored in clientelistic, parochial, and personal inducements rather than in issues, ideologies, and party platforms ( Teehankee 2015 ). In the Philippines, party membership is transient, fleeting, and momentary, as the majority of political parties are active only during election season. There is no way to collect reliable data on party membership because political parties and the COMELEC do not keep accurate records.

All relevant parties have a national territorial scope. Political parties at the national level are organized at the regional or provincial level. Local political parties have branches at the city or municipal level. Ordinary party members have little influence over party decisions, typically made by higher-level party organs such as a national executive committee or national directorate comprising a select group of party leaders and personalities ( Teehankee 2012 ).

Party members elected to both chambers of Congress or local government positions, or appointed to cabinet or sub-cabinet positions, are typically appointed to higher party organs. On paper, all relevant party constitutions designate the party congress, national assembly, or a variation thereof as their respective parties’ highest decision-making body. However, in practice, major decisions are made by a smaller group of party leaders and party bodies called the national executive committee or national directorate. The party’s daily operations are typically overseen by the secretary-general or executive director ( Teehankee 2012 ).

Party Financing

Parties, and particularly their electoral campaigns, are primarily funded by private donors, usually from the business sector. The state does not finance or subsidize political parties. Since 2003, the House has debated a proposed ‘Political Development Party Act’, which aims to promote political party institutionalization in the Philippines by addressing four critical reform issues: campaign finance reform, state subsidy to political parties, a prohibition on party switching, and strengthening citizen–party ties ( Teehankee 2015 ).

Existing election laws regulate only campaign expenditures and contributions and do not require political parties to file financial reports outside of the campaign period. Most, if not all, political parties do not collect dues from their rank-and-file members. Frequently, elected party members with access to state funds bear the burden of financing the party’s day-to-day operations (i.e. pork barrel). Additionally, it is not uncommon for individual politicians who are viable presidential candidates to finance a political party’s entire operation ( Teehankee 2012 ).

Almost all major political parties are financed through campaign donations and membership dues collected from elected members. The mainstream parties have made arrangements with their elected members to deduct part of their salaries automatically. Usually, the non-elected rank-and-file members are not required to pay party dues and are subsidized by their party leaders. The three top political parties are identified with the three Forbes-listed billionaires in the country: Manny Villar with NP, Ramon Ang with NPC, and NUP with Enrique Razon, Jr.

Multimedia Communication Strategies

Given the physical, financial, and logistical impossibility of encountering the electorate personally during a national campaign in the Philippines, the media have emerged as the most efficient and cost-effective means for political party candidates to communicate with the public. The broadcast media (radio and television) have surpassed newspapers and magazines as the primary source of news and information for the general public. Broadcast media, which reach millions of people, have largely displaced print media, circulating in the hundreds of thousands. While broadcast media have the broadest reach, they also tend to lack substance as everything is reduced to two- or three-sentence sound bites. On the other hand, print media allow for extensive explanations ( Teehankee 2010 ).

Within broadcast media, television has supplanted radio as the primary source of mass information. The rise of digital and social media is another emerging trend. Due to the exorbitant cost of political radio and television advertising for most candidates, the internet in general and social media in particular have become more cost-effective alternatives ( Teehankee 2010 ). Rodrigo Duterte was the first to successfully utilize social media in a presidential campaign in the Philippines. Given the initial weakness of his political party, the PDP-Laban, his campaign depended on social media to boost his candidacy. Among the presidential candidates who used social media campaigning, Duterte’s online presence was the most aggressive and intense, even using trolls and fake accounts. Moreover, Duterte’s supporters were not only committed to their candidate online but also offline. They were consistently part of the huge crowds who attended his political campaigns and rallies. ( Sinpeng et al. 2020 ).

Summary Evaluation

Philippine political parties ‘remain to be candidate-driven alliances of provincial bosses, political machines, and local clans, based on clientelistic, parochial, and personal inducements rather than on causes, ideologies, and party programs’ ( Teehankee 2012 ). The factionalized nature of Philippine party politics is both a cause and effect of the political parties’ lack of institutionalization. Since the founding of the first Filipino political party in 1900, many political parties have come and gone. Nonetheless, the institutionalization of political parties in the country remains weak and underdeveloped.

Philippine elections continue to be patronage-driven rather than policy- or ideology-driven, in the sense that the provision of material benefits is the primary resource of politicians for courting votes. Patronage provisions include various activities, such as pork barrelling, casework, and vote-buying ( Kasuya 2009 ). Political parties in the Philippines have essentially been an amalgamation of vote-generating machines oriented towards putting their leaders in government, gaining access to patronage, and generally securing the benefits of public office. The weakness of political parties has promoted the mobilization of pork barrel and other state patronage by presidential administrations to push for their legislative agenda in Congress.

The passage of the long-delayed Political Party Development Act might help mitigate some of the weaknesses of the party system, such as money politics, constant party switching, and weak citizen–party linkages. The legislation of the constitutional provision banning political dynasties will also facilitate a level playing field. Unfortunately, these important pieces of legislation have not yet been passed by Congress. In the long term, a constitutional review should seriously study the institutional effects of the presidential form of government on the party system and consider the feasibility of switching to a more party-oriented parliamentary system.

Halfway into the second Marcos presidency, the various political parties in the Philippines began their ritual of splitting and merging in anticipation of the 2025 midterm elections. Already, the de facto ruling party Lakas CMD has been shaken by a leadership struggle between House Speaker Romualdez and former president Arroyo. The feud resulted in the sudden resignation of the party chair, Vice President Sara Duterte, who is a known close Arroyo ally. On the other hand, the president’s original party in the 2022 election—the PFP—has actively been recruiting party switchers into its ranks. Unfortunately, these political realignments reinforce the continuing ‘anarchy of parties’ in the country.

The author acknowledges the research assistance of Ivan Harris Tanyag and Davijay Leighton Engay for this chapter.

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Civil Society, Political Alliance-Building, and Democratization in the Philippines: An Instructive Example for the MENA Region?

Jasmin Lorch

The MENA and Southeast Asia regions have undergone and continue to undergo massive political transitions.  Differences in the process and outcomes of their transitions can be viewed through the lens of a “civil society infrastructure” and the qualitative differences in both these regions. This essay series engages a variety of issues regarding the roles and impact of civil society organizations (CSOs) in these two regions during the transition and pre-transition periods as well as in instances where the political transition is completed.  Read more ...  

Democratization in the Philippines is often considered the textbook example of a democratic transition that was brought about by civil society activism. In February 1986, popular demonstrations commonly referred to as People Power were followed by the crumbling of the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos. [1] Starting from the late 1980s, civil society representatives, including NGO leaders, leftist activists, and public intellectuals, have occupied influential positions in successive democratic governments, which has allowed them to contribute to the formulation of reformist laws and policies. [2] A closer look reveals, however, that Philippine civil society actors have been able to exert this level of political influence only because they have forged alliances with powerful, and sometimes highly controversial, political elites, including traditional political families, established political dynasties with access to land and economic wealth, populists, and even the military.  

Civil Society Influence and Political Alliance-Building in the Philippines

Much of the literature on civil society assumes that civil society is a sphere that is highly autonomous from the state, the family, and the market and that this autonomy constitutes an essential precondition for civil society groups to realize their political potential. [3] The case of the Philippines contradicts this assumption. On closer inspection, the fall of Marcos, after massive popular demonstrations on Metro Manila’s Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), can be traced to a complex process of political coalition-building in which not only civil society but also the powerful Catholic Church, the business community, and the traditional political elite played a vital role. [4] Moreover, alongside peaceful demonstrations, a military mutiny staged by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) also played a key role in Marcos’ fall. Military intervention thus constituted “the dark side of EDSA.” [5]

In the post-authoritarian period, civil society actors as different as NGOs, liberal democratic organizations, and leftist associations, with (former) ties to the Communist underground, have joined highly fluid and ideologically broad-based electoral coalitions and supported the electoral campaigns of traditional political elites, former military officers, and populists—a pattern that Abinales has called “coalition politics.” [6] Where such electoral coalitions have been successful in bringing a candidate to power, civil society activists who played an important role in mobilizing support for the latter’s electoral campaign have often been appointed to high-level decision-making posts. In particular, civil society representatives have held positions in successive Presidential Cabinets. [7] This “cross-over leadership,” as the phenomenon has become known locally as well as internationally, [8] has allowed civil society leaders to act as heads of important state agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) or the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), thereby enabling them to enhance the quality of social services provided by the state. [9] In an interview, a prominent leftist civil society leader described this strategy of political alliance-building as “political judo,” or, in other words, as a way to use the strength of civil society’s adversaries from the political elite to achieve political objectives defined by civil society. [10]

Since donor support to civil society dwindled from the late 1990s onwards, various civil society actors have also used the strategies of political alliance-building and “cross-over leadership” in order to get access to state resources. For instance, civil society groups with representatives or allies in the bureaucracy or the parliament have often been more likely to benefit from development projects contracted out by the state, or from so-called “pork barrel funds,” priority development funds allocated by the president to loyal supporters in Congress. Various civil society actors have thus become involved in patron-client ties, and, in some cases, quarrels over particularistic spoils and preferential access to state resources have led to serious conflicts and frictions between and among civil society groups. [11]

In 2001, the Philippines saw a reprise of People Power when an ideologically broad-based spectrum of civil society groups, including development NGOs, leftist activists, and liberal democratic groups, mobilized large-scale demonstrations to demand the ouster of populist President Josef Estrada on corruption charges. [12] The protests swept to power Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), a member of the traditional political elite. Despite its success, People Power II caused serious frictions within the national civil society, given that Estrada’s ruling coalition had been supported by prominent civil society leaders as well. [13] Moreover, the ouster of Estrada was highly problematic from a democratic point of view, given that he had come to power on a broad electoral mandate, leading Thompson to speak of “uncivil” society in the Philippines. [14] This appears all the more justified if one considers the role played by the army in making EDSA II succeed. Notably, it was only when the Chief of the Army Staff withdrew his support from Estrada that the latter finally fell, leading to categorizations of the ESDSA II demonstrations as a “civilian-military uprising,” [15] or as an uprising that had “equal ingredients of civilian and military participation.” [16]

Philippine People Power and the Role of the Military

As can be seen from the elaborations above, both in 1986 and in 2001, People Power in the Philippines required a substantial military component to succeed. [17] Moreover, with regard to the way how military intervention in the Philippines has sometimes been perceived in the light of the historical experiences of EDSA I and EDSA II, Spaeth has argued that one of the “unintended and unfortunate legacies of People Power (has been) that a coup, popular or otherwise, is considered a legitimate―glorious even―way to transfer power.” [18] This has had severe negative repercussions on the prospects for democratic consolidation in general and the long-term democratic potential of civil society in particular.

The concept of a “Coup Cum Revolution” has been floating within restive military circles since the first People Power revolt, with several rebellious military groups that succeeded the RAM, such as the Young Officers Union (YOU) and, more recently, the Magdalo group, trying to re-create EDSA for the purpose of toppling elected governments. [19] On 24 February 2006, the twentieth anniversary of the first EDSA uprising, the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) foiled an attempted Coup Cum Revolution plotted by rebel military officers against the government of Arroyo. [20] Some prominent civil society actors, including public intellectuals, NGO leaders, leftist activists and even members of the Catholic Church, reportedly supported the attempt to oust the President with the help of the military. [21] The local weekly Newsbreak accused the civilian groups involved in the endeavor of “romancing the military.” [22] Popular protests planned at different places in Metro Manila failed to draw large crowds and were quickly quelled by security forces loyal to Arroyo, [23] showcasing an increasing divide between many elitist civil society leaders and the broader society. Some civil society leaders were also present during the Manila Peninsula Rebellion. [24] During this other military uprising against Arroyo, junior rebel officers belonging to the Magdalo group laid siege to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in the capital’s financial district of Makati, hoping that their intervention would snowball into a reprise of “People Power”. [25]

Civil Society in the Philippines: An Instructive Example for the MENA Region?

The Philippines and the countries of the MENA region differ greatly in terms of their historical legacies as well as their cultural and religious conditions. Nevertheless, reflecting on the possible implications of the Philippine experience for the MENA region appears worthwhile, given that the Arab Spring has led to renewed academic enthusiasm about the presumed role that civil society mobilization may be able to play in processes of democratic transition. [26] Concurrently, “Western” development assistance to civil society in the MENA region and the broader Middle East has also been on the rise since the Arab Spring. [27]

If the case of the Philippines is any measure, civil society actors rely on strategic alliances with political elites in order to be able to exert profound political influence, and popular demonstrations led by civil society are dependent on at least tacit military support to succeed. A cursory look at the MENA region shows a rather similar pattern. During the Arab Spring, civilian protests toppled authoritarian regimes only in those countries where the military chose not to crack down, or even sided with the protesters. [28] In Tunisia, the most frequently cited success story of the Arab Spring, the armed forces refused orders by Ben Ali to open fire on unarmed demonstrators. The military then moved to protect the protesting crowds from security forces loyal to the President, thus actively contributing to the removal of the authoritarian regime. [29] In Egypt, the military enabled the success of the public protests against authoritarian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 by refusing to crack down on the demonstrators and terming the latter’s demands as legitimate. [30] In mid-2012, the Egyptian armed forces allowed for popular elections won by the Muslim Brotherhood, [31] but they moved to assume direct political control soon afterwards.

No regime change occurred in Algeria, even though the country did witness popular protests during the Arab Spring and even though its civil society was arguably more vibrant than Tunisian civil society under Ben Ali. [32] In early 2011, the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD), an alliance of civil society groups and political opposition parties, was organized and called for reforms. But it failed to achieve substantial democratic change, given that the opposition was internally divided and the military had a vital political and economic interest in preserving the existing political regime. [33] As Volpi has noted, Algeria’s system of entrenched “neopraetorianism” left “little chance for a protest-induced regime-change scenario in which the military stands by and lets a revolt run its course.” [34]

Under the current political system of durable authoritarian rule, some civil society actors establish working relations and personal connections with members of the ruling elite to realize concrete policy changes. Some women’s rights groups, for instance, engage with parliamentarians, state ministries, and members of the Cabinet to improve the political representation of women and change the country’s discriminatory Family Code. [35] In the run-up to the elections of 2014, presidential contender Ali Benflis as able to mobilize some degree of civil society support. [36] While Benflis promised political change and was a major opponent of incumbent President Bouteflika, he was clearly a member of the established political elite himself, having served as the country’s prime minister from 2000 to 2003. [37]

Moreover, the case of the Philippines also shows that a “post-people power system” can be highly unstable and prone to military interventions, [38] both in their purer forms and in the form of Coups Cum Revolution. In the MENA region, this pattern is particularly evident in the case of Egypt. In June 2013, and, thus, not even two and a half years after the ouster of Mubarak, the Egyptian military toppled elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and assumed direct political control, following considerable civil society mobilization. [39] In an article published in Foreign Affairs , Encarnación has compared the military intervention against Morsi to the toppling of Joseph Estrada in the Philippines through People Power II, as well as to the temporary military ouster of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, which occurred in 2002 after massive civil society mobilizations. According to Encarnación, all these three events constituted “civil society coups,” which, as he concludes, are “seldom, if ever, a good thing for democracy.” [40] Other authors have characterized the ouster of Morsi as a “Civil Society Coup,” [41] or as a “Coup Cum Revolution” [42] as well.

As shown above, the case of the Philippines also suggests that the strategy of political alliance-building can lead to severe fragmentations within civil society itself, [43] and that civil society groups who rely on state resources can easily become involved in patron-client ties. This finding may also be relevant for rentier economies in the MENA region and the broader Middle East, where the state acts as the main provider of resources and income for many. Again, the case of Algeria is telling in this regard. In a reaction to the Arab Spring, the Algerian regime in late 2012 issued a new Law on Associations, which severely curtails the ability of NGOs and other civil society organizations to receive foreign funding. [44] At the same time, the Algerian rentier state coopts and divides civil society groups with the help of selective financial allocations, usually in the form of annual subventions. [45] For instance, the regime uses particularistic financial allocations in order to create loyal “clones” of popular civil society associations, which it perceives as being too critical. [46] In addition to this, many Algerian civil society groups also experience tensions due to political affiliations, both actual and perceived. Some rights-based associations, for example, have reportedly split because some of their members have sympathized with opposing political parties. [47]

In sum, cursory evidence from the MENA region thus seems to confirm the finding from the Philippine case that forging alliances with political elites can enable civil society actors to gain access to valuable material resources and exert substantial political influence. However, whether such civil society influence is good or bad for democracy will depend on the particular types of power constellations and the specific political deals that civil society actors choose to enter into.

[1] For such a positive view on the role played by civil society in the democratization of the Philippines see, for example, Karina Constantino-David, “From the Present Looking Back: A History of Philippine NGOs,” in G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble (eds), Organizing for Democracy. NGOs, Civil Society, and the Philippine State (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), pp. 26-48; Aurel Croissant, “Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft in Ostasien,” Nord-S üd aktuell , Vol. 17, No. 2 (2003), pp. 239-260; G. Sidney Siliman and Lela  Garner Noble, “NGOs in Context. Introduction,” in G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble (eds), Organizing for Democracy (1998), pp. 3-25; Mary Racelis, “New Visions and Strong Actions: Civil Society in the Philippines,” in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (eds), Funding Virtue. Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), pp. 159-187.

[2] Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing. Inc., 2005),pp. 239ff.; David Lewis, “Crossing Boundaries between ‘Third Sector’ and State: life-work histories from the Philippines, Bangladesh and the UK,” Third World Quarterly , Vol. 29, No. 1 (2008), pp. 128ff.

[3] Michael Edwards, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); for a prominent example see Jean L. Cohen Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 1997).

[4] For superb elaborations on these processes of political coalition building see, for example, Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In the Name of Civil Society. From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines (Manila: Manila University Press, 2006); Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

[5] Yabes, Griselda 2009, The Boys from the Barracks. The Philippine Military After EDSA , Updated Edition, Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., p. 10. On the important role played by the military in the ouster of Marcos see also Miranda, Felipe B. and Ciron, Ruben F., 1987, ‘Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis’, in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong (eds), Soldiers and stability in Southeast Asia , Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 163f.; Selochan, Viberto 1991, ‘The Armed Forces of the Philippines and Political Instability’, in Viberto Selochan (ed.), The Military, State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific , Boulder, CO/London: Westview Press, pp. 97f.

[6] Patricio N. Abinales, “Coalition Politics in the Philippines,” Current History , Vol. 100, No. 645 (2001), pp. 154-161.

[7] Patricio N. Abinales, “Coalition Politics in the Philippines”; Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines   (2005), pp. 239f.; David Lewis, “Crossing Boundaries between ‘Third Sector’ and State” (2008), pp. 128ff.

[8] David Lewis “Crossing Boundaries between ‘Third Sector’ and State,” (2008), p. 128; interview with an international expert, Manila, September 28, 2009; interview with a scholar of the Atteneo de Manila University, Manila, October 14, 2009.

[9] Patricio N. Abinales and Dona J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (2005), pp. 239ff.; David Lewis, “Crossing Boundaries between ‘Third Sector’ and State” (2008), pp. 128ff.; interview with a well-known leftist civil society leader, October 9, 2009; interview with an NGO expert and scholar of the University of the Philippines, Manila, December 9,/2009.

[10] Interviews with a well-known leftist civil society leader, October 9, 2009 and December 1, 2009.

[11] For instance, struggles revolving around the leadership of the DAR and development projects financed by the agency have often led to conflicts within the civil society-based agrarian reform community. See interview with a well-known leftist civil society leader, October 9, 2009. Similarly, the creation of the Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC), a civil society group that aligned itself with a traditional political family in order to gain political influence and access “pork barrel funds” created serious rifts within many agrarian reform NGOs and peasant groups. See interviews with agrarian reform advocates, Manila and Baccolod, September to December 2009.

[12] See, for example, Jennifer C. Franco, “The Philippines. Fractious Civil Society and Competing Visions of Democracy,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Civil Society and Political Change in Asia. Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (2004), pp. 126ff.; Carl H. Landé, “The return of ‘People Power’ in the Philippines,” Journal of Democracy , Vol. 12, No. 2 (2001), pp. 88-102.

[13] See especially Jennifer C. Franco, “The Philippines. Fractious Civil Society and Competing Visions of Democracy (2004), pp. 126ff.

[14] Mark R. Thompson, “People Power Sours: Uncivil Society in Thailand and the Philippines,” Current History , Vol. 107, No. 712 (2008), pp. 381-387; for other critical assessments of the ouster of Estrada through People Power II see also Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In the Name of Civil Society (2006), pp. 167-186; Anthony Spaeth, Anthony, “Oops, We Did it Again,” TIME , January 29,.2001, http :// www . time . com / time / world / article /0,8599,2054385,00. html .

[15] Jennifer C. Franco, “The Philippines. Fractious Civil Society and Competing Visions of Democracy” (2004), p. 126.

[16] Griselda Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks (2009), p. 248.

[17] On this point see also Claudia Derichs and Mark R. Thompson, Dynasties and Female Political Leaders in Asia: Gender, Power and Pedigree (LIT Verlag, 2013), p. 175f.

[18] Anthony Spaeth, “Oops, We Did it Again” (2001).

[19] See especially Griselda Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks (2009); see also: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy. Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 141f.

[20] Marites Vitug and Glenda Glora, “Failed Enterprise,” Newsbreak , March 27, 2006, pp.12-14; Miriam Grace A. Go, Aries Rufo , et al ., “Romancing the Military,” Newsbreak , March 27, 2006, pp.18-21.

[21] Miriam Grace A. Go, Aries Rufo , et al ., “Romancing the Military,” Newsbreak , March 27, 2006; Sonny Melencio, “The February ‘Coup d’Etat’ and the Left’s alliance with the Military,” Socialistworldnet , October 30, 2006,  http :// www . socialistworld . net / print /2483 . Interviews with civil society leaders who, according to their own accounts, supported the ouster of Arroyo with the help of the military, Manila, September to December, 2009; interview with a Catholic scholar, Manila, October 2009; interview with an international expert with a long working experience in the Philippines, Manila, September 2009; interview with an General of the Philippine Marines, who played an important role in foiling the February 2006 coup attempt, Manila, November 11, 2009; interview with a military expert, Manila, December 7, 2009.

[22] Grace A. Go, Aries Rufo , et al ., “Romancing the Military” (2006).

[23] See, for example, Sheila S. Coronel, “The Philippines in 2006: Democracy and Its Discontents,” Asian Survey , Vol. 47, No. 1 (2007), pp. 175-182.

[24] Thea Alberto, “Released Manila Pen civilians form new group,” Philippine Daily Inquirer , December 13, 2007, http :// www . inquirer . net / specialreports / makatistandoff / view . php ? db =1& article =20071213-106690 ; interview with a civil society leader arrested during the Manila Pen Rebellion, Manila, December 4, 2009; interviews with a civil society activist present during the Manila Pen Rebellion, Manila, September to December 2009; interview with a leading rebel military officer involved in the Manila Pen Rebellion, Manila, December 14, 2009.

[25] Inquirer Bureaus,”Manila Pen Caper. Elsewhere, local gov’t troops choked off support for Trillanes,” Philippine Daily Inquirer , December 1, 2007; and interview with a leading rebel military officer involved in the Manila Pen Rebellion, Manila, December 14, 2009.

[26] Francesco Cavatorta, Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview (Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean [IEMed], 2012), http :// www . iemed . org / observatori - en / arees - danalisi / arxius - adjunts / anuari / med .2012/ Cavatorta _ en . pdf . See also Joel D. Adriano, “Lessons in misguided people power,” Asia Times Online , February 24, 2011.

[27] Timo Behr and Aaretti Siitonen, Aaretti, Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement after the Arab Spring , The Finish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) Working Paper, January 2013, p.4.

[28] Daniel Silverman, The Arab Military in the Arab Spring: Agent of Continuity or Change? A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria , APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, ULR: http :// politicalscience . osu . edu / intranet / cprw / Silverman %20 CPRW %202012. pdf , accessed 08/07/2015.

[29] Ibid., pp. 2; 9f.

[30] Ibid., pp.10f.

[32] Frédéric Volpi, “Algeria versus the Arab Spring,,” Journal of Democracy , Vol. 24, No. 3 (2013), pp. 107ff.; with reference to Jack Brown’s observations on the strength of civil society in Algeria and Tunisia respectively.

[33] Frédéric Volpi, “Algeria versus the Arab Spring” (2013) pp. 207-212.

[34] Ibid., p.112.

[35] Interviews with women’s rights groups in Algiers, September 2014 and March 2015.

[36] Karim Aimeur, “Ça bouge du côté de Benflis,” l ’Expression , November 27, http :// www . lexpressiondz . com / actualite /185211- ca - bouge - du - cote - de - benflis . html ; “Des militants du FLN et la société civile appellent Ali Benflis, ” El Watan ,November 18, 2013, http :// www . djazairess . com / fr / elwatan /435447 ; Wael Hasnaoui, “Algérie: La société civile s’est réveillée,” Le Monde , April 17, 2014, http :// www . lemonde . fr / idees / article /2014/04/17/ algerie - la - societe - civile - s - est - reveillee _4403210_3232. html .

[37] Isabelle Mandraud, “En Algérie, Ali Benflis, l’homme du changement » issu du sérail,” Le Monde , April 3, 2014, http :// www . lemonde . fr / afrique / article /2014/04/03/ ali - benflis - l - homme - du - changement - issu - du - serail _4394814_3212. html .

[38] Joel D. Adriano, “Lessons in misguided people power” (2011).

[39] Thomas Demmelhuber, “Kann ein Putsch demokratisch sein? Normativer Etikettenschwindel in Ägypten,” Zeitschrift f ür Politikwissenschaft , 61 (January2014); W.J. Dorman, “Egypt’s ‘civil society coup’ and the resilience of the post-1952 order,” openDemocracy , October 10, 2013, http :// www . opendemocracy . net / arab - awakening / wj - dorman / egypts - civil - society - coup - and - resilience - of - post -1952- order .

[40] Omar G. Encarnación, “Even Good Coups Are Bad. Lessons for Egypt from Venezuela, the Philippines, and Beyond,” Foreign Affairs (July 2013), http :// www . foreignaffairs . com / articles /139570/ omar - encarnacion / even - good - coups - are - bad .

[41] W.J. Dorman, “Egypt’s ‘civil society coup’ and the resilience of the post-1952 order” (2013).

[42] Islam Al Tayeb, “Fallout for Turkey over events in Egypt,” IISS Voices , November 22, 2013, https :// www . iiss . org / en / iiss %20 voices / blogsections / iiss - voices -2013-1 e 35/ november -2013-1 d 99/ fallout - for - turkey - over - events - in - egypt -2 e 2 e ; Bessma Monami, “Morsi’s Last, Lonely Days in Power,” Opencanada.org , July 9, 2013, http :// opencanada . org / features / blogs / roundtable / morsis - last - lonely - days - in - power / .

[43] On this point see also Jennifer C. Franco, “The Philippines. Fractious Civil Society and Competing Visions of Democracy” (2004).

[44] Human Rights Watch, Algeria: Bureaucratic Ploy Used to Stiffle Accociations. Billed as Reformist, 2012 Law Hindering Independent Groups (2013), https :// www . hrw . org / news /2014/03/30/ algeria - bureaucratic - ploys - used - stifle - associations .

[45] Interviews with civil society associations in Algiers and Oran, September 2014 and March 2015. See also Andres Liverani, Civil Society in Algeria. The political functions of associational life (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

[46] Interview with a local scholar, Algiers, September 14, 2014; interview with an independent journalist, Oran, September 11, 2014.

[47] Interviews with civil society associations, Algiers, March 2015.

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