essay on naxalism in india

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Naxalism in India: Causes, Government Response & its Outcomes

From Current Affairs Notes for UPSC » Editorials & In-depths » This topic

Left-wing extremism has been a major threat to India since the 1960s. Many of these militant groups, for many years, had held the mineral-rich lands under their influence. Both the states and Central government, through a series of measures, had significantly improved their presence in the Naxal-infested regions. Currently, these militant groups are only operating in a few isolated regions. However, they still pose a substantial threat to India’s national security.

What is Naxalism?

• The term Naxalism derives the name of the Naxalbari village in West Bengal where a peasant revolt took place against local landlords who had beaten up a peasant over a land dispute in 1967.
• The Naxalites are considered to be the far-left communists who support Mao Zedong’s political ideology.
• Initially, the Naxalite movement originated in West Bengal and had later moved to the less developed rural areas in Southern and Eastern India, including in the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana.
• Some Naxalite groups have legal organisations as representatives in the parliament like the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti.
• As of April 2018, the states where Naxalites are most visible are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha and Telangana.

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How did it come to be?

• Maoist movement in India is among the longest and most deadly insurgencies that originated in India.
• While the origins of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in India goes back to Telangana peasant rebellion (1946-51), the movement was at its peak in 1967, when the peasants, landless labourers, and Adivasis raided the granaries of a landlord in the Naxalbari village in West Bengal.
• This rebellion was suppressed by the police force, which consequently led to the Naxalite movement under the leadership of Charu Majumdar and his close associates, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal.
• These rebels not only were assisted by the people from nearby villages but also from the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese Media had called this movement the “Spring Thunder”.
• The movement initially took inspiration from China’s founding father, Mao Zedong, but had later become radically different from Maoism.
• In the following decades, the movement had later spread to other regions in the country.
• Most notably, in the 1980s, Andhra Pradesh saw the formation of People’s War Group (PWG) under the leadership of Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, which fought for the cause of peasants and the landless through a series of violent attacks, assassinations, and the bombing of Andhra Pradesh’s landlords, upper-caste leaders, and politicians.
• In the late 1990s, Andhra Pradesh police had decimated the PWG. However, this did not end the insurgency problem in India as it had spread across the nearby Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and parts of Maharashtra.
• In 2004, the merging of the Communist Party of India (Maoist-Leninist), PWG, Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and 40 other armed factions under the Communist Party of India (Maoist) had turned the tide in favour of the insurgents.
• Before this, the Maoists were relatively a minor force, separately operating within four states – Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Andhra Pradesh. They were so fragmented that there were even instances of conflicts and killing between these groups.
• The 2004 merger of the two major Maoist factions had led to the strategic breakthrough, allowing the insurgents to enhance their strength, spatial spread, and firepower.
• This movement had eventually spread across such vast geography that it had surpassed all other insurgent groups in India, including in the Jammu and Kashmir and the North East.
• In 2006, they controlled more than 200 districts across the country.
• The insurgents had rapidly enhanced their firepower, arms, ammunition, and cadre with improved expertise.
• In a short span of time, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PGLA), the armed wing of the CPI (Maoist) had nurtured 20,000 regular cadres who were armed with automatic weapons, shoulder rocket launchers, mines, and other explosive devices, etc.
• They are experts at making and deploying high-end bombs and some reports even claim that they have set up manufacturing centres for weapons like rocket launchers.
• By the mid-2000s, the Maoists had managed to create full-fledged administrative and military infrastructures in the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Bihar, and West Bengal.
• The improvement in the financial resources had significantly enhanced their ability to buy weapons, attract recruits and modernise communication warfare systems including the use of Information and communication technology.
• The worst of the recent attacks by these groups include the Chintalnar massacre of 76 soldiers in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district in April 2010 and the assassination of top leaders of the Congress Party in Chattisgarh’s Jerram Ghati area in Sukma district in May 2013.

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What are the causes of Naxalism?

• Forest mismanagement was one of the main causes of the spread of Naxalism. It originated during the time of British administration when new laws were passed to ensure the monopolisation of the forest resources. Following the globalisation in the 1990s, the situation worsened when the government increased the exploitation of the forest resources. This led the traditional forest dwellers to fight for their aspirations against the government through violence.
• Haphazard tribal policy implementation , marginalisation, and displacement of the tribal communities worsened the situation of Naxalism.
• The increase in the interregional and intraregional differences and inequalities led to people choosing Naxalism. Naxal-groups mostly consist of the poor and the deprived like the anglers, small farmers, daily labourers, etc. The government policies have failed to address this issue.
• Lack of industrialisation , poor infrastructure growth and unemployment in rural areas led to disparity among the people living in these areas. This has led to an anti-government mindset among the locals in the isolated villages.
• The poor implementation of the land reforms has not yielded the necessary results. India’s agrarian set up is characterised by the absence of proper surveys and other details. Due to this reason, it has greatly damaged the rural economy and anti-government sentiments were high among those who were deprived and exploited by the local landowners.
• Forest cover in India is the main area of operation for these groups. The government is facing difficulties while dealing with the insurgents due to the lack of accessibility to these areas.
• The unemployed youth in India is one of the major supporters of the Naxalism movement. This group mostly consists of medical and engineering graduates. The universities have become one of the major breeding grounds for radical ideologies.

How did the government respond to it?

State governments:

• States’ response to the Maoist insurgency has evolved over the years, influenced by the intensity of the threat and political decisions at the state and centre.
• Since the law and order come under the state list, the critical counterinsurgency initiatives come under the jurisdiction of the State governments.
• The Centre is involved in supporting these efforts through joint strategies, providing resources, intelligence, and coordination when necessary.

Andhra Pradesh:

The undivided Andhra Pradesh saw the rise of PWG in the early 1990s. The state government’s response to this insurgent group includes:

• The rapid modernisation of the police force
• Launch of full-scale counterinsurgency operations and massive crackdown of key Maoist leaders in the state
• After the short-term strategic defensive stage, the Maoist group scaled back on its operations in 2004.
• In 2004, the government reduced its counterinsurgency operations and engaged in negotiations with the insurgent leaders.
• The failure of talks led to the relaunch of the offensive.
• The elite combat force, the Greyhounds, was used between 2004 and 2007 to successfully crack down the top Maoist leaders.
• The state had also quashed mass organisation activities by using civilian “vigilante” groups that had been carefully encouraged through the attractive Surrender and Rehabilitation package.
• The government also gained public trust and reduced the insurgent groups’ popularity through developmental projects and welfare programmes to all, including the tribal communities.
• The AP government had also provided healthcare, education , clean drinking water, pucca houses with sanitation facilities, electricity, roads, etc to all villages within three years while also providing Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.
• These measures had made the state government more popular than that of the left-wing extremist groups operating in the area.
• Thus, through the combination of police action and developmental programmes, the state government has successfully addressed the problem of left-wing extremism in the state.

Chhattisgarh:

• Today, Chhattisgarh is the epicentre of Maoist insurgency in India.
• At its peak, these groups had influenced over 18 districts out of the total 27.
• This state is the home for the so-called Red Corridor and these regions are believed to be intensively mined by the Maoists.
• The worst of the attacks in this area include the Chintalnar massacre of 76 CRPF soldiers in 2010 and the assassination of the top political leaders in 2013.
• In the initial years of the creation of Chhattisgarh as a separate state, it saw the political support to the insurgent groups leading to them expanding their base and firepower.
• Later, the government took various steps including the nurturing and strengthening of the vigilante group, popularly known as Salwa Judum and creating a local militia called Special Police Officers (SPOs) comprising of rebels and local youth.
• However, this strategy resulted in mass displacement and killing of the tribal communities who were caught between the two factions.
• In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the vigilante group was illegal and ordered the state government to disband it.
• After this incident, the state government focused on strengthening and modernising the security forces, intelligence, and combat infrastructure, particularly establishing an anti-insurgency training school for the police.
• It had also adopted a Surrender and Rehabilitation policy and had passed the Chhattisgarh Special Public Securities Act, 2006, which expanded the purview of the “unlawful” activities to verbal or oral communications.
• The roads and communication networks were also improved in the challenging terrains and the government had also launched the pioneering socio-economic schemes for the poor.
• While Maoist-led violence remains a major concern in the northern parts of Chhattisgarh, progress has been made in restricting Maoists in the state’s southern districts.
• Improvement in road connectivity, enhancement of combat capability of the local police through modernisation and fortification of the police stations and improved coordination between the Centre and the state in intelligence and paramilitary force has significantly reduced the Maoist threat.
• Jharkhand is the second most affected by the LWE after Chhattisgarh.
• At their peak in 2000, the rebels held about 20 districts across the state.
• Initially, the state government attempted negotiations with these groups. Its failure led to the formation of special force (Jharkhand Jaguar modelled after the Greyhounds of AP) and initiation of anti-Naxal operations.
• The state government had also framed a unique surrender policy for the Naxalites.
• The most crucial operation for Jharkhand’s state forces was the ambitious plan to recapture the forested region of Saranda, which had been a Maoist stronghold since the early 2000s.
• Together with central forces, the state launched Operation Anaconda to counter Maoists operating in Saranda.
• After its success in 2011, the Centre had immediately framed the Saranda Development Plan in 2012.
• The success of the Saranda strategy prompted the state government to expand the focus area approach to free more of such locations and undertake developmental projects.
• The government has so far taken control over 40 camps and freed 13 focus areas from Maoist influence.
• Currently, the government is heavily investing in the construction of infrastructure projects like roads, bridges, schools, etc.
• The past years saw a decline in the Maoist incidents in this state.
• The year 2018 had the lowest number of Maoist incidents.
• Furthermore, a large number of rebels are surrendering – as many as 108 in 2018 alone.
• While at their strongest, the Naxalites in Jharkhand held 13 districts under their control. Now, only hold four districts.
• The success is attributed to the state government’s efforts and factionalism within the Maoists’ ranks.
• However, this does not mean the LWE is completely eliminated. There still exist active rebel hotspots across the state.

West Bengal:

• West Bengal, the birthplace of the 1967 Naxalite uprisings, had witnessed an unprecedented rise in Maoist insurgency a decade ago.
• The state government had taken a series of military actions in the late 1960s and the early 1970s to deal with these insurgent groups.
• Yet, in the late 1990s, the Maoists had managed to revive their hold and had spread across the state.
• By the early 2000s, the CPI-Maoists had control over 18 districts and played a crucial role in fuelling agitations in many of them.
• Initially, the state government’s response was inconsistent and reluctant to cooperate with the Centre and other states.
• However, due to the intensity of the violence, the state government indulged in serious counterinsurgency campaigns.
• In 2009, the state government had banned various left-wing extremist groups and had created Special Battalion to deal with the insurgency in the state.
• Later, the government adopted a 3-pronged counterinsurgency strategy.
• First, the government refurbished the security strategy by setting up an elite police team to pursue the rebel leaders.
• Second, the government offered to surrender and rehabilitation package to the rebels, promising jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities to those who surrendered.
• The third was the formation of comprehensive confidence-building measures with the people living in the Maoist-infested Jangalmaha region.
• The government had combined two components to quash the left extremists:
• Political outreach
• Welfare programme and developmental schemes.
• To strengthen the intelligence and police combing operation, the government had actively incentivised the local youth to serve as informants and formed the so-called Special Police Officers (similar to vigilante groups in other Naxal-affected states.
• The political outreach and welfare programmes had greatly strengthened the government’s presence in the neglected regions like the tribal villages.
• From a peak of 425 Maoist-related violent incidents in 2010, the number had come down to zero by the end of 2018.
• The government had even successfully negotiated with several rebels, including top leaders to make them surrender to the police.
• This state has only one district (Jhargram), which remains under the category of “highly affected” by the insurgency.
• In the late 1990s, Odisha saw a rapid spurt in the LWE, especially in the most backward regions consisting of large tribal populations.
• At one point in the late 2000s, the Maoists influenced 22 of the 30 districts of Odisha.
• The hotspots of the Maoist activities were the most backward and forested, mineral-rich districts which had a large number of tribal population.
• The intensity of the attacks by the groups was so bad that a large number of people died, properties were destroyed, government systems were paralysed and the economic activities were disrupted.
• The insurgents had also fuelled protests against several projects on the issues of land acquisition and mining rights.
• Initially, the state government had negotiated and even allowed a rally in the capital. However, this did not yield the intended results.
• 2008 saw the worst of the insurgent attacks in the region, leading to the government’s rapid measures to address the issue.
• The government had immediately fortified the police stations, provided training to the police officers and announced, the necessary incentive package to the police personnel involved in the anti-Maoist operations.
• It had also trained thousands of tribal youth from the insurgency-affected areas to recruit them as Special Police Officers (SPOs).
• The state also opened a training school in each of the 7 police ranges, supplemented by 17 battalions of Central forces stationed in key Naxal-affected districts.
• Apart from law and order measures, developmental activities and political outreach were also undertaken to gain popular support in the insurgent-affected areas.
• This included land entitlements to the tribal communities across several Naxal-infested districts.
• Odisha also came up with the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy to address core issues related to land acquisition and displacement.
• Over time, the state government had achieved progress in managing the LWE in the mineral-rich regions though there are occasional attacks from these factions.
• As per the statistics, the Maoist related incidents has declined from 42 in 2016 to 9 in 2017.
• Between 2015 and 2016, more than 1,000 Maoists have surrendered to the police.
• Currently, only 8 districts remain “worst affected”.
• Bihar is among the few states where the LWE took deep root in the 1970s.
• At their peak, the Maoists enjoyed widespread popularity among the poor and the marginalised.
• The cause for this includes the failed land reforms, caste feuds and the rich suppressing the poor.
• These rebel groups had merged, leading them to become more powerful.
• In the 2000s, the rebels had extended their base to North Bihar that has borders with Nepal.
• In 2005, the state government took steps to restore law and order.
• There was an improvement in governance and the government undertook various socio-economic and developmental initiatives.
• The jailbreak and the release of 394 convicts by the insurgents had led to the state government’s greater emphasis on the anti-Naxal campaign.
• The government had set up 400-member Special Task Force along with Special Auxiliary Police for counterinsurgency operations.
• It had also established specialised counterinsurgency training schools to improve the combat operation skills of the security personnel.
• Additionally, it had fortified the long and porous Nepal border through improved infrastructure and surveillance to address other illegal activities like fake currency, drug trafficking, etc.
• The state government had revamped the surrender and rehabilitation policy to make it more attractive for the insurgents.
• The measures that saw greater results were the developmental projects and improved governance.
• These efforts were branded as “effective politics”.
• To improve law and order and gain the public’s trust, the government had ensured the speedier trials for the Maoists.
• These measures showed a significant improvement in the anti-Naxal campaigns.
• While the state saw as many as 22 of the 38 districts under the Naxal influence, it has currently come down to four.

Maharashtra:

• Maoists currently have a foothold, in varying degrees, in Maharashtra’s districts of Gadchiroli and Gondia, which have areas contiguous with the Dandakaranya region of Chhattisgarh.
• Gadchiroli has borders with both Chattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, leading to it becoming the hotspot for Maoist activities in the state.
• In 2007-2010, the Maoists had made massive inroads into this strategic belt and in recent times, had launched daring assaults against the security forces.
• Compared to other Maoist-infested states, Maharashtra responded rather seriously with a combination of developmental and security components.
• The following measures were taken by the government:
• A major offensive against the Maoists in the Gadchiroli-Chhattisgarh-Andhra border.
• Police machinery was strengthened in Naxal-infested areas through training and modernisation of equipment.
• Created a district-level force called C-60 commando,
• Surrender and Rehabilitation policy led to the surrender of more than 500 rebels, including some prominent leaders in the past 12 years.
• Special focus was given in the developmental activities, especially in Gadchiroli,
• Authorities have arrested and prosecuted individuals who were identified as Maoist “sympathisers”, giving them a pejorative name, “urban Naxals”. These individuals include academic scholars and NGO workers.
• The state police along with the Central paramilitary forces have successfully killed numerous rebels and arresting hundreds of them.
• Currently, the Maoists are still visible in the tribal districts, particularly in Gadchiroli. The Naxals are still able to launch attacks in their stronghold.

Central government:

The previous UPA government at the Centre had laid the foundation for India’s Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy and the current government has accelerated the paces and effectiveness of the COIN strategy. These strategies have integrated the population-centric and enemy-centric approaches, combining law and order mechanisms and development instruments. Centre has largely led the COIN efforts from behind by providing resources like security and financial support, paramilitary, intelligence, and strategic direction. Overall, the COIN involves a mixture of population-centric and enemy-centric approach to deal with insurgents in India with the aim to complement state initiatives. It involves the following:

Law and order approach:

• It plays a key role in the Centre’s counterinsurgency strategy.
• It is seen in the deployment of about 532 companies of the central paramilitary forces in the affected states.
• In 2006, for the first time, the government had issued a security blueprint to tackle Maoist extremism.

Police force modernisation:

• The government had realised that the Maoist insurgents were highly successful due to the lack of strong and effective policing.
• To improve the quality of policing, in the mid-2000s, the Centre had implemented a Police Modernization Scheme.
• Centre had also provided enormous financial aid to the states for the modernisation and up-gradation of police forces’ weaponry, communication, and infrastructure.
• It was recently found that the improvement in police modernisation and intelligence gathering had brought in success for the police’s anti-Maoists campaigns.

Enhancing intelligence networks:

• Poor intelligence infrastructure at the state level was a major nuisance to the counterinsurgency campaign.
• The Centre, in consultation with states, took steps to enhance and upgrade the capabilities of the intelligence agencies. This includes:
• Round-the-clock intelligence sharing through Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) at the Central level and through State Multi-Agency Centre (SMAC) at the state level.
• Setting up of the Joint Command and Control Centre at Maoist hotbeds like Jagdalpur and Gaya,
• Strengthening of technical and human intelligence through cooperation among the security forces, district police, and intelligence agencies
• providing thrust on the generation of real-time intelligence and creation/strengthening of the State Intelligence Bureaus (SIBs) in LWE-affected states for which the Central assistance is provided through the Special Infrastructure Scheme.

Assisting States in security-related infrastructure:

• The Centre had launched the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme to allow the states to reimburse 50% of their expenses on provisions like insurance scheme for police personnel, community policing, rehabilitation for the surrendered Maoists and other security-related items not covered under the Police Modernisation Scheme.
• Recently, the current government has raised the SRE reimbursement to up to 100%.
• Now it also allows the advance release of the funds to the Naxal-affected states.

Deploying Central Paramilitary forces:

• The centre had created the Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) to assist the Naxal-affected states.
• It has extended the placement of CAPFs on a long-term basis. This is similar to its approach in the Northeast and Kashmir.
• Currently, more than 70,000 CAPFs are deployed in the Maoist-affected states.
• Also, the Centre had assisted the states to raise 14 Specialised Commando Battalions (CoBRA) that are well equipped and trained in guerrilla and jungle warfare techniques.
• Furthermore, the Centre had assisted in creating a number of Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) schools for the long-term sustainability of the counter-offensives.
• The Centre had also announced the setting up of a Bastariya battalion in CRPF from Scheduled Tribe candidates belonging to four districts – Bijapur, Dantewada, Narayanpur and Sukma of Chhattisgarh.

Special Infrastructure Scheme

• This is to fill the infrastructure gaps that are not covered under the existing schemes.
• It includes up-gradation of roads and rail tracks to improve the mobility of the security personnel and providing secure camping grounds and helipads at a strategic location in remote areas.
• Under this scheme, about 400 Fortified Police Stations were opened in Maoist-affected states.
• Additionally, the Centre also provides funds for the creation of training schools, weaponry, vehicles and other requirements for the LWE-affected states.
• Launched in 2017, it stands for S – smart leadership, A – Aggressive strategy, M – Motivation and training, A – Actionable intelligence, D – Dashboard Based KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and KRAs (Key Result Areas), H – Harnessing Technology, A – Action Plan for each theatre and N – No access to financing.
• Its aim is to enhance the government’s anti-Maoist initiatives, even the basic components of the counterinsurgency campaign.
• The Centre has expanded the realm of the existing provisions under the Explosives Act and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2017 to monitor the transportation of the explosive substance and hinder the flow of finances of the insurgents.
• UAV and mini-UAV were introduced for each of the CAPF battalions deployed in the Maoist hotbeds.
• Speedy infrastructure development with special focus on solar lights , mobile towers and road-rail connectivity in inaccessible areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

The banning of CPI (Maoist) and enactment of the UAPA Act, 1967

• The nationwide ban on CPI (Maoist) and the enactment of UAPA ensured pressure on Maoists.
• Also, the government had provided autonomy and sweeping powers to police and paramilitary forces to take legal action against the banned organisations and their activities.

Enhancement of monitoring and coordination mechanisms :

• Establishment of high-level Task Force under the Cabinet Secretary for promotion of coordination across a range of security and developmental measures.
• Coordination Centre, chaired by the Union Home Secretary, was established to review and coordinate efforts of concerned state governments in close consultation with Chief Secretaries and Director Generals of Police of respective states.
• Task Force, headed by a Special Secretary (Internal Security) in the Ministry of Home Affairs with senior officers from intelligence agencies, paramilitary forces and State Police Forces was set up to deliberate on operational strategies.
• Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG), headed by Additional Secretary (Naxal Management) was set up to oversee the effective implementation of the developmental schemes in the insurgent-infested areas.
• Naxal Management Division was brought under the MHA to oversee and provide actionable inputs.
• The government had also brought in a Unified Command to enhance the on-going anti-Naxal operations among the worst affected States – Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and West Bengal. This is unofficially called the Operation Green Hunt. The Unified Command aims to strengthen intelligence and operational coordination and launch coordinated attacks on the Maoists.

Developmental Programmes:

• COIN involves a population-centric approach to win popular support of the locals in the Maoist-infested areas.
• Since the government’s initial enemy-centric approach to deal with Naxalism failed to curb the Maoist groups completely, a series of developmental and good governance measures were taken by the government to reduce the support for insurgents.
• This approach was best illustrated in the Centre’s appointment of an expert committee to carry out a detailed study of the socio-economic development in the affected regions and suggest ways to address the deficits.
• The suggestion by the Expert Committee and the government’s own assessment had led to an unprecedented amount of resource transfer to the affected areas and the launch of the Integrated Action Plan (IAP). Later IAP was disbanded and a similar scheme – Special Central Assistance (SCA) – was launched.
• Grievances of the tribal communities were also addressed through the enactment of the Forest Dwellers Act, 2006. This was done despite the protests from environmentalists and NGOs.
• The government had also launched a new scheme, Civic Action Program (CAP), providing financial grants to the CAPFs s that they can undertake welfare activities in the Naxal-affected areas.
• Another notable scheme, Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) was also launched to provide finance and administrative support to expand mobile services in 96 districts in 10 states.
• The issue of unemployment and illiteracy was addressed through “Skill Development in 47 LWE affected districts” and PMKVY .
• Electricity was provided to the affected villages through Deen Dayal Upadhyay Gram Jyoti Yojana.
• The Centre, under the Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA), had upgraded schools and girls’ hostels have been sanctioned in 35 most affected LWE districts.
• Launched in 2018, the Aspirational Districts Programme aims to rapidly transform districts that have made less progress in key social areas.
• ROSHNI: It is a special initiative under the Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (Formerly Ajeevika Skills), which was launched in June 2013 to train and place rural poor youth from 27 LWE-affected districts across nine states.

What are the outcomes of these responses?

• While there is a difference in opinions in the nature and extent of their decline, available evidence points to a convincing decline of an insurgency that was once considered as posing a credible threat to the Indian state.
• Coordinated efforts from the Centre and Maoist-infested states have brought down LWE sponsored violence to drastic levels, which has resulted in the elimination of many important leaders of the insurgent groups and reducing the foothold of the insurgents to a handful of tri-junction districts in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha.
• Recently, about 44 districts were removed from Naxal Affected list, while the “worst affected category” was reduced from 36 to 30.
• According to reports, the Naxalite movement is facing a vacuum in the leadership, leading to the weakening of cooperation and coordination of the individual militants. The successful elimination of prominent leaders of the insurgent groups through various counterinsurgency operations has worsened the situations for the LWE groups.
• Furthermore, the coordinated response from the states on close intelligence-led operations, growing disillusionment among ideologically committed cadre and the shrinking base have hurt the CPI-Maoist’s finances.
• Demonetisation has reduced the insurgent’s ready financial resources to lure recruits, buy arms and critical equipment.
• Currently, the LWE groups are restricted to a few isolated hilly regions bordering 3 states.
• A combination of improved state actions, welfare programmes and security measures has seriously damaged the left-wing extremist operations.
• Loss of strongholds, the declining appeal of ideology and leadership crisis, along with the improved performance from the Naxal-affected states in socio-economic fronts has also led to significant improvement of counterinsurgency operations.

The concerted effort from both the Centre and Naxal-affected states is a rare example of cooperative federalism . Comprehensive COIN strategy, encompassing both the population-centric and enemy-centric approaches has significantly reduced the Naxal footprint in many of the militant groups in the region. Yet, the Naxalites still remain a formidable force that can nevertheless be considered a threat to India’s national security. However, unlike in the 2000s, the Indian government is well prepared in addressing this issue through a comprehensive strategy that is already in place.

Test Yourself

India’s counterinsurgency strategy is a fine example of cooperative federalism. Comment. (250 Words)

• The Director-General of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) recently stated that three states had been cleared of hotbeds of left-wing extremism (Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh). CRPF launched  Operation Octopus, Operation Double Bull, Operation Thunderstorm  and  Operation Chakarbandha in these three States

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A historical introduction to naxalism in india.

India’s remarkable economic development in the last 30 years has earned it the rank of the fastest growing democracy in the world. However, three major issues in the country have threatened its advancement on the international scene, its development and its national unity. These are: the Jammu and Kashmir conflict (as old as independent India itself), the separatist movements in the North Eastern states ( which date back to the early 1950s) and the Naxalite insurgency (which started in West Bengal in the late 1960s). The latter insurgency is the focus of this paper.

In 1967, oppressed peasants inspired by the communist movement raised their bows and arrows against the feudal landowners in Naxalbari. In 2019, the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist), known also as Maoists or Naxalites, raised their upgraded, more sophisticated weapons against mining corporations and development projects which threatened to expel indigenous tribes (or Adivasis, an umbrella term to describe tribal populations) from their ancestral lands in order to exploit the mineral-rich soil. Times have changed, but the aim of the Maoists has not: seizing land from oppressors and redistributing it to the people. This armed struggle has resulted in human rights violations, mass displacement and at least 12,000 deaths as of 2018.

This paper aims to describe the extent to which the CPI-Maoists cause a threat to Indian integrity and development. It will provide a description of communist movements in India, and how schisms within these movements brought about the creation of Naxalism. Furthermore, it will explore the current ideology and tactics of the CPI-Maoists, and how the group aims to overthrow the democratic institutions in India through a protracted ‘people’s war’ , as it perceives the Indian government to be feudal and imperialist. Finally, it will approach the State’s counter-insurgency policies and its population-centric development plans.

The origins of Naxalism                                                                                                                                                                             

The birth of Naxalism is pinpointed to the Naxalbari uprising of spring 1967. Naxalbari, the village that gave its name to the movement, was the site of a peasant revolt, instigated by communist leaders against land owners of the State. While at this point, India had been independent from the British for 20 years, the country had retained the colonial land tenancy system. Under the British imperial system, indigenous landlords were granted pieces of land in return for their collection of tax revenue and as in Medieval European feudal systems, these landlords subleased their land to peasants for half their yield. As shown by the 1971 census, nearly 60% of the population was landless, the lion’s share of land being owned by the richest 4%.

While this event marked the beginning of the Naxalite movement as we know it today, it is important to understand that its emergence is a result of the various fragmentations of communist ideologies in India over time. Hence, in order to comprehend the nature of the Naxalism, one must first delve into its own tumultuous history.

Communist movements in India

The creation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1925 consolidated the presence of communist ideology in the country. Inspired by the communist movements taking place all over the world, the CPI fanned the flames of a proletarian-led national revolution against British imperials. The political context at the time proved to be favourable for the CPI. Firstly, peasant revolts against imperialist landowners has continuously occurred throughout the history of British India. According to Gupta (2007), at least 110 violent peasant uprisings took place between 1783 and 1900 and while these uprisings proved to be unsuccessful, they planted the seed for future proletariat mass movements against the State. Secondly, thousands of cadres, being disappointed in the failure of Mahatma Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement of 1920-1922 and disenchanted by the nationalist movement, were drawn to the more revolutionary Marxist ideology and would become the corpus of the CPI upon its formation. The success of the October Revolution in Russia became a source of inspiration for the nascent communist movement in India.

While in its initial stages, the CPI remained secure in the idea of a Marxist inspired mass revolution, followed by setbacks that eventually led to the emergence of more radical communist parties. To elaborate, the CPI was inherently tied to foreign communist leaders, such as Stalin. In February 1951, a delegation from the CPI met with Stalin in Moscow and the USSR leader allegedly told the members of the delegation to abandon violent revolution and participate in the democratic platforms of newly independent India. Perhaps Stalin sought to establish a strategic relationship with India that could not be sustained should a violent communist revolt engulf the nation. Not only was India suffering the repercussions of Partition and the first India-Pakistan war over Jammu and Kashmir (1947-1949), but the USSR was at the time also engaged on the side of North Koreans in the Korean War. The economic and demographic consequences of the Second World War for the USSR, its engagements in Korea and the climate of the Cold War settling on the international scene could not have permitted the USSR to facilitate their ideological brethren of the CPI.

Stalin’s encouragement to dismiss the armed revolution proved to be a major blow to the CPI, and likely influenced the CPI’s decision to abort the Telengana movement. This movement, which lasted from 1946 to 1951, sought to liberate the peasantry from the dominance of oppressive landlords and redistribute the land amongst the landless - as would be the root of the Naxalbari uprising 16 years later. The CPI had established a strong presence in Telengana and aimed to organise the peasantry to lead it into revolution against the State. Moreover, the Telengana insurgency led to the CPI promoting guerrilla warfare as a tactic.

The tables turned when the Indian Army augmented their offensive against peasant rebels and called for all communists to surrender. The landlords were returning to reclaim their lands, and thousands of people were imprisoned and placed in camps. As a consequence of this offensive,  CPI members were faced with a dilemma, as some felt the necessity to give up arms, while others believed that abandoning the struggle would discredit the CPI in the eyes of the peasantry. The leadership was hence divided; some members opted to surrender while others continued the armed struggle. However, following negotiations with the Indian National Congress, the CPI formally withdrew from the insurgency in October 1951.

Birth of the CPI-M

As feared, this led to a discreditation of the CPI, which seemingly had abandoned the revolutionary ideology that had been their selling point to the proletariat. This sentiment of disillusionment in the capacities of the CPI paved the way for the creation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of India in Calcutta in late 1964. The schism between the CPI and the CPI-M was brought about by the tensions between the two communist giants of the time - the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In the 1960s, the Soviets advocated for democratic methods and diplomatic relations to spread communism, which lead the Chinese to label the Soviets as revisionists who had abandoned the revolutionary flame.  While the older members of CPI stood by the USSR (as they had when Stalin advised them to make use of democratic institutions back in 1951), the younger generation (which still advocated for violent revolution) sided with the Chinese as it considered the older members traitors to the cause for having abandoned the Telangana uprising.

It was not long until the CPI-M itself was faced with yet another separation due to ideological differences. While imprisoned in the mid-1960s, a man named Charu Mazumdar wrote a set of nine essays that would serve the basis for Naxalite ideology. Mazumdar was born into a family of small landowners, but had risen in the ranks of the CPI and later the CPI-M. Frustrated by the failure of a communist takeover in India, Mazumdar turned to the example of the Chinese Communist Party. Not only did Mazumdar denounce the revisionist turn of the Soviet Union and the CPI as being the reason for the failure of communism in India, he also affirmed that the revolution in India must come from the peasants in rural areas rather than the working class - as it happened in China under the leadership of Mao Zedong.

Mazumdar’s pro-China stance resonated throughout the CPI-M at a time when international politics once again played a role in the fracture of Indian communist parties. In 1965, one year after the formation of the CPI-M, India and Pakistan raised arms against each other over Jammu and Kashmir for the second time in less than 20 years. This lead to a clash between patriotism and communist ideology for the pro-China CPI-M, as Mao’s government chose to side with its ‘all-weather friend’ , Pakistan. Considering the deep animosity between India and Pakistan, the CPI-M condemned Beijing’s choice to support Rawalpindi (Pakistan’s interim capital between 1959 and 1967). However, this did not sit well with members of the party who felt that the CPI-M had betrayed the allegiance to Chinese communist ideology.

Another issue arose between the CPI-M and its more radical members when the CPI-M participated in the United Front coalition for the 1967 West Bengal Legislative Assembly Elections. The coalition won and ousted the Indian National Congress from the seat of power it had held in West Bengal since independence. However, this meant that the CPI-M was now part of mainstream politics and could no longer sustain faithfulness to its revolutionary goals while swearing allegiance to the Indian Constitution. Additionally, two members of the CPI-M were given important positions in the cabinet, notably in the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Land Revenue.

At the start of the Naxalbari uprising in 1967, barely a few months after the victory of the CPI-M’s coalition in the Legislative Assembly Elections, the seeds for another schism had been planted. The Naxalbari uprising was sparked by the United Front’s inability to implement effective land reforms. The people involved in the Naxalbari uprising put CPI-M leaders in a very difficult situation: the communist party found itself the opponent of a communist movement.

The CPI-M had an obligation to law and order, which it carried out, however, this did not deter the movement which continued to gain momentum. In fact, at its peak in 1969, Mazumdar officially split from the CPI-M by forming the Communist Party of India- Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML). Despite the name, Mazumdar was much more inspired by Maoist ideology than Marxist or Leninist Doctrine. In fact, the slogan of the party was: “China’s Chairman is our Chairman. Chinese path is our path” . Mazumdar and the CPI-ML sought to import a Maoist-style revolution, but the dissemination of Maoist propaganda proved to be an unattractive move on behalf of the CPI-ML, following India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962, clashing with patriotic sentiments. Moreover, the CPI-ML was not as concerned with public opinion as it should have been (and as the CPI-Maoists is now). Instead, Mazumdar was convinced the revolution would simply need a spark and the right conditions to ignite. This assumption proved to be the beginning of the end for this phase of the Naxalite insurgency. Furthermore, the situation took a turn in 1971, when the government commenced Operation Steeplechase and sent the army and members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) into West Bengal. The operation lasted 45 days from June to August, and ultimately crushed the Naxalite movement. Following the retaliation by State forces, the movement saw a decline in activity for the following two decades. However, the insurgency resurfaced in the 1990s, during the liberalization of the Indian economy when the government began granting licenses to private and multinational mining corporations, when splintered Naxalite groups began dialogues and negotiations to recycle the original movement, only this time in a more structured fashion. One of the most famous results of these negotiations is the merger of two of the biggest and most active Naxalite groups, the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Center in 2004. This merger resulted in the Communist Party of India-Maoists.

As explained, the CPI and the CPI-M abandoned their armed struggle in favour of mainstream politics. However, the CPI-Maoists, which was declared a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act in 2009, tenaciously held on to the protracted people’s war, and aims to bring about a communist revolution as was seen in China in the 1930s and 1940s, while being oblivious to the fact that the political context of modern-day India cannot be compared to the civil-war inflicted China of 80 years past. Technological, social and economic advancements have changed the terrain, and hence led to evolutions in the Maoist tactics and the Indian Government’s counter-insurgency policies.

Modern Maoists

The merger of the People’s War Group and Maoist Communist Center in 2004 resulted in the creation of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), and an upsurge in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) related violence. While this is the biggest operating group, there are still numerous Naxalite factions active in the country’s eastern states, along what has been infamously dubbed the Red Corridor . Some of the states in which the Maoists have a relatively strong presence include Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, where Maoist factions control pockets of territory in underdeveloped areas that are not easily accessed.

The merger prompted an upsurge in violence in numerous Indian states, which led Dr. Manhoman Singh, the Prime Minister of India from 2004 to 2014, to declare that Naxalism was “the single biggest security challenge ever faced by our country” , in April 2006. In the first trimester of 2006, more than 200 people were killed in Naxalite activities. In a context where India was still battling Sikh separatist movements and Kashmir insurgency, labelling Naxalism as the biggest threat showed how seriously officials grasped the menace. At the time, Naxalites were an estimated 20,000 strong group and occupied territory in states that comprised of 20% of the country’s population. Maoist factions, to this day, continue operating in India’s “Red Corridor” , which includes central and eastern states such as Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. Pockets in these states have been riddled with poverty and underdevelopment for decades, which the Naxalites seek to exploit in order to achieve their aims. The return of this insurgency forced the Indian Government to implement policies that would contain and eventually eradicate the Naxalite threat, resulting in the creation of The Left Wing Extremism Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs in October 2009 to tackle the various Naxalite factions spread throughout the country.

Around the time of its creation, the CPI-Maoists published a document titled, ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution (STIR)’ . This document clearly outlines guidelines of political and military strategies to achieve the immediate aim of the group - the New Democratic Revolution (NDR). The NDR, in line with Mazumdar’s formulation of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thoughts, aims to overthrow “imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism only through the Protracted People’s War” . The ultimate aim, and second phase of the revolution following the NDR, is installing communism in the country. Both these aims are formulated along the central task of the revolution, which is the seizure of power through protracted armed struggle.

As articulated in this document, both the political and military strategy of the CPI-Maoists are centred on civilian masses. The political strategy is to exploit the existing class inequalities in India to the Maoists’ advantage, as unequal income distribution, socio-demographic disparity, poverty and deprivation are issues that plague the underdeveloped areas of the country. Hence, the Maoists draw on this to mobilize socially and economically marginalized populations, such as the Adivasis. The military strategy aims to create revolutionary ‘base areas’ in the countryside where the State has little reach and cannot enforce the rule of law. The weakness of the State in such areas, combined with the support of alienated Adivasis, allow the Maoists to sustain their operations. Quoting the doctrine of the Maoists: “The people are the eyes and ears of the army; they feed and keep our soldiers, It is they who help the army in sabotage and in battle. The people are the water and our army the fish” . 

From this quote, two observations can be made. Firstly, the nature of the Maoist’s ideology translates into using guerrilla tactics against the State. Secondly, as the Maoists wish to use people as “eyes and ears” , this implies that if the Maoists are not able to mobilize them, their operations would end. It can also explain why said civilians are currently caught in a tug of war between the Maoists and the Indian government, where the State has implemented counter-insurgency strategies that involve developing tribal areas and eradicating poverty amongst tribal people. This will be discussed later on in the paper.

Maoists against the State

The Maoists’ tactics against the Indian State fit well within the principles of guerrilla warfare, as mentioned above. As their base areas are distributed in dense forests and hilly territories, where the State is relatively weak, they are able to maximize the use of the terrain in their favour. This makes for a textbook example of asymmetric and unconventional warfare. The size of the Maoist army and its resources render it unlikely to succeed in a full blown confrontation with the Indian forces, and in order to avoid a repetition of the government victories that were seen in the 1970s, the Maoists have had to adapt. The STIR describes that Maoist forces should operate in small, decentralised units and gather intelligence before conducting swift ambuscades. As such, they have become highly mobile and flexible. These methods of movement render them almost undetectable by State forces, and allows them to gather intelligence through simple methods, such as scouting, spying and bribing corrupt police officials, in order to conduct effective ambushes against the Indian security forces. Some examples of such ambushes include the May 2009 attacks in the jungles of Maharashtra that killed 16 police officers and the April 2010 ambush of police reinforcement troops in Chhattisgarh. In one of the most recent attacks, on 1 May 2019 in Gadchiroli (district in the east of Maharashtra), the Maoists allegedly torched 27 vehicles belonging to a construction company and ten hours later detonated an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that killed 15 members of the Quick Response Team (QRT) that was sent for reinforcements. According to government officials, this is a typical Maoist tactic; launching an attack in order to ambush reinforcement troops. It is also believed that swift, successive attacks are part of the Maoists’ tactical offensive campaign, as it would distract police forces and divert their attention away from periodic meetings of top Maoist leaders. Aside from ambushes, Maoists have conducted prison break operations and hostage taking in exchange for the release of Maoist prisoners.

The deadliest Maoist attacks almost exclusively target State forces (such as police and paramilitary forces). This not only undermines State authorities in the eyes of the local population, because they are perceived as unable to defend themselves against Maoists, but it also discourages police officers from operating effectively for fear of ambushes. It could also discourage people from joining police forces in districts with a high Maoist presence, hence depleting the State of potential personnel. However, civilians have paid the price; between 1980 and 2015, the Naxalite insurgency caused 20,012 casualties; of these, 4,761 are Naxalites, 3,105 are members of the security forces, and 12,146 are civilians. Moreover, a report published by the Indian Home Ministry in 2019 demonstrated that, since 2010, an average of 417 civilians have been killed annually in approximately 1,200 incidents of violence perpetrated by Maoists.

The report also highlighted the reduction of Maoist related violent incidents in the last five years (a decrease of 26.7% from 2013 to 2018), due to the Maoists losing ground to the Indian forces. Furthermore, it states that: “The development outreach by the Government of India has seen an increasingly large number of LWE cadres shunning the path of violence and returning to the mainstream” .

While this is positive news for India’s counterinsurgency efforts, the Maoists’ loss of ground coincides with an increase of executions of civilians by Maoists. Individuals are often branded as police informers by Maoists, and are executed for supposedly conspiring with the State. Using civilians as scapegoats for their decreasing hold in the Red Corridor territory creates an environment of terror for those living in Naxalite areas, and deters them from any attempts to collaborate with the police. Out of the 109 civilian casualties in Naxalite-related incidents in 2018, 61 were executed. From January to June 2019, out of the 37 civilian casualties, 22 were executed for being “police informants” . This goes to show that civilians pay the highest price in the Naxalite insurgency, and that the Maoists have turned their terror tactics against the very people they claim to be fighting a so-called revolution for. This brings into question the durability of the CPI-Maoists and other Naxalite groups that resort to these tactics. As they increase violence against their very own support base, they stray from their original ideology and civilians earlier loyal to their cause become disenchanted with Maoist ideology. 

There is little concrete evidence that would suggest a steady flow of external funding for the CPI-Maoists. Rather, as outlined in the document ‘Our Financial Policy’ adopted at the CPI-Maoists’ 9th Unity Congress in 2007, the sources of funding come from membership fees and contributions, extortion and confiscation of wealth and income of the enemy and ‘revolutionary taxes’ . These funds aim to cater to three main economic needs: war expenditures, propaganda and the people. As such, the Maoists have established an elaborate and strict tax collection system. However, extortion and racketeering conducted by the Maoists does not only affect individuals, who could see their property burnt or even lose their lives over refusing to contribute to the cause, but also corporations. Evidence suggests that some businesses operating in Maoist areas pay a tax in order to avoid attacks. This method of extortion highlights hypocrisy on behalf of the Maoists, and also causes a risk to these companies as they could be prosecuted for terror financing.

Recently, some reports have also emerged linking Naxalites to organised crime. For the insurgents to sustain their activities in the face of India’s increased counter-insurgency tactics, it would make sense that the Maoists have had have to evolve and orientate itself towards deeper organised crime networks. In 2018, Indian police seized an amount of crude heroin equivalent to 700 million Rupees (approximately 8,8 million Euros) from Naxal areas. Officials speculated that following the crackdown of cross-border drug cartels along the Afghan-Pakistan trafficking route, Naxalites had seized the opportunity to merge into the drug trafficking network. While India’s license to cultivate opium for pharmaceutical purposes is officially recognised by the United Nations’ International Narcotics Control Board, the growing international market for heroin has turned Jharkhand into a major hub for illegal opium cultivation. Jarkhand is one of the Indian states heavily affected by the Maoist insurgency and the Maoists have been using opium cultivation as a source of revenue since 2007. Moreover, Maoists have been known to entail villagers in opium production by providing them with seeds, start-up money and a reward of 10,000 Indian Rupees (approximately 130 Euros) per kilogram of opium. In return for opium farming, these villagers gain protection from the Maoists, who claim a large share of the profits (a kilogram of opium could sell for up to 450 euros in Mumbai). By involving these isolated citizens in this illicit production system, Maoists further marginalize them from the State. This tactic could be a way to secure the loyalty of people living in Naxalite-controlled areas and remove options of legitimate sources of revenue for the population. Hypothetically, a farmer may see more benefits in cultivating illegal opium for Maoists for profit and protection than turning towards established government development programs such as the NREGA, which would mean losing the protection of the Maoists. One of the worst case scenarios would be being branded as a police informant, which is used as an excuse by Maoists to carry out executions of civilians. In order to root out this method of funding and counter the incentive to work with Maoists, the Jharkhand State government, which destroys thousands of poppy fields each year, has started to promote the cultivation of profitable medicinal plants.

Aside from the opium trade, it is suspected that Naxalites are also profiting from harvesting and trafficking cannabis from Orissa, parts of which are under Maoist control, to other parts of the country and the region. Cannabis is one of the most used drugs in South Asia, and in 2017 the Indian government seized 352 tonnes of trafficked cannabis. In 2010, the Bengaluru police stumbled across plans to arrange a meeting between Chhota Shakeel’s men and Naxalite leaders. Chhota Shakeel is an Indian crime boss, and a high ranking member of the D-Company, Dawood Ibrahim’s notorious organised crime gang. The D-Company has ties to the Pakistani spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and a Naxalite-D-Company partnership could be encouraged by the ISI in order to prolong the insurgency, hence engaging in yet another proxy war. While the plot was foiled and five people were arrested, the establishment of an ISI-Naxalite link is one that has consistently troubled the Indian authorities. Nearly 500 Maoists have allegedly undergone training with the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), a banned organisation with ties to the ISI, in 2008. Two years later, members of the notorious ISI-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) reportedly met with Naxalite leaders.

The Naxalites have been known to seek the support of other insurgent groups in order to sustain their operations. Carrying out a “protracted people’s war” requires funds and resources such as weapons and ammunitions, and the Naxalite cannot entirely rely on “donations”, “revolutionary taxes ” and looting police outposts. As the ISI has traditionally kept a keen interest in subversive movements in India, and the Naxalites are in need of external support, such an alliance could lead to an escalation of LWE in India.

Ties to other groups

In the mid-2000s, the Maoists were believed to have received logistical support and training from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This transfer of knowledge was a source of worry for the Indian government, as the LTTE was notorious for their expertise in explosives and suicide bombings. As the use of IEDs, landmines and bombs by Maoists is recurrent, it is suspected that a LTTE-Maoist alliance was at some point in time established, where LTTE expertise in weaponry was exchanged for safe haven from Naxalites. It is also believed that the Maoists in India had links to the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-Maoists). While one government official stated in 2009 that this link was mainly ideological, joint operations and trainings between the CPI-Maoists and the CPN-M have been reported, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Furthermore, the Indian Maoists have been able to procure arms from China through the Nepalese Maoists.

Moreover, the CPI-Maoist is a member of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), an umbrella organisation that serves as a discussion platform for Maoist parties in the subcontinent, and it is believed to have mainly provided moral support in the past. According to a report published by the US-based think tank Stratfor in 2010, the Maoists mainly sustain their weapons stock through raids on police outposts, theft from businesses operating in areas under their control, local makeshift arms factories and procuring foreign weapons from external militant groups operating within India and/or neighbouring countries. This last point is of serious concern for the Indian government, as Maoists have allegedly sought the support of their comrades in insurgency in Assam and Jammu & Kashmir to accomplish the goal of overthrowing the central Indian government. This nexus suggests that the CPI-Maoists support their so-called right to self-determination, yet it seems to contradict its own objective of installing a communist regime in the whole country.

Such ties between anti-India armed groups could further challenge the State’s capacity of efficiently combating these insurgencies. The same Stratfor report mentions that the Indian government accuses the United Liberated Front of Assam (ULFA) of working with the Naxalites to smuggle drugs and counterfeit money along the Indian-Bangladeshi border, in exchange for weapons and explosives from the ISI. Another Bengali connection is Sailen Sarkar, a member of the communist party of Bangladesh. Sakar was accused of training Naxalites in ISI sponsored camps in Bangladesh, and of participating in organised crime activities alongside the Maoists and the ULFA.

In these operations, the ISI seems to act as a third party, because of which establishing a direct link between the ISI and the Naxalites becomes difficult. However, the ISI’s long-lasting policy of providing support to anti-India insurgent groups should not be overlooked, especially when the Naxalites are moving towards establishing business relations with underground criminal networks based in Pakistan.

The tug of war for civilian support

In his 2013 book, ‘ Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present’ , Max Boot, an American military historian, describes the conditions through which guerrilla warfare can succeed. His work retains 12 lessons from the history of guerrilla warfare, two of which can be directly applied to the Naxalite insurgency in India. Firstly, he notes that in the past 200 years, public opinion has made an impact on the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare. This explains why the CPI-Maoists are adamant on providing welfare services to the population and continue conducting active propaganda against the State. Building upon the injustice-narrative , they can rally people to their cause. By providing services to marginalised people, they attempt to establish some form of legitimacy. The second lesson that can be applied to the Indian context is that population-centric counterinsurgency policies are often effective; however these have brought about their own share of crimes and human rights violations.

These lessons share one point in common: the population. From this, one could draw the conclusion that the population is the key to success, for both the State and insurgents. Considering that both the Indian government and the CPI Maoists have incorporated population-centric strategies, it would seem that both parties have taken the primordial importance of public opinion and support into account.

According to the Left Wing Extremism Division, the “Government’s approach is to deal with Left Wing Extremism in a holistic manner, in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities, improvement in governance and public perception management”. An integrated method has been adopted in order to accomplish this, as the government first aims to retake the territory held by Naxalites and hold it securely, and re-establish relations with the local population before carrying out development projects. Furthermore, in order to counter the “land-grabbing” narrative of the Maoists, the government has adopted laws that aim to decrease poverty rates and reform land acquisition. As such, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005 (one of the largest poverty-eradication programs in the world), provides a legal guarantee of 100 days of public-sector employment to rural households, in order to decrease the urban/rural disparities and to reduce recruitment opportunities for Maoists as rural populations would have less incentive to join. However, a study conducted by Khanna and Zimmermann (2017) showed that the implementation of this scheme led to an increase in violence, police-initiated attacks and insurgent violence on civilians. Similarly to this, the 2009 Integrated Action Plan (IAP), which provided funds for focused development projects in areas with high intensity of Maoist violence, saw an expected backlash. While early successes were recorded as the number of attacks decreased, the Maoists have called this as a government tactic that disfavours tribal populations and rural areas while conducting sporadic attacks on infrastructure and development contractors as to deter businesses from accepting contracts in these areas. Officials in Jharkhand have attributed the number of attacks on infrastructure as a result of poor implementation of the IAP. Maoists have also blown up mobile towers as these facilitate communication between State authorities and allows them to track the Naxalites.

In regards to the prevention of land acquisition mentioned above, the government implemented the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act in 2013 and the Forest Rights Act of 2006. While on paper, the laws aim to provide security against forcible land acquisition and allow indigenous tribes to live in forest areas, an estimated 10 million Adivasis have been displaced due to development projects. This challenges the government’s aim to re-establish ties with populations who work with and support the Naxalites. Indeed, the deeply rooted mistrust of authorities has to be overcome, which explains why the Indian government has included “public perception management” in its approach.

Aside from improving public perception, the government has included development strategies in the implementation of its counter-insurgency policies. However, this could prove to be a double-edged sword. The rural population is marginalised and this is partly due to a lack of integrated connectivity infrastructure, such as roads and highways, and facilities, such as schools and hospitals. As the government seeks to undertake development projects to improve the living conditions of rural populations, it can also backfire as the Naxalites can concrete the narrative that the government wants to expel populations from their ancestral lands to develop these infrastructure projects to its own ‘ capitalist’ ends. However, as seen above, insurgents have continuously discouraged civilians from engaging with authorities and have resorted to executions of so-called police informants, hence installing fear. Yet, by destroying development and infrastructure programs initiated by the State, and claiming to solve the issue of marginalised, rural populations, the Maoists are further marginalising these populations. Moreover, they are cutting off any possibility of alternative options, meaning that civilians are forced to turn to Maoists for governance issues (such as dispute resolution, jobs, welfare etc.). The notion that Maoists are only able to depend on the loyalties of rural populations out of installed fear, rather than commitment to the ideology, is therefore proven to be a correct one.

While the Maoists have committed gross human rights violations against the people they swore to protect from the “feudal”, “imperialist” and “capitalist” Indian State, the state authorities have also been accused of crimes against civilians since the beginning of Operation Greenhunt . This operation, as dubbed by the Indian media, began in 2009 when the Indian government sent out troops and formed paramilitary groups such as the Salwa Judum. Due to the guerrilla tactics employed by the insurgents, distinguishing between civilian and Maoist can often be difficult. Some raids on Maoist controlled areas have resulted in extrajudicial killings and executions, thus adding to the mistrust of authorities. One such case is the alleged 2012 killing of 17 Adivasis, including 7 children, by the CRPF who claimed these villagers were Maoists. In 2017, a judicial inquiry found this claim to be untrue, the killing unprovoked and hence extra-judicial. However, the government has yet to take action against the perpetrators.

Seizing land from oppressors and redistributing it amongst the peasants has been the aim of the Naxalites since its creation. Today, they are no longer fighting against imperialist landlords but the State and its development industries. Hence, India’s advancement as a world power, and its integrity, remains challenged by the Naxalite insurgency. By attacking development and infrastructure projects, Naxalites directly impede the development of India’s economy, while themselves perpetuating the cycle of poverty and marginalisation of rural populations. As such, the Indian government has had to adapt to this unconventional warfare. While their counter-insurgency has shown successes, they have also led to human rights violations.

History shows that most insurgencies only survive by giving up armed struggle and joining mainstream politics. Two examples of this are the African National Congress in South Africa and PLO in Palestine. Two even better examples are the communist movements of India themselves. Both the CPI and the CPI-M started out with aims of revolutionary armed struggle, but eventually joined mainstream Indian politics and are today established, legitimate political parties. Yet, the CPI-Maoists show no sign or will to integrate itself with democratic Indian institutions, as they continue to call for boycotts of elections and prevent civilians in areas controlled by them to vote. In the past, voters living in Naxalite areas have been targeted for their election-ink stained finger. This active boycotting campaign could have had an impact on the low turnout rates in two of the most affected districts, Bijapur (Karnataka State) and Konta (Chhattisgarh State). These states saw a 49% and 55% turnout rate respectively for the 2018 State Legislative Assembly elections. While this may be perceived as an achievement by the Maoists, it does call into question the sustainability of their operations and agenda. As evoked above, the CPI-Maoists itself is a result of numerous splits that opposed parties joining the political mainstreaming and those that opted from the prolongation of the people’s struggle. Considering the CPI-Maoist’s obvious derailments from its original doctrine, counter-insurgency operations by the State and the disillusionment among the violence-fatigued people, the group splintering off again, remains a realistic possibility.

The Maoists’ suspected connections to organised crime further shows that the group has evolved from its original ideology and has become more profit motivated, hence marking a clear distinction between the CPI and CPI-M experience. These sources of funding should be explored by counter-insurgency units in order to evaluate the situation and adopt appropriate policies to counter this.

Furthermore, the connection with other insurgency groups, as well as the involvement of the Pakistani ISI, in being the middle-man for these groups, India could be faced with a security threat that extends beyond the Red Corridor. While the erstwhile Maoist ideology is losing its appeal, hard counter-terrorism strategies coupled with an efficacious population-centric campaign by the State, aimed at winning over hearts and minds, seems the answer.

December 2019. © European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS), Amsterdam

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 Syllabus: Naxalism, Internal security

 Source: TH

  Context:   Recently security forces in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region engaged in a significant gunfight with Naxalites, resulting in the death of 28 insurgents. This marks one of the highest casualty tolls in recent anti-Naxal operations.

About Naxalism :

• Origins in Naxalbari : The Naxalite movement began in 1967 in Naxalbari village, West Bengal , when peasants led an uprising against local landlords over land disputes.
• Maoist Ideology : The movement was inspired by Maoist political ideology , advocating armed rebellion to overthrow the state and redistribute land and resources to oppressed communities.
• Spread to Tribal Regions : Naxalism gradually spread to underdeveloped and tribal areas, particularly in states like Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand , and parts of Andhra Pradesh .
• Objective : The Naxalites aimed to challenge the Indian state through armed insurgency, focusing on the redistribution of land, wealth, and resources to marginalized and tribal communities.
• The Red Corridor refers to areas significantly affected by Naxalite-Maoist insurgency. It includes regions in Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar, and Telangana.

Reasons for Naxalism’s growth:

• Tribal displacement: Massive displacement due to development projects and mining activities has fueled discontent among tribal populations, making them vulnerable to Maoist influence.
• Socio-economic gaps: Poverty, lack of education, and absence of government welfare programs in tribal and rural areas have deepened grievances.
• State negligence: Lack of infrastructural development, poor connectivity, and weak governance in the Red Corridor have created vacuums that Maoists exploit.
• Forest rights: The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 restricts access to forest produce, further alienating forest-dependent communities.
• Government focus on security: The government’s emphasis on security measures rather than addressing underlying socio-economic issues has left many grievances unresolved.

  Steps taken by the government:

Legal measures:

• Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) : Declares Naxalite groups as terrorist organizations and enables swift action against them.
• Relief and Rehabilitation Policy : Encourages Naxalites to surrender and join the mainstream by offering rehabilitation packages.
• Forest Rights Act, 2006 : Aims to restore land rights to tribal communities, addressing one of the root causes of insurgency.

Military measures:

• Operation Green Hunt : Launched in 2010, this large-scale counter-insurgency operation has significantly reduced Naxal activities.
• Greyhounds force : Special forces unit in Andhra Pradesh trained for guerrilla warfare against Naxalites.
• Coordination with state forces : Increased cooperation between central paramilitary forces and state police, improving intelligence and response.

Developmental measures:

• Aspirational Districts Programme : Targets underdeveloped regions, including those affected by Naxalism, to enhance healthcare, education, and infrastructure.
• Skill development programs: Initiatives to train the tribal youth in vocational skills and reduce their dependency on Naxalite ideologies.
• Infrastructure development: Road and telecom connectivity projects have been launched in remote areas, enhancing access to basic services and governance.
• Addressing socio-economic grievances : Focus on addressing root causes such as land disputes, tribal rights, and poverty through inclusive policies.
• Enhanced intelligence : Improve real-time intelligence gathering and collaboration between state and central forces.
• Sustained development : Ensure the long-term implementation of development schemes and socio-economic programs.

Conclusion:

To comprehensively address Naxalism, India must balance military actions with efforts to improve tribal livelihoods and ensure access to “Jal, Jangal, Zameen” , the fundamental demands of tribal populations.

Insta Links:

• Urban Naxalism
• The persisting drives of the government for development of large industries in backward areas have resulted in isolating the tribal population and the farmers who face multiple displacements. With Malkangiri and Naxalbari foci, discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) doctrine that affected citizens back into the mainstream of social and economic growth. (UPSC – 2015)
• What are the determinants of left-wing extremism in the Eastern part of India? What strategy should the Government of India, civil administration and security forces adopt to counter the threat in the affected areas? (UPSC – 2020)

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The Naxalite Insurgency in India: Addressing the Limitations of Greed and Grievance in Conflict Resolution

I . Introduction

The Indian state and academic analysis often adopt – unintentionally or otherwise – Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s global theoretical framework of greed and grievance when addressing the Naxalite insurgency. This framework argues that such rebel insurgencies are motivated by individual greed and personal interests instead of more systemic grievances. This treats Naxalites as terrorist factions rather than political insurgents and that the government’s counterinsurgency strategy should treat them as such and be primarily based on military repression. [1]  Epstein, for instance, posits that “the Naxalite insurgency amounts to an existential crisis for the nation”, using the same approach of security and terrorism over acknowledging that there may be valid political grievances. [2]

In this paper, I argue against an overreliance on this theoretical framework which defines political and academic discourse on the Naxalite insurgencies and conflict resolution. The paper argues that analysis of the Naxalite conflict through the theoretical lens of “new” civil wars which sees greed and grievance as a binary and a result of the resource curse, is inadequate and lead to ineffective governmental counterinsurgency policies of repression and military action which have failed to resolve the conflict thus far. The paper does this by fully contextualizing the Naxalite conflict to emphasize what greed and grievance ignore, contrasting this theoretical lens with more expansive frameworks seen in Kalyvas’ ontology of political violence, which emphasizes the importance of looking at the particularities. This adds nuance pertaining to the Naxalite conflict, by ejecting binaries and recognizing political violence as “complex and ambiguous processes that foster the “joint” action” of different actors which results in violence that reflects the multifaceted goals of these actors. Furthermore, that when it comes to policy decisions, this nuance is necessary to resolve such a longstanding conflict. [3]

With relation to Naxalite insurgencies, a key supporting argument is paying close attention to the historical and political relationship between Naxal grievances, or interests, and those of corporations, and the state. That in many parts of the country, the Naxalites have been pushed via warfare into remote parts of the forest, barely subsisting, and yet continuing to resist the state or give up (Roy 2010). [4]  One may argue that if this were a question of greed, the incentive for warfare would have already diminished, and yet, it continues, likely pointing to a need to address years of underdevelopment in Naxalite regions. [5]   The aspect of the conflict that is particularly puzzling and reflects the “complex and ambiguous processes” and socio-historical interaction between private and public interests, is its simultaneously persistent and distant nature. That whilst the Naxalite conflict strongly exists in Indian public imagination, few have encountered it. [6]   [7]  Despite this relative invisibility of the insurgents and their lack of instruments of war, they are labeled as the biggest internal threat to the nation-state. [8]  The resulting tension is thus between private industrial interests in local resources and Naxalite/Maoist sovereignty over their ancestral land. [9]  This defines the conflict along lines of political ideology as well as ethnic identity, as most Naxalites are either lower-caste of Adivasi (tribal) communities, who are enfranchised in theory according to the constitution but disenfranchised in practice due to corporate interest in their land. [10]   [11]  On the other hand, there is evidence that a more sympathetic approach that actually addresses poverty and grievances reduces violence. These policies that address development are compatible with the framework of the ontology of political violence but not when greed takes precedence over grievance. 

In terms of structure, the paper will address the different theoretical frameworks in the context of the Naxalite insurgencies in India, and how that informs policy and conflict resolution. The first part will analyze the Naxalite insurgency from the perspective of greed and grievance and resource curse and look at how the theories’ suggestion of personal gain leads to military action, governmental neglect, and a lack of empathy when it comes to policies derived from it. This is seen in India as a state’s approach in viewing Naxalite grievances as a façade for terrorist interests and practicing both negligence and counterterrorism as policy. [12]  The paper will also address a counterargument that argues for a need to disregard empathy and put state sovereignty first; I refute this by pointing out that repressive means of state consolidation do not promote peace, but an active engagement with Naxalites might allow for joint consolidation. In this vein, the paper will provide the contrasting framework of recognizing nuance as presented by Kalyvas and making room for addressing grievances stemming from systemic underdevelopment. [13]  This approach may inform more rehabilitative policy decisions such as using the instruments of developmental programs and education which have – in their limited adoption – proven more effective in reducing Naxalite insurgent violence.

II. Socio-Historical Context to Modern Naxalism

The Naxalite problem refers to a Maoist insurgency and peasant movement known to have originated from the namesake village of Naxalbari in West Bengal in the 1960s, where a Maoist agrarian revolution attempted to repossess land from  zamindars  (landowners) and the state. [14]  This revolution was localized but then spread across India’s industrial belt over recent decades, which is also known as the Red Corridor because of its abundant Naxalite presence. [15]  Today, it is estimated that about a fifth of India’s dense forests are within Naxal control. [16]

 India’s former Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, referred to the lingering Naxalite insurgency as the “single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by [the] country”. [17]  This response typifies the Indian state’s approach to the Naxalite insurgency, treating it as a terrorism or an internal security problem, without even considering socio-historical and political grievances of the tribes and agrarian peoples who are labeled as Naxalites. Political violence has taken place by both warring parties, the Naxalites and the government of India, with casualties on both ends. [18]  Rural Maoist/Naxalite animosity towards the state apparatus is so strong that they boycott elections, engage in booth-capturing, and blame the government for both social and environmental neglect and exploitation of the region. [19]

The Indian state has dealt with the “internal…challenge” of Maoist insurgencies ever since its independence and establishment as a postcolonial nation-state. [20]  Having said this, the Indian state apparatus’ interaction with the mineral-rich Red Corridor has colonial roots which far predate modern India as we know it. This so-called corridor is home to some of India’s densest forests, most difficult terrain, and most ancient and prominent indigenous, or “tribal”, communities who have consistently resisted both the imposition of colonial rule on their terrain as well as that of the modern Indian state. [21]  The lower-caste and indigenous communities (referred to as  adivasis ) in India played a prominent role in pre-independence resistance, especially early resistance towards colonial rule at a time when the Indian elite was sympathetic to colonial presence. [22]  The massive role of peasant and indigenous movements in catalyzing Indian resistance to the British is rarely acknowledged. It includes, but is not limited to, the Indigo revolution, several boycotts of British products as well as farmer’s revolts and indigenous insurgencies. [23]

Below, Table 1.  Demonstrates that the main demographics involved in Naxalite insurgencies are indigenous, lower caste, and other marginalized communities. This is important to keep in mind throughout because it points to this conflict being more layered than just agrarian and communist; it is rooted in India’s historical and systemic structural inequalities which have ignored and exploited these populations. This predates colonialism but was formalized within the bureaucratic apparatus of the British and carried forward into modern India. [24]

Table 1. The demographic and ideological mapping of Naxal presence (Misra 2002)

Moreover, the most significant periods of conflict can be demarcated as having occurred through the following years: 1948-1951, 1969-1971, 1990-1994, 1996-2012, and 2015-present day. [25]  The periodization reveals how blurred the line is between India’s structural tensions with its indigenous populations and the antagonization of Naxalism as a rebel movement. This is because it recognizes the insurgencies of 1948-1951 as existing before the original Naxal uprising in 1969. [26]   [27]  The regions with the largest Naxal bases include Bihar, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh. [28]   [29]

Therefore, it is clear that there existed an antagonistic relationship between the organs of the state, as manufactured by the British and consolidated in modern India, and the indigenous populations’ interests in sovereignty and freedom from exploitation. [30]   [31]  This historical antagonism has been carried into modern India and has manifested itself through Adivasi adoption of Maoist philosophy and modern-day Naxalism. The conflict is therefore endemic to the very structure of the Indian state as an entity and as a project. As stated above, Naxalism as we know it today began as an offshoot to the agrarian Communist movement in West Bengal from the namesake village of Naxalbari. [32]  Given this, modern-day Naxalism cannot be effectively studied without keeping this complex historical and structural context in mind. 

Yet, the vast majority of policy-centric research on this subject tends to treat Naxalism as an isolated rebellion, situated within the context of its own binary bubble of either greed or grievance, and is coded in the language of both elimination and state consolidation. There is rarely mention of actually addressing Naxalite concerns, where Indian military strategists are in line with the Western model of not negotiating with terrorists. [33]   [34]  This language of rebellion and terrorism is challenged if the conflict is situated in its full socio-historical context. There is academic literature that points to the nuanced nature of the relationship between the nation-state and Naxalite uprisings. Curiously, however, this analysis exists more prominently in the fields of Anthropology, Postcolonial Literary Theory and Women and Gender Studies, which are all adjacent to the study of political violence, rather than in research specifically on peacemaking and conflict resolution. [35]   [36]  The unfortunate implication of this is that full contextualization of Naxalite conflict currently exists in fields that do not directly inform policy decisions. In part, this paper works to address this and bridge this gap in contextualization which naturally challenges the current state response of repression, often unlawful vigilantism, and overall dismissal of the Naxalite cause. [37]   [38]

III. Situating the Central Theoretical Frameworks 

In order to understand the Naxalite insurgencies in India both theoretically and empirically, it is important to situate the conflict with relation to the frameworks interrogated in this paper. The three key theoretical lenses this paper interrogates and engages with are: the theory of greed vs. grievance, necropolitics and policy, and the ontology of political violence. [39]   [40]   [41]  Through the case study of Naxalites in India, the paper interrogates not only the adequacy of greed and grievance as a framework for analyzing conflict but crucially, the demonstrably reductive effects of basing policy on this theoretical understanding. [42]   [43]  Secondly, the paper examines these effects through a necropolitical lens, arguing that greed and grievance end up justifying necropolitical policy decisions, characterized by a strategy and accepted rhetoric of elimination and removal. [44]  Lastly, the essay engages with Kalyvas’ more nuanced ontology of political violence, suggesting that full attention to the interaction of private and public contextual factors will help address the disenfranchisement of Naxalites as a way forward for peace. [45]  This paper’s engagement with these theories is introduced below:

• Greed and Grievance 

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s theory posits that insurgent motives may be analyzed on a binary of greed and grievance. Their modeling, which forms the empirical basis of their theory, suggests that in most cases greed, or “a model that focuses on the opportunities for rebellion performs well” as compared to grievance, which has “little explanatory power”. [46]  The use of this understanding within the context of Naxalite insurgencies implies that they are motivated by opportunistic individuals interested in profiting from the abundance of natural resources present within India’s forests in the Red Corridor. This framework leans towards the neoliberal understanding that as rational beings, even rebels are unlikely to get involved in civil war, or the guerrilla-like warfare of Naxalism unless there is personal profit in doing so. [47]   [48]  In many ways, this idea that potential profits from that “primary commodity exports substantially increase civil war risk” is both complementary and foundational to the resource curse explanation of rebel violence. [49]

2. Necropolitics

The lack of “explanatory power” apparently demonstrated by grievances then paves the way for counterinsurgency tactics that are repressive, bound by a logic of elimination, often unlawful, and largely unwilling to engage with the demands and concerns of the insurgents. [50]   [51]   [52]   [53]  Not to mention that this response has been largely ineffective. [54]  I posit that the governmental response in India, which has been shaped by the binary logic of greed being more likely than grievance, takes on a necropolitical character. This paper understands necropolitics as coined and defined by Achille Mbembe, who reworks our understanding of the state through the lens of its power over both bodies and life. [55]  Specifically, he extends Michel Foucault’s theorizing of biopolitics, where state power is mediated through control of living bodies. [56]  To extend this, Mbembe defines necropolitics as the primary mode of state sovereignty, where “to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power”. [57]  In simpler terms, that the sovereignty of the state lies in “the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die”. [58]  Given this, necropolitical state policies refer to policies and responses to citizenries needs aimed at reducing their life chances and privileging certain populations over others to the point where the government seeks to disregard and eliminate the segment of the population which disturbs the state. [59]  One might argue that structurally, the Indian state’s relationship with its indigenous communities is one inherited from British colonialism and has always been necropolitical. [60]  I further this by suggesting that within the context of the persistent Naxalite threat to the Indian state, the logic of greed vs. grievance ends up justifying the necropolitics of the state. Therefore, necropolitical counterinsurgency tactics are the mechanism derived from the understanding of greed and grievance as motivating political violence, which is reductive and crucially, has proved ineffective in abating violence. 

3. The Ontology of Political Violence

Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of the ontology of political violence is one that aims to look beyond the binary of greed and grievance and further, to look outside of the lens of individual rationality and sentiment as being the key motivators of political violence. [61]  This theory broadens the scope for understanding the nature of political violence, looking at it instead as a complex “joint” interaction between private and public variables. [62]  This expansive theorizing is a good starting point in remedying the counterinsurgency tactics that arise from an individualistic understanding of violence. Applying this framework onto Naxalite violence accommodates structural, historical, and individual factors, where Naxalism can be understood through its historically complex relationship to the very activity of state-building itself. Moreover, that such an understanding, in contrast to the greed vs. grievance binary, makes necropolitical counterinsurgency unjustifiable, implicates the state’s inaction in the condition of the Naxalites and indigenous communities in India, and likely allows for policy that is rehabilitative and rooted in engagement with these communities rather than refusing to do so. [63]   [64]

IV. Addressing the Key Counterargument: State Consolidation by Any Means Necessary  

It has been regularly noted that India’s compatibility with the Westphalian nation-state and its status as a legitimate state were precarious from its very beginnings; that India’s diversity and vastness made the consolidation of power, let alone democracy, a monumental task that onlookers were skeptical about at its independence. [65]  When India first became independent in 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru faced the extraordinarily difficult and unprecedented tasks of consolidating India as a democracy by making sure its liberal institutions were sound and established and secondly, of consolidating state power and ensuring sovereignty over its vast territories. [66]  This task was especially difficult given India’s diverse and fragmented geography which is historically made up of independent regions, princely states, colonies, and parts of empires such as the Mughals. [67]  On top of this, India’s immediate geopolitical situation, with the partition into West Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and border disputes with both Nepal and China, made internal state consolidation crucial maintaining the legitimacy of India as an infant state and democracy. 

The counterargument presents itself within this context, of the sovereignty of the Indian state, which must be continually asserted in order to be maintained and where both external and internal threats must be neutralized by any means necessary. [68]   [69]  This is the argument presented as a justification for India’s counterinsurgency tactics towards Naxalites, as far as the military and state are concerned, neutralizing the threat presented by them is paramount and an attempt to understand grievances, for instance, is the misleading action of a weak state. [70]

This argument is most clearly presented in direct discussion of military tactics, specifically as recorded by Colonel. JK Achuthan in his piece “Tackling Maoists: The Andhra Paradigm,” which was notably published in the Indian Defense Review. [71]  Colonel. Achuthan criticizes the central government’s current approach to counterinsurgency as being “sporadic and piecemeal”, arguing instead for a more sustained and aggressive deployment of paramilitary forces aimed at defeating “the Maoist menace”. [72]   [73]  The premise of his argument lies in the notion that Naxalite/Maoist insurgencies in India are working to usurp power from the Indian state and in doing so, threaten its existence and legitimacy. It is explicitly stated that states without an aggressive enough approach at immediate removal of Naxalites have “abdicated their authority over vast regions”, linking Indian sovereignty and consolidation of power with Naxalite insurgents. [74]  Crucially, this policy perspective draws from the centrality of greed as a key motivator over grievance, asserting that  “the Maoists have clearly played upon the sentiments and decades of developmental neglect experienced by poor people in remote regions, to build up a strong base of sympathizers”, suggesting that the grievances of the poor are being co-opted by self-interested Maoists who are “prepared to split India in order to seize power”. [75]  This is the argument of asserting sovereignty by any means necessary, where the means by default disregard insurgents, and use violent, admittedly ineffective, tactics of repression. It is ironic that the article making this argument has in its epigraph a quote by Leon Trotsky asserting that “the armed threat from within is more dangerous than any external threats”. [76]

This essay agrees with the fact that the maintenance of legitimacy of the Indian state is important, especially given its fragmented and precarious design, and that Naxalite violence does have a destabilizing effect on this. However, the any means necessary approach, which prescribes heightened military intervention in order to escalate existing efforts to weed out Naxalites is misguided and goes against the idea of India, which was from its inception, premised upon “unity in diversity”. [77]  This is because the above approach, even if it is effective, asserts its sovereignty by disenfranchising India’s indigenous citizens. To further nullify the above counterargument, this essay recognizes some crucial discrepancies in this line of thought. First, this essay established that the distinction made between “Maoists” and “poor people in remote regions” – a euphemistic, and vague way of referring to indigenous, Adivasi communities – is false because they refer to the same group. But the logic of greed and grievance creates this binary separation between those who function on greed exploiting those with real grievances. [78]   [79]

Instead, I would rebut that this method may consolidate power, but it does not create peace, as can be seen in the continuous resurgence of Naxalite violence even after bouts of governmental counterinsurgency. [80]   [81]   I have argued instead that a better form of state consolidation which fosters peace and legitimacy is by recognizing the complex relationship between Naxals, the indigenous, and the state apparatus, which should aim to address their concerns regarding land and exploitation and invest in their development. [82]   [83]   [84]  That promoting a strategy of violent counterinsurgency and disregard just represses tensions and leaves them unaddressed yet simmering under the surface.

V. Indian Counterinsurgency Tactics: How Greed and Grievance Ignores Complex Intra-State Relationships and Justifies Ineffective, Necropolitical Policy 

The Indian government recognizes all Naxalite activity as criminal activity, and its counterinsurgency tactics are informed by this categorization. [85]   [86]  As stated before, these counterinsurgency methods involve a policy of non-negotiation, increased neglect, and heavy militarization. [87]  These repressive methods have only increased the spread of guerrilla warfare from just West Bengal in the 1960s, to 13 out of India’s 26 states by 2013. [88]  However, there is an immediate contradiction in the fact that the government also recognizes that a lot of the conflict stems from neglect, underdevelopment, and the routine disenfranchisement of India’s rural communities. [89]

 These two contradictory beliefs can be held because of the logic presented by the binary of greed vs. grievance, which acts as a shortcut, or bridge between these two lines of thinking, allowing policymakers to ignore the contextual nuance of Naxalite warfare. Firstly, the notion that greed is a more rational explanation for motives for political violence supports the categorization of Maoists/Naxalites as one-dimensional terrorists and criminal actors interested in personal gain. [90]   [91]   [92]  Secondly, that grievances and ideological bases for engaging in such conflict are used to “[play] upon the sentiments” of the truly poor and disenfranchised who are recruited into the violence by these greedy actors. [93]  This theory therefore promotes the idea that greed coopts grievance and any violence is therefore criminal and must be fought without engagement or negotiation. Furthermore, this logic erases grievances and allows the state to ignore the structural inequalities that may produce conditions for such left-wing uprisings. A framework of greed versus grievance allows the government to ignore the fact that the adoption of the Maoist ideology is reactionary to sustained subjugation under Indian landlords, exploitation of indigenous land for capitalistic purposes, and the colonial legacy embedded within the state apparatus. [94]  Even more so, that (excluding petty theft) the Naxalites have stood to make no profit off of their resource-rich land for the decades in which they have fought against the state (Roy 2010). [95]  If anything, they have been pushed further into the forests, living in harsher, more militarized conditions where one might see no incentive for the kind of greed as suggested in the theory (Roy 2010). [96]  The question becomes, why then do they continue to resist? And in this question, it is difficult to ignore the structural realities of the relationship between the Indian state and its systemic neglect of lower caste and indigenous populations. [97]   [98]

In the case of the Naxalite conflict, the resulting effect of adopting the framework as prescribed by greed and grievance is that of ineffectual, necropolitical policies of counterinsurgency. India’s counterinsurgency strategy against Naxalite violence over the last several decades has been so simultaneously hostile and misguided, that it has led to a proliferation of Naxalite presence across India. These tactics include increased militarization, deliberate neglect and underdevelopment, torture, state-sponsored vigilantism, and even witch hunts. [99]   [100]  Below, I look at how these tactics – guided by the logic of greed vs. grievance – have proved ineffective. Moreover, that these policies reveal the state’s necropolitical character and intentions. 

• Increased Militarization 

The Indian government is known to have established a military presence in the form of their paramilitary forces in the key states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and most with the most recent insurgencies, of the late 2000s and 2010s, in the state of Chhattisgarh. [101]   [102]  The military efforts of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have been continued and accelerated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi since he came into power in 2014 but have largely been unsuccessful given the difficult terrain of Indian jungles have prompted increases in guerrilla warfare since the 1980s onwards. [103]  This military not only targets Naxalites but anyone potentially associated with them; it has pushed them deeper into the forest and forced retaliation which has proliferated violence instead of abating it. [104]

2. Deliberate Neglect and Underdevelopment 

The underdevelopment of tribal and indigenous parts of the country has long been a feature of the Indian state, but it has been significantly exacerbated since indigenous communities in what are considered Naxalite territories are especially targeted and neglected as a means to disincentivize the movement. [105]  Part of this may be traced back to British colonialism, where indigenous resistance was routinely punished with neglect, crop destruction, and drought (Bose & Jalal). [106]  The same tactics of induced famine have been used by the state in rural areas that do not benefit the state and are thus deemed Naxalite. [107]  This is a clear example of necropolitics, where the state apparatus reduces the life chances of entire populations through neglect, removal of access to food for its own political aims. 

Perhaps one of the most well-documented state abuses has been the use of torture to interrogate those though to be associated with the Naxalite insurgency. The horrific techniques of physical torture, sexual abuse, and indefinite, unlawful imprisonment used by police departments across India have been recorded in oral and written personal histories and are a testament to the internal antagonism that exists between the Indian state and its indigenous peoples’ wish for autonomy over their ancestral land. [108]  The illegal use of torture has been condemned by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for violating fundamental human rights in both, the Indian Constitution as well as international law. [109]   [110]  This further points to the shortcomings of an any means necessary approach arrived at from perceptions of greed, which leads to ineffective, unlawful counterinsurgency.  

4. State-sponsored Vigilantism

Another unlawful activity that the state has been involved in is in supporting and promoting the growth of vigilante groups as a counterinsurgency method, most notably Sulwa Judum, which largely recruits urban youth to fight the Naxalites. [111]  One of the main vigilante activities has been the emptying out of villages to stop them from being used by Naxalites as their territory and to stop more Maoist recruitment. [112]  This has led to the displacement of near 100,000 villagers in 2007 alone, without significant improvement on the frontline with Maoist rebels. [113]

5. Witch Hunts 

In more absurd counterinsurgency, increased antagonism towards India’s indigenous because of their association with the Naxalite movement includes a police endeavor to track down supposed witchcraft. In “Anti ‘anti-witchcraft’ and the Maoist insurgency in rural Maharashtra, India” (2009), Amit Desai explores the strange interaction between the state, villagers, and the public imagination of Maoists in producing a witch hunt. [114]  This points to the way in which the state’s counterinsurgency methods have interacted with rural populations to produce medieval outcomes against tribal peoples and perceived Maoists.

Overall, these policies have not only proven ineffective, but they have also put the lives of entire populations, tribes, and communities at risk of elimination and displacement. This targeted violence towards an internal population through the different instruments of the state, both legal and illegal, is inherently necropolitical as it ignores the humanity of the rebelling actors. In this sense, the state actually increases internal hostility and proliferates violence instead of consolidating its legitimacy due to this dynamic of resistance and repression.

VI. Applying the Ontology of Political Violence to Understand and Resolve Structural Tensions.

 The theory of greed vs. grievance isolates insurgencies, like the Naxalite insurgency, out of the structural contexts from which they stem from; ignoring the tensions that have long existed between the indigenous and tribal populations of India and the capitalist class which was previously aligned with the British. Adopting Kalyvas’ ontology of political violence means considering the interaction between the private and structural factors and recognizing that today’s Naxalite insurgency in modern India is a larger manifestation of this historically and socially persistent tension now carried forward into the present as persistent political violence and conflict which remains unresolved. [115]   [116]

Independent India has seen several, relatively distinct, periods of Naxalite insurgencies in opposition to state practices over issues not limited to mining, agriculture, underdevelopment, and land-based industry. [117]  Recognizing nuance means accepting that this violence need not be understood in isolation but recognized within the context of the interaction between the tribal and the state. India has a long and historically complex relationship between tribal land, forests, indigenous agrarian society, and the bureaucratic instruments of the state. These interactions between state mechanisms and local populations have been a source of conflict predating the existence of the modern Indian state. Historians Guha and Gadgil point to the “great variety of property relations” inherent to India, and specifically those between state forestry and social conflict as being a major concern for British rule. India’s history of agrarian resistance and conflict is simultaneous with the creation of the modern state and its prioritization of capitalist private enterprise over tribal and agrarian interests. [118]   [119]

This essay has repeatedly reckoned with this history, but what is important to note is that within the framework of the ontology of political violence, the key mechanism is in this very interaction between the core and the periphery. [120]  This interaction can be hostile and one of conflict, like in the Naxal case, and according to this theory, overcoming it is a question of reconciliation of the core tensions: underdevelopment, neglect, sovereignty over ancestral land. 

In terms of structural underdevelopment, there is evidence that rehabilitative approaches are successful in reducing violence.  This is seen through the labor market program adopted by the Indian government in some regions called MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) the implementation of which coincided with a reduction in Naxalite/Maoist violence, pointing to the importance of good governance and development as a strategy to reduce conflict. [121]  This reduction in conflict has also been more sustained than the temporary reduction that takes place from paramilitary intervention. [122]

There has been little attempt to help develop Naxal regions or attend to their concerns, but what has been established through over 70 years of violence is that military counterinsurgency proves ineffective. If the state does invest in these underdeveloped regions and attends to the concerns of Naxalites instead of assuming their greed, there may be a way out of this deadlock and into a peaceful consolidation of Indian state power. 

Conclusion 

The way in which greed and grievance are limited is that it fails to recognize the complexity of rebel motives. It is important to interrogate the language of rebels and greed and grievance rather than looking at the structural barriers. I argue that using the theoretical framework of greed and grievance empirically allows the state to mobilize itself in ways that are fundamentally necropolitical in its pursuit of the consolidation of power. I address the counterargument that this consolidation of power, prompted by greed and grievance, is necessary by pointing to the inefficacy of aggressive methods the state has taken in order to assert its power and by looking at how the minimal use of development programs have helped reduce violence. This stresses a need to address the inequities at the premise of the state in order to resolve the conflict at its roots and promote peace rather than more repression which has proved only to proliferate violence. 

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[1] Gaurav Khanna and Laura Zimmerman “Development For Peace: The Decline Of Naxalite Violence in India.” Oxford Research Group. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/development-for-peace-the-decline-of-naxalite-violence-in-india.

[2] Daniel Epstein , “ East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”  Harvard International Review  36 no.1: 26-28.

[3] Kalyvas, Stathis N, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”  Perspectives on Politics  1 no.3: 475

[4] Roy, Arundhati. “Walking with the Comrades.”  Outlook India.

[5] Khanna and Zimmerman, “Development For Peace: The Decline Of Naxalite Violence in India.”.

[6] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”, 475.

[7] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.

[8] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”, 26.

[9] Kar, Priyadarshi, “Naxal Movement and Issues of Tribal Development in Odisha (1960 – 2010).” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress  76: 953-61. 

[10] Ibid, 953

[11] Kennedy, Jonathan, and Sunil Purushotham, “ Beyond Naxalbari: A Comparative Analysis of Maoist Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Independent India.”  Comparative Studies in   Society and History , 54 no.4: 832-62. 

[12] Judge, Paramjit S, “Deconstructing Maoism in India: Development, Democracy, and Human Rights.”  Sociological Bulletin , 64 no.2: 240-50. 

[13] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”.

[14] Goswami, Namrata, and Jason Miklian, “India’s Violent Internal Dissent, 2008.”  Economic and Political   Weekly , 43 no.21: 21-22. 

[15] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”.

[16] Ibid, 27

[18] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”  Human Rights Watch . https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/14/being-neutral-our-biggest-crime/government-vigilante-and-naxalite-abuses-indias.

[19] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.

[20] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”, 26.

[21] Bose, Sugata, and Jalal, Ayesha, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy.” Florence: Taylor & Francis Group. 

[25] Peace Research Institute Oslo, “India.”  PRIO. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2020. https://www.prio.org/Data/Conflicts/Conflict/?x=29.

[26] Jaffrelot, Christophe, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”  Les études du Centre d’études et de recherches internationales , Centre de recherches internationales de Sciences Po (CERI): 1-38.

[27] Brass, Paul R.,  “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.”  The Politics of India since Independence  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 303-367.

[28] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”

[29] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38

[30] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy.”.

[31] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38

[33] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”.

[34] Achuthan, JK. “Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm.”  Indian Defense Review, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/tackling-maoists-the-andhra-paradigm/. 

[35] Shah, Alpa, and Judith Pettigrew, “Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in South Asia.”  Dialectical Anthropology   33, no. 3:  225-51.

[36] Roy, Mallarika Sinha. “During West Bengal’s Naxalbari Movement, Women Were Not Merely in the Background.”  The Wire ,  https://thewire.in/women/west-bengal naxalbari movement-women. 

[37] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.

[38] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.

[39] Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”  Oxford Economic Papers , 56 no.4 563–595.

[40] Mbembe, J-A, “Necropolitics.”  Public Culture  15, no.1: 11-40.

[41] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil  Wars.”.

[42] Collier and  Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 563.

[43] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.

[44] Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”.

[45] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”.

[46] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.

[47] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.

[48] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.

[51] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.

[52] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.

[53] Roy, Mallarika Sinha. “During West Bengal’s Naxalbari Movement, Women Were Not Merely in the Background.”. 

[54] Jaffrelot, Christophe. “Forests of the Night.”  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/29/forests-of-night-pub-52519.

[55] Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”.

[57] Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”, 12.

[58] Ibid, 11.

[59] Ibid, 12-14.

[60] Sen, Uditi, “Developing Terra Nullius: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Indigeneity in the Andaman Islands.”  Comparative Studies in Society and History  59, no. 4 (September 29, 2017): 944–73. 

[61] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil

 Wars.”.

[62] Ibid, 457.

[63] Ibid. 

[64] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.

[65] Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen.  An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions .

(Pinceton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[66] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political 

[67] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political 

[68] Ibid. 

[69] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[71] Achuthan, “Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm.”.

[77] Corbridge, Stuart and John Harriss.  Reinventing India: Liberalisation, Hindu nationalism and Popular Democracy . (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

[78] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.

[79] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil

[80] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[81] Peace Research Institute Oslo, “India.”.

[82] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”

[83] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[84] Khanna and Zimmerman, “Development For Peace: The Decline Of Naxalite Violence in India.”.

[85] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”, 26.

[86] Brass, “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.”, 303-367.

[87] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[89] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”

[91] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.

[92] Achuthan, “Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm.”.

[94] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[95] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.

[97] Ibid. 

[98] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[100] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”

[101] Ibid.

[102] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[103] Routray, Bibhu Prasad, “ Left Wing Extremism: 3 Years of the Modi Government.” 

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies  no.1: 5-7. 

[104] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[105] 

[106] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political 

[107] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.

[108] Ibid. 

[109] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”

[110] Amnesty International. “India: Archana Guha: 16 Years Awaiting Justice: The Lack of

Speedy And Effective Redress Mechanisms For Torture Victims ” March 1, 1994. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/184000/asa200081994en.pdf

[111] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Goswami and Miklian, “India’s Violent Internal Dissent, 2008.”, 21-22.

[114] Desai, Amit,  “Anti-‘anti-witchcraft’ and the Maoist Insurgency in Rural Maharashtra,

India.”  Dialectical Anthropology  33, no. 3/4 (2009): 423-39.

[115] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil

 Wars.”, 475.

[116] Brass, “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.”, 303-367.

[117] Kennedy and Purushotham, “Beyond Naxalbari: A Comparative Analysis of Maoist Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Independent India.”,   832-62. 

[118] Brass, “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.”, 303-367.

[119] Guha, Ramachandra, and Madhav Gadgil, “State Forestry and Social Conflict in British

 India.”  Past & Present , 123: 141-77. 

[120] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil

[121] Khanna and Zimmerman, “Development For Peace: The Decline Of Naxalite Violence in India.”.

[122] Ibid.

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Unveiling the complexities of Naxalism: Socio-economic disparities, violence, and resistance in contemporary India

The narratives elucidate how historical marginalisation, compounded by contemporary socio-economic inequities, lays fertile ground for the propagation of naxalite ideology, which promises liberation from caste-based oppression and economic deprivation..

The Naxalite movement, originating from the Naxalbari village in West Bengal, is a significant socio-political uprising in India. Emerged in the late 1960s, it advocates for the rights of oppressed and marginalised rural communities, mainly peasants and tribal groups. Characterised by ultra-left Maoist ideology, it seeks to overthrow the existing power structures through armed struggle and establish a communist state.

In his work titled "Underdevelopment and the Naxal Movement," Rajat Kumar Kujur meticulously examines the intricate interplay between economic disparity and the proliferation of Naxalism in India. Kujur asserts that governmental neglect and inadequately conceived development projects have significantly contributed to the rise of the Naxalite insurgency, its latest manifestation seen in the killing this week of nearly 30 Naxalites in a "clash" with security forces in the tribal-dominated forested region of Bastar in Chhattisgarh.

Central to Kujur's argument is the plight of tribal communities residing in regions abundant in natural resources but plagued by underdevelopment, such as Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. Despite substantial mineral wealth, these communities often derive minimal benefits from extractive industries due to systemic underdevelopment. This disparity fosters deep-seated grievances among the populace, rendering them susceptible to the allure of Naxalite ideology.

Kujur offers a pointed critique of the government's development strategies, which frequently prioritize infrastructure projects over community engagement and addressing underlying socio-economic issues. The case of the Rourkela Steel Plant project exemplifies this disconnect, wherein tribal communities were displaced through land acquisition without adequate measures to mitigate the adverse impacts on their livelihoods. The disconnect between development initiatives and the genuine needs of the local populace exacerbates alienation among tribal communities, thereby providing fertile ground for Naxalite recruitment.

Funding of movement

Furthermore, Kujur delves into the complex funding mechanisms of the Naxalites, elucidating their practice of extorting "levies" from local populations and businesses. He highlights the formidable challenges the government faces in preventing Naxalite infiltration into development projects and stemming the diversion of allocated funds.

In a complementary analysis titled "Oppression and Resistance: An Analysis of Conflict and Violence Through the Shift in Naxal Movement of Bihar, India," authored by Archana and Yagati Chinna Rao, a nuanced examination of the evolving trajectory of the Naxalite movement in Bihar is provided. The authors meticulously dissect the disillusionment pervading among erstwhile supporters, notably within the marginalised Musahar community, who were initially drawn to the movement's promise of combating caste-based oppression but later distanced themselves due to its recourse to violence.

The narrative is deeply entrenched in the historical context of Bihar, elucidating the entrenched caste-based exploitation endured by the Mushahars. This historical oppression provided fertile ground for the propagation of Naxalite ideology, which ostensibly championed armed resistance against systemic exploitation.

Through a rigorous analysis of interviews conducted within Musahar communities, the authors elucidate the initial appeal of the Naxalite movement, particularly its advocacy for land rights and defiance of the status quo. However, a discernible shift in sentiment emerges over time, with the movement's escalating propensity for violence and callous disregard for civilian casualties precipitating disillusionment among the Musahars. This disillusionment, compounded by a palpable lack of substantive progress on core issues such as land reform, led to the estrangement of many Musahars from the Naxalites.

Exploitation of women

In "Naxal Movement in India: A Feminist Critique," Kujur delves into the oft-overlooked aspect of the Naxalite conflict's impact on women, offering a trenchant critique of the movement's failure to address the specific vulnerabilities and exploitation endured by women within its ranks and afflicted communities.

The discourse centres on the pervasive prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict zones, with Kujur drawing a sobering parallel to instances of mass sexual assault as a weapon of war in other contexts like the Rwandan genocide. While acknowledging disparities in scale, Kujur contends that India's scenario presents an equally disconcerting reality, with women ensnared amidst the crossfire of Naxalites, security forces and entrenched patriarchal structures, thereby heightening their vulnerability to violence.

Kujur critiques the Naxalite movement itself for failing to address this issue adequately. He highlights the lack of clear guidelines within the movement to prevent violence against women.  The article doesn't delve into specific examples within the Naxalite ranks, but the implication is clear – the movement that promises liberation may be perpetuating its own form of oppression.

Kujur's critique extends beyond physical brutality to encompass the socio-economic ramifications of the conflict, elucidating how the disruption of traditional gender roles precipitates a surge in domestic violence and exploitation of women's labour. By highlighting instances wherein women are coerced into assuming traditionally male roles, such as procuring forest produce or catering to the needs of Naxalites, owing to displacement or the loss of male kin, Kujur underscores how the conflict perpetuates extant gender disparities within ostensibly liberatory movements.

Facing uncomfortable truths

In reflecting on the collective insights gleaned from the articles examining various facets of the Naxalite movement in India, a multifaceted narrative emerges, shedding light on the complex interplay between socio-economic disparities, violence, and resistance. Collectively, these analyses underscore the profound ramifications of governmental neglect, exploitative development practices, and the ideological evolution of the Naxalite movement on marginalised communities.

At the heart of these discussions lies a poignant indictment of entrenched power structures and systemic injustices that perpetuate cycles of exploitation and violence. The narratives elucidate how historical marginalisation, compounded by contemporary socio-economic inequities, lays fertile ground for the propagation of Naxalite ideology, which promises liberation from caste-based oppression and economic deprivation.

Yet, as the discourse unfolds, a sobering realisation dawns: the very movement purportedly championing social justice often becomes ensnared in its web of violence and coercion. The disillusionment among erstwhile supporters, particularly marginalised communities like the Musahars, underscores the inherent tension between ideological rhetoric and lived realities.

Moreover, the analysis extends beyond the immediate manifestations of violence to illuminate the gendered dimensions of conflict, wherein women bear the brunt of intersecting forms of oppression and exploitation.

In navigating these complexities, the articles collectively challenge us to confront uncomfortable truths about the nature of resistance movements and the complexities inherent in the pursuit of social change. They beckon us to interrogate not only the oppressive structures of power but also the efficacy and integrity of the mechanisms deployed in the pursuit of liberation.

Ultimately, these reflections compel us to envision alternative pathways towards a social transformation that prioritizes inclusivity, equity, and genuine empowerment, transcending the binaries of violence and non-violence, rhetoric and praxis, to forge a more just and equitable society.

(The writer is an undergraduate student at Christ (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru. Views are personal. She can be reached at  [email protected] )

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Naxalbari: How a peasant uprising triggered a pan-India political movement

In the late sixties and early seventies, the naxalbari uprising ignited a fire in the hearts of both the urban youth and the rural masses. eventually, it would go on to determine the very nature of armed revolution in india..

In the summer of 1967, a tiny village on the foothills of the Himalayas was making headlines. Located in the Darjeeling district in West Bengal, Naxalbari lit a fire that would spread across large parts of India and burn till today in the form of the Maoist movement. The peasants of Naxalbari, who mainly worked on tea plantations and at large estates, had for centuries been exploited by the landowning classes and the moneylenders. On March 25, 1967, when one of the sharecroppers in the village tried to till the land from which he had been illegally evicted, the landlord got him brutally beaten up and took away his belongings. Exasperated by the exploitation of the landlords, peasants across the village got together and rose in rebellion.

In the two years before 1967, the seeds of rebellion in Naxalbari were being nurtured by the cadres of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M). A splinter group from the Communist Party of India (CPI), the CPI-M was convinced that a real socialist revolution was possible only when the workers and peasants would launch an armed uprising against the moneyed classes. After the March 25 incident at Naxalbari, they were convinced that the moment had arrived. Charu Mazumdar, one of the leaders of the CPI-M, is believed to have held that “there was an excellent revolutionary situation in the country with all the classical symptoms”. On May 25 that year, he along with the two other key leaders, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal, launched the peasant uprising in Naxalbari. The movement was quick to face the wrath of the state government with the police dealing with protesters with an iron hand. Nonetheless, in the next few days, months and decades, the Naxalbari uprising would go on to determine the very nature of armed revolution in India.

The movement in its current form has altered significantly, both in its nature and objectives. In the late sixties and early seventies, the Naxalbari uprising ignited a fire in the hearts of both the urban youth and the rural masses. In the next few months, similar movements became common in pockets of Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal , in parts of Odisha , all the way till Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra . “For the first time in post-independence India the movement asserted the demands of the poor and landless peasantry in a way that shook the then atrophied Indian political scene,” writes historian Sumanta Banerjee. Also significant was the way the movement appealed to the urban youth, particularly students, from some of the most esteemed universities of the country, for whom the movement exemplified the precise way in which the establishment could be challenged.

Naxalbari and the restless urban India youth

“People are reacting. Naxalbari is an inspiration. It’s an impetus for change,” says Udayan, the fictionalised character of Jhumpa Lahiri in her book “The Lowland.” A student of Presidency University, Udayan’s euphoria at the outbreak of the uprising was evident in the way he challenged his family and joined a group of simmering revolutionary intelligentsia in supporting the Naxal cause. Lahiri’s protagonist set in the background of Calcutta in the 1960s is a reflection of a similar character set in Delhi in Sudhir Mishra’s “Hazaron Khwaishein Aisi”.

Mishra’s protagonist Siddharth Tyabji (played by Kay Kay Menon) was a student in Delhi University. A firebrand Naxalite of the seventies, he decides to leave his life of luxury to move to a village in Bihar in the hope of bringing revolution against the oppressive tendencies of upper caste landlords. Both the characters of Lahiri and Mishra are reflective of a generation of young people, affected beyond measure by the Naxal movement, despite being far removed from the site in which the uprising primarily took place.

In the immediate aftermath of the Naxal uprising, the urban youth of India, several among them being from the privileged sections of society, were remarkably inspired to rise in revolution. Descendants of a generation that had seen Independence, for those in their twenties in the 1960s and 70s, Naxalbari was their moment of bringing change in the way in which their parents’ generation had risen against the colonial state. It was not uncommon to see posters of Naxalbari hanging across the walls of colleges in Calcutta and Delhi. Many students left college to join the Naxalites.

Charu Mazumdar took a number of steps as well to entice students into joining the Naxal movement. He declared that the revolution was not just for the rural masses but rather a fight against everyone who was a ‘class enemy’ which included University teachers, businessmen, police and, of course, the government. Naxalites took over Jadavpur University and Calcutta University. Presidency College in Calcutta and St. Stephens in Delhi became hotbeds for Naxalite activities.

The state, too, could not remain immune for long from the ‘disruptive’ activities of the students and went after them. Reportedly, it was at the house of Congress MLA Somen Mitra where students were held up illegally by the police and government officials. Till date, several upper-middle-class families belonging to these urban centres narrate tales of family members and friends who had to be flown outside the country, or somehow suppressed, in order to escape the wrath of the state.

Naxalbari and the agitating rural masses

The real achievement of the movement, however, lay in the way it shook up rural India. “It continues to arouse them to protest and take up arms against their feudal oppressors, and even take on the Indian state whenever it sends its police to protect these feudal interests, whether in the villages of Bihar or the tribal hamlets of Andhra Pradesh,” writes Banerjee.

In the days immediately following the Naxalbari uprising, a similar uprising took place at Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh. Believed to have its roots in the Telangana rebellion of 1946, the uprising at Srikakulam in October 1967 is said to be inspired by the Naxalbari episode. Two men associated with the communists, Koranna and Manganna, were killed here by the local landlords. In retaliation, the tribal population of the village rose up in arms, looting the landlords of their land and grains. The movement escalated by 1968 when groups of tribal peasants organised themselves into guerilla squads to attack police officers.

Bihar was influenced as well. Movements modeled along the lines of Naxalbari sprung up in the Mushahari region of Muzaffarpur district in north Bihar, in parts of Bhojpur and Patna districts in central Bihar, and in Hazaribagh, Ranchi, Singhbhum and Dhanbad districts of south Bihar. Kerala saw a period of time when the movement was backed by students and resulted in a violent crackdown by the authorities.

Fifty-one years later, the movement is mainly operating in parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. It was dealt with severely, particularly during the Emergency period under the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi. In the ensuing decades, despite a strong surveillance by the Indian police, the movement managed to remain alive although in a significantly altered form.

“The programme of agrarian revolution and anti-imperialist mobilisation have acquired a fresh appeal in the era of globalisation and economic reforms seen in the past two decades and also since the US-led ‘war on terror’ that began in 2001,” writes political scientist Manoranjan Mohanty in his article “Challenges of revolutionary violence: the Naxalite movement in perspective.” He goes on to say that in such an atmosphere tribal people increasingly find themselves distressed by shrinking access to forest resources and large-scale displacement by mega-mining projects. Sumantra Banerjee adds that “if the movement is still surviving, the credit is due not so much to prescience of its leaders, as to the Indian state which, with its abysmal failures in socio-economic areas, persists in nourishing the soil for the continuation of the Naxalite movement.”

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Adrija Roychowdhury leads the research section at Indianexpress.com. She writes long features on history, culture and politics. She uses a unique form of journalism to make academic research available and appealing to a wide audience. She has mastered skills of archival research, conducting interviews with historians and social scientists, oral history interviews and secondary research. During her free time she loves to read, especially historical fiction.   ... Read More

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NAXALISM AS AN INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS OF INDIAN STATES: AN APPRAISAL OF STATE RESPONSE

The Naxal insurgency has challenged the Indian State's internal security since the 1970s decades. It emerged from Naxalbari region of West Bengal as a peasant revolt against socioeconomic injustice. It has gradually deviated from its original objectives which emerged as a violent resistance movement and posed the single biggest threat to internal security in India till 2006. The present study focuses on examining the history of Naxalism with tracing its origin, and causes. Another focused point of this paper is to examine the periodic responses of Indian state governments against the Naxal insurgency. To achieve these objectives, The data has been collected from secondary sources such as various government reports, scholarly views, periodical newspapers and news magazines etc. A major finding of this paper is that an integrated and comprehensive policy has been adopted as a joint effort by the Central and State Governments for the protection, development, rights of local communities, administration, and tackling threats of Naxal activities and Maoist ideology across the country. The Ministry of Home Affairs (GOI) has also taken various important initiatives in the context of Naxalite affected states that has led to tackle Naxal problems and to promote developmental approach in Naxal affected areas of the country.

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India’s remarkable economic development in the last 30 years has earned it the rank of the fastest growing democracy in the world. However, three major issues in the country have threatened its advancement on the international scene, its development and its national unity. These are: the Jammu and Kashmir conflict (as old as independent India itself), the separatist movements in the North Eastern states ( which date back to the early 1950s) and the Naxalite insurgency (which started in West Bengal in the late 1960s). The latter insurgency is the focus of this paper.

In Michael Kugelman ed. India's Contemporary Security Challenges, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011.

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Political violence is a phenomenon that, in the past century, has been growing in alarming proportions across the world. Violence is a common method used to achieve particular ends .The turn of the century make a new goal threat .The most important cause of socio-political violence is the feelings of “Relation Deprivation.”As and when people perceive or believe that injustice and frustrated, and tend to strive violently, as the last option .It may have distabiling consequences for the Sociopolitical violence, its forms, casual factors and implications for the political-systems.

This paper explores the Naxalite insurgency in India in terms of causal mechanisms that lead to the intensification of rural civil conflict by focusing specifically on grievance, mobilisation and government responses to rebellion. Realist theory is inadequate when analysing the causal factors of complex insurgencies and the mechanisms leading to their continuation. This case illustrates some aspects of intra-state conflict in a very large country, in terms of geography and population, and how the rebels have mobilised grievances at local level. New Delhi has addressed the conflict as both a development and a security challenge, and consequently has oscillated between repression and concession in its responses. This approach has resulted neither in reduction of grievances through adequate rural development, nor in consistent armed response to the Naxalite threat. Without a comprehensive and clear set of state responses, the violence is likely to continue.

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The election of an indigenous (Adivasi) lady as the President of India added a new dynamic to the centuriesold Naxal insurgency in India. Not receiving a fair deal after India's independence, the Naxals adopted Maoist ideology. By 2010 the insurgency engulfed one-third of India and posed a serious security challenge. Since then, the Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) governments have adopted different strategies to curtail the insurgency, but it still persists. Against this backdrop, this article briefly discusses the historical antecedents; delineates in detail the operational strategies adopted by the Naxals, the counter-insurgency strategies adopted by the Congress and BJP governments; developmental challenges faced by the Adivasis; and suggests recommendations for how the President of India, an Adivasi herself, can be instrumental in containing the Naxal insurgency threats through empowerment.

Evolving through three generations covering the periods of roughly 1967-1975, 1980-1990 and the late 1990’s till today, the Naxalite Insurgency in India has grown from a peasant revolt to a movement and into an increasingly sophisticated and violent insurgency. Rigorous academic thought and research has detailed and provided in-depth understanding for the roots of the movement, and the many influencers related to evolution from movement to insurgency and of the solutions engaged by the Indian government. Drawing upon this extensive work, the paper will focus instead on the less obvious but more important question of who benefits domestically, regionally and internationally from an India destabilized by a now forty seven year Maoist insurgency or from an independent Maoist state in what is today Eastern India.

R R a a j j a a t t K K u u j j u u r r I I n n s s t t i i t t u u t t e e o o f f P P e e a a c c e e a a n is an independent think tank devoted to research on peace and security from a South Asian perspective. Its aim is to develop a comprehensive and alternative framework for peace and security in the region catering to the changing demands of national, regional and global security.

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