literature review on homegrown terrorism

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Home Grown Terrorism in The United States (US) – Causes, Affiliations and Policy Implications

In the wake of the September 11th, 2001 attacks of the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C, a focus on decapitating and dislodging transnational terrorist groups from safe heavens overseas have shifted research and policy efforts from threats of potential homegrown terror activities. The paper explores causes of home grown terrorism, the role of transnational terror groups and policy implications on effective counter-terrorism in the United States of America while carefully examining the May, 2010 attempted attack of Time Square, New York and April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings as case studies for analysis.

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Zachary Maragia

Terrorism and Political Violence

Joshua D. Freilich

Klisman Murati

A sense of morbid paranoia has engulfed the Western establishment following the acts of 9/11 and consecutive terror acts in Europe, and although it may be easy to conceptualise them in all the same way there are very distinct differences that separate them. This paper explores an innovation in terrorist strategy titled home-grown terrorism, a reincarnation of guerrilla warfare for the modern day freedom fighter. We tackle the established academic paradigm that HGT is synonymous with Islamic radicalization and provide an innovative approach to understanding this new phenomenon that takes Islam out of the heart of this debate and replaces it with credible alternatives that strike at the core of terrorist motivations. Building on the research design of Bakker (2006) we design a global replica that tests our new hypothesis and provides a platform for further original research.

Security Journal

Larry Gaines

tony lemieux , M. Beasley , William (Bill) Harlow , James Lutz

Aaron Winter

At 9:02 on the morning of April 19th, 1995, a bomb went off at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The bomb not only killed over 160 people and injured more than 650, but it also shook the illusion held by many Americans of a nation safe from the political unrest and terrorism outside its borders (an illusion that would be shattered for good on 9/11). In the hours and days following the bombing, the media and law enforcement authorities focused on the Muslim terrorists they believed were responsible, including a Muslim Oklahoma City resident detained at Heathrow Airport in London. On April 20th, one day after bombing, another Oklahoma City resident, Iraqi refugee Suhair al-Mosawi, was attacked in his home as retaliation for the bombing. When Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols – two white, Christian, home-grown anti-government activists – were arrested, what became evident was that these were ‘American’ terrorists. In spite of the initial shock of the bombing and focus on Muslims, this was far from a new phenomenon. For many experts who had been researching and monitoring the extreme right, the bombing was the culmination of a fifteen-year trajectory of violence. In response to the bombing, hearings were held, anti-terror legislation was passed, arrests were made and numerous books written and films made about the phenomenon. Yet, following the events of 9/11, Oklahoma City and the domestic extreme right were pushed to the margins of history and memory, as terrorism and terrorists were redefined as Islamic or Islamist, and Christianity and patriotism were evoked in America’s defense. Throughout American history, both terrorism and extremism have been constructed, evoked or ignored strategically by the state, media and public at different points, in order to disown and demonize political movements whenever their ideologies and objectives become problematic or inconvenient – because they overlap with, and thus compromise, the legitimacy of the dominant ideology and democratic credentials of the state, because they conflict with the dominant ideology or hegemonic order, because they offend the general (voting) public, or because they expose the fallacies of national unity and bi-polar opposition in the face of foreign enemies or international conflicts, such as the war on terror. This chapter looks at how domestic extreme right terrorism has been constructed, represented, evoked or ignored in the American political imagination in the post-civil rights era, with a particular focus on its changing status following the Oklahoma City bombing and 9/11.""

The Open Psychology Journal

Alice LoCicero

Stephen Bowers

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

Kaisa Hinkkainen

Dr. Ben Johnson

Update of original paper September 12, 2017

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Home Grown: How Domestic Violence Turns Men Into Terrorists – review

Joan Smith examines the roots of terrorism, but fails to address the complexities of social inequality

K halid Masood, 52, born Adrian Russell Elms, drove across Westminster Bridge in 2017 mowing down pedestrians and stabbing to death PC Keith Palmer. He had a string of criminal convictions for offences involving violence but since 2003 he had done little to attract police attention. Instead, in Home Grown , Joan Smith argues that Masood had chosen to “privatise his aggressive behaviour, hiding it behind closed doors”, controlling and beating a succession of women.

Smith, a feminist and human rights activist, contends that if victims were believed, domestic abuse was better recognised, policed efficiently and addressed appropriately in court, then numerous acts of terrorism, committed in the name of religion, extreme ideology and misogyny, could – and can – be avoided. So why is this link ignored?

Among the examples she gives is Darren Osborne , who drove his van into a group of Muslims in London’s Finsbury Park; Saïd and Chérif Kouachi , who carried out the attack on the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo ; and Salman Abedi , who detonated a homemade bomb in the foyer of the Manchester Arena with such horrific consequences. Abedi, 17, had punched a fellow female student in the head, telling her that her skirt was too short; he went unpunished, leaving no warning sign, according to Smith’s theory, which could have provided invaluable information to the security forces.

Childhood lives informed wholly or in part by misogyny, poverty, neglect, abuse and racism, Smith argues, shaped, for instance, “the Beatles”, the London gang members who joined Islamic State, the Kouachi brothers and murderous angry young white men such as 22-year-old Elliot Rodger, an “incel” , involuntary celibate. “I will destroy all women because I can never have them,” he declared in his manifesto before killing six and wounding 13 women and men in California in 2014.

Smith quotes Nazir Afzal , a solicitor and former chief crown prosecutor for the north-west of England who has been indefatigable in his pursuit of child sexual exploitation and violence against women: “The first victim of an extremist or terrorist is the woman in his own home.” He points out that 25,000 men are on the radar of police and the security services as potential terrorist threats. “You can’t monitor 25,000. But you shouldn’t have to. You already know which ones to target by flagging up violence against women as a high-risk factor.”

It’s hard to fault the logic: treat what police used to call “domestics” as the serious crime it is and you considerably improve the chances of saving the lives not only of wives, partners and former girlfriends but also members of the public. And yet there is a conundrum at the heart of Home Grown . It reads like a letter from the recent past. And while domestic abuse is a red flag, it is only part of a much more complex challenge. Smith herself asks why “… siblings from the same families grow up in equally damaging circumstances but don’t become abusers let alone terrorists”. Misogyny and terrorism don’t have to be infectious.

Domestic abuse (the reference to “violence” in the book’s title doesn’t allow for coercive control, stalking and harassment that leave no physical wounds but can inflict deep mental scars) is rife. One in five women will experience it in her lifetime. Smith has reported on the cumulative impact of misogyny and violence directed at women and girls for decades. Currently, she co-chairs the London mayor’s violence against women and girls board. In Home Grown , she writes that in the year ending March 2016, the police recorded more than 1 million domestic abuse cases in England and Wales, a fraction of the genuine extent of the crime. Systemic failures to arrest dangerous men continue; refuges are drastically underfunded. But there has been progress and paradoxically in refusing to surrender her pessimism, Smith does feminist activists and their supporters a disservice.

In the book, Smith repeatedly insists the scale and effects of domestic abuse “are played down or even denied altogether”. Attacks, she asserts, are explained away “as though violent men lack self-control and can’t help themselves”. She cites the stereotypes of women who are to blame for allegedly triggering violence – “nagging” wives. “Toxic masculinity,” she argues, “hasn’t received anything like sufficient attention.” Really? In the UK?

Forty years ago, sociologists, R Emerson Dobash and Russell Dobash published a seminal work, Violence Against Wives . “Women’s place in history has most often been at the receiving end of a blow,” they wrote. It was a time when “battered women” were deemed deviant and deserved what they got; men were believed to be innately aggressive. Domineering mothers created perpetrators who married frigid women. Nothing was a violent man’s fault. Presciently, the Dobashes discarded these dominant “theories”, challenged the patriarchy and demanded more “work on the subordination, isolation and devalued status of women in society… and change to the hierarchical family”.

If several large steps haven’t been taken in that direction, if negative female stereotypes aren’t challenged daily, if pressure isn’t constantly exerted on police and the judiciary to do more, if we now don’t have a better understanding of the impact of insecure childhoods, low self-esteem and economic stress in the makings of modern masculinity, then campaigners, #MeToo and women speaking out who have experienced abuse have made no progress at all. And they have.

In the final chapters of Home Grown , Smith offers her unsurprising recommendations, including better police training. She also acknowledges what may prove fruitful for even earlier identification of both potential abusers and terrorists. In the 1990s, research began, and continues, into adverse child experiences (Aces). Ten have been identified, including physical and emotional abuse and growing up in a household that is poor and/or with parents who have problems with drugs and/or alcohol. Four Aces flag up a vulnerable child who requires support that is sensitive to their trauma. The Scottish government, commendably, is adapting many of its policies accordingly.

Domestic abuse is rooted in inequality – that needs to be aggressively tackled but so, too, does bringing the right kind of help to boys such as the Kouachis long before they raise a hand in anger.

Society books
Observer book of the week
Domestic violence

Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?

Lorenzo Vidino
Published 20 January 2009
Political Science
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

39 Citations

Place still matters: the operational geography of jihadist terror attacks against the us homeland 1990–2012, when harry met salafi: literature review of homegrown jihadi terrorism, iraq versus lack of integration: understanding the motivations of contemporary islamist terrorists in western countries, violent radicalization in europe: what we know and what we do not know, defining and understanding the jihadi-salafi movement, radicalization within the somali-american diaspora: countering the homegrown terrorist threat, homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization, the politics of postsecular borders: everyday life and the ground zero mosque controversy, hold your friends close, selected literature on radicalization and de-radicalization of terrorists: monographs, edited volumes, grey literature and prime articles published since the 1960s, related papers.

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What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism

Militant, nationalistic, white supremacist violent extremism has increased in the United States. In fact, the number of far-right attacks continues to outpace all other types of terrorism and domestic violent extremism. Since 1990, far-right extremists have committed far more ideologically motivated homicides than far-left or radical Islamist extremists, including 227 events that took more than 520 lives. [1] In this same period, far-left extremists committed 42 ideologically motivated attacks that took 78 lives. [2] A recent threat assessment by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security concluded that domestic violent extremists are an acute threat and highlighted a probability that COVID-19 pandemic-related stressors, long-standing ideological grievances related to immigration, and narratives surrounding electoral fraud will continue to serve as a justification for violent actions. [3]

Over the past 20 years, the body of research that examines terrorism and domestic violent extremism has grown exponentially. Studies have looked at the similarities and differences between radicalization to violent domestic ideologies and radicalization to foreign extremist ideologies. Research has found that radicalization processes and outcomes — and perhaps potential prevention and intervention points — vary by group structure and crime type. In addition, research has explored promising and effective approaches for how communities can respond to radicalization and prevent future attacks. [4]

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has played a unique role in the evolving literature on terrorism and violent extremism. NIJ has promoted the development of comprehensive terrorism databases to help inform criminal justice responses to terrorism, address the risk of terrorism to potential targets, examine the links between terrorism and other crimes, and study the organizational, structural, and cultural dynamics of terrorism. In 2012, the U.S. Congress requested that NIJ build on these focal points by funding “research targeted toward developing a better understanding of the domestic radicalization phenomenon and advancing evidence-based strategies for effective intervention and prevention.” [5] NIJ has since funded more than 50 research projects on domestic radicalization, which have led to a better understanding of the processes that result in violent action, factors that increase the risk of radicalizing to violence, and how best to prevent and respond to violent extremism.

This article discusses the findings of several NIJ-supported domestic radicalization studies that cover a range of individual and network-centered risk and protective factors that affect radicalization processes, including military involvement and online environments. The article also explores factors that shape the longevity of radicalization processes and their variation by group structure and crime type, and examines factors that affect pathways away from domestic extremism. It concludes with a discussion of how these findings can inform terrorism prevention strategies, criminal justice policy, and community-based prevention programming.

The Characteristics of U.S. Extremists and Individuals Who Commit Hate Crimes

Over the past two decades, research that seeks to understand individual-level engagement in violent extremism has grown tremendously. However, as the research field has developed, a gap has emerged between the increasingly sophisticated arguments that scholars use to explain extremism and the availability of data to test, refine, and validate theories of radicalization.

In 2012, NIJ funded the Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization project to address the data gap in radicalization research. [6] The project created the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database, a cross-ideological repository of information on the characteristics of U.S. extremists. In 2017, NIJ supported a follow-on project [7] that sought to replicate the PIRUS data for individuals in the United States who commit hate crimes. This project yielded the Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) dataset, the first data resource for researchers and practitioners interested in understanding the risk and protective factors associated with committing hate crimes.

PIRUS and BIAS are designed to provide users with information on a wide range of factors that can play a role in a person’s radicalization to criminal activity. [8] These risk and protective factors can be divided into four domains: [9]

The situational characteristics of the crimes, including whether the acts were premeditated or spontaneous, involved co-conspirators, or were committed while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
The characteristics of the victims, including whether targets were “hard” (for example, military bases, secure facilities) or “soft” (for example, businesses, public areas, private civilians) and whether the individuals had prior relationships with their victims.
Factors that produce the social bonds that may protect against mobilization to violence, such as marriage, military service, work experience, and advanced education.
Factors that may act as radicalization mechanisms and risk factors for violence, such as previous criminal activity, membership in extremist or hate groups, substance use, and mental illness.

The PIRUS and BIAS data have been used to generate insights on a range of important topics related to hate crime and extremism; however, there are three overarching findings common to both datasets: diversity in beliefs, diversity in behaviors, and diversity in characteristics.

Diversity in Beliefs

Although it is not uncommon for a particular ideology to dominate the public discourse around extremism, the PIRUS and BIAS data indicate that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes routinely come from across the ideological spectrum, including far-right, far-left, Islamist, or single-issue ideologies. These ideologies break down into particular movements, or sub-ideologies. For instance, in 2018, the PIRUS data identified extremists associated with several anti-government movements, Second Amendment militias, the sovereign citizen movement, white supremacy, ecoterrorism, anarchism, the anti-abortion movement, the QAnon conspiracy theory, and others. [10] The prevalence of particular movements can ebb and flow over time depending on political climate and law enforcement priorities, but at no point in recent U.S. history has one set of beliefs completely dominated extremism or hate crime activity. [11] Furthermore, the PIRUS and BIAS data reveal that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes are often motivated by overlapping views. For instance, it is common for individuals from the anti-government militia movement to adopt views of white supremacy or for those from the extremist environmental movement to take part in anarchist violence. Nearly 17% of the individuals in PIRUS were affiliated with more than one extremist group or sub-ideological movement, and nearly 15% of the individuals in BIAS selected the victims of their hate crimes because of multiple identity characteristics, such as race and sexual orientation. [12]

Diversity in Behaviors

Although radicalization to violence has been a primary topic in extremism and hate crime research, the PIRUS and BIAS data indicate that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes often engage in a range of violent and nonviolent criminal activities. Indeed, 42% of PIRUS and nearly 30% of BIAS individual actors engaged exclusively in nonviolent crimes, such as property damage, financial schemes, and illegal demonstrations. [13] Moreover, the violent outcomes represented in the PIRUS and BIAS data vary in scope and type. For instance, approximately 15% of those in BIAS committed or planned to commit mass casualty crimes, while the remaining subjects targeted specific victims. [14] Similarly, nearly 50% of those in BIAS did not premeditate their crimes but rather acted spontaneously after chance encounters with their victims. [15]

Diversity in Characteristics

One of the more common conclusions of recent research on radicalization is that no single profile accurately captures the characteristics of the individuals who commit extremist and hate crimes. [16] The PIRUS and BIAS data support this finding, revealing that background characteristics vary considerably depending on ideological affiliations. For instance, white supremacists in PIRUS tend to be older and less well-educated and are more likely to have criminal histories than those who were inspired by foreign terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or those associated with the extremist environmental or anarchist movements. [17] Despite these differences, some risk and protective factors tend to separate violent from nonviolent individuals, regardless of ideology. [18] In the PIRUS data, individuals with criminal records, documented or suspected mental illness, and membership in extremist cliques are more often classified as violent, while those who are married with stable employment backgrounds are more likely to engage in nonviolent crimes. [19] Similarly, in BIAS, violent individuals are more likely to co-offend with peers, have criminal histories that include acts of violence, and offend while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. [20]

Military Experience and Domestic Violent Extremism

According to current statistics, individuals with military backgrounds represent 11.5% of the total known extremists who have committed violent and nonviolent crimes in the United States since 1990. [21] Although this percentage seems small, there has been a growing trend of (former) military members engaging in extremist offenses in recent years. An average of seven people with U.S. military backgrounds per year committed extremist crimes between 1990 and 2010. That rate has risen to an average of 29 people per year over the past decade. Also worth noting is that more than half (52%) of extremists with military experience are identified as violent.

Given the growth of violent domestic extremism among military personnel, the relationship between military service and radicalization has become a major concern. Prior NIJ-funded studies have identified military experience as a potential risk factor for attempted and actual terrorism. [22] The likelihood of radicalization and radicalization to violence increases when individuals have already left military service. [23] This research suggests that military service is not a social bond that inhibits extremist violence.

NIJ studies have also shown that individuals with military experience may be susceptible to recruitment by domestic violent extremist groups due to their unique skills, which an extremist group may perceive as contributing to the success of a terrorist attack. [24] Also, transitioning from military to civilian life appears to be a pull factor for engaging in violent extremism. [25] Indicators for potential involvement in extremism may include a lack of a sense of community, purpose, and belonging. If these indicators are identified early, community stakeholders — in partnership with military agencies — could have an opportunity to intervene. Although such knowledge is valuable, the role of military service in radicalization to violent extremism still requires study.

Differences in Violent Extremist Characteristics Between Military Veterans and Civilians

In 2019, NIJ funded researchers at the University of Southern California to study the link between military service and violent domestic extremism. They are also examining the differences between military veteran and civilian extremists in terms of their characteristics and social networks. [26] Although this study is ongoing, preliminary findings have been drawn from a secondary analysis of the American Terrorism Study data, which contain information on people federally indicted for terrorism-related crimes by the U.S. government between 1980 and 2002. [27] With these data, the researchers compared the demographic and homegrown violent extremist characteristics among military veterans and civilians. The demographic characteristics considered were age, race, sex, marital status, and education level. The homegrown violent extremist characteristics consisted of the length of group membership, type of terrorist group, role in the group, mode of recruitment into the group, primary target, and the state of indictment.

The research team observed significant differences between military veteran and civilian extremists across both demographic and homegrown violent extremist characteristics. First, they found that military veteran and civilian extremists differed with respect to age, sex, and marital status. Specifically, individuals with military service who engaged in homegrown violent extremism were more likely to be older, male, and in marital or cohabiting relationships than civilians who engaged in homegrown violent extremism. Second, analyses revealed that, compared to civilian extremists, military veteran extremists had greater affiliations with right-wing terrorist groups (versus left-wing, international, or other terrorist groups) and were more likely to hold leadership positions within these groups and either initiate a terrorist group or unite groups together. Finally, other than government/federal officials or buildings, which were the primary targets across all groups, the primary targets of veterans were diverse social groups, such as those belonging to racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups.

Implications of Transitioning Out of Military Service

The University of Southern California researchers intend to supplement these results by interviewing members from the social networks of military veterans and civilians who committed homegrown violent extremism between 2003 and 2019. The findings produced thus far are important, especially because the association between military experience and terrorism is understudied. Ultimately, these results suggest that people who transition from active duty to veteran status experience a nuanced, complex, and potentially lifelong process. Veterans who encounter difficulties during this transition and desire — but lack — a sense of community, purpose, and belonging after leaving the military may be attracted to the pull of domestic extremist groups. In these groups, veterans can lead and collaborate with others of similar ideologies to accomplish a shared mission akin to what they did in the military. For example, the military veterans in this study largely endorsed right-wing values; thus, perhaps something about the narratives of right-wing extremist groups compensates for the void felt when leaving military service. With such insights in mind, researchers recommend forming partnerships among civilians, the military, and veteran communities to identify and prevent violent extremism among U.S. veterans.

Longevity of Terrorist Plots in the United States

A major question for researchers and counterterrorism officials is how to prevent the next act of terrorism or violent extremism from occurring. As such, much attention has been paid to disrupted plots and successful interdiction tactics that ultimately led to arrest and indictment. Less attention has been given to what those responsible for acts of terrorism and violent extremism do to successfully evade detection and arrest. In other words, the focus has not been on what terrorists and violent extremists are doing “right.”

In 2013, NIJ funded researchers at the University of Arkansas’ Terrorism Research Center to study the sequencing of precursor behaviors for individuals who have been federally indicted in the United States for charges related to terrorism and domestic violent extremism. [28] Based on preliminary analyses, the researchers somewhat serendipitously observed lifespan differences between lone actors and those operating in small cells or more formalized groups. Consequently, it warranted a more comprehensive examination of the factors that increased the likelihood of terrorists and violent extremists evading arrest. NIJ funded the researchers to identify behaviors that improved the chances of plot longevity — or the ability for terrorists to commit acts of terrorism and evade capture by law enforcement — for individuals federally indicted on terrorism-related charges. [29]

Data on the longevity of terrorism and violent extremism plots come from the American Terrorism Study, the longest-running project on terrorism and violent extremism in the United States. With NIJ funding that began in 2003, [30] the American Terrorism Study maintains the most comprehensive dataset on temporally linked precursor behaviors and outcomes of terrorism and violent extremism plots. To examine plot longevity, the Arkansas researchers [31] limited their analyses to 346 federally indicted individuals who were linked to the planning or completion of a terrorist attack in the United States from 1980 to 2015. Longevity, or duration of their “terrorist lifespan,” is based on the date of a person’s involvement in their first preparatory activity and their “neutralizing” date (usually the date of arrest).

One of the key findings from this research is a correlation between significant declines in the lifespan of individual terrorists and major changes to the U.S. Attorney General guidelines established to combat terrorism and violent extremism in the United States. For example, those who began in the mid- to late 1970s, following Watergate, COINTELPRO, and the Privacy Act, had a median longevity of 2,230 days. In contrast, the median lifespan of terrorists who began operating in the mid-1980s decreased to 1,067 days. Later, in the early 2000s, it fell even further to 99 days, which reflects the FBI’s tighter focus on terrorism and violent extremism and guidelines granting law enforcement more discretion in the investigative techniques employed.

The researchers also found that the lifespans of terrorists and violent extremists vary significantly depending on key attributes, such as ideology, sex, and educational attainment. For example, environmental and extreme left-wing violent extremists tend to sustain themselves for relatively long periods of time (5.4 and 4.3 years, respectively), while the longevity of extreme right-wing and radical Islamist terrorists is, on average, two years or less.

Females federally indicted on charges related to terrorism and violent extremism also tend to have increased longevity compared to male terrorists and violent extremists, perhaps because of females’ disproportionate representation in longer-lasting extreme left-wing and environmental movements, as well as increased representation in left-wing group leadership roles. Females involved in terrorism and extremism are usually more educated, which is also associated with extended longevity. Further, females who play support roles in terrorism and extremist groups — as is more often the case for right-wing extremists and radical Islamist terrorists — also appear to have longer lifespans. In contrast, males have been more likely to engage in overtly criminal preparatory behavior and actual incident participation than females. Both types of behavior are significantly more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement and would be expected to shorten the longevity of both male and female terrorists and violent extremists.

Finally, longevity also depends on a plot’s sophistication and the extent of the planning required to carry it out. Less sophisticated plans or executed plots, or those using simpler and less advanced weapons, are generally associated with longer lifespans for terrorists and violent extremists. More sophisticated plots may provide greater potential for missteps by terrorists and violent extremists and leads for law enforcement. Additionally, more sophisticated plots are associated with more meetings with accomplices and necessitate extra preparation. Importantly, both the number of meetings and preparatory activities have been found to be negatively related to the successful completion of terrorist incidents, suggesting that early intervention or arrest are also linked to these two factors.

How Domestic Terrorists Use the Internet

Terrorists and terrorist groups use the internet to share propaganda and recruit new members. The internet provides a platform to strengthen their members’ commitment to the cause, encourage radicalized individuals to act, and coordinate legal and illegal activities. A recently published meta-analysis concluded, “Exposure to radical content online appears to have a larger relationship with radicalization than other media-related risk factors (for example, television usage, media exposure), and the impact of this relationship is most pronounced for the behavioral outcomes of radicalization.” [32]

In 2014, NIJ funded a study to develop a deeper understanding of what domestic terrorists discuss on the internet. [33] The study analyzed 18,120 posts from seven online web forums by and for individuals interested in the ideological far right. The research team read each post’s content and coded it for either quantitative or qualitative analyses depending on the project’s objective.

The project provided several important insights into terrorist use of the internet. First, the web forums included discussions about a variety of beliefs, such as gun rights, conspiracy theories, hate-based sentiments, and anti-government beliefs; however, the intensity of ideological expression was generally weak. The nature of the online environments that far-right groups use likely facilitates the diffusion of ideological agendas.

Second, the amount and type of involvement in these forums played a key role in radicalization. Posting behaviors changed over time. Users grew more ideological and radical as other users reinforced their ideas and connected their ideas to those from other forums. (It is important to note that the study focused on online expression and not conversion to offline violence.)

Third, far-right extremists were primarily interested in general technology issues. Discussions focused on encryption tools and methods (such as Tor), internet service providers and social media platforms, and law enforcement actions to surveil illicit activities online. These far-right extremists appeared more interested in defensive actions than sophisticated schemes for radicalization or offensive actions such as criminal cyberattacks.

The study used social network analyses to visualize user communications and network connections, focusing on individuals’ responses to posts made within threads to highlight interconnected associations between actors. The social network analyses indicated that far-right forums have a low network density, which suggests a degree of information recycling between key actors. The redundant connections between actors may slow the spread of new information. As a result, such forums may inefficiently distribute new knowledge due to their relatively insular nature. They may also be generally difficult to disrupt, as the participants’ language and behaviors reinforce others and create an echo chamber. These networks are similar to others observed in computer hacker communities and data theft forums, [34] which suggests that there may be consistencies in the nature of online dialogue regardless of the content.

The study also indicated that extreme external events usually did not affect posting behaviors. However, there were significant differences associated with conspiratorial, anti-Islamic, and anti-immigrant posts after the Boston Marathon bombing. It may be that violence or major disruptive events inspired by jihadist ideologies draw great responses from far-right groups relative to their own actions. The same appears to be true for the 2012 presidential election; the study observed increases both in the number of posts in the month after the election and in overt signs of individual ties or associations to far-right movements through self-claim posts, movement-related signatures, and usernames. These findings are consistent with other recent work comparing online mobilization after the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. [35]

Entering and Exiting White Supremacy in the United States

An NIJ-funded research team led by RTI International examined the complex social-psychological processes involved with entering, mobilizing, and exiting white supremacy in the United States. [36] The researchers conducted in-depth life history interviews with 47 former members of white supremacist groups in 24 states and two provinces in Canada. [37]

For this project, white supremacy referred to groups that reject essential democratic ideals, equality, and tolerance. A key organizing principle is that inherent differences between races and ethnicities position white and European ancestry above all others. Those interviewed were authoritarian, anti-liberal, or militant nationalists who had a general intolerance toward people of color. They had used violence to achieve their goals and supported a race war to eradicate the world of nonwhite people. [38]

The study led to several key findings about entering and exiting white supremacy in the United States.

Hate as Outcome

The study found that most people do not join white supremacist groups because they are adherents of a particular ideology. Rather, a combination of background factors increases the likelihood that someone will be susceptible to recruitment messaging (for example, propaganda). [39] Previous research has highlighted that hate or adherence to racist violence was an outcome of participation in white supremacist groups. [40] The commitment to white supremacist groups lacked a preexisting sense of racial grievance or hatred that motivated an individual to join the racist movement. [41] One former member reported having “no inkling of what [Nazism] really was other than what you saw on TV.” [42] The NIJ-funded study found that people joined white supremacist groups because they were angry, lonely, and isolated, and they were looking for opportunities to express their rage. [43]

Vulnerabilities as Precondition

The former white supremacists had various personal, psychological, and social vulnerabilities that made them strive for what psychologists have framed as developing a new possible self. [44] High levels of negative life experiences — including, but not limited to, maladjustment, abuse, and family instability — potentially make a person imagine a new, different, and more fulfilled self. [45] They can imagine an empowered future self with friends and a purpose. Extremist recruiters prey on these desires. The former white supremacists indicated high levels of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse as children; strained personal relationships; and general difficulties throughout their lives. These struggles made white supremacy seem like an improvement to their sense of self, as the group came with a ready-made set of friends, social events, and camaraderie among individuals with similarly rough pasts. Besides these social benefits, white supremacist groups provided members with a deeper sense of belonging and explanation for their life troubles, rooted in a sense of racial pride and empowerment.

Gradual, Nonlinear Exit

Most white supremacists in this country do not remain members for life. Rather, group membership is often temporary (but not always short-lived), and many become disillusioned and burnt out over time. The study showed that the exit process is gradual, as the former white supremacists reported slowly becoming dissatisfied with the ideology, tactics, or politics of a group. [46] They described an identity that became filled with negative encounters with other members, even breeding distrust. White supremacy requires the development of a totalizing identity that results in isolating members from nonextremists. This marginalization fosters a sense of social stigma that makes white supremacy less attractive and further supports disengagement and deradicalization processes.

This research reported that emotional dynamics create trajectories of development and decline in white supremacy and the role of disillusionment among the reasons why members exit the organization. [47] These analyses offer an explanation for how white supremacist organizations maintain solidarity even though many individuals stay in groups after losing their ideological commitment. They also demonstrate that exit from a group is a nonlinear process. [48] Meanwhile, in other analyses, the study team reported that, even after an individual exits a group, their white supremacist identity lingers with a residual effect. [49] That research likened hate to an addiction that creates an uncontrollable emotional, social, and cognitive hold over adherents, which has the ability to pull former members back into hate almost against their will. [50] The former white supremacists shared experiences in which music, environments, and images created desire, longing, and curiosity about their old lifestyle within the organization.

Opportunities

The NIJ-funded study found several blind spots in terms of identification and awareness among criminal legal system practitioners and other responders. This resulted in several missed opportunities for intervention and practical solutions. Exhibit 1 details four areas in which the study findings can contribute to criminal justice policy and practice. [51]

Exhibit 1. Missed Opportunities for Intervention and Practical Solutions

Policy Implications

The results of the NIJ-funded studies discussed in this article have several implications for policy and practice. First, they illustrate that extremism is complex and that successfully countering it will require a unified response that bridges law enforcement, community partners, health officials, and concerned citizens. To facilitate a shared understanding of the extremist threat, stakeholders engaged in counterextremism efforts routinely use findings from these studies to provide training to concerned family and friends about potential radicalization warning signs and how best to respond. They also use the findings to educate law enforcement, corrections and probation officers, and mental health professionals on the complexity of radicalization so they can accurately gauge and respond to extremism in their communities. These types of training initiatives will remain critical to counterextremism efforts as the threat continues to evolve.

Second, the studies highlight the importance of focusing criminal justice resources on domestic extremism. Although international terrorist organizations remain a threat, these studies show that domestic extremists continue to be responsible for most terrorist attacks in the United States. Historically, far fewer resources have been dedicated to the study of domestic extremism, leaving gaps in our understanding about terrorist trends, recruitment and retention processes, and online behaviors. Due in large part to NIJ’s commitment to funding research on domestic radicalization, considerable progress has recently been made in addressing these topics. But this work will need to continue if we hope to keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat landscape.

Finally, the studies highlight the need for communitywide partnerships that link government and nongovernment organizations in support of community-level prevention and intervention programs. Law enforcement and criminal justice resources for countering extremism are finite and scarce, making it imperative that we focus our research and support efforts on understanding what occurs before a crime takes place. As the studies reviewed in this article show, there is often an opportunity to intervene to help individuals exit extremism before they engage in criminal activity. Similarly, prevention efforts are needed in digital spaces where extremist narratives often flourish. Achieving these goals will require community members, policymakers, and practitioners to commit to supporting counterextremism efforts.

About This Article

This article was published as part of NIJ Journal issue number 285 . This article discusses the following awards:

“Exploring the Social Networks of Homegrown Violent Extremist Military Veterans,” award number 2019-ZA-CX-0002
“Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis,” award number 2013-ZA-BX-0001
“Radicalization and the Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability,” award number 2015-ZA-BX-0001
“Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents,” award number 2003-DT-CX-0003
“Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR),” award number 2012-ZA-BX-0005
“A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders,” award number 2017-VF-GX-0003
“Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA,” award number 2014-ZA-BX-0005
“Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology To Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence,” award number 2014-ZA-BX-0004

Opinions or points of view expressed in this document represent a consensus of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position, policies, terminology, or posture of the U.S. Department of Justice on domestic violent extremism. The content is not intended to create, does not create, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.

[note 1] Celinet Duran, “ Far-Left Versus Far-Right Fatal Violence: An Empirical Assessment of the Prevalence of Ideologically Motivated Homicides in the United States ,” Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society 22 no. 2 (2021): 33-49; Joshua D. Freilich et al., “ Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) ,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26 no. 2 (2014): 372-384; and William Parkin, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak, “ Did Far-Right Extremist Violence Really Spike in 2017? ” The Conversation, January 4, 2018.

[note 2] Duran, “ Far-Left Versus Far-Right Fatal Violence ”; Freilich et al., “ Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) ”; and Parkin, Freilich, and Chermak, “ Did Far-Right Extremist Violence Really Spike in 2017? ”

[note 3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Threat Assessment: October 2020 , Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020, 4.

[note 4] Allison G. Smith, How Radicalization to Terrorism Occurs in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us , Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 2018, NCJ 250171; and Michael Wolfowicz, Badi Hasisi, and David Weisburd, “ What Are the Effects of Different Elements of Media on Radicalization Outcomes? A Systematic Review ,” Campbell Systematic Reviews 18 no. 2 (2022).

[note 5] Aisha Javed Qureshi, “ Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism: A National Issue Within a Global Context ,” NIJ Journal 282, August 2020.

[note 6] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) ,” at the University of Maryland, award number 2012-ZA-BX-0005.

[note 7] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders ,” at the University of Maryland, College Park, award number 2017-VF-GX-0003.

[note 8] The PIRUS and BIAS datasets are based on the same data collection methodologies and share similar goals. Both contain random samples of individuals who committed crimes in the United States that were motivated by their extremist ideologies or hate beliefs. The PIRUS dataset includes 2,225 individuals from 1948 to 2018, and BIAS is based on 966 cases from 1990 to 2018. Both datasets are collected entirely from public sources, including court records, online and print news, and public social media accounts. Both seek to capture individuals who promoted a range of extremist ideologies and hate beliefs. PIRUS, for instance, includes those whose crimes were associated with anti-government, white supremacist, environmental, anarchist, jihadist, and conspiracy theory movements. Similarly, BIAS includes individuals who selected victims based on their race, ethnicity, and nationality; sexual orientation and gender identity; religious affiliation; age; or disability.

[note 9] Michael Jensen and Gary LaFree, “ Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) ,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2012-ZA-BX-0005, December 2016, NCJ 250481; and Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth A. Yates, and Sheehan E. Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders ,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2017-VF-GX-0003, February 2021, NCJ 300114.

[note 10] Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) ,” Research Brief, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], May 2020.

[note 11] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) .”

[note 12] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders .”

[note 13] Jensen and LaFree, “ Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) ”; and Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders .”

[note 14] Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “ Characteristics and Targets of Mass Casualty Hate Crime Offenders ,” College Park, MD: START, 2020.

[note 15] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders .”

[note 16] John Horgan, “ From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives From Psychology on Radicalization Into Terrorism ,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 no. 1 (2008): 80-94.

[note 17] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) .”

[note 18] Gary LaFree, “ Correlates of Violent Political Extremism in the United States ,” Criminology 56 no. 2 (2018): 233-268; Michael A. Jensen, Anita Atwell Seate, and Patrick A. James, “ Radicalization to Violence: A Pathway Approach To Studying Extremism ,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32 no. 5 (2020): 1067-1090; and Michael A. Jensen et al., “ The Link Between Prior Criminal Record and Violent Political Extremism in the United States ,” in Understanding Recruitment to Organized Crime and Terrorism, ed. David Weisburd et al. (New York: Springer, 2020), 121-146.

[note 19] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) .”

[note 20] Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “ Violent Hate Crime Offenders ,” College Park, MD: START, 2020.

[note 21] Unless otherwise noted, all data reported in this section originate from Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, Radicalization in the Ranks: An Assessment of the Scope and Nature of Criminal Extremism in the United States Military , College Park, MD: START, January 2022. In this project, extremists with military backgrounds consisted of active and nonactive personnel from all military branches and reserves, aside from the Space Force and Coast Guard Reserves. Individuals who were honorably discharged, dishonorably discharged, or otherwise violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice were excluded from the study. Also excluded were those discharged through court martial unless information about their criminal proceedings was publicly available.

[note 22] Allison G. Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us , Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 2018, NCJ 251789.

[note 23] Jensen and LaFree, “ Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) .”

[note 24] Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States .

[note 25] Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States .

[note 26] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Exploring the Social Networks of Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) Military Veterans ,” at the University of Southern California, award number 2019-ZA-CX-0002.

[note 27] Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section come from Hazel R. Atuel and Carl A. Castro, “ Exploring Homegrown Violent Extremism Among Military Veterans and Civilians ,” The Military Psychologist 36 no. 3 (2021): 10-14.

[note 28] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Sequencing Terrorists? Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis ,” at the University of Arkansas, award number 2013-ZA-BX-0001.

[note 29] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Radicalization and the Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability ,” at the University of Arkansas, award number 2015-ZA-BX-0001.

[note 30] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents ,” at the Board of Trustees, University of Arkansas, award number 2003-DT-CX-0003.

[note 31] Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section come from Brent L. Smith et al., “ The Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability ,” Final Summary Overview, award number 2015-ZA-BX-0001, January 2021, NCJ 256035.

[note 32] Wolfowicz, Hasisi, and Weisburd, “ What Are the Effects of Different Elements of Media on Radicalization Outcomes ?”

[note 33] Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section come from Thomas J. Holt, Steve Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, “ An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology To Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence ,” Final Summary Overview, award number 2014-ZA-BX-0004, January 2021, NCJ 256038.

[note 34] Thomas J. Holt and Adam M. Bossler, “Issues in the Prevention of Cybercrime,” in Cybercrime in Progress: Theory and Prevention of Technology-Enabled Offenses (New York: Routledge, 2016), 136-168.

[note 35] Ryan Scrivens et al., “ Triggered by Defeat or Victory? Assessing the Impact of Presidential Election Results on Extreme Right-Wing Mobilization Online ,” Deviant Behavior 42 no. 5 (2021): 630-645.

[note 36] Matthew DeMichele, Peter Simi, and Kathleen Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA ,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2014-ZA-BX-0005, January 2021, NCJ 256037.

[note 37] The project included three human rights groups (Anti-Defamation League, Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Southern Poverty Law Center) and Life After Hate, an organization that assists white supremacists in exiting the movement. The project partners helped develop a semi-structured interview protocol and provided contact information for initial interviewees. The study used a snowballing technique from these initial interviewees to identify former white supremacists who were in the public sphere to determine if they were interested in being interviewed. The interviews were conducted in places where the individuals would be comfortable, including hotel rooms, homes, places of work, coffee shops, restaurants, and parks. The interviews were in-depth accounts (lasting 6-8 hours each) of individuals’ backgrounds (for example, how they grew up), entry into white supremacy (for example, how they learned about the movement), mobilization (for example, rank and use of violence), and exit process (for example, initial doubts and barriers to exit). The completion of the project was a collaboration with equal contributions from Kathleen Blee, Matthew DeMichele, and Pete Simi and support from Mehr Latif and Steven Windisch.

[note 38] Steven Windisch et al., “ Understanding the Micro-Situational Dynamics of White Supremacist Violence in the United States ,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12 no. 6 (2018): 23-37.

[note 39] DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 40] Kathleen M. Blee et al., “ How Racial Violence Is Provoked and Channeled ,” Socio 9 (2017): 257-276.

[note 41] Blee et al., “ How Racial Violence Is Provoked and Channeled .”

[note 42] Blee et al., “ How Racial Violence Is Provoked and Channeled ,” 265.

[note 43] DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 44] Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius, “ Possible Selves ,” American Psychologist 41 no. 9 (1986): 954-969.

[note 45] Unless otherwise noted, all data in the remainder of this paragraph come from DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 46] All data in this paragraph come from DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 47] Mehr Latif et al., “ How Emotional Dynamics Maintain and Destroy White Supremacist Groups ,” Humanity & Society 42 no. 4 (2018): 480-501.

[note 48] Latif et al., “ How Emotional Dynamics Maintain and Destroy White Supremacist Groups .”

[note 49] Pete Simi et al., “ Addicted to Hate: Identity Residual Among Former White Supremacists ,” American Sociological Review 82 no. 6 (2017): 1167-1187.

[note 50] Simi et al., “ Addicted to Hate .”

[note 51] DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

About the author

Steven Chermak, Ph.D., is a professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University and studies domestic terrorism and cyber offending. Matthew DeMichele, Ph.D., is a senior research sociologist at RTI and has conducted research on correctional population trends, risk prediction, terrorism/extremism prevention, and program evaluation. Jeff Gruenewald, Ph.D., is a professor and director of the Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas and studies domestic violent extremism and hate crime. Michael Jensen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, where he leads the team on extremism in the United States. Raven Lewis, MA, is a Ph.D. candidate at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey, and a former research assistant at the National Institute of Justice, where she supported research efforts focused on domestic radicalization and violent extremism. Basia E. Lopez, MPA, is a social science analyst at the National Institute of Justice, where she leads the firearm violence and mass shootings research portfolio and co-leads the violent extremism and domestic radicalization research portfolio.

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Terrorism preliminaries, migration as a cause of transnational terrorism, the effects of terrorism on attitudes towards immigrants, electoral behavior and immigration policies, terrorism and migration: an overview.

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 December 2020

This article provides an overview of the literature on the relationship between terrorism and migration. It discusses whether and how (1) migration may be a cause of terrorism, (2) terrorism may influence natives' attitudes towards immigration and their electoral preferences and (3) terrorism may lead to more restrictive migration policies and how these in turn may serve as effective counter-terrorism tools. A review of the empirical literature on the migration–terrorism nexus indicates that (1) there is little evidence that more migration unconditionally leads to more terrorist activity, especially in Western countries, (2) terrorism has electoral and political (but sometimes short-lived) ramifications, for example, as terrorism promotes anti-immigrant resentment and (3) the effectiveness of stricter migration policies in deterring terrorism is rather limited, while terrorist attacks lead to more restrictive migration policies.

Shortly after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13769, called ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’ (Trump Reference Trump 2017 ). This order instituted a number of immigration restrictions, especially concerning immigration and travel from Muslim-majority countries to the United States. Explicitly referring to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, Trump ( Reference Trump 2017 , 8977) argued that these restrictions were necessary because

[n]umerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes since 11 September 2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas, or who entered through the United States refugee resettlement program.

Thus the purpose of these immigration restrictions (which included suspending the issuance of visas and denying immigrants from certain countries entry into the United States) was ‘to protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States’ (Trump Reference Trump 2017 , 8977). Footnote 1

Trump's executive order is emblematic of how some politicians relate terrorism to immigration: migrants Footnote 2 are regarded as a potential threat to domestic security given the chance they will engage in terrorist activity. In recent years, Muslim immigration in particular has been considered a security threat to Western societies (for example, Givens et al. Reference Givens, Freeman and Leal 2009 ; Sides and Gross Reference Sides and Gross 2013 ). Furthermore, as exemplified by Trump's travel ban, the ostensible relationship between terrorism and migration has public policy consequences . More generally, since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, many policy measures in fields such as surveillance, immigration and foreign policy have been justified with the security threat that immigrants ostensibly pose (for example, Chebel d'Appollonia Reference Chebel d'Appollonia 2012 ; Davis and Silver Reference Davis and Silver 2004 ; Givens et al., Reference Givens, Freeman and Leal 2009 ; Huddy et al. Reference Huddy, Norris, Kern and Just 2002 ). Consequently, the alleged effect of migration on terrorism will also matter to electoral politics . For instance, Wright and Esses ( Reference Wright and Esses 2019 ) show that individuals who perceived immigrants as a security concern were more likely to vote for Donald Trump, who explicitly campaigned on an anti-immigration and tough-on-terror platform, in the 2016 US elections.

Motivated by recent political, electoral and security events such as the election and politics of Donald Trump, the rise of right-wing anti-immigrant parties in Europe and a number of high-profile terrorist attacks committed by migrants in the West (for example, the Paris attacks of November 2015 and the Berlin attack of December 2016), we provide a state-of-the-art overview of the literature on the migration–terrorism nexus . Footnote 3 Virtually all studies that address the relationship between migration and terrorism have been published over the last twenty years; many of them are only a few years old. The topic has attracted research interest in various fields such as economics, political science, sociology and social psychology. This allows us to consider the migration – terrorism nexus from various and complementary viewpoints. When reviewing the literature, we are interested in answering three (related) research questions:

(1) Does immigration lead to terrorism? In other words, is there empirical evidence to support the argument often raised in political and public debates that migration carries a risk to national security in the form of terrorism?

(2) What are the electoral consequences of terrorism? In particular, to what extent do terrorist attacks shape individual citizens' views about immigration and their electoral preferences?

(3) What is the relationship between terrorism and migration policy? Does terrorism lead to stricter migration policies, and do these measures, in turn, decrease the number of terrorist attacks a country experiences?

To answer these questions, we proceed as follows. After defining the term ‘terrorism’ and discussing its development across time and space, we review the literature that examines the role of migration as a potential cause of terrorism. Here, we also study how terrorism may be related to migration in origin countries. The next section focuses on the effects of terrorism in the destination countries. More specifically, we look at how terrorist attacks contribute to the politicization and framing of migration as a security issue by affecting attitudes towards immigrants, electoral behavior and migration policy making. The final section concludes.

Definition of Terrorism

According to Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Enders and Sandler 2011 , 321), terrorism can be defined as ‘[…] the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims’.

According to this definition, terrorism is distinct from (1) unorganized forms of violent political protest (including riots, mob violence), (2) non-political acts of violence (such as violent crime, school shootings) and (3) violent repression by the government, that is, state terrorism (for example, in the form of torture). Terrorism may, however, overlap with large-scale civil wars, meaning that non-state actors may resort to both terrorism and more conventional guerilla warfare in certain conflicts at the same time (for example, Gaibulloev and Sandler Reference Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019 : 291–292; Krieger and Meierrieks Reference Krieger and Meierrieks 2011 ; for a general introduction to terrorism studies, see Enders and Sandler Reference Enders and Sandler 2011 ).

Domestic terrorism is ‘homegrown [so that] the venue, target, and perpetrators are all from the same country’ (Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler Reference Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011 , 321), while transnational terrorism concerns more than one country. Prominent examples of transnational terrorism are the 9/11 attacks: the perpetrators hailed from several Middle Eastern countries, while the attacks occurred in the United States and victimized thousands of US and non-US citizens.

Since migrants are, by definition, foreign nationals, transnational terrorism is particularly relevant for the study of the nexus between terrorism and migration. Transnational terrorism can be divided into two categories: (1) terrorism carried out by immigrants (foreign nationals) in their destination country, directed either against the inhabitants and institutions of the destination country or against other foreign nationals and (2) terrorism committed by natives (inhabitants of the destination country) against immigrants.

Trends in Transnational Terrorism since 1995

Figure 1 depicts global trends in transnational terrorism frequency and ferocity. The data used to construct this figure are drawn from Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011 ) and Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019 ). These authors use raw data from the Global Terrorism Database, first described in LaFree and Dugan ( Reference LaFree and Dugan 2007 ), applying various calibration and recoding methods to differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism. Footnote 4 On average, between 1995 and 2016 there were approximately 320 transnational terrorist attacks with approximately 810 deaths per year. Transnational terrorism was fairly persistent with respect to its frequency and ferocity between the mid-1990s and 2010, with the noticeable exception of the spike in terrorism lethality in 2001 due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It became more common and deadly after 2010.

Figure 1. Global trends in transnational terrorism, 1995–2016

Sources : Global Terrorism Database; Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011 ), Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019 ).

Table 1 shows that since the end of the Cold War, transnational terrorism has primarily affected countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. However, rich and industrialized (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD) countries have also been affected. Left-wing transnational terrorism has become less common after the end of the Cold War due to the loss of popular support for (and state sponsorship of) left-wing terrorist groups; however, pockets of this type of terrorism still exist, such as in Colombia (the ELN) and India (the Naxalites). Yet, post-1995 transnational terrorism has been much more strongly dominated by nationalist-separatist (for example, the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës in Serbia/Kosovo) and especially religious-Islamist terrorist groups, for example, in Afghanistan (the Taliban), Iraq and Syria (Islamic State), Somalia (al-Shabaab) and Algeria (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). These trends in transnational terrorism are also described in more detail in Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019 , 278–291).

Table 1. Geographical distribution of transnational terrorism, 1995–2016

Note : this list only considers countries that were always independent between 1995 and 2016 and that have more than one million inhabitants. Countries in bold were OECD members as of 2016.

In sum, the stylized facts about transnational terrorism since 1995 tell us that (1) it concerns many parts of the world, particularly (2) many countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East from which migration to Western countries originates, while (3) the overall risk of transnational terrorism (as expressed by its frequency and lethality) tends to be rather marginal, notwithstanding the ‘outlier’ of the 9/11 attacks.

Theoretical Considerations

In this section, we discuss the empirical evidence on the potential effect of migration on terrorism. To theoretically understand how migration may affect terrorism, we employ a rational-choice model of terrorism . This model is the theoretical basis for many social science investigations of terrorism. Footnote 5 In short, it assumes that terrorists are rational actors who weigh the benefits of terrorism (such as achieving certain political goals) against its costs (for example, capture) and opportunity costs (for example, foregone earnings from non-violence when engaging in terrorism). Potential terrorists opt for violence (non-violence) when the benefits of terrorism outweigh its costs (benefits).

Migration may affect this terrorist calculus in two ways. First, it may make terrorism less costly. For instance, foreign terrorist organizations can use existing migration networks and routes to get terrorist operatives (for example, in the form of ‘sleeper cells’) into foreign countries at low costs, making subsequent terrorist activity by these operatives more probable. Similarly, foreign terrorist organizations can potentially rely on existing migrant communities in destination countries, so-called diasporas. Diasporas can be considered networks that provide their members with social bonds that produce mutual emotional and social support and reinforce common identities (for example, Sageman Reference Sageman 2004 ). Terrorist organizations linked to these diasporas (for example, due to a shared religious or ethnic background) can exploit these pre-existing networks for the purpose of radicalization, recruitment, financing, intelligence gathering and as safe havens (for example, Sageman Reference Sageman 2004 , Reference Sageman 2011 ; Sheffer Reference Sheffer and Richardson 2006 ). This ought to lower the operating costs of terrorist organizations and thus make terrorism – ceteris paribus – more likely.

Secondly, these very diasporas and migrant communities may also be subject to discrimination in destination countries such as in the form of religious intolerance or exclusion from the labor market or political representation (for example, Sheffer Reference Sheffer and Richardson 2006 ). Discrimination is a powerful predictor of terrorism (for example, Piazza Reference Piazza 2012 ; Saiya Reference Saiya 2019 ). It makes terrorism a more attractive option by lowering its opportunity costs, for example as opportunities for non-violent economic or political participation are constrained. Consequently, as migration leads to the growth of diasporas, it may also lead to the growth of grievances (due to discrimination) that could fuel terrorist violence by migrants.

The Effect of Migration on Terrorism in Destination Countries

Three large-N studies investigate the effect of migration on terrorism in the destination country of migration. First, Bove and Böhmelt ( Reference Bove and Böhmelt 2016 ) study this relationship for a sample of 145 countries between 1970 and 2000. They find that increases in migrant inflows lead to fewer terrorist attacks. Secondly, Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) examine migration from 183 origin to 20 OECD countries in a dyadic setting and come to the opposite conclusion: a larger number of foreigners leads to more terrorist activity in the host country. Thirdly, Forrester et al. ( Reference Forrester 2019 ) use bilateral migration data for 170 countries (thereby also including South–South migration) between 1995 and 2015, and find no evidence that immigration leads to more terrorism in destination countries.

Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) argue that their finding of a positive effect of immigration on terrorism is a mere consequence of scale effects. It is well known from the literature on the determinants of terrorism that more populous countries experience more terrorist activity simply due to a larger pool of (potential) terrorist recruits and terrorist victims (for example, Krieger and Meierrieks Reference Krieger and Meierrieks 2011 ). Indeed, Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) show that the effect of foreign population growth on terrorism is not different from the effect of domestic population growth, meaning that immigration does not disproportionately undermine security. At the same time, this suggests that other theoretical mechanisms that could explain the link of migration and terrorism (for example, lower infiltration and operating costs of terrorist groups or support from diasporas) are not at play.

This leaves little evidence from large-N studies in favor of the hypothesis that immigration unconditionally promotes terrorism in receiving countries. However, we can use the results of Bove and Böhmelt ( Reference Bove and Böhmelt 2016 ), Forrester et al. ( Reference Forrester 2019 ) and Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) as well as those of Böhmelt and Bove ( Reference Böhmelt and Bove 2020a ) to think about the conditional effects of immigration on terrorism in a number of ways.

First, the composition of the migration influx may matter to the migration–terrorism relationship. While Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) do not find that the gender mix of migration plays a role, they are able to show that high-skilled immigration actually reduces the risk of terrorism. For instance, more educated migrants may be more likely to integrate into destination country societies, thus having fewer reasons to resort to terrorism (due to the high opportunity costs of terrorism). In a similar vein, Bove and Böhmelt ( Reference Bove and Böhmelt 2016 , 586) argue that their result of a negative effect of immigration on terrorism may be due to ‘side effects of human capital’, since high-skilled individuals are usually over-represented in migration flows. Footnote 6 For example, high-skilled individuals may find it easier to participate in the labor markets of destination countries; this will result in higher opportunity costs of terrorism and – ceteris paribus – lower levels of participation in terrorism.

Secondly, the origin of migrants may also play a role. Prior research in this area focuses on the influx of migrants from (1) Muslim-majority countries (given the rise and thus possible ‘import’ of religious-Islamist extremism) and (2) conflict- and terror-ridden countries (given the potential dangers of ‘importing’ foreign conflict). With regard to Muslim migration, both Forrester et al. ( Reference Forrester 2019 ) and Dreher, Gassebner, and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) find that migration from Muslim-majority countries is not systematically associated with more terrorism in receiving countries. The evidence is somewhat more divided when it comes to the role of migration from conflict-ridden states. Bove and Böhmelt ( Reference Bove and Böhmelt 2016 ) find that migration from conflict-ridden countries can be an important vehicle for the diffusion of terrorism. Bove and Böhmelt ( Reference Bove and Böhmelt 2016 , 576) argue that ‘migration flows from terrorism-prone countries facilitate the diffusion of terrorism in the host country by providing a dense framework of prior trusted relationships among the migrants’ that terrorist organizations can exploit for recruitment and radicalization, given a shared national, ethnic or religious background of terrorist group and diaspora members. However, they also note that while their results indicate that terrorism may travel from one country to another via migration, this migration – beyond the diffusion channel – will not need to automatically lead to more terrorism in destination countries (Bove and Böhmelt Reference Bove and Böhmelt 2016 , 585). Indeed, using migration from terror-prone countries as a predictor and thus testing the total effect of emigration from conflict-prone countries, neither Forrester et al. ( Reference Forrester 2019 ) nor Dreher, Gassebner, and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) find evidence that migration from conflict-intense countries shares a special relationship with terrorism in receiving countries.

Thirdly, conditions in the destination country may also affect the migration–terrorism nexus. In particular, conditions that are conducive to immigrants' integration can reduce the risk of terrorism committed by migrant populations. Studying migration into OECD countries between 1980 and 2010, Böhmelt and Bove ( Reference Böhmelt and Bove 2020a ) find that cultural proximity between the migrants' home and destination countries reduces the cross-border diffusion of terrorism. Here, similar identities and values may facilitate integration and reduce the incentives to engage in terrorism against the host country (Böhmelt and Bove Reference Böhmelt and Bove 2020a ). This suggests that while cultural proximity ought to lower the costs of terrorist infiltration, this effect is outweighed by its concurrent effect on integration, which ought to increase the opportunity costs of terrorism.

Refugee Migration and Terrorism in Host Countries

While previous empirical studies have examined the general relationship between migration and terrorism, another set of studies examine the relationship between involuntary migration and terrorism. Three large-N studies by Choi and Salehyan ( Reference Choi and Salehyan 2013 ), Milton, Spencer and Findley ( Reference Milton, Spencer and Findley 2013 ) and Polo and Wucherpfennig ( Reference Polo and Wucherpfennig 2019 ) investigate the effect of refugee inflows on terrorism in the receiving country.

Choi and Salehyan ( Reference Choi and Salehyan 2013 ) use data for 154 countries for the years 1970–2007, and find that countries that host refugees are more likely to experience terrorist activity. They argue that this relationship can be explained by poor conditions in refugee camps that make participation in terrorist violence more attractive. Similarly, Milton, Spencer and Findley ( Reference Milton, Spencer and Findley 2013 ), using a dyadic framework, show that refugee flows significantly increase transnational terrorism that occurs in the host country. As in Choi and Salehyan ( Reference Choi and Salehyan 2013 ), they argue that this unfavorable relationship can be explained by the poor treatment of refugees in host countries in general and harsh conditions in refugee camps in particular. Both transmission channels would imply comparatively low opportunity costs of terrorism, for example, as the possibilities of refugee participation in the labor market are limited. By contrast, Polo and Wucherpfennig ( Reference Polo and Wucherpfennig 2019 ) challenge the notion that hosting refugees leads to more terrorism against nationals of the host country. They claim that any increase in terrorism due to the inflow of refugees that is observed at the country level is due to scapegoating – that is, refugees becoming the target (rather than the perpetrators) of terrorism.

Refugee migration is a special kind of migration. Indeed, the evidence on the effect of refugee migration on terrorism helps more clearly identify the conditions under which migration more generally may result in increased terrorist activity in several ways. First, refugee migrants are less likely to self-select into migration, meaning that – in contrast to voluntary labor migration – the educated are less likely to be over-represented. The (relative) lack of human capital endowment of refugees may complicate their economic and social integration into host societies and thus make refugee migrants – in contrast to more educated labor migrants – more vulnerable to politico-economic hardship and discrimination. This could ultimately lead to terrorism by refugees as a means to voice dissent and achieve politico-economic relief. Secondly, by definition, refugee migrants predominantly come from countries affected by conflict and repression (for example, Echevarria and Gardeazabal Reference Echevarria and Gardeazabal 2016 ). This may make it more likely that terrorist organizations can recruit refugees into their ranks, ‘weaponizing’ the refugees' experience with violence in their host country. Thirdly, the conditions under which refugees live in their host countries are usually less conducive to integration compared to regular migrants. For instance, refugee camps are important breeding grounds of refugee terrorism, but voluntary labor migrants would not live in such camps. This again speaks to the idea that the treatment of migrants (for example, in terms of immigration and integration policies) can condition the effect of migration on terrorism. Indeed, Polo and Wucherpfennig ( Reference Polo and Wucherpfennig 2019 ) show that refugees will not attack nationals of their host country especially in developed countries, presumably because refugees are treated better in richer countries. Similarly, Böhmelt, Bove and Gleditsch ( Reference Böhmelt, Bove and Gleditsch 2019a ) show that while a refugee influx may fuel domestic conflict between refugees and locals, this effect is especially prevalent in countries characterized by low levels of state capacity (such as those with a weak state bureaucracy). This latter effect is especially relevant to the refugee migration–terrorism nexus, as refugee flows tend to cluster in the direct neighborhood of conflict-ridden countries; these countries in turn also tend to lack sound institutions and economic resources to effectively manage these refugee flows.

Terrorism against Migrants in Destination Countries

Migrants may not only be the perpetrators of terrorism; they may also be its victims . The native population may respond to (increased) immigration with fear and hostility. For example, migrants can be perceived as labor market competitors, burdens to domestic welfare systems or threats to native cultural identity (for example, McAlexander Reference McAlexander 2020 ). Applying a rational-choice model of terrorism, the inflow of migrants can make anti-immigrant terrorism more likely because (1) there is a larger pool of potential targets (which lowers the costs of carrying out anti-immigrant violence) and (2) immigration may lower the opportunity costs of anti-immigrant violence for host country locals (for example, as labor market competition crowds out part of the native population). Migrants and refugees may also be scapegoated when they can be linked (for example, due to religious or ethnic affiliation) to external terrorist threats that are relevant to the host country's native population (Polo and Wucherpfennig Reference Polo and Wucherpfennig 2019 ). Through these pathways, terrorism against non-natives can become more likely as immigration increases. This ought to especially pertain to right-wing terrorism , which is usually animated by rabid nativism and xenophobia.

Indeed, empirical evidence by McAlexander ( Reference McAlexander 2020 ) on a set of Western European countries between 1980 and 2004 strongly suggests that a larger number of refugees and non-European immigrants is associated with more right-wing terrorist activity. Interestingly, he finds no evidence that migration flows affect left-wing terrorism in a similar manner, which indicates that it is indeed only a specific sub-set of terrorism that responds to migration. This finding is complemented by the large-N evidence of Polo and Wucherpfennig ( Reference Polo and Wucherpfennig 2019 , 3), who show that refugee stocks from countries that experience terrorist activity are more likely to be victimized by right-wing terrorism in their host country, suggesting that these refugees are perceived as security threats and thus scapegoated by the native population.

Given a lack of further large-N evidence, we can supplement the aforementioned results by looking at evidence from Germany on the relationship between immigration and right-wing violence. Germany is an interesting case study because it experienced two periods of increased immigration after the end of the Cold War (the early 1990s and the post-2015 period) that were also accompanied by a marked increase in right-wing violence. Footnote 7 Indeed, Krueger and Pischke ( Reference Krueger and Pischke 1997 ), Koopmans and Olzak ( Reference Koopmans and Olzak 2004 ), and Braun and Koopmans ( Reference Braun and Koopmans 2010 ) provide statistical evidence that the number of foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers at the regional or state levels in Germany was linked to more right-wing violence against foreigners and immigrants in the 1990s, especially in East Germany. Similarly, investigating the post-2015 period that was characterized by a record influx of refugees into Germany, Jäckle and König ( Reference Jäckle and König 2017 , Reference Jäckle and König 2018 ) find that the strength of right-wing parties in a district as well as anti-immigrant rhetoric, partly prompted by terrorist attacks in neighboring countries, considerably boosted the probability of attacks on refugees in the areas under study. In other words, their studies suggest that ideological predispositions determine how locals respond to (increased) immigration.

While limited, the empirical evidence thus suggests that (1) migrants can indeed be victimized and (2) anti-migrant terrorism is primarily committed by right-wing groups. In light of these findings, the results of Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) could point to a vicious circle between anti-immigrant terrorism and terrorism by migrants. They show that terrorist attacks against foreigners in their host countries increase the risk that foreign populations will likewise resort to terrorism.

The Migration–Terrorism Nexus in the Origin Countries of Migration

The migration–terrorism nexus may also be related to the origin countries of migration in two ways: (1) terrorism may be a cause of out-migration and (2) communities of migrants in foreign countries may influence terrorist conflicts in their home countries.

Concerning terrorism as a cause of population out-flows, domestic conflicts obviously trigger forced or refugee migration (for example, Echevarria and Gardeazabal Reference Echevarria and Gardeazabal 2016 ). However, terrorism may also affect voluntary labor migration. Dreher, Krieger and Meierrieks ( Reference Dreher, Krieger and Meierrieks 2011 ) consider labor migration from 152 countries to the OECD between 1976 and 2000, and find that more terrorist activity in origin countries leads to more high-skilled migration to OECD countries. They argue that terrorism reduces economic opportunities at home (for example, by adversely affecting trade and foreign investment) and therefore decreases the returns to education, making it more attractive to migrate, especially when one is highly educated. This large-N evidence is complemented by the results of Belmonte ( Reference Belmonte 2019 ), who studies the effect of (separatist) terrorism in South Tyrol on out-migration. He similarly finds that skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to leave areas that are exposed to terrorist attacks.

After migration or flight, diasporas in foreign countries may still influence terrorist activity in their home countries. For instance, migrants may send money to support terrorist groups at home. Indeed, Mascarenhas and Sandler ( Reference Mascarenhas and Sandler 2014 ) show that such remittances are linked to more terrorist activity in the remittances-receiving country, suggesting that these types of payments help fill the war chests of terrorist organizations that are active in the migrants' home country. In a similar vein, Piazza ( Reference Piazza 2018 ) studies how transnational ethnic diasporas affect the resolution of campaigns by terrorist groups to which these diasporas are linked. He finds that such terrorist campaigns are less likely to end (for example, through military means or the political process) than campaigns without diaspora links, arguing that diasporas provide material support to sustain them.

Given their importance as potential reservoirs of material support, diasporas are also important audiences for terrorist groups that depend on their support. Here, Piazza and LaFree ( Reference Piazza and LaFree 2019 ) find that Islamist terrorist organizations are more likely to refrain from high-casualty terrorism when they are dependent upon diaspora backing. They argue that such acts will adversely affect diaspora communities when they can be linked to these attacks (for example, because such attacks increase fear and distrust against them in their host countries), leading terrorist organizations to forego such attacks to protect their diaspora support.

Theoretical Framework

In this section, we examine the effects of terrorism in destination countries in the context of three interrelated linkages: (1) the effect of terrorism on natives' attitudes towards immigration, (2) the effect of terrorism on electoral outcomes and (3) the role of terrorism in migration policy making.

Figure 2 outlines a theoretical framework consisting of the main elements and their relationships as they are discussed in the literature. First, it illustrates that transnational terrorism might affect public perceptions of (and attitudes towards) immigrants and migration (A). More precisely, fear and actual or perceived threats from transnational terrorism might translate into stronger anti-immigration sentiment; these sentiments may be triggered by transnational terrorism in one's home country as well as in neighboring or far away countries. Secondly, anti-immigrant sentiment ought to fuel support for (right-wing) anti-immigrant political parties. This may reduce the re-election chances of governments with different ideological orientations (B1). Terrorism may also affect electoral outcomes through other pathways (B2), for example by reducing economic activity and life satisfaction in targeted countries. These effects may further reduce the electoral success of incumbent governments. By endangering their political survival, transnational terrorism consequently creates powerful incentives for governments to enact more restrictive migration policies (C). Governments may expect harsher policies to serve as a political signal to the electorate and thus siphon off political support for right-wing or opposition parties. At the same time, restrictive migration policies may help reducing transnational terrorist activity (D). For instance, stricter immigration policies may increase the costs of terrorist infiltration and thus reduce the level of terrorist activity directed against the country pursuing such policies. By reducing (future) transnational terrorism, governments may be able to restore electoral confidence and limit economic damage due to terrorism, further increasing the government's chances of political survival.

Figure 2. Theoretical framework

Terrorism's Effects on Attitudes towards Immigrants

In general, we expect attitudes towards immigrants to become more negative in the context of terrorism. Actual or perceived threat is one of the most important explanatory factors for such attitudes or changes in attitudes (for example, Huddy et al. Reference Huddy 2005 ). That is, terrorism is perceived as a threat to personal and national security; this leads to heightened fear of the other, increased ethnocentrism, prejudice and xenophobia as well as stronger ties to native identity, all of which, in turn, promote more negative attitudes towards migrants (for example, Hellwig and Sinno Reference Hellwig and Sinno 2017 ; Hitlan et al. Reference Hitlan 2007 ; LeVine and Campbell Reference LeVine and Campbell 1972 ; Schimel et al. Reference Schimel 1999 ).

A first group of studies investigates the effects of terrorism on attitudes towards immigrants in the context of the 9/11 attacks. The evidence indicates that these attacks affected Americans' feelings of security and led to higher levels of fear and anxiety (for example, Huddy et al. Reference Huddy, Norris, Kern and Just 2002 ; Huddy, Khatib and Capelos Reference Huddy, Khatib and Capelos 2003 ). What is more, a number of studies found that in the wake of these attacks, prejudices and discrimination against Muslims increased in many Western states (for example, Allen and Nielsen Reference Allen and Nielsen 2002 ; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede Reference Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006 ; Sheridan Reference Sheridan 2006 ). This increase in xenophobia and Islamophobia in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also coincided with more negative views on immigration not only in the United States but also in other Western countries. For instance, Aslund and Rooth ( Reference Aslund and Rooth 2005 ) show that negative views on immigrants increased in Sweden after the 9/11 attacks. In Germany, more people supported a reduction in immigration after the attacks (Noelle-Neumann Reference Noelle-Neumann 2002 ). Schüller ( Reference Schüller 2016 ) studies panel data and observes a shift towards more negative attitudes toward immigration and a decrease in concerns over xenophobia in Germany in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Some evidence indicates that the adverse effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on prejudices and xenophobia was rather short-lived. Panagopoulos ( Reference Panagopoulos 2006 ) finds that prejudices increased in the United States after the 9/11 attacks but receded to pre-9/11 levels shortly thereafter. Similarly, Kalkan and Uslaner ( Reference Kalkan, Uslaner and Helbling 2012 ) found no important changes in Islamophobic attitudes in the United States when comparing the pre- and post-9/11 period. Hopkins ( Reference Hopkins 2010 ) provides the most convincing test of the effect of the 9/11 attacks on immigration attitudes. He investigates panel survey data from the fall of 2000, October 2001 and March 2002. He finds an important short-term impact on attitudes toward immigrants: respondents were more likely to agree with the assessment that immigrants have become too demanding in the aftermath of the attack. While this change in attitudes implies increased hostility towards migrants, Hopkins ( Reference Hopkins 2010 ) also shows that these changes in attitudes had already receded by March 2002.

While almost all studies that investigate effects on attitudes due to 9/11 compare survey data before and after the attacks, a second group of studies takes advantage of attacks that occurred during the field phase of surveys. Boomgaarden and De Vreese ( Reference Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007 ) and Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam ( Reference Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2011 ) use this quasi-natural experimental research design to investigate the effects of the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a radical Islamist in 2004. Here, Boomgaarden and De Vreese ( Reference Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007 ) rely on their own survey data from the Netherlands, and find that while the murder did not affect general attitudes towards immigrants, immigrants and immigrants' religion were nevertheless more likely to be considered cultural or security threats. Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam ( Reference Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2011 ) use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to show that preferences for more restrictive immigration policies increased. However, this was not the case for the Netherlands but for three of the 17 other European countries in the study. This finding, similar to evidence compiled on the 9/11 attacks, suggests substantial heterogeneity in and the potential cross-border diffusion of terrorism-induced anti-immigration views.

Finseraas and Listhaug ( Reference Finseraas and Listhaug 2013 ) and Legewie ( Reference Legewie 2013 ) examine similar cross-border effects of terrorism. In both papers, ESS data on attitudes towards migrants in European countries is correlated with large-scale terrorist attacks outside the Western world in quasi-natural experiments. For the 2008 Mumbai attacks (India), Finseraas and Listhaug ( Reference Finseraas and Listhaug 2013 ) find an increasing fear of terrorism but no increasing support for illiberal immigration policies among European respondents. Focusing on the 2002 Bali attacks (Indonesia), Legewie ( Reference Legewie 2013 ) finds that attitudes towards immigrants became more negative after the attacks. However, this effect was limited to three out of nine investigated countries and disappeared after approximately one month.

The evidence so far suggests that (1) while terrorism can negatively affect attitudes towards migrants, leading to more hostility among the native population, (2) these effects tend to be short-lived and not uniform across countries. Also, (3) terrorist activity in one country may affect – via media coverage and other communication networks – immigration attitudes in other countries.

These findings are corroborated by a third group of very recent empirical studies that examine the effects of large-scale terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States. The most prominent example is the November 2015 Paris attacks in which 130 people were killed at the Saint-Denis football stadium, several restaurants and especially the Bataclan concert hall. Jungkunz, Helbling and Schwemmer ( Reference Jungkunz, Helbling and Schwemmer 2019 ) investigate the impact of the 2015 Paris attacks with a German student sample and differentiate between attitudes towards immigrants that could be related to the attacks (Muslims) and those that could not (Christian). They find that attitudes towards Muslims became more negative among right-wing but not left-wing students; attitudes towards Christian refugees were not affected. Once again, this suggests terrorism has heterogeneous effects on attitudes. Van Assche and Dierckx ( Reference Van Assche and Dierckx 2019 ) use a student and a convenience sample in Belgium to investigate the effects of the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks. They find no changes in attitudes towards different out-groups among respondents. Boydstun, Feezell and Glazier ( Reference Boydstun, Feezell and Glazier 2018 ) come to a similar conclusion when studying Americans’ feelings towards Muslims after the 2015 attacks in Paris and San Bernardino; they find that these attacks had no discernible effects on attitudes. Finally, Mancosu, Ferrin and Cappiali ( Reference Mancosu, Ferrin and Cappiali 2018 ) investigate the effect of the 2017 Manchester bombings in the UK. While they find that these attacks led to a negative response (increased stereotyping) towards immigrants and refugees in the immediate aftermath of the attack, this effect disappeared after a few days.

Several empirical studies also test for the existence of cross-border spillover effects of terrorism on attitudes, and study the role of contextual factors in shaping such effects. Analyzing Eurobarometer data from twenty-eight countries in November 2015, Ferrin, Mancosu and Cappiali ( Reference Ferrin, Mancosu and Cappiali 2020 ) find that the Paris attacks had a negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants, especially for educated and left-wing respondents in countries with a more positive political climate towards immigrants. According to them, such attacks especially affected people whose stereotypes were disconfirmed. Castanho ( Reference Castanho 2018 ) looks at the same data and investigates potential backlash and polarization effects. To strengthen the robustness of his analyses, he also evaluates ESS data that were in the field in January during the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris. He finds no important changes in immigration preferences. Using the same Eurobarometer data, Nussio, Bove and Steele ( Reference Nussio, Bove and Steele 2019 ) show that terrorism leads to increases in negative attitudes towards migrants and refugees, particularly in countries that have a relatively low immigrant population. Böhmelt, Bove and Nussio ( Reference Böhmelt, Bove and Nussio 2020 ) test the proximity argument, which maintains that proximity to terrorism (even in other countries) will increase the likelihood of responding to it due to a heightened fear of terrorism. Using a sample that includes all terrorist attacks in Europe between 2003 and 2017, they come to the conclusion that terrorism both at home and abroad leads to more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Impact of Terrorism on Electoral Outcomes

By fueling support for anti-immigrant sentiment among natives, transnational terrorism may be conducive to the electoral success of populist and mainstream right-wing parties that oppose immigration (Abou-Chadi and Krause Reference Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020 ). Indeed, there is considerable evidence that negative attitudes towards immigrants increase support for these types of political parties (for example, Coffé and Voorpostel Reference Coffé and Voorpostel 2010 ; Ivarsflaten Reference Ivarsflaten 2007 ; Rydgren Reference Rydgren 2008 ; Oesch Reference Oesch 2008 ).

For Turkey, Kibris ( Reference Kibris 2011 ) shows that the number of police forces killed at the district level between 1991 and 1995 by the Kurdistan Workers' Party led to increased support for right-wing parties. Similarly, focusing on Israel, Berrebi and Klor ( Reference Berrebi and Klor 2008 ) show that right-wing parties receive more votes when Israeli localities are affected by terrorism. In a similar vein, Getmansky and Zeitzoff ( Reference Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014 ) find that right-wing support increases in areas in Israel that are affected by rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. There is an effect even if localities are not targeted but lie within the rockets' range. Thus the mere risk of being victimized tends to change voting behavior in favor of right-wing parties.

While some evidence plausibly links terrorism, anti-immigrant views and electoral outcomes, it remains circumstantial, as the role of anti-immigrant views in the nexus between transnational terrorism and right-wing voting has not been directly tested. Right-wing parties may also plausibly benefit – more generally – from tough-on-terror and law-and-order stances after terrorist attacks, which complicates interpretations of how strongly anti-immigrant views induced by terrorism contribute to overall right-wing success at the voting booth.

At the same time, the literature on electoral accountability and retrospective voting suggests that evaluations of the incumbent government also affect election outcomes (for example, Barro Reference Barro 1973 ; De Vries and Giger Reference De Vries and Giger 2014 ; Ferejohn Reference Ferejohn 1986 ). Healy and Malhotra ( Reference Healy and Malhotra 2013 ) provide an overview of the literature. Importantly, terrorism is expected to adversely affect economic conditions in affected countries, for example by depressing trade and investment (for example, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides Reference Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 2004 ; Gaibulloev and Sandler Reference Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019 : 316–320; Meierrieks and Gries Reference Meierrieks and Gries 2013 ). By adversely affecting economic growth and producing fear and stress, terrorism is also anticipated to reduce overall life satisfaction (for example, Farzanegan, Krieger and Meierrieks Reference Farzanegan, Krieger and Meierrieks 2017 ; Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer Reference Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 2009 ). Through these effects, terrorism ought to lead to an unfavorable evaluation of the incumbent government's performance and thus make the electoral success of incumbent governments less likely.

Indeed, there is evidence that the electorate might hold the government accountable for terrorism and punish them at the ballot box. For instance, national elections took place in Spain in March 2004, only three days after bombs exploded in several commuter trains in Madrid, killing almost 200 people. Bali ( Reference Bali 2007 ) finds that these attacks influenced turnout and voting decisions and led to the replacement of the incumbent government. Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau ( Reference Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau 2008 ) find that the Spanish experience can be generalized. In a study of 800 elections in 115 countries between 1968 and 2002, they show that terrorism increases the probability of government replacement after an election, and the severity of the terrorist attack amplifies this effect. It is also possible that terrorism can promote government support and thus its re-election chances via a rally effect . For instance, Hetherington and Nelson ( Reference Hetherington and Nelson 2003 ) show that the US government benefitted from such a rally effect after the 9/11 attacks. However, rally effects appear to be rather elusive, which explains why governments will ultimately be more likely to be voted out of office after a terrorist attack (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau Reference Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau 2008 ).

In sum, terrorism may affect voting behavior and electoral outcomes by (1) strengthening anti-immigrant sentiment and thus benefitting right-wing (anti-immigration) parties and (2) inducing adverse socio-economic shocks that reduce voter satisfaction with the incumbent government. This creates powerful incentives for incumbent governments to introduce more restrictive immigration policies. Indeed, we have reason to believe that the introduction of new immigration policies affects political parties’ electoral support. For instance, while not accounting for transnational terrorism, Abou-Chadi and Helbling ( Reference Abou-Chadi and Helbling 2018 ) demonstrate that both restrictive and liberal policy reforms affect issue voting.

There are two reasons why implementing more restrictive immigration policies may help incumbent governments. First, more restrictive immigration policies may satisfy public demand for policies that increase safety, especially when terrorism and immigration policies are linked in the public discourse (for example, Huysman Reference Huysmans 2006 ; Messina Reference Messina 2014 ). This, in turn, is expected to contribute to electoral success. For instance, Wright and Esses ( Reference Wright and Esses 2019 ) show that individuals who linked terrorism to immigration and consequently perceived immigration as a security threat were more likely to vote for Donald Trump, who explicitly campaigned on an anti-immigration platform, in the 2016 US elections. Secondly, predictions from a rational-choice model of terrorism suggest that implementing harsher immigration policies will increase the costs of terrorism (for example, by making it more difficult to launch cross-border attacks), thereby reducing future levels of terrorist activity directed against the country pursuing such policies. This ought to limit socio-economic damage due to terrorism and thus restore electoral confidence, therefore increasing the re-election chances of incumbent governments.

Effects of Terrorism on Immigration Policies

The logic of political survival would seem to suggest that incumbent politicians will respond to transnational terrorism (that is, terrorism by foreign nationals) by introducing more restrictive immigration policies. Footnote 8 This is because citizens – either due to increased fear, stronger anti-immigrant sentiment or due to economic anxiety when facing the socio-economic costs of terrorism – are likely to demand more restrictive immigration policies and vote for political parties that promise such policy changes.

Indeed, a number of analysts have found that immigration policies became more restrictive in response to the 9/11 attacks. For instance, Waslin ( Reference Waslin, Givens, Freeman and Leal 2009 ) discusses the negative effects of immigration policy changes enacted after 9/11 for the Latino population in the United States, whereas Brown and Bean ( Reference Brown, Bean, Givens, Freeman and Leal 2009 ) show that the tightening of visa review processes led to a decline in the number of applications and admissions of international science and engineering students. Chebel d'Appollonia ( Reference Chebel d'Appollonia 2012 ) shows that both American and European governments implemented stricter border controls and even extraterritorial control mechanisms after 9/11. For her, however, these measures mostly reinforced security logics that have been around since the 1970s (see also Epifanio Reference Epifanio 2011 ). Luedtke ( Reference Luedtke, Givens, Freeman and Leal 2009 ) also points to cross-border effects, arguing that 9/11 slowed the European Union's development towards a more harmonized European immigration and asylum regulations.

While these studies are qualitative in nature and focus on the 9/11 attacks as a special case, more recent empirical studies seek to provide quantitative and more general evidence regarding the effect of terrorism on migration policy making. Helbling and Meierrieks ( Reference Helbling and Meierrieks 2020 ) study the effect of transnational terrorism on migration policies in thirty OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. They find that higher levels of exposure to transnational terrorism are associated with stricter migration controls, but not stricter migration regulations regarding immigration eligibility criteria and conditions. The effects are particularly strong when the attacks are ferocious and occur after the end of the Cold War. For the same set of countries and time period, Bove, Böhmelt and Nussio ( Reference Bove, Böhmelt and Nussio 2020 ) show that states also implement more restrictive immigration policies when terrorist attacks happen in nearby countries. This once more points to potential diffusion effects associated with transnational terrorism. Finally, Choi ( Reference Choi 2019 ) studies the effect of terrorism on twenty-three immigration-receiving countries between 1970 and 2010; his sample includes developed (OECD) and developing countries (for example, Botswana) as well as several emerging markets (such as Brazil). In contrast to the former two studies, Choi ( Reference Choi 2019 ) finds that immigration policies are not responsive to terrorist activity.

In sum, these quantitative studies suggest that while transnational terrorism can indeed be policy relevant, this relationship is not necessarily straightforward. For one, there appear to be differences between rich and democratic (OECD) and less wealthy and democratic countries, which could explain the different findings of Helbling and Meierrieks ( Reference Helbling and Meierrieks 2020 ) and Bove, Böhmelt and Nussio ( Reference Bove, Böhmelt and Nussio 2020 ) in comparison to Choi ( Reference Choi 2019 ). For instance, electoral accountability and other democratic mechanisms may induce a more pronounced response to terrorism in OECD economies; however, future research is necessary to provide evidence to support this hypothesis. For another, countries may change their immigration policies in response to terrorism rather selectively (Helbling and Meierrieks Reference Helbling and Meierrieks 2020 ). For instance, Avdan ( Reference Avdan 2014a ) finds no evidence that increased global transnational terrorist activity reduces asylum recognition rates, suggesting that this humanitarian immigration policy is not affected by terrorism.

Indeed, while there may be political gains associated with framing migration as a security issue in response to terrorism, other factors may limit this process. For example, Avdan ( Reference Avdan 2014b ) finds that transnational terrorism affects visa policies, but that this effect declines with increasing levels of economic interdependence between involved states, suggesting that other considerations (for example, gains from economic integration) also matter. Similarly, the political elite tends to be much more cosmopolitan than the ‘common people’ and thus less susceptible to possible security threats due to transnational terrorism and migration (Teney and Helbling Reference Teney and Helbling 2014 ). For instance, Lahav, Messina and Vasquez ( Reference Lahav, Messina and Vasquez 2013 ) show that the immigration attitudes of members of the European Parliament were not affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Footnote 9 What is more, powerful interest groups may actually be interested in more immigration. That is, framing migration as a security issue might contradict other policy goals such as the increase in the labor supply through immigration that is desired by powerful political players (such as business owners) (Boswell Reference Boswell, Givens, Freeman and Leal 2009 ). Consequently, the policy preferences of cosmopolitan elites and pro-immigration interest groups that disfavor overly strict immigration policies will likely also be reflected in the eventual immigration policy regime.

The Effectiveness of Migration Policies as Counter-Terrorism Policies

Finally, we review the evidence on the effectiveness of stricter migration policies to combat terrorism. According to the rational-choice perspective introduced above, we should expect stricter policies to affect the terrorist calculus in ways that increase the material costs of terrorism. For instance, stricter policies may make it more difficult for terrorists to infiltrate other countries.

Böhmelt and Bove ( Reference Böhmelt and Bove 2020b ) investigate the role of migration policies in moderating the effect of terrorism diffusion (via migration) for a sample of OECD economies. They find that ‘restrictive immigration policies may indeed make it more difficult for terrorism to diffuse across borders’ (Böhmelt and Bove Reference Böhmelt and Bove 2020b , 176), suggesting that restrictive policies may help curb the risk of transnational terrorism. However, they also stress that this effect is only relevant to ‘target countries with exceptionally lax [immigration] regulations and control mechanisms’ (Böhmelt and Bove Reference Böhmelt and Bove 2020b , 176), indicating that the overall effectiveness of migration policies as counter-terrorism tools is limited.

Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt ( Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ) find that policies that restrict foreigners' rights (for example, by curtailing migrants' access to social welfare programs and the labor market) and enforce integration will actually lead to more terrorist activity. In particular, policies that are too repressive may backfire by alienating parts of the migrant population (Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt Reference Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt 2020 ). Choi ( Reference Choi 2018 ) analyzes the effect of migration policies on terrorism for ten Western industrialized democracies between 1970 and 2007 and obtains a similar finding. He likens the impact of migration policies on terrorism to a ‘double-edged sword’ (Choi Reference Choi 2018 , 21), finding that certain policies (such as governing the migrants' path to citizenship) may indeed encourage rather than deter terrorism. These findings suggest that in addition to affecting the material costs of terrorism (where higher costs would reduce terrorism), immigration policies may also affect the opportunity costs of terrorism, for example by aggravating migrants’ labor market participation or integration efforts. Potentially, then, an unwise mix of migration policies may produce undesired outcomes (more transnational terrorism), which will also run counter to incumbent politicians’ desire to be re-elected.

Bandyopadhyay and Sandler ( Reference Bandyopadhyay and Sandler 2014 ) also advocate a sound migration policy mix in their theoretical analysis. They introduce a model in which developed countries may curb terrorism at home by limiting unskilled and promoting skilled migration from developing (skill-scarce) countries. For instance, attracting high-skilled labor will increase the standard of living of high-skilled workers from developing countries (thus increasing their opportunity costs of violence), while at the same time depriving foreign terrorist organizations of the human capital they would need to stage successful cross-border terrorist attacks against the developed country (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler Reference Bandyopadhyay and Sandler 2014 ).

The study of the migration–terrorism nexus first gained traction after the 9/11 attacks. More recent terrorist attacks (such as the 2015 Paris attacks), developments in migration (for example, the influx of refugees to Europe that started in 2015) and electoral events (for example, the election of Donald Trump and other anti-immigrant and tough-on-terror politicians) have motivated further analyses of the interplay among migration, terrorism, public policy and electoral politics. The study of the migration–terrorism nexus is thus a relatively young and dynamic research field. What is more, different disciplines (for example, political science, economics, sociology and social psychology) have contributed to this research field, which might make it even more difficult to keep track of the literature. Therefore, this review seeks to bring together different research strands on transnational terrorism and migration and provide a state-of-the-art overview of the literature, which can be summarized as follows.

First, there is little evidence that migration has an unconditional effect on terrorism that goes beyond a mere mechanical scale effect. Thus the evidence indicates that migration per se is not a Trojan horse of terrorism. However, migration may nevertheless lead to terrorism under unfavorable circumstances, especially when state capacity and socio-economic conditions in host countries are poor and detrimental to migrant and especially refugee integration. For instance, hostile conditions in refugee camps may be associated with more transnational terrorism.

Secondly, the evidence more strongly suggests that migrants are victimized by (right-wing) terrorism, for example serving as scapegoats for anti-immigration sentiment. This dimension of the migration–terrorism nexus, however, remains underappreciated in the public discourse and empirical studies.

Thirdly, even though the empirical connection between migration and terrorism is tenuous and by no means unconditional, such a link is still perceived to be valid in destination countries, which, in turn, has several consequences. The evidence suggests that terrorism (1) fosters anti-immigration sentiment (even though this effect can be short-lived), (2) benefits (right-wing) political parties that hold nativist views, while damaging the electoral position of incumbent governments and (3) leads to stricter migration policies, even though this effect may be context specific (for example, influenced by the relative strength of interest groups) and limited to specific types of migration policies. We develop a theoretical framework that links these three effects, arguing that transnational terrorism may create incentives for political incumbents to respond to terrorism with harsher migration policies to ensure their political survival.

Fourthly, there is little evidence that stricter migration policies actually result in less terrorism. Rather, certain policies that alienate the migrant population appear to incite terrorism. This may result in the worst of both worlds, with strict migration polices depressing economic growth (by reducing labor migration) and harming rather than contributing to domestic security.

Fifthly, the migration–terrorism nexus is transnational in nature. This not only refers to the cross-border flow of terrorist violence and people, but also to, for example, (1) the cross-border diffusion of fear and anti-immigrant resentment due to terrorism, (2) the adaption of stricter migration policies in response to terrorism in foreign countries and (3) feedback between terrorism and migration in sending and destination countries, for example, via diasporas and the cross-border flow of information and remittances.

We hope our literature overview provides researchers with a starting point for future research on the migration–terrorism nexus. In fact, we believe there are many potential areas for future research. For instance, when studying the conditional effects of migration on terrorism, it may be fruitful to also examine the roles of political factors (for example, interstate rivalries) and economic variables (such as trade interdependencies) in governing the migration–terrorism relationship. Similarly, it may be interesting to explicitly test (parts of) our theoretical framework introduced above ( Figure 2 ), for example by investigating how terrorism could affect migration policy making and could thus be linked to electoral success. This framework could also be extended both theoretically and through empirical testing to account for potentially more complex linkages, for example by allowing for a reciprocal relationship between electoral outcomes induced by terrorism (for instance, the success of right-wing parties) and the development of anti-immigrant resentment. Considering migration policies in destination countries, there is also a need to more thoroughly study how specific regulations shape the integration, assimilation and participation of migrant populations. This could help explain why different migration policy mixes appear to share a different relationship with terrorism, which could consequently further improve immigration policy making. Finally, we would also like to encourage researchers to examine the interaction between migration and security policy making in the context of transnational terrorism in non-democratic countries, given that the existing evidence – also due to data constraints – tends to strongly focus on Western OECD democracies. For instance, it may be interesting to analyze whether non-democratic countries – by nature of being less sensitive to electoral demands – make different changes to their migration policy regime in response to transnational terrorism.

Transnational terrorism and international migration will likely continue to be contentious issues in the coming decades. Thus, in addition to inspiring further investigations of the migration–terrorism nexus, we also hope that our literature overview provides some guidance to policy makers as well as reassurance to the general public, for example concerning the alleged perilousness of migration as a Trojan horse of terrorism.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Tobias Böhmelt, Vincenzo Bove and two anonymous reviewers for their highly valuable comments.

1 While the courts scrapped this early version of the so-called Muslim Travel Ban, a revised version (sometimes called the ‘Travel Ban 3.0’) was upheld and took effect later in 2017.

2 A migrant is someone who migrates to a host country and who in theory possesses, and in practice exercises, the right to settle. According to Schain ( Reference Schain 2008 ), we can differentiate between (1) voluntary migration, mainly for economic reasons (labor migration) and on social grounds (family reunification), and (2) refugee migration. The later type of migration is involuntary; according to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugees leave their home countries owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Refugee migration is far less common than labor migration; the International Organization for Migration reports a global refugee population of approximately 26 million for 2018, while the number of international migrants was as high as 272 million for 2019 (IMO 2019 , 3).

3 Beyond terrorism, there are also other security issues related to migration that we do not discuss here. For example, migration may also be linked to the spread of civil wars (e.g. Salehyan and Gleditsch Reference Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006 ) and the dynamics of interstate conflict (e.g. Salehyan Reference Salehyan 2008 ). For further discussion, see Adamson ( Reference Adamson 2006 ).

4 This is necessary because the database does not differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism. The data from Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011 ) and Gaibulloev and Sandler ( Reference Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019 ) are available until 2016.

5 Seminal contributions to the rational-choice analysis of terrorism can be found in, e.g., Landes ( Reference Landes 1978 ) and Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley ( Reference Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley 1983 ). Caplan ( Reference Caplan 2006 ) provides a more recent discussion of rational-choice models of terrorism.

6 High-skilled individuals are more likely to emigrate, resulting in positive self-selection into out-migration. This is because international migration will allow especially skilled labor to maximize their income. See, e.g., Grogger and Hanson ( Reference Grogger and Hanson 2011 ) for a further discussion.

7 For an analysis of the relationship between right-wing violence and immigration in further European countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see Koopmans ( Reference Koopmans 1996 ). He shows that a larger refugee population may contribute to more right-wing and racist violence.

8 Of course, in addition to migration policies, governments have a wide range of other counter-terrorism tools at their disposal. For an overview and discussion of these tools, see, e.g., Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks ( Reference Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks 2015 ).

9 Similarly, Messina ( Reference Messina 2014 ) concludes that there is little empirical evidence that the migration–security nexus has become more salient in politicians' discourses due to terrorism. For him, most of the evidence regarding this question remains ‘anecdotal, episodic, unsystematically gathered, and/or difficult to compare across national cases’ (Messina Reference Messina 2014 , 536).

Figure 1. Global trends in transnational terrorism, 1995–2016 Sources : Global Terrorism Database; Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011), Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019).

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Volume 52, Issue 2
Marc Helbling (a1) (a2) and Daniel Meierrieks (a2)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000587

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Perceived risk of terrorism, indirect victimization, and individual-level determinants of fear of terrorism

Original Article
Published: 21 March 2020
Volume 34 , pages 498–524, ( 2021 )

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M. Salih Elmas 1

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This paper tests the pertinence of individual-level theoretical framework of fear of crime to explain fear of terrorism and underscores the significance of the nexus between fear of terrorism and perceived risk of terrorism. It reviews the literature on conceptualization of terrorism and crime, focusing on individual-level determinants of fear of crime and terrorism through victimization and vulnerability perspectives. The study explores the impact of individual-level predictors and of perceived risk of terrorism on fear of terrorism through three complimentary multiple linear regression models on the basis of results of a web-based survey conducted in Spring semester of 2013 among 504 undergraduate and graduate students from Kent State University between the ages of 19–36, directly following the Boston Marathon Bombings. The study concludes that perceived risk of terrorism on future attacks is a robust indicator of fear of terrorism and the influence of individual-level predictors of fear of crime literature, media exposure, and indirect victimization should not be underestimated.

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Acknowledgements

The data has been collected for the author’s dissertation, for which he conducted a research as a visiting scholar in the Department of Sociology at Kent State University. The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Associate Professor David Kessler, Associate Professor and Director of Survey Research Lab Gregory Gibson, and Professor Emeritus Richard Serpe of the Department of Sociology for collecting the data and facilitating this research.

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Elmas, M.S. Perceived risk of terrorism, indirect victimization, and individual-level determinants of fear of terrorism. Secur J 34 , 498–524 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00242-6

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1) defines homegrown terrorism as a "terrorist activity or plots perpetuated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, permanent legal residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States." A review of the empirical literature demonstrates that homegrown terrorists currently pose a threat to public safety.
Rationales for terrorist violence in homegrown jihadist groups: A case
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Part I: Domestic Terrorism - A Theoretical and Literature Review The link to the "global mission" and quicken pace of radicalization are considered byproducts for the increase in homegrown terrorist (Silber, 2007). Terrorism can occur by inspiration and imitation alone, not by direction. Hatred is the key motivational factor.
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Manni Crone and Martin Harrow, "Homegrown Terrorism in the West," Terrorism and Political Violence 23(4) (2011), p. 522. 4. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the US and UK: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process (Washington, DC: FDD Center for Terrorism Research, 2009), p. 11.
The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical
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Protecting New York City From Homegrown Terrorism: the City'S Role in
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Lone-actor and homegrown terrorism poses a credible threat to the safety and security of the globe, specifically the West. Lone-actor terrorism, also known as lone-wolf terrorism, is essentially "a person who acts on his or her own without orders from—or even connections to—an organization". 1 There have been numerous examples of lone ...
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This study reviews the state of the literature on homegrown jihadi terrorism, including the role of radicalization, religion, culture, the Internet, and Al-Qaeda on recruitment. The crisis of culture is particularly relevant, causing second and third generation Muslim immigrants to search for a true identity and sense of belonging.
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Homegrown terrorism is acts of terrorism targeting the citizens, institutions, or government within the country in which the terrorist resides. Homegrown terrorism falls into two categories: domestic terrorism and homegrown violent extremism (HVE). Domestic terrorism is acts of terrorism inspired by the US-based movements that espouse extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social ...
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Homegrown terrorism in the West. Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(4), 521-536. Manni Crone and Martin Harrow's article takes an interesting position by attempting to address certain ambiguities surrounding the definition of homegrown terrorism. They suggest that homegrown terrorism can be reduced to two dimensions: belonging and autonomy ...
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Home Grown: How Domestic Violence Turns Men Into Terrorists by Joan Smith is published by Quercus (£16.99). To order a copy go to guardianbookshop.com or call 0330 333 6846. Free UK p&p on all ...
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Over the last few years, much attention has been devoted to the phenomenon of homegrown jihadist networks in the West. Most analyses have been based on the dual assumption that this phenomenon has manifested itself only extremely recently and that it is largely limited to Europe. While these two assertions are not completely unfounded, they do not take into consideration significant anecdotal ...
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In this study, researchers examined detailed forensic biographies of 135 American jihadism-inspired homegrown terrorists. Biographies included court documents, online communications posted by terrorists, media profiles, and interviews with family members. All of the subjects were judged to have become radicalized while living in the United States.
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homegrown terrorist. The approaches that counterterrorism forces have successfully employed overseas to prevent large-scale terrorist attacks are not suitable to counter homegrown terrorism threats. There has to be proportionality in the manner in which security organizations conduct domestic operations so that they do not infringe on
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United States. This study examines five cases of homegrown radicalization to determine the role. that traumatic events, alienation, poverty, internet usage, a perceived divide between the West. and Islam, overseas trips and social withdrawal play in the radicalization process. In this study.
What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism
What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism. NIJ-funded research projects have led to a better understanding of the processes that result in violent action, factors that increase the risk of radicalizing to violence, and how best to prevent and respond to violent extremism. January 4, 2024. By. Steven Chermak.
Rationales for terrorist violence in homegrown jihadist groups: A case
Starting from the well-established assumption that terrorism is an essentially rational form of behavior (Caplan, B., 2006, Kacou, A., 2013), this article first presents the results of a literature review on strategic and organizational rationales for terrorist attacks.
Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent ...
This Research Note is a summary of the findings of a larger literature review of more than 200 publications on what their authors consider to be Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) in Counter-Terrorism (CT) efforts and in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs.
Terrorism and Migration: An Overview
A review of the empirical literature on the migration-terrorism nexus indicates that (1) there is little evidence that more migration unconditionally leads to more terrorist activity, especially in Western countries, (2) terrorism has electoral and political (but sometimes short-lived) ramifications, for example, as terrorism promotes anti ...
Fifty years of scholarly research on terrorism: Intellectual
The scholarly literature on terrorism research is estimated to have exceeded 18,651 items as of September 2020. Articles of this literature have been disseminated across of range of different sources and disciplines including social and psychological sciences, but their concentration is most noticeable in two particular disciplines: "Political Science" (N = 4177) and "International ...
Full article: Research on Terrorism, 2007-2016: A Review of Data
ABSTRACT. Research on terrorism has long been criticized for its inability to overcome enduring methodological issues. These include an overreliance on secondary sources and the associated literature review methodology, a scarcity of statistical analyses, a tendency for authors to work alone rather than collaborate with colleagues, and the large number of one-time contributors to the field.
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examination of available research literature on the definition, causes, and solutions of terrorism is presented. The literature utilized in the review and analysis are peer-reviewed journal papers accessed and retrieved through the ProQuest Central databases, as well as research findings published in edited volumes and scholarly books.
Perceived risk of terrorism, indirect victimization, and individual
This paper tests the pertinence of individual-level theoretical framework of fear of crime to explain fear of terrorism and underscores the significance of the nexus between fear of terrorism and perceived risk of terrorism. It reviews the literature on conceptualization of terrorism and crime, focusing on individual-level determinants of fear of crime and terrorism through victimization and ...
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Article contents

Definition of Terrorism

Trends in Transnational Terrorism since 1995

Theoretical Considerations

The Effect of Migration on Terrorism in Destination Countries

Refugee Migration and Terrorism in Host Countries

Terrorism against Migrants in Destination Countries

The Migration–Terrorism Nexus in the Origin Countries of Migration

Theoretical Framework

Terrorism's Effects on Attitudes towards Immigrants

Impact of Terrorism on Electoral Outcomes

Effects of Terrorism on Immigration Policies

The Effectiveness of Migration Policies as Counter-Terrorism Policies

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