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Yemen and the Dynamics of Foreign Intervention in Failed States

Yemen, a small nation at the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula, has been mired in political strife and unrest since its government was overthrown in 2014 by the Houthis, a minority Shiite tribal group. Soon after, foreign intervention began, with Saudi Arabia joining the fight alongside the remains of the Yemen government authorities against the Houthis. In 2015, Iran began supporting their ally the Houthis with economic aid and materials, but not with direct military involvement. What ensued has been labeled one of the worst modern-day humanitarian crises, and it rages on to this day.

The author, Bryn Lauer

With no end to the conflict in sight, Yemen now has the status of a failed state, one with no governmental authority or rule of law. This humanitarian tragedy raises many unanswered questions about the effects of foreign intervention on failed states: Why has Yemen’s civil war continued? Why is Saudi Arabia siding with a country lacking a working government? What does Iran have to gain by allying with the Houthis, and why hasn’t it intervened directly? Has Yemen as a failed state exacerbated the conflict? What is at stake for each actor? 

The use of the term  failed state  is debated by political science researchers. Definitions of the term range from complete anarchy to a functioning government with weak institutions. In this article I use the term  failed state  for two reasons: (1) it places greater emphasis on the system of governance as a path to civil war than on extremism and terrorism (Cordesman and Molot, 2019), and (2) it has been used explicitly as justification for intervention by Saudi Arabia. I use political scientist Robert Rotberg’s commonly accepted definition of a failed state: a state which is unable to provide political goods to its inhabitants and experiences high levels of internal violence (Rotberg, 2003). My project aims to shed light on the dynamic between failed states and foreign intervention, with Yemen as a case study. I became interested in this subject because of an international politics course I took at SUNY Binghamton and have followed Yemen closely since then. After transferring to the University of New Hampshire (UNH) and completing an internship at the Department of State in the Office of Investment Affairs, I received an Undergraduate Research Award, with Dr. Elizabeth Carter as my faculty mentor, and turned my interest into a concrete research project.

Summarizing Yemen’s history over the past several decades remains a challenge, which is why I focus on the key events in this background section. Yemen’s conflict is multifaceted, with regional and domestic actors at play, a history of governmental instability, economic constraints, political fallout, and strained alliances.

The Houthis make up 5 to 10 percent of the population in Yemen. Although a revolutionary Shiite Muslim group, the Houthis’ plight began as a political one during the rule of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh from 1978 to 2011 (Haykel, 2021). For years, authoritarian President Saleh used corruption and oppression to unify the government and to repress dissent. The Houthis’ goal was to assert themselves as a dominant political group to bring an end to political marginalization and discrimination. These sentiments then cultivated six wars between the Houthis and the central government from 2004 to 2010. In 2011, President Saleh resigned because of mounting tension among supporters and was replaced by Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, but Hadi’s leadership lasted only three years and included unsuccessful attempts at reform before the Houthis seized Sana’a, the highly populated capital of Yemen, thereby waging war once again on the government of Yemen. With no true foundation in place, Yemen’s government fell swiftly by January 2015, when President Hadi and other politicians were forced to resign. President Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s sovereignty became porous, the remaining domestic institutions ceased to operate, and foreign actors have had free rein to exert their influence over the region since 2015.

On March 26, 2015, shortly after the Houthis overthrew Hadi’s government, Saudi Arabia launched its first military involvement in Yemen with Operation Decisive Storm, and air strikes, ground troops, and economic sanctions were deployed almost immediately (Nußberger, 2017; Gunaratne, 2018). The launch of Operation Decisive Storm in 2015 was Saudi Arabia’s first deviation from its norm of unassertive foreign policy toward Yemen (Stenslie, 2013). Saudi Arabia justified its active, open military engagement with Yemen by claiming it was countering Iranian influence while defending itself against fallout from a failed state.

Airstrike by Saudi Arabia in Sana’a, Yemen, 2015.  Source:   Wikimedia Commons

Throughout the fighting, Saudi Arabia and many prominent Western scholars have accused Iran of supporting the Houthis. Iran has historically kept a limited role in Yemeni affairs and did not become an active ally of the Houthis until Saudi Arabia’s direct involvement in 2015. However, during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, which were a series of anti-government protests that ricocheted throughout the Middle East, Iran had provided limited aid to the Houthis. The Houthis are not dependent on Iran and are not under their direct control (Vatanka, 2015; Milani, 2015). Nonetheless, Iran has increasingly provided more arms to the Houthis as a direct response to escalation in fighting from Saudi coalition forces (Nichols and Landay, 2021). 

As of spring 2022, the conflict is continuing to escalate, United Nations mediation attempts have repeatedly failed, and there remains no internationally recognized government in place (Aljazeera, 2022; Reuters, 2022). As of 2022, 24 million Yemenis need assistance, 100,000 Yemenis have been killed since the start of the conflict in 2015, and 4 million remain displaced (Global Conflict Tracker, 2022).  

Martin Griffiths, a UN Special Envoy to Yemen who has attempted diplomacy between the Yemeni and Houthi factions, noted that the crisis in Yemen is man-made, and that ending the war is a choice. Yet Mr. Griffiths, and others in the international community who support this premise, fail to specify exactly what allowed Yemen’s crisis to become man-made in the first place. I was interested in researching the reasons behind foreign interference in a failed state because, intuitively, intervention should be a means to end a conflict. In Yemen, the conflict has only been exacerbated, and I wanted to know what went wrong and why.

This map shows Yemen in relation to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other regional countries.  Source:  Wikimedia Commons

To uncover why regional foreign actors interfere in failed states—specifically, Yemen—I planned several phases of research, each of which would take several weeks. First, I planned to look at when and how Yemen became a failed state, including its weaknesses, when and why each foreign and domestic actor intervened, and the overall geopolitical and societal trends of each actor. Next, I planned to examine empirical evidence from the start of the conflict in 2014 to the present, including military data, domestic and economic data, and peace data. For the final weeks of my research time, I planned to compile theories about the motives of Saudi Arabia, the Houthis, and Iran. This was done via literature review, whereby I examined the rhetoric of each actor toward Yemen and looked at the contemporary policies and overall belief system of each actor. I planned to conclude my research time by drawing conclusions and drafting an argument that would address my research goal. All research was conducted remotely using sources accessible online.

I used a variety of sources over the course of my research, including both political science and history journal articles. For empirical evidence, I relied upon data collected from the World Bank, the Yemen Data Project and Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, as well as online articles from  MediaWire, Reuters,  and  Al Jazeera.  Specifically, I collected data on the change in Saudi military expenditures, civilian casualties, coalition air raids, political violence, unemployment, government institutions, rule of law, markets, poverty, GDP, supply chains, migration flows, and peace attempts before and during the war. This data was critical, as it allowed me to quantify the potential impact of interference on factors relating to violence, political stability, and economics in a failed state—specifically, Yemen.

I adapted my research plan on numerous occasions. Most of my research was composed of searching the history of Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis on EBSCOHost. From there, I selected data on the conflict and pieced together an argument. When I needed to fill in gaps, I searched news articles. My research was nonlinear, because the ideas grew as I went along, thereby causing me to deviate from my original plan as needed.

Results: Three Opportunities

My research suggests that foreign actors may perceive the cost of intervening in a failed state—a space devoid of authority—as low and therefore simply too good an opportunity to pass up to influence regional power. In pursuing opportunities to intervene in a failed state, foreign actors may exacerbate the conflict and plunge the state into chronic instability. After concluding my research, including my review of the articles and databases mentioned in my methods section, I argue that failed states create three opportunities for actors who intervene.

The first is the Opportunity for Security, in which foreign actors may perceive failed states to be security threats to their own inhabitants and to neighboring countries. Therefore, actors looking to gain favor domestically and regionally may claim to intervene to defend the inhabitants of the failed state while protecting themselves from regional spillover.

The second is the Opportunity for Influence. Because failed states are unable to defend themselves militarily and are unable to pursue diplomatic measures, foreign actors perceive intervention as low risk, and victorious foreign actors gain the opportunity of influencing the restructuring of the government of the failed state in their favor.

The third is the Opportunity for Amplifying Power, in which actors who intervene can amplify their regional power by securing a swift victory at a low cost.

Saudi Arabia: Opportunity for Amplifying Power

With its intervention in the conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia claims to pursue the Opportunity for Security, but the reality shows that it pursues the Opportunity for Amplifying Power. Despite claiming to defend the Yemeni people and restore the Hadi government, the extent and intensity of Saudi Arabia’s military efforts, their unwillingness to cooperate in peace talks with the Houthis and other actors or abide by ceasefires, their blocking of food and medicinal imports, and deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure such as hospitals indicate they are uninterested in the well-being of Yemen’s inhabitants and its stability. Actors insecure in regional power likely pursue more aggressive intervention as a desperate attempt to amplify their regional status. Saudi Arabia’s regional power status has been waning since 2014, driven largely by their dwindling oil reserves and unsuccessful interventions in Iraq after 2003 and Lebanon in 2008 (Council, 2011), which evidences their motivation behind intervention.

As mentioned previously, Saudi Arabia has not acted in a way that suggests it is concerned with a strong Yemeni state, and especially not one as an ally. Driving Yemen into further instability has created a breeding ground for terrorism, illegal immigration, and regional spillover. Under the guise that it is pursuing the Opportunity for Security, Saudi Arabia has been able to justify its intervention as countering Iranian influence while defending itself against fallout from a failed state. In reality, Saudi Arabia’s intentions extend further than self-defense. By pursuing the Opportunity for Amplifying Power, Saudi Arabia has supported an illegitimate government, destroyed critical infrastructure, killed innocent civilians, refused to accept anything other than complete victory over the Houthis, and blocked imports, thereby guaranteeing Yemen’s instability for years to come. 

Iran: Opportunity for Influence

Iran’s intervention in Yemen suggests that it is pursuing the Opportunity for Influence. In contrast with Saudi Arabia, Iran is more stable in regional power. This is evidenced by Iran’s national sovereignty and fierce independence, and that it aligns itself with “Neither East nor West” (Maloney, 2017). Stable actors do not seek to use failed states to boost their status and can instead pursue opportunities related to “soft power”—building support domestically and regionally through positive attraction and persuasion (Nye, 1990). Iran seeks to align itself with marginalized groups—in the case of Yemen, the Houthis—to gain in soft power by being viewed as a “champion of the oppressed and marginalized” (Juneau, 2016). This is the same strategy Iran applied in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it exerted soft power through reconstruction aid, infrastructure development, media, and financial investments (Wehrey et al., 2009).

Rather than engage militarily in Yemen, Iran has supported the Houthis from a safe distance. During the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Iran provided limited aid to the group. By the time the Yemeni government was overthrown in 2014, Iran supplied some arms and economic support to the Houthis, and as of 2022 it continues to keep its distance (IISS, 2019). Iran’s goal is to establish ties to the Houthis should they secure victory and restructure the government. Although Iran does not directly seek to state-build in Yemen, the opportunity to maintain a steady presence with the Houthis has been low-cost and low-risk.

Map of the Yemeni civil war and Saudi Arabian intervention as of 2021. Red is controlled by the Hadi-led government; green is Houthi controlled; and yellow is controlled by the Southern Transitional Council, a secessionist organization in southern Yemen.  Source:  Wikimedia Commons

Current Situation

As of January 2022, the war continues to drag on, despite Saudi Arabia’s expectation of a quick and decisive victory. Both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis are intensifying their efforts, and Iran continues to steadily support the Houthis with arms. To complicate the situation even further, the United Arab Emirates, which has been part of Saudi Arabia’s coalition since 2015, has shown signs of increasing its role in the conflict for its own ends. All this means that peace is still far out of reach. For years, Saudi officials promised that progress was being made in their fight. Instead, Saudi Arabia finds itself struggling to exit Yemen, which has further exemplified its deteriorating regional power. It is likely that Saudi Arabia overestimated its military prowess and strategy. By using a “blank check” strategy for fighting the Houthis, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its lack of understanding of the conflict (Horton, 2020). When compared with the fractured and weakly governed Yemeni army supported by Saudi Arabia, the Houthis have repeatedly been successful against coalition forces by striking fast and staying mobile, and, according to some Western experts, are poised to defeat the coalition forces despite the odds (Horton, 2020). 

If a peace settlement is reached through Saudi Arabia and Iran brokering a peace agreement between the Houthi and Hadi regimes, the question remains: What is to prevent intervention from occurring every time an internal conflict arises? If Yemen and other failed states experience conflicts via revolution or civil war, what can prevent external actors from intervening? As this research has demonstrated, the incentive to intervene in failed states is a powerful one. Reworking a state’s entire structure of government is complex, and there is no one-size-fits-all.

Given that Saudi Arabia sought to amplify its power, its inability to conquer an easy target will be a major blow to its regional power status. If Iran is to cease support, it is likely that the Houthis would be capable of surviving on their own. Having sought gains in soft power, Iran will not lose out as extensively. Regardless, the real loser at the end of the conflict will be Yemen. The real calamity is that unchecked intervention has degraded the state and created further conflict. Under the guise of championing the oppressed, Saudi Arabia, the Houthis, and Iran have all made for a grave future for Yemen. I hope that readers will see through the layers of complexity of the Yemen conflict and better understand why foreign intervention can be dangerous and costly.

By studying the conflict in Yemen so deeply, I have garnered a greater appreciation for research in international politics. I underestimated how in-depth and complex the research process is. Most importantly, I have learned that research is not rigid; it morphs and grows with each new discovery, and often more questions arise than answers. Because of this research, I now think about the world in terms of opportunities and incentives, on the global and personal level. My next goal is to apply the ideas that I theorized in this project to an exploration of international politics from a financial incentive perspective. This perspective is important to include in the research of world affairs, because, more often than not, money is at the heart of conflicts. After graduation, I hope to follow my passion for researching international conflict and to publish more of my writing on the subject.

Thank you to Mr. Dana Hamel, who made this research possible through a generous endowment, as well as the Hamel Center for Undergraduate Research staff. Dr. Elizabeth Carter, thank you for inspiring me to pursue international politics research in your United States in World Affairs class. I am incredibly grateful for the opportunity to complete this project and for those who helped me along this journey.

Allinson, Tom. (2019). Yemen’s Houthi rebels: Who are they and what do they want? DW: 01.10.2019.  www.dw.com/en/yemens-houthi-rebels-who-are-they-and-what-do-they-want/a-50667558 .

Al Jazeera. (2022). How the Yemen conflict flare-up affects its humanitarian crisis.   https:/www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/18/yemens-humanitarian-crisis-at-a-glance .

Council on Foreign Relations Press. (2011). Saudi Arabia in the new Middle East.  https://www.cfr.org/report/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east .

Cordesman, A., and Molot, M. (2019). Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: The long-term civil challenges and host country threats from “failed state” wars. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghanistan-iraq-syria-libya-and-yemen .

Global Conflict Tracker. (2022, March 11). War in Yemen.  https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen .

Gunaratne, R., and Johnsen, G. (2018). When did the war in Yemen begin?  https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-did-war-yemen-begin .

Haykel, B. (2021). The Houthis, Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen.  https://www.hoover.org/research/houthis-saudi-arabia-and-war-yemen .

Hodali, D. (2021). “Saudi Arabia has lost the war in Yemen.”  https://www.dw.com/en/saudi- arabia-has-lost-the-war-in-yemen/a-57007568 .

Horton, M. (2020). Hot issue—the Houthi art of war: Why they keep winning in Yemen.  https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-houthi-art-of-war-why-they-keep-winning-in-yemen/ .

IISS (2019). Chapter five: Yemen. Iran’s networks of influence in the Middle East. Routledge.  https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier .

Juneau, T. (2016). Iran’s policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A limited return on a modest investment.  International Affairs, 92 (3), 648.

Maloney, S. (2017). The roots and evolution of Iran’s regional strategy.  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-roots-drivers-and-evolution-of-iran-s-regional-strategy/ .

Milani, M. (2015, April 19). Iran’s game in Yemen: Why Tehran isn’t to blame for the civil war.  Foreign Affairs .  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-04-19/irans-game-yemen .

Nichols, M., and Landay, J. (2021). Iran provides Yemen’s Houthis “lethal” support, U.S. official says.  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-idUSKBN2C82H1 .

Nußberger, B. (2017). Military strikes in Yemen in 2015: Intervention by invitation and self-defence in the course of Yemen’s “model transitional process.”  Journal on the Use      of Force and International Law, 4 (1), 110–160.

Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft power.  Foreign Policy, 80 , 153–171.  https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580 .

Reuters. (2022, January 21). U.N. chief condemns deadly Saudi-led coalition strike in Yemen.   https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/several-killed-air-strike-detention-centre-yemens-saada-reuters-witness-2022-01-21/.

Rotberg, R. (2016). Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: Causes and indicators. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.  https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeofterror_chapter.pdf .

Stenslie, S. (2013). Not too strong, not too weak: Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Yemen. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.  https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162439/87736bc4da8b0e482f9492e6e8baacaf.pdf .

Wehrey, F., et al. (2009). Assertiveness and caution in Iranian strategic culture. In  Dangerous  but not omnipotent: Exploring the reach and limitations of Iranian power in the  Middle East  (pp. 7–38). Rand Corporation.

Vatanka, A. (2014). Iran, Saudi Arabia find common ground in Yemen.  https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/11/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia-houthi-islah.html .

Author and Mentor Bios

Bryn Lauer  will graduate from the University of New Hampshire in spring 2022 with a bachelor of science degree in business administration: finance. She hopes to pursue work as a financial economist with a concentration in international affairs. Originally from Durham, New Hampshire, Bryn became interested in international conflict after taking some international politics classes and participating in an internship at the U.S. Department of State. Because of Yemen’s unique position as a failed state, Bryn wanted to understand the motivations of outside actors intervening and how their actions impacted the conflict there. To pursue her research interests, Bryn received an Undergraduate Research Award through the Hamel Center for Undergraduate Research. From the project Bryn gained a deep understanding of the history of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Houthis, as well as learned a lot about the research process itself. Given the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, Bryn unfortunately was unable to conduct field research abroad, so she had to rely only on information that was published in databases. This presented a challenge for Bryn, because she had to be able to work through contradicting data to find information that focused specifically on the effects of external intervention of foreign states. Despite the challenges, Bryn was able to piece together the data, history, and geopolitics to develop her own theories, making the research her own.

Elizabeth Carter  has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire since 2015. She specializes in comparative politics, political economy, and Western European politics. Dr. Carter met Bryn in her U.S. and World Affairs course and was delighted to serve as her research mentor after being impressed with an essay on Yemen that Bryn had written for the class. Though she has mentored several undergraduate students for both undergraduate honors theses and as part of Hamel Center Undergraduate Research Awards, this was Dr. Carter’s first time mentoring a student who submitted an article to  Inquiry . Dr. Carter is proud of the great work that Bryn conducted. In addition, Dr. Carter says that it was wonderful to have the experience of enhancing her understanding of a region, like Yemen, that she had not researched much herself, especially with the rigorous research and applications of political science theories and framework that Bryn incorporated into her work. Dr. Carter believes that it’s important for researchers to make research more accessible to broader audiences across multiple disciplines, not just to those engaged in that particular field.

Contact the author 

Copyright 2022, Bryn Lauer

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Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering

• The eight-year-old conflict in Yemen is between the internationally recognized government, which is backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, and Houthi rebels supported by Iran.
• The country’s humanitarian crisis is said to be among the worst in the world, due to widespread hunger, disease, and attacks on civilians.
• Tensions eased and humanitarian conditions improved with a UN-mediated cease-fire in 2022, but the combatants failed to renew the deal after six months.

Introduction

Yemen, a small country on the Arabian Peninsula, has become the site of grievous civilian suffering amid an intractable civil war. Many analysts say the fighting, now seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who overthrew the Yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The involvement of other combatants, including militant Islamist groups and separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has complicated the picture.

The conflict has displaced more than four million people and given rise to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. The warring parties observed a monthslong cease-fire in 2022, raising hopes for a political solution to the conflict, but that October, they failed to extend the truce.

What are Yemen’s divisions?

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Yemen has long struggled with religious and cultural differences between its north and south and the legacy of European colonialism. The modern Yemeni state was formed in 1990 with the unification of the U.S.- and Saudi-backed Yemeni Arab Republic, in the north, and the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, in the south. Ali Abdullah Saleh, a military officer who had ruled North Yemen since 1978, assumed leadership of the new country.

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However, just four years after unification, southern separatists seceded for several months and reemerged in 2007 as the Southern Movement, which has continued to press for greater autonomy within Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) , an Islamist militant group, and the related Ansar al-Sharia insurgent group have captured territory in the south and east. The Houthi movement, whose base is among the Zaydi Shiites of northern Yemen, rose up against Saleh’s government six times between 2004 and 2010.

The United States lent its support to Saleh beginning in the early 2000s, when counterterrorism cooperation against al-Qaeda and affiliate groups became Washington’s overriding regional concern. In 2000, al-Qaeda in Yemen, a group that would later become AQAP, conducted a suicide attack on a U.S. Navy warship, the USS  Cole , in the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen U.S. service members were killed in the bombing. Since then, the United States has provided Yemen more than $850 million in military aid, according to the online database  Security Assistance Monitor .

Rights groups  persistently charged  [PDF] that Saleh ran a corrupt and autocratic government. As the popular protests of the 2011 Arab Spring spread to Yemen, the president’s political and military rivals jockeyed to oust him. While Yemeni security forces focused on putting down protests in urban areas, AQAP made gains in outlying regions.

Under escalating domestic and international pressure [PDF], Saleh stepped aside in 2012 after receiving assurances of immunity from prosecution. His vice president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, assumed office as interim president in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional organization based in Saudi Arabia, and backed by the United States. As part of the GCC’s timetable for a transition, the UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference (NDC) convened 565 delegates in 2013 to formulate a new constitution agreeable to Yemen’s many factions. But the NDC ended with delegates unable to resolve disputes over the distribution of power.

What caused the current crisis?

Several factors widened these political divisions and led to full-scale military conflict.

Fuel price hikes . Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which had extended to Yemen a $550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, Hadi’s government lifted fuel subsidies in 2014. The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base with its criticisms of the UN transition, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. Hadi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated party al-Islah held counterrallies.

Houthi takeover . The Houthis captured much of Sanaa by late 2014. Reneging on a UN peace deal, they consolidated control of the capital and continued their southward advance. Hadi’s government resigned under pressure in January 2015 and Hadi later fled to Saudi Arabia.

Military division . Military units loyal to Saleh aligned themselves with the Houthis, contributing to their battlefield success. Other militias mobilized against the Houthi-Saleh forces, aligning with those in the military who had remained loyal to the Hadi government. Southern separatists ramped up their calls for secession.

Saudi intervention . In 2015, with Hadi in exile, Riyadh launched a military campaign—primarily fought from the air—to roll back the Houthis and restore the Hadi administration to Sanaa.

Who are the parties involved?

The Houthi movement, named for a religious leader from the Houthi clan and officially known as Ansar Allah, emerged in the late 1980s as a vehicle for religious and cultural revivalism among Zaydi Shiites in northern Yemen. The Zaydis are a minority in the Sunni Muslim–majority country but predominant in the northern highlands along the Saudi border.

The Houthis became politically active after 2003, opposing Saleh for backing the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq but later allying with him after his resignation as president. This alliance was a tactical one: Saleh’s loyalists opposed Hadi’s UN-backed government and, feeling marginalized in the transition process, sought to  regain a leading role  in Yemen. Saleh won the allegiance of some members of Yemen’s security forces, tribal networks, and political establishment. But in 2017, after Saleh shifted his support to the Saudi-led coalition, he was killed by Houthi forces.

Iran is the Houthis’ primary international backer and has reportedly provided them with military support, including weapons. Hadi’s government also accused Hezbollah , Iran’s Lebanese ally, of aiding the Houthis. Saudi Arabia’s perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy rather than an indigenous movement has driven Riyadh’s military intervention. But many regional specialists say that Tehran’s influence is likely limited, especially given that Iranians and Houthis adhere to different schools of Shiite Islam. Experts also say Iran’s sway could shrink as Saudi-Iranian relations warm following a China-mediated rapprochement in early 2023. Some analysts expect Iranian weapons transfers to the Houthis to decline. 

At Hadi’s behest in 2015, Saudi Arabia cobbled together a coalition of Sunni-majority Arab states: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). By 2018, the coalition had expanded to include forces from Eritrea and Pakistan. They launched an air campaign against the Houthis with the aim of reinstating Hadi’s government. For Riyadh, accepting Houthi control of Yemen would mean allowing a hostile neighbor to reside on its southern border, and it would mark a setback in its long-standing contest with Tehran.

After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most significant military role in the coalition, contributing some ten thousand ground troops , mostly in Yemen’s south. However, the UAE removed most of them after entering into conflict with its coalition allies in 2019, when it backed the separatist Southern Transitional Government (STC), which captured Aden. That November, Hadi and the STC president signed the Riyadh Agreement, which affirms that the factions will share power equally in a postwar Yemeni government. The separatists reneged on the deal for several months in 2020, but eventually they joined a unity government with equal representation of northerners and southerners. Though the formation of a government signaled progress in bridging Yemen’s internal divisions, it did little to accelerate peace talks. In April 2022, Hadi ceded power to a governing council and fired a deputy scorned by the Houthis in hopes that the rebels would return to the negotiating table.

Although the U.S. Congress has been  divided on the matter  [PDF], the United States has backed the Saudi-led coalition, as have France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. U.S. interests include security of Saudi borders; free passage in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the choke point between the Arabian and Red Seas and a vital artery for the global transport of oil; and a government in Sanaa that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism programs. But uproar over civilian deaths in  coalition air campaigns , which often use U.S.-made weapons, and Saudi Arabia’s role in the 2018 killing of  Washington Post  journalist Jamal Khashoggi led the United States and other Western powers to limit some weapons sales and refueling of coalition aircraft. Lawmakers have also raised concerns that U.S.-made weapons are  falling into the hands  of AQAP and Houthi fighters. Still, the United States is Saudi Arabia’s largest arms supplier, and President Donald Trump thrice vetoed bills that would have halted arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

President Joe Biden said he would end U.S. support for the coalition’s military offensive, including the sale of weapons, and signaled a shift to diplomacy by appointing a special envoy to Yemen. Yet, U.S. defense contractors still oversee the servicing of Saudi aircraft that carry out offensive operations, and the administration has approved the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia for defense purposes. Shortly after taking office, Biden reversed the Trump administration’s last-minute designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group, citing the move’s potential damage to aid deliveries in Yemen.

What is the role of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

AQAP, in Yemen since the early 1990s, has benefited from the more recent chaos. In 2015, it captured the coastal city of Mukalla and released three hundred inmates, many believed to be AQAP members, from the city’s prison. The militant group expanded its control westward to Aden and seized parts of the city before coalition forces recovered much of the region in 2016. AQAP has also provided Yemenis in some areas with security and public services unfulfilled by the state, which has  strengthened support  for the group.

The U.S. State Department warns that Yemen’s instability has  weakened long-running counterterrorism efforts  [PDF], which rely heavily on air strikes. The Barack Obama administration conducted an estimated 185 strikes over eight years, while the Trump administration launched nearly 200 in its four years. These air strikes have killed several high-level AQAP members, including former leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi and top official Jamal al-Badawi, who was allegedly involved in the USS  Cole  bombing. But the U.S. strikes have also resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred civilians , watchdog groups say.

For years, AQAP vied for influence with the Houthis and the self-declared Islamic State, especially in the central al-Bayda Governorate. The Islamic State marked its 2015 entrance into Yemen with suicide attacks on two Zaydi mosques in Sanaa, which killed close to 140 worshippers. Though the group has claimed other high-profile attacks, including the assassination of Aden’s governor in late 2015, its following lags behind that of AQAP. In 2021, the United Nations estimated that the Islamic State had hundreds of fighters [PDF] in Yemen, while AQAP had around seven thousand [PDF] as of mid-2020. Opposition from the Houthis has reportedly debilitated both groups, but experts warn against discounting their possible resurgence.

What has the humanitarian impact been?

With around three-quarters of its population living in poverty , Yemen has long been the Arab world’s poorest country, and its humanitarian crisis has been called one of the worst in the world. Disease runs rampant; suspected cholera cases passed two hundred thousand [PDF] in 2020. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is harder to assess, since there is no comprehensive caseload data. Some twelve thousand cases have been reported to the World Health Organization, but health analysts say the actual count is likely much higher. Moreover, many countries cut back on critical aid to Yemen amid the crush of the pandemic, leading the United Nations to reduce food rations for some eight million Yemenis in January 2022. Three out of four Yemenis require humanitarian aid and protection, and four million are internally displaced [PDF], according to the UN refugee agency. 

The situation has worsened under a yearslong de facto land, sea, and air blockade imposed by coalition forces, which has obstructed the flow of vital supplies of food and medicine and helped drive up prices of essential goods. Under the 2022 cease-fire, prices dropped significantly, but with the expiration of the truce, many Yemenis fear that high costs will return . The UN Development Program estimates that more than 370,000 people have died as a result of the war, with indirect causes such as lack of food, water, and health services causing almost 60 percent of deaths.

In addition, the United Nations has found [PDF] that both Houthi and coalition forces have knowingly attacked civilian targets in violation of international law. This includes the destruction of a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders in 2015. Torture, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances are among the other alleged war crimes perpetrated by both sides.

What are the prospects for a solution to the crisis?

UN-backed peace negotiations have made limited progress. The 2018 Stockholm Agreement averted a battle in the port city of Hodeidah, a vital hub for aid; but there has been little success in implementing the accord’s provisions, which includes the exchange of more than fifteen thousand prisoners and the creation of a joint committee to de-escalate violence in the city of Taiz.

Observers worry that friction among regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is prolonging the war . Conditions deteriorated in late 2019, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. UN monitors concluded that the Houthis did not carry out the attack, while the Saudi-led coalition blamed Iran. 

Peace efforts gained momentum in April 2022 when Yemen’s new governing council helped consolidate anti-Houthi forces. Later that month, the Houthis and coalition forces coordinated their first nationwide cease-fire in years, which allowed commercial flights to resume from Sanaa and some fuel ships to dock in Hodeidah. The parties extended the truce several times, but after six months of relative peace, failed to renew it again. Recently improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and ongoing talks between Riyadh and the Houthis have buoyed hopes for another extension of the cease-fire, but the exclusion of the governing council and STC from the talks has raised questions about the prospects for peace.

Recommended Resources

For Foreign Affairs , the International Crisis Group’s Michael Wahid Hanna and Peter Salisbury argue that negotiations on Yemen should be more inclusive .

CFR’s Global Conflict Tracker follows the latest developments in Yemen’s civil war.

The New York Times ’ Declan Walsh and Tyler Hicks capture the war’s human toll .

Ohio State University’s Asher Orkaby explains how Yemen’s internal divisions were centuries in the making .

In late 2021, the UN Development Program assessed the impact of Yemen’s war and charted potential pathways for recovery.

• Political Transitions

Nathalie Bussemaker, Mia Prange, and Will Rampe contributed to this report. Will Merrow created the graphic.

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Yemen, Potential Existence and Effects of Naval Blockade

The case studies presented in “How does law protect in war?” are based on open-source information. The discussions that follow are developed in partnership with academia. Neither the information contained in the case studies nor the discussions necessarily reflect the opinions of the ICRC or of the authors of “How does law protect in war?”. By continuing on this website, you agree to its terms and conditions .

• Applicability of IHL
• Ius ad bellum - ius in bello
• Armed conflicts subjects to foreign intervention
• Medical personnel, facilities and transports
• Protection of medical objects
• Civilian population
• General protection
• Conduct of hostilities
• Non-international armed conflict
• Methods of warfare
• Humanitarian assistance
• Naval and air warfare
• Naval warfare
• Air warfare
• Analogies with the law of international armed conflict
• Implementation mechanisms
• United Nations
• IHL and human rights
• Human rights in armed conflict
• Lex specialis
• Middle East

INTRODUCTORY TEXT:  This case study is derived from Security Council Resolution 2216 and a joint letter addressed to Saudi Arabia, the head of the Coalition Forces instituting a potential naval blockade in Yemen, from various UN Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts. Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015) authorized measures that could amount to air and naval blockades of Yemen by the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the League of Arab States. UN Special Mandate holders subsequently brought the negative impact of the potential blockades to the Coalition’s attention. This case will discuss those effects from an IHL perspective.

Case prepared by Julie Black, LL.M. student at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, under the supervision of Professor Marco Sassòli and Ms. Yvette Issar, research assistant, both at the University of Geneva.

A. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2216

[ Source: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2216, 14 April 2015, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2216(2015) ]

Security Council,

[Preambular paragraphs]

[PP 2] Noting the letter dated 24 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen, to the United Nations, transmitting a letter from the [exiled] President of Yemen, in which he informed the President of the Security Council that ‘he has requested from the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the League of Arab States to immediately provide support, by all necessary means and measures, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from the continuing aggression by the Houthis’, and noting the letter dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar, S/2015/217, transmitting a letter from the Representatives of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,

[PP7] Reiterating its support for the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council in assisting the political transition in Yemen and commending its engagement in this regard,

[PP8] Reaffirming its support for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and reiterating its call to all parties and Member States to refrain from taking any actions that undermine the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and the legitimacy of the President of Yemen,

[PP9] Expressing grave alarm at the significant and rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Yemen, and emphasizing that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution,

[PP10] Recalling that arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supply and access, may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law,

[PP13] Alarmed at the military escalation by the Houthis in many parts of Yemen including in the Governorates of Ta’iz, Marib, AlJauf, Albayda, their advance towards Aden, and their seizure of arms, including missile systems, from Yemen’s military and security institutions,

[PP14] Condemning in the strongest terms the ongoing unilateral actions taken by the Houthis, and their failure to implement the demands in resolution 2201 (2015) to immediately and unconditionally withdraw their forces from Government institutions, including in the capital Sana’a, normalize the security situation in the capital and other provinces, relinquish government and security institutions, and safely release all individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained, and reiterating its call on all non-State actors to withdraw from government institutions across Yemen and to refrain from any attempts to take over such institutions,

[PP23] Recognizing that the continuing deterioration of the security situation and escalation of violence in Yemen poses an increasing and serious threat to neighbouring States and reaffirming its determination that the situation in Yemen constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

[PP24] Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

[Operative clauses]

1. Demands that all Yemeni parties, in particular the Houthis, fully implement resolution 2201 (2015), refrain from further unilateral actions that could undermine the political transition in Yemen, and further demands that the Houthis immediately and unconditionally:

(a)  end the use of violence;

(b)  withdraw their forces from all areas they have seized, including the capital Sana’a;

(c)  relinquish all additional arms seized from military and security institutions, including missile systems;

(d)  cease all actions that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen;

(e)  refrain from any provocation or threats to neighbouring States, including through acquiring surface-surface missiles, and stockpiling weapons in any bordering territory of a neighbouring State;

(f)  safely release Major-General Mahmoud al-Subaihi, the Minister of Defence of Yemen, all political prisoners, and all individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained; and

(g)  end the recruitment and use of children and release all children from their ranks;

8. Calls on all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law;

9. Reaffirms, consistent with international humanitarian law, the need for all parties to ensure the safety of civilians, including those receiving assistance, as well as the need to ensure the security of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel, and urges all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian actors to reach people in need of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance;

10. Calls on all parties to facilitate the evacuation by concerned States and international organizations of their civilians and personnel from Yemen and commends steps already taken in this regard;

Arms Embargo

14. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, Abd al-Khaliq al-Huthi, and the individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) […] from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories;

15. Calls upon Member States, in particular States neighbouring Yemen, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to Yemen, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 14 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

16. Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 14 of this resolution, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of such items and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

Additional Designation Criteria

19. Reaffirms paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014), and underscores that acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen may also include the violations of the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 14 or obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Yemen;

25. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

B. INFORMATION RECEIVED CONCERNING THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE APPARENT BLOCKAGE OF AIRCRAFT AND VESSELS CARRYING ESSENTIAL GOODS FROM ENTERING YEMEN

[ Source: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Information Received Concerning the Negative Impact on the Enjoyment of Human Rights and the Apparent Blockage of Aircraft and Vessels Carrying Essential Goods from Entering Yemen, 17 November 2016, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22818 ]

Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation

Excellency,

[1] We have the honour to address you in our capacities as Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation […].

[2] In this connection, we would like to bring to the attention of your Excellency’s Government, as the leading member of the Coalition Forces, information we have received concerning the negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights of the people in Yemen due to the apparent blockade of aircraft and vessels carrying essential goods along the Red Sea, including basic food items, fuel and essential medicines.

[3] According to the information received:

In March 2015, before UNSC Resolution 2216 had been adopted, the Coalition Forces [The coalition consists of all the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (with the exception of Oman), as well as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal and the Sudan. (A/HRC/33/38, paragraph 10)] imposed an aerial and naval blockade against Yemen. It has been reported that ‘one of the Saudi-led Gulf coalition's first actions was to close Yemen's airspace and placed its ports under naval blockade, in part to prevent the military resupply of the Houthis and elements supporting former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.’ Once coalition forces took control of Yemeni airspace, they quickly disabled air-traffic control at Sana’a International Airport and other regional airports. Yemen was thereafter closed as an international civil aviation route. Iranian attempts at delivering humanitarian supplies to Yemen have been denied by the coalition, which also bombed the runways at Sana’a airport, forcing the planes to turn back. The alleged purpose of this blockade is to implement the UNSC aforementioned resolution. Nevertheless, in practice, this blockade appears to encompass a unilateral coercive measure from the Coalition to Yemen, restricting and disrupting both the import and export of commercial goods (including food, medical and fuel supplies) and humanitarian aid. Given the fact that Yemen is a net-food-importing State, this situation has led to a severe lack of basic goods and services, as well as to an increase in their respective prices, destabilizing the market system. Consequently, the human rights situation has deteriorated rapidly in the country. Additionally, the humanitarian situation in Yemen has also deteriorated significantly, and the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the country is now among the highest in the world. As of October 2016, the Humanitarian Country Team estimates that 21.2 million people in Yemen (82 % of the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance. Some 14.1 million are food insecure, including 7.6 million who are severely food insecure. Access for 14.1 million people to healthcare services is disrupted.

(i) Aerial and naval blockage

[4] Regarding the aerial and naval blockade, it is reported that humanitarian aid into Yemen is being hampered, by a variety of regulatory or even apparently in some cases arbitrary impediments from the Coalition. There is a long list of vessels waiting to enter the ports of Yemen and sometimes those which have already entered the port are removed from the dock before unloading the goods. Moreover, there is an unreasonable delay and/or denial of entry to vessels that have been inspected and proven to not be carrying weapons, and also for those that are not suspected of carrying weapons. This situation illustrates the discretional criteria when inspecting vessels. Due to aforementioned uncertainties, security and insurance considerations, a number of vessel operators and shipping lines have reduced or pulled out their operations in Yemen. One of the most affected ports is Al Hudaydah.

[5] The blockade of Yemen is reported to have entailed serious humanitarian and socio-economic consequences on the Yemeni people. The conditions of life have become untenable for the vast majority of people in Yemen. As summarized by the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 2140 (2014):

[t]he systematic and widespread blockade of commercial goods has directly contributed to the obstruction of deliveries of aid and humanitarian assistance, while restricting vital imports of commercial fuel, food and other goods not within the purview of resolution 2216 (2015) or currently subject to sanction.

[6] The impact of the blockade has been further documented in the report “2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview” issued by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in November 2015, as follows:

Since the crisis began, Coalition restrictions on imports – as well as damage to port infrastructure due to air strikes – have added to the humanitarian burden by preventing or discouraging commercial imports into the country. Over 90 per cent of staple food (such as cereals) in Yemen was imported prior to the crisis, and the country was using an estimated 544,000 metric tons of fuel per month before the crisis. Fuel is essential to distribute food, pump water and run hospital generators, among other critical activities. In September [2015], OCHA estimated that commercial fuel imports fell to just 1 per cent of monthly requirements, and food imports hit their second-lowest level since the crisis began. These restrictions constitute a major driver of shortages and rising prices of basic commodities, which have in turn contributed to crippling the economy. Health facilities continue to close at alarming rates due to shortages of fuel and other basic supplies. Without critical commodities, needs across sectors are rising, and response efforts are being hampered.

[7] The latest Yemen Food Security Update (October 2016) also observes that “[b]lockades on importation and high prices of essential food commodities has further plugged households to limited access to food and hence to dire food security needs.”

[8] On 6 August 2015, the Government of Yemen requested the Secretary General to establish the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM). The aim of this mechanism is to facilitate the unimpeded flow of commercial items to Yemen and to revive the economy of the State, in line with the UNSC Resolution 2216. On 2 May 2016, the UNVIM started its operations but it functions solely on a voluntary basis. Thus, any inspection would require the vessel’s permission.

(ii) Right to health

[9] According to reports received, the blockade and ongoing conflict have seriously undermined the national health system’s ability to respond to the situation. The lack of availability and inadequate quality of basic healthcare services are severely affecting the right to health of people in Yemen, in particular the elderly, sick and infants. In addition, there is a severe shortage of essential medicines, especially vaccinations, and an important number of people, especially children, are at immediate risk of malnutrition and diarrhoea.

[10] According to information available, as a result of the blockade and the ongoing hostilities, including airstrikes, over 54 per cent of health facilities in 16 governorates are not functioning or partially functioning, only 37 per cent of hospitals remain fully functional, and 70 per cent of governorates report levels of staffing below the minimum benchmark of 22 health workers for every 10,000 persons. Moreover, hospitals are increasingly unable to provide basic healthcare services due to the shortage of fuel, which prevents the power generators from functioning correctly. As a result, several hospitals and medical services have shut down. Moreover, the lack of fuel makes it difficult to transport patients in ambulances and hampers the ability of the staff and patients to access healthcare services.

[11] In the context of the conduct of hostilities, substantial allegations pointing to possible violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen have been documented. In particular, reports indicate a lack of respect by the parties for the international law principles of precautions, distinction and proportionality, including in conducting air strikes. This has resulted in the killing and injuring of thousands of civilians and the extensive destruction of and/or damage to protected civilians objects, including healthcare facilities and health personnel. In this connection, the partial or full damage on 23 healthcare facilities has been documented.

[12] The Saudi-led Coalition enforced a four-day aerial blockade on Sana’a Airport, between 9 and 12 August 2016, preventing the access of humanitarian and commercial flights to Sana’a import. On 13 September 2016, humanitarian flights to Sana’a International Airport resumed; however, commercial flights have not yet been permitted. Yemen’s Civic Aviation and Meteorological Authority, has stated that approximately 3,700 Yemenis are currently abroad since they left the country seeking medical care, and are not able to return due to aerial blockade on the airport.

(iii) Right to Safe Drinking Water and sanitation

[13] Fuel prices, which are more than double the pre-crisis levels, have affected the water supply system, especially in many public hospitals and health centres. Considering the Yemenis’ reliance on water trucks and pumps, the shortage of fuel is preventing drinking water from being pumped and transported to civilian residences.

[14] It is reported that two-thirds of Yemen’s population do not have access to clean water supply. The lack of safe drinking water forces people to drink and use untreated water for cooking and personal use, and increases the chance of getting diarrhea and other water-borne diseases. This situation mainly affects children and women, who are subjected to long distance travel to fetch water.

(iv) Right to food

[15] The food security and nutrition situation in Yemen continues to deteriorate. At present, nearly 50% of the total population is food insecure. This is due in part to the extreme poverty faced by Yemeni people, which limit their accessibility to food, but also to stressed livelihoods as well as a high level of indebtedness. Malnutrition is further compounded by extremely poor water and sanitation conditions, poor food utilization, and scarce health facilities, goods and services. According to the Yemen Food Security Update of October 2016, the food security and nutrition situation is under continuous deterioration. It has also been reported that the ongoing conflict has significantly affected the fishing sector, the importance of which is critical to the nutrition situation in Yemen. It also notes that the “Yemen Fish market and supply chain has suffered huge loss due to the conflict and blockage of the export market to neighboring countries and Europe” and further states that “swift action is required to lift the blockage and support the actors along the fish value chain”.

[16] While we do not wish to prejudge the accuracy of these allegations, we express grave concern over the deteriorating human rights conditions in Yemen due to, among others, the vessel and aerial blockade. This hampers the trade of goods, resulting in the shortage and rise of basic commodities’ prices. The blockade has contributed to the obstruction of humanitarian assistance and aid. Very serious concern is expressed on the impact that these measures, which could be considered as unilateral coercive measures and not the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 2216, have had on a number of fundamental human rights, including the enjoyment of the right to health, food, and safe drinking water and sanitation. Concern is also expressed at the procedure used to inspect vessels in Yemenis ports, which may not be considered as neutral, impeding the effective and prompt clearance.

• Publications

A Data Case Study: Famine in Yemen

Famine in Yemen, an Integrated Food Phase Classification Exercise

Since 2017, the biggest headlines to grip the world about Yemen have been repeated claims that Yemen is “on the brink” or “one step away” from the largest famine in decades or a century. [1] This has been one of the most visible sound bites of the response, bringing in hundreds of millions of dollars in funding and leading to one of the largest scale-ups in food delivery ever seen. It is a claim that has been repeated for almost four years now by top UN leadership. Mark Lowcock, while serving as the UN’s humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, routinely appeared before the Security Council warning of famine and stating that Yemenis were on the brink of mass starvation. But is it true?

The data used to build this claim comes from the Integrated Food Phase Classification exercise, known as the IPC, which was introduced in Yemen in 2011. The IPC provides a common global system for classifying acute food insecurity ( see Figure 2.3) and malnutrition situations and identifying their key drivers. Currently, the IPC is the most comprehensive and most standardized tool used to monitor food insecurity in more than 30 countries worldwide. Through the IPC process, government authorities, humanitarian actors and civil society organizations as well as other experts collaborate on data collection and analysis. Their aim is to generate food security data that can be compared across crises and used to more effectively evaluate the severity and extent of food insecurity and malnutrition in a country. This data is then used to inform emergency responses as well as longer-term programming. [2]

The definition of famine used by the IPC is, “the absolute inaccessibility of food to an entire population or sub-group of a population, potentially causing death in the short term.” [4] As famine is considered a rare and serious phenomenon, three set standards supported by reliable evidence have to be concurrently present to declare famine:

• at least 20 percent of households in an area face extreme food shortages with a limited ability to cope (usually indicating a near-complete collapse in food and livelihood systems, resulting in extreme food consumption gaps even though coping strategies have been fully employed);
• acute malnutrition rates in children exceed 30 percent; and
• a death rate that exceeds two persons a day per 10,000 people. [5]

In theory, food security data is collected on a yearly basis. IPC acknowledges that the volatile conflict situation hampers data collection in Yemen, resulting in a scarcity of data. [6] This has been confirmed by previous research done on the Yemen IPC process, which found that several types of data often are not available for the analysis (such as mortality — a key data set), that little systematic data exists, either quantitative or qualitative, and that there is a lack of data sharing and transparency. [7] The conflict and lengthy processes required to gather the data have also meant that it has been difficult to gather timely data. As a result, often the IPC analysis is undertaken with a compilation of data that has been collected at varying points in time. [8] For example, the IPC analysis released at the end of 2020 projecting into 2021 used data that was collected seven months prior. [9] This means that the same data used for the analysis measuring outcomes in March 2020 was being used to project scenarios for almost a year later. Yet, in IPC, reliability depends partly on the “timeliness” of data. It requires data to be collected within the same season and/or from a similar season in a previous year. Implicit in the use of “previous season” data is that events and circumstances since data collection have not changed, so, with other supporting context, certain inferences can be made from the data. This is where the end-of-2020 Yemen IPC analysis fell short. Data collected at inconsistent time intervals and compilations of data from various times cannot be assumed to be reflective of any similar period. [10] Taking this into account, it is debatable whether the data used for the analysis to project into 2021 remained relevant enough to project accurately. [11]

Data availability and quality became more problematic with increased interference by authorities in the process. This led, for example, to the data collection for the IPC process in 2019 being blocked completely by Houthi-based authorities in areas under their control, resulting in no data. [12] This interference also greatly undermines the independence and quality of the data collected. In theory, data collection is carried out by independent data collection teams trained in the IPC protocol and using questionnaires designed by experts, but this is not the case in Yemen. Particularly in areas under the control of the armed Houthi movement, there is extreme interference in the data collection. Questionnaires have to be approved by Houthi authorities who regularly interfere in the type of questions included in them and the data that can be collected. They also interfere in the selection of teams that collect the data and frequently collect it themselves without the presence of any independent monitors. [13] Experts admit that it is common knowledge that answers to the questionnaires in Houthi-controlled areas are often coached. [14] This opens the potential for data manipulation and bias. Unfortunately, this bias is not transparently shared as a limitation of the data in the process of analyzing the data and the publication of results. [15]

The data quality is further compromised by a lack of independent and external review of the data. During the IPC process, it is usual for external experts in food security and nutrition to be included on panels while the IPC data is processed and analyzed at the end of the data collection process. This increases independence and quality control of the data, and improves the conclusions published as an outcome of the data analysis. In Yemen, this is not possible. The Houthi authorities prohibit raw data collected in areas of Yemen they control from being taken out of the country. This means that while it is possible for IPC technical working group (IPC TWG) members present inside Yemen to access the data, it is impossible for anyone outside Yemen to verify any of the general outcomes or test for accuracy based on actual data. [16] This was made even more difficult in 2020 by COVID-19 restrictions, which severely constrained the ability of IPC TWG members to be in Yemen at the time of the analysis.

In addition to this, the IPC framework has its limitations in the Yemen context. Firstly, IPC is geared toward analysis in rural areas predominantly dependent on rural livelihood models and coping strategies. The framework was not set up for urban populations and to properly analyze urban livelihoods and the labor market. Therefore, there is a debate around whether the data accurately reflects and correctly interprets the situation for the approximately one-third of Yemenis residing in urban areas. [17] Secondly, the IPC’s Acute Food Security analysis was designed for a six- to 12-month acute hunger episode driven by a shock or convergence of stressors. The locust infestation in East Africa that began in 2019, for example, destroyed crops and pushed an area from a Phase 2 (with some Phase 3) into a Phase 3/4, but the area retained an ability to recover in a following harvest (and with some support). Another example would be a sudden outbreak of conflict and escalation of needs, such as in Tigray, Ethiopia. IPC indicators are aimed to capture outcomes, for example the sudden need to use coping strategies to mitigate food gaps. This approach is not well suited for a protracted situation when coping is no longer really an option for vulnerable populations such as those in Yemen. [18]

Furthermore, the impact of humanitarian food assistance (HFA) on food security in Yemen is not well understood because of the protracted nature of providing it. Most other countries deliver HFA through different models. In South Sudan, for example, food assistance is provided on a seasonal cycle, being distributed during lean seasons. It is, therefore, possible to understand and analyze the effects of food assistance on a population by comparing periods of HFA versus periods without it. In Yemen, food assistance is given year round and has been since the start of the L3 in 2015. In fact, food aid has scaled up massively in recent years. In December 2015, the World Food Programme (WFP) reached 1.8 million people; [19] by late 2019/early 2020, more than 12 million people were reportedly being reached. [20] Yet, with the widespread interference and diversion that has been well-evidenced, it is unclear if and how much of the food assistance reaches populations affected by food insecurity and how this impacts these people’s situation. When conducting food analysis in Yemen, it is unclear whether we are looking at populations with or without HFA, or with how much HFA, and what coping mechanisms people are using because these are not properly documented, analyzed or understood. For this reason, the impact of HFA remains unclear, detracting from the accuracy of the analysis. [21]

Despite the shortcomings evidenced above, IPC data remains at the core of strategic planning related to food and nutrition, and purportedly provides the rationale for statements by UN leaders about the severity of Yemen’s food insecurity when they seek donor funding. Therefore, IPC outcomes and data since 2017, when warnings of impending famine became routine, merit review to understand the reliability of these claims.

The 2017 IPC

The 2017 IPC classified 17 million people in Yemen as facing acute food insecurity. The data used was based on Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessments (EFSNAs) carried out by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNICEF and WFP in 18 governorates in 2016. For two other governorates, 2014 data was used. For the two remaining governorates, it was unclear which data was used. [22] No classification was made for any pockets of the population being in Phase 5, though it was estimated that 6.8 million people (24 percent of the population) were thought to be in emergency Phase 4 of food security. [23] Nutrition data collected had major gaps, [24] but the data did not indicate the required threshold of 30 percent of acute malnutrition in children had been exceeded, which would be an IPC indicator of famine. [25] EFSNA data on mortality collected using Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey methodology found that none of the 18 governorates assessed showed a death rate (crude or under-5) of 1 or above per 10,000 people per day. [26]

In late 2017, after the Saudi-led coalition closed Yemen’s land, air and sea ports in a temporary tightening of its blockade, Lowcock began warning of “the largest famine the world has seen for many decades, with millions of victims,” [27] apparently based on the vulnerability of populations found to be in IPC Phase 4. This came despite the fact that IPC thresholds for famine were not met.

The 2018 IPC

The 2018 IPC process saw some improvement, with analysis taking place at the district level for the first time, allowing for better analysis and differentiation in areas where challenges to gathering the data were fewer or surmountable. In October 2018, two months before results of the IPC were even published, the UN began to refer to the food security situation as a “potential famine.” [28] The references to famine increased as the publication deadline of the IPC came closer, and throughout the 2018 battle for Hudaydah, the specter of famine was heavily used to advocate against a military push to oust Houthi forces from Hudaydah city. [29] The role and wisdom of humanitarian advocacy in political (and military) decisions related to Hudaydah is discussed in more detail in a later report, ‘ A Principled Response ’, but by its own criteria, the data did not bear out the rhetoric.

The 2018 IPC was the source of heated debate in humanitarian circles. Food security analysts and nutrition experts fundamentally disagreed on the results of the data collection, with nutrition experts pointing to a lack of data to support any famine declaration from their side while food security experts pushed for a famine declaration based on food consumption data alone. [30] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which has a presence across Yemen, also disputed the push to declare a famine, stating its medical staff had not seen any change in mortality and nutrition rates in their treatment facilities – including in comparison to times before the conflict. [31] Despite this, using only the food security side and discounting the other required IPC thresholds in the analysis, UN leaders came out with, and media headlines amplified, fresh cries of imminent famine.

The disagreement over the data and a push to classify famine in some areas of Yemen led to the review by a famine review committee (FRC) in November 2018. It was a challenging task for the FRC, which was unable to find a solid reason for the contradictory food security and nutrition data. [32] Though internally divided, the IPC TWG ultimately confirmed the evidence did not support a famine or famine-likely classification. [33] As a result, despite high levels of the population found to be suffering from acute food insecurity, the consensus outcome of the 2018 analysis was that there was no famine, and none projected. [34] Still, senior humanitarian leaders continued to use the term and the food security data to infer a potential famine, pushing the narrative without supporting scientific evidence ( see : ‘ Challenging the Narratives ’). [35]

Despite the lack of evidence for famine, the 2018 IPC data did reflect a concerning situation. It reported that 15.9 million people — 53 percent of the population analyzed — were acutely food insecure, despite ongoing humanitarian food assistance. It estimated that 17 percent of the population (about 5 million people, and more than 1 million fewer than in the 2017 IPC) fit the food security classification of IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and that an additional 63,500 people were in IPC Phase 5 (catastrophe). [36] The 45 districts flagged as hosting populations in IPC 5 had been inaccessible to assessors, meaning that this data, like much gathered in 2018, had been collected remotely. [37] While the data collection can be questioned, sub-par food consumption and coping methods were beginning to be more widely evidenced on the ground as reflected in the data available.

2019: Process Aborted

An attempt to undertake an IPC assessment in 2019 was severely hampered by the restrictions imposed by Houthi authorities in Yemen and resulting disagreements between WFP (and the UN as a whole), and the Houthis. Ultimately, the 2019 IPC process was never completed. Initial plans to monitor the 45 districts deemed most at risk for famine based on the 2018 analysis also were hampered by access restrictions. [38] A finding within a hotspot analysis of 2019 is, however, interesting to note: Only 29 of the 45 districts that had reported pockets of population in Phase 5 in 2018 were accessible in 2019 and, therefore, could be included in the hotspot analysis, but no evidence of Phase 5 conditions was found in any of them, [39] raising questions about the veracity of the remotely gathered data initially collected from those locations.

The 2020 IPC

The next IPC analysis was published in July 2020, [40] following a fraught process that initially resulted in data only being published for areas under the control of the internationally backed Yemeni government. Eventually, a food security update was released for the whole country in December 2020, [41] although by the end of the year nutrition data had still only been published for areas outside Houthi control. [42] Following the contested process in 2018, external experts were allowed for the first time to participate in the IPC analysis process remotely. Their access to data remained limited, however, with the Houthi ban on letting raw data out of Yemen remaining in place. As a result, only generic output tables were accessible to analysts participating remotely, which meant the data quality could not be adequately tested. [43] Sources of data and how it had been collected also remained opaque. [44]

The final analysis published found that 13.5 million people (45 percent of the analyzed population) were facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), despite ongoing HFA. This included 9.8 million people (33 percent) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), 3.6 million (12 percent) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and, of greatest concern, approximately 16,500 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), with numbers expected to increase in the first half of 2021. [45]

Some contention exists around the data outcomes. In early 2020, Houthi officials approved one type of survey needed to establish the level and severity of malnutrition. The survey was carried out soon after, before the first Covid-19 cases were detected in Yemen. When the time came for the IPC analysis, Houthi-based authorities refused to allow UN agencies and the IPC technical working group access the survey data, without giving a convincing reason as to why. [46]

One food security expert who participated in the analysis process said the final results did not reflect the data that was presented to the external review panel during the process, especially with regard to the final determination of populations in IPC Phase 5 conditions. As per the analysts’ review, “the data used was quite insufficient to make such statements, especially about Phase 4 and Phase 5 populations.” [47]

Regardless, the final outcome of the analysis found that famine in Yemen was not present and was not a likely scenario. This was backed up by Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) analysis, which provides additional analysis to the IPC. [48] Nutrition data for areas under the control of Houthi authorities was not available at the time of the analysis, and current, reliable mortality data remains unavailable in Yemen.

A more recent report on food security in 2020 offers interesting insight. According to the 2021 Global Report on Food Crises, Yemen showed the largest change in the number of people considered to be in crisis Phase 3; with a 15 percent improvement in food security, the largest among the improvements seen globally. [49] The numbers above also are notable, with the number of people in Phase 4 having continuously dropped over the years (from 6.8 million in 2017 to 3.6 million in 2020). The veracity of pockets of populations in IPC Phase 5 is questionable in light of the findings in 2019 (29 districts purported to have populations in famine-like conditions actually had none) and in 2020, when 16,500 persons were thought to be experiencing famine-like conditions compared to 64,000 in 2019. Rather than a country falling into famine, the data coming in has increasingly been indicating that Yemen’s food security is improving.

Still, less than two weeks before the release of the food security analysis, and with only a partial nutrition analysis conducted (which did not find any evidence to reach the nutrition threshold for famine), [50] Guterres once again declared that “Yemen is now in imminent danger of the worst famine the world has seen for decades.” [51] The purpose of the statement was to call for more funding. And despite the lack of evidence, this narrative has continued to be used indiscriminately, even following the IPC findings, mainly to push for more funding. [52]

Food Security is a Problem in Yemen, Famine is Not

Yemen is a country with a big population compared to some others in crisis. As a result, the numbers are big, and will always look big side-by-side with South Sudan or northeast Nigeria, which can warp perception (relative comparisons of figures can be seen in ‘ Challenging the Narratives ‘). In Yemen, there are large populations with acute and chronic food insecurity and pockets of people who are considered to experience severe forms of food insecurity. But there is no scientific, or anecdotal, evidence that this food insecurity is leading to increased death rates and large-scale starvation. In other places, overall numbers may be much lower, but acute food insecurity is visibly resulting in increased deaths and populations who are wasted. These places, which get little public attention, are much more at risk of famine according to assessments grounded in data-based, scientific findings. Several areas of South Sudan, for example, are considered “famine-likely” following IPC analysis. [53] Yet, months into a famine declaration in Pibor, South Sudan, there has been no visible scale-up of assistance to these areas. [54] One shock in these locations could collapse food consumption and lead to high excess mortality due to hunger and disease.

The debate on “famine” or “no famine” is an emotive one, and often, a fundraising one. As evidenced above, the accuracy of these claims has not been a concern for the UN and the Yemen humanitarian response as there is no evidence, and never has been, to support a famine declaration in Yemen. Even anecdotally, there has been no evidence of people dying in large numbers of food insecurity. Claiming famine only heightens skepticism about the fundamental basis on which the response claims to work and fundraise. It also misses the point. Food security is a problem in Yemen, famine is not, and skewing the narrative skews the appropriate response. Cries of famine simply lead to agencies such as WFP trying to increase general food distributions by throwing actual food at the problem. This does not fix the underlying problem of food security, though it greatly increases the risk of food diversion. Investment in markets and production would far more sustainably solve systemic food security problems. Until a nuanced, realistic and honest analysis and debate is held about food security in Yemen, it will not be properly addressed.

The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies is an independent think tank that seeks to foster change through knowledge production with a focus on Yemen and the surrounding region. The Center’s publications and programs, offered in both Arabic and English, cover diplomatic, political, social, economic and security-related developments, aiming to impact policy locally, regionally, and internationally.

This report is part of the Sana’a Center project Monitoring Humanitarian Aid and its Micro and Macroeconomic Effects in Yemen, funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The project explores the processes and modalities used to deliver aid in Yemen, identifies mechanisms to improve their efficiency and impact, and advocates for increased transparency and efficiency in aid delivery.

The views and information contained in this report are not representative of the Government of Switzerland, which holds no responsibility for the information included in this report. The views participants expressed in this report are their own and are not intended to represent the views of the Sana’a Center.

• “Yemen facing largest famine the world has seen for decades, warns UN aid chief,” UN News, New York, November 9, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/570262-yemen-facing-largest-famine-world-has-seen-decades-warns-un-aid-chief ; Hillary Clarke, “Twelve million face famine in Yemen if bombs don’t stop, warns WFP,” CNN, October 16, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/15/middleeast/yemen-famine-war/index.html ; “10 million Yemenis ‘one step away from famine’, UN food relief agency calls for ‘unhindered access’ to frontline regions,” UN News, New York, March 26, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035501 ; Peter Beaumont, “‘Open your eyes’: Yemen on brink of famine again, UN agencies warn,” The Guardian, July 22, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jul/22/open-your-eyes-yemen-on-brink-of-famine-again-un-agencies-warn ; Hannah Summers, “Yemen on brink of ‘world’s worst famine in 100 years’ if war continues,” The Guardian, October 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/15/yemen-on-brink-worst-famine-100-years-un
• For more information on the IPC, see : http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/en/
• “Technical Manual Version 3.0. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions,” IPC, Rome, April 2019, p. 35, http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf
• Ibid., p. 204.
• Ibid., p. 9, and “IPC and Famine: Using the appropriate terminology and scientific thresholds,” IPC Global Support Unit, March 2012, http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Def_Meas.pdf
• “Yemen,” Integrated Food Phase Classification, Rome, website accessed on January 19, January 2021, http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/where-what/asia/yemen/en/
• Daniel Maxwell, Peter Hailey, Lindsay Spainhour Baker and Jeeyon Janet Kim, “Constraints and Complexities of Information and Analysis in Humanitarian Emergencies. Evidence from Yemen,” pp. 16, 21, 24 and 33.
• Ibid., pp. 16-17, 25, 35, 37.
• Interview with food security analyst #1, November 25, 2020.
• Follow-up interview with food security analyst #1, February 6, 2021.
• Ibid; interview with a senior food security expert, January 20, 2021.
• “2019 Humanitarian Response Plan End of Year Report,” UNOCHA, p. 18.
• Author´s experience with IPC in Yemen in 2019; evidenced through internal UN emails with challenges experienced in the IPC process shared with author during the course of this research in 2020; and interviews with UN senior staff member #3, November 30, 2020, and UN agency staff member #4, December 7, 2020.
• Interviews with food security analyst, November 25, 2020, and UN agency staff member #4, December 7, 2020.
• Interview with UN agency staff member #4, December 7, 2020; author’s experience in Yemen; and evidenced through previous research conducted by Maxwell et al., “Constraints and Complexities,” pp. 20, 29, 31, 33.
• Interviews with food security analyst #1, November 25, 2020, and senior food security expert, January 20, 2021; Maxwell et al., “Constraints and Complexities,” pp. 23-25, 33.
• Follow up interview with food security analyst #1, February 6, 2021.
• “Yemen: Emergency Dashboard,” WFP, Sana´a, February 2016, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/
• “Yemen: Emergency Dashboard,” WFP, Sana´a, February 2020, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/0779e ; 12.84 million people were assisted in January 2020, but by January 2021, this figure had gone down to 7.9 million: https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/001a
• Interviews with food security analyst #1, November 25, 2020, and senior food security expert, January 20, 2021.
• Maxwell et al., “Constraints and Complexities,” p. 16.
• “Yemen: Projected Acute Food Insecurity Situation for March-July 2017,” IPC, Rome, March 15, 2017, http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1026467/?iso3=YEM
• In 2016, only five SMART surveys (in Al-Dhalea, Hudaydah, Sa’ada, Sana’a and Taiz) were conducted, and only three (Ibb, Lahj and Shabwa) in 2017. See: SMART Surveys Reports for 2016 and 2017, OCHA Services website, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/yemen/document/smart-surveys-reports-2016 and https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/yemen/document/smart-surveys-reports-2017
• “Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (EFSNA): Yemen,” FAO, UNICEF, WFP, June 2017, p. 123, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/yemen_efsna_-_full_report_final_2016.pdf
• Angela Dewan, “Saudi blockade pushing Yemen towards ‘worst famine in decades’,” CNN, November 9, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/09/middleeast/yemen-famine-saudi-arabia/index.html
• Emma Graham Harrison, “Famine in Yemen could become one of worst in living memory, UN says,” The Guardian, London, October 25, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/25/famine-in-yemen-could-become-one-of-worst-in-living-memory-un-says
• See , for example: “International Community Must Take Action to Stop Catastrophic Famine in Yemen, Top Humanitarian Affairs Official Tells Security Council,” UN press office, New York, October 23, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13550.doc.htm ; “Yemen war: Battle for vital port of Hudaydah intensifies,” BBC News, November 7, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46125858 ; Geert Cappelaere, “Conflict in Yemen, a living hell for children,” full text of remarks to the press, November 4, 2018, Amman, via UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/mena/stories/conflict-yemen-living-hell-children ; “250,000 people ‘may lose everything — even their lives’ in assault on key Yemeni port city: UN humanitarian coordinator,” United Nations, Sana’a, June 8, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1011701
• Author’s discussion with UN staff member in Sana’a in 2019; interview with humanitarian analyst #2, December 15, 2020; and Maxwell et al., “Constraints and Complexities,” p. 32. For information on areas classified as at risk of famine, see the 2018 IPC report: http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1151858/
• “Is Yemen on the Brink of Famine?” MSF, Geneva, October 24, 2018, https://www.msf.org/yemen-there-no-quality-data-available-declare-famine-imminent
• Interview with senior food security expert, January 20, 2021.
• Nicholas Haan, Peter Hailey, Daniel Maxwell, Oleg Bilhuka and Jose Lopez, “Famine Review Committee Conclusions and Recommendations on the IPC Yemen Analysis. Summary Report,” IPC, Rome, November 28, 2018, p. 3, http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/FRC_Yemen_Summary_report.pdf
• Maxwell et al., “Constraints and Complexities,” p. 32.
• In February 2019, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres opened a donor conference for Yemen by saying “almost 10 million are just one step away from famine.” Within hours, US$2.6 billion had been pledged toward the UN’s US$4 billion appeal. Declan Walsh and Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Seeks $4 Billion to Save Millions from Famine in Yemen,” The New York Times, February 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/world/middleeast/yemen-famine-aid-donors.html ; See also, “10 million Yemenis ‘one step away from famine’, UN food relief agency calls for ‘unhindered access’ to frontline regions,” UN News, New York, March 26, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035501 ;
• “Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation December 2018 – January 2019,” IPC, Rome, December 7, 2018, http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1151858/?iso3=YEM
• Internal UN emails shared with the author during the research period by key informants, supporting knowledge gained in a debriefing of the 2018 IPC process.
• “Yemen Hotpot Analysis: Severe Acute Food Insecurity Persists in 29 Districts in Yemen,” IPC, July 2019, http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_AFI_Hotspot%20Analysis_2019JulySept.pdf
• “IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, July – December 2020; Yemen, Partial Analysis for 133 Districts,” IPC, July 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IPC_Yemen_AcuteFoodInsecurity_2020FebDec_Report_English.pdf
• “Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October – December 2020 and Projection for January – June 2021,”IPC, December 3, 2020, http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1152947/?iso3=YEM
• “Yemen: Acute Malnutrition January — July 2020 and Projection for August — December 2020,” IPC, Rome, October 23, 2020, http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1152903/?iso3=YEM ; updated in February 2021 for the whole country: http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1153006/?iso3=YEM
• “Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October – December 2020 and Projection for January – June 2021.”
• “Deadly Consequences. Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19,” Human Rights Watch, New York, September 14, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/09/yemen0920_web_3.pdf
• Interview with food security analyst #2, December 3, 2020.
• “Yemen Food Security Outlook Update. December 2020 – May 2021,” FEWSNET, Rome, December 2020, https://fews.net/east-africa/yemen
• “Global Report of Food Crises 2021: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions,” Food Security Information Network and Global Network Against Food Crises, May 2021, p. 17, https://www.wfp.org/publications/global-report-food-crises-2021
• “Yemen: Acute Malnutrition January – July 2020 and Projection for August – December 2020,” IPC.
• Antonio Guterres, “Warning Yemen in ‘Imminent Danger’ of Worst Famine World Has Seen for Decades, Secretary-General Urges Immediate Action to Avert Catastrophe,” full text, United Nations, New York, November 20, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20432.doc.htm
• See , for example, “Window to prevent famine in Yemen is narrowing, UN agencies warn. Levels of hunger reach record levels, requiring urgent action,” UNICEF, New York, December 3, 2020, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/window-prevent-famine-yemen-narrowing-un-agencies-warn ; Martin Chulov, “Classifying Houthis as terrorists will worsen famine in Yemen, Trump is warned,” The Guardian, December 13, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/13/classifying-houthis-as-terrorists-will-worsen-famine-in-yemen-trump-is-warned ; Mark Lowcock, “Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock, Briefing to the Security Council on humanitarian situation in Yemen,” full text, UNOCHA, New York, January 14, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-mark-35
• “IPC South Sudan Alert December 2020,” IPC, Rome, December 2020, http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-31/en/
• Follow up interview with food security analyst #1, February 6, 2021, and an internal report by an INGO in South Sudan that followed a February 2021 assessment of the Pibor area, shared with the author in February 2021.

Table of contents

• Executive Summary
• Challenging the Narratives: Is Yemen Really the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World?
• You're here The Myth of Data in Yemen A Data Case Study: Famine in Yemen
• To Stay and Deliver: Security
• To Stay and Deliver: Sustainable Access and Redlines A Centralized Response is a Slow, Ineffective Response
• A Principled Response: Neutrality and Politics Monitoring: Accountability Falters When Oversight is Outsourced
• Rethinking the System: Is Humanitarian Aid What Yemen Needs Most?

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Cholera in yemen: a case study of epidemic preparedness and response.

• Johns Hopkins Univ.

Attachments

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND:

In 2015, the United Nations (UN) declared Yemen a Level 3 (L3) emergency. On September 28, 2016, a largescale cholera outbreak began. Between April 27, 2017 and July 1, 2018, more than one million suspected cases in two waves were reported. In the last decade, several large-scale and high mortality cholera outbreaks have occurred during complex humanitarian emergencies including in Iraq, Somalia, and South Sudan. While the issues of “what to do” to control cholera are largely known, context-specific practices on “how to do it” in order to surmount challenges to coordination, logistics, insecurity, access, and politics, remain. During the Yemen cholera outbreak response, questions arose concerning how to effectively respond to a cholera outbreak at a national scale during an existing L3 emergency. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), supported by the Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), provided funding to the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health for an unsolicited proposal for a case study of the response.

OBJECTIVES AND METHODS:

The main objective was to identify lessons from September 28, 2016 to March 2018 (i.e., from the preparedness and detection phase to the end of second wave) to better prepare for future cholera outbreaks in Yemen and similar contexts. The methods included: literature reviews of global cholera guidance, cholera and other outbreak management in complex humanitarian emergencies and fragile states, and documents relating to the outbreak in Yemen; interpretation of surveillance data; and, key informant interviews (KII) with practitioners, donors, and technical experts involved in the response.

114 documents were reviewed, and 71 KIIs were undertaken.

Reports from Iraq, South Sudan, Haiti, and other complex emergencies and fragile states highlight substantial adaptations undertaken to manage cholera outbreaks. Global cholera guidance emphasizes the early detection and response to contain outbreaks at an early stage, a multi-sectoral approach to prevent cholera in hotspots in endemic countries, and effective mechanisms of coordination for technical support, resource mobilization, and partnership.

Prior to the outbreak, Yemen did not have a sufficient cholera preparedness and response plan. There was no plan despite previous cholera outbreaks, endemicity in the region, active conflict, and World Health Organization (WHO) regional office initiatives.

The 2016 cholera response plan evolved iteratively, but did not initially prioritize standard components. Initial gaps including epidemiological analysis to inform the response, and reference to the oral cholera vaccine, community surveillance, and infection prevention and control as well as emerging problems (e.g., improvement of laboratory capacity and monitoring of the application of the case definition).

The surveillance and laboratory systems were insufficiently prepared and inadequately modified to monitor the cholera epidemic during a complex emergency. The large number of suspect cases reported is likely much higher than the actual number meeting the suspect case definition. The lack of systematic use of culture-confirmation and the late adoption of epidemiological investigation and quality control made it difficult to address the high proportion of mild suspect cases. Extensive human resources and logistics were applied to sustain the response, proportionate to caseload, at a national level. Multiple contributing factors included: culture confirmation needs surpassing the capacity of the only two authorized laboratories; an incentive payment structure inadvertently promoted the inclusion of patients who did not meet the suspect case definition; and lack of early implementation of a system to remotely monitor reporting practices in insecure areas.

The treatment network of case management units (diarrhea treatment centers (DTCs) and oral rehydration corners (ORCs)) were insufficiently decentralized and did not ensure adequate access for as much of the population as could have been achieved. The strategy focused on establishing DTCs (both waves) and ORCs (second wave only) in or near existing health facilities, rather than being driven by placement near areas of epidemiological need and in more remote areas.

Decision-making was driven by the humanitarian need to integrate services due to a lack of human resources and functioning health centers. Despite the rapid scale of infection, technical guidance with attention to high-risk groups like pregnant women and children with severe acute malnutrition were provided with delay. Finally, there was limited focus on community-based approaches to treatment, referral and surveillance.

The water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector was unprepared to transition from generalized development-style programming to choleraspecific activities. It was not until September 2017, after the peak of the second wave, that targeted, outbreak-specific rapid response teams (RRTs) were established, operationalized, and managed at the level of the 22 governorates, leading to specific WASH activities to reduce transmission. A late 2017/ early 2018 evaluation by the WASH cluster found that the majority of beneficiaries were reached through system support, including fuel, operations and maintenance support, rehabilitation, and sewage treatment plant support as opposed to choleraspecific interventions.

The use of the oral cholera vaccine (OCV) was slowed by the lack of cholera response planning and technical knowledge among the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP) and partners.

The lack of an updated cholera preparedness and response plan meant that OCV was not integrated into the response mindset and thus, there was a lack of technical knowledge and familiarly with OCV. OCV was not sufficiently discussed during the first wave, and was requested then rejected by the MoPHP during the second wave based on differing conceptions of the overall scale of distribution. The March 2018 plan is the first document that mentions an OCV strategy, based on a January 2018 risk assessment. The MoPHP then made a successful request to the Global Task Force for Cholera Control in April 2018 for 4.6 million doses for preventative use against future surges of cholera.

• Three coordination systems operated with various success and limited complementarity. These included the health and WASH clusters and a Cholera Task Force (CTF) and followed by the implementation of the incident management system (IMS) and emergency operations centers (EOCs) led by WHO.

Coordination was also hampered by having two different governments in Yemen and political tensions.

• Insecurity and airstrikes resulted in extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, including water systems. It likely contributed to service disruptions, reduced access to many areas of the country, and potentially increased cholera transmission. Other stressors included the closures of ports, airports and blockades of imported food, fuel, medications and medical supplies, and persistent ground-level insecurity.

CONCLUSIONS:

The cholera response in Yemen was and remains extremely complicated and challenging for a variety of political, security, cultural, and environmental reasons. The study team recognizes these challenges and commends the government, international and national organizations, and the donors for working to find solutions in such a difficult context. There are no easy fixes to these challenges, and the conclusions and recommendations are meant to be constructive and practical, taking into account the extreme limitations of working in Yemen during an active conflict.

The findings were consistent across respondents and methods. The study team found that several areas gained strength throughout the second wave, including: an extensive operational footprint which reached into insecure areas; the strengthening of the collaborations between WHO and UNICEF and the health and WASH clusters; the initiation of a funding mechanism through the World Bank which enabled a timely response at scale; the revitalization of the WASH strategy; and, eventual consensus and use of OCV.

Conversely, the major gaps of this response are rooted in weaknesses in preparedness and the early strategies developed in the first wave. An after-action review after the first wave could have institutionalized these areas in order to prevent a much larger second wave.

The World Bank’s commitment to the cholera response provides the rationale for major investment in bolstering the preparedness activities in Yemen and other conflictaffected contexts which would go far for addressing the foundational gaps discussed in this case study.

Related Content

Yemen humanitarian fund (yhf) 2023 annual report.

Yemen + 2 more

Yemen Crisis Response Plan 2024

Unicef yemen humanitarian situation report, 1 - 30 november 2022, world vision yemen response situation report: march 2022 - january 2023.

• Download the study pdf (2.1 MB)

Case Study: ERRYJP Area-based Contribution to Enhance Resilience, Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen

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March 24, 2024

Discover how area-based approaches are making a tangible impact on the resilience, livelihoods, and food security of communities in Yemen, particularly in Tuban District, Lahj Governorate.  This case study explore into the strategies implemented by the ERRY III Joint Programme, focusing on Tuban District, a rural area grappling with vulnerability, food insecurity, and job disruptions. Through targeted and integrated solutions, the programme addresses root issues, leveraging an area-based approach to build resilience and create sustainable employment opportunities.

Highlighted in this study is the significance of gender mainstreaming, as the roles of men and women are intricately woven into the planning and implementation processes. By examining the programme's effects, this study sheds light on its success in building sustainable job opportunities and improving food security in one of Yemen's most severely affected areas.

Funded generously by the European Union and Government of Sweden, the Supporting Resilient Livelihoods, Food Security, and Climate Adaptation in Yemen Joint Programme (ERRY III Joint Programme) brings together the expertise of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and World Food Programme (WFP). Together, they work towards enhancing the resilience of crisis-affected communities in Yemen by establishing sustainable livelihoods, enhancing food security, and facilitating access to basic services.

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Cholera and Conflict in Yemen

By Mehron S. Dhillon, Daniel Na, Christopher R. Kawata, Jacelyn Swede, Parth N. Patel, Angelika F. Ringor, Joshua Chu, Andrea C. Nicholas

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This case study explores the 2016–2018 cholera outbreak in Yemen and how political and financial circumstances impacted relief efforts. Students research the basics of the Vibrio cholerae bacterium and then amplify their understanding in class through the use of a role-play activity representing a doctor-patient interaction. This is followed by a second in-class activity in which students participate in a simulation of a small town in war-torn Yemen illustrating how cholera spreads and the strains that are placed on the healthcare system. A PowerPoint presentation is used in class to help guide the activities. Additionally, the teaching notes include an optional post-class extension based on the cholera outbreak in London (“Cholera in the Streets”), which allows students to critically analyze factors within a fictional town and engage with public health policies surrounding outbreak scenarios. The case was designed for an advanced IB or AP high school biology class, or for use as part of an introductory college-level biology course.

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• Describe how cholera infects and affects patients, and understand the basics concerning diagnosis and treatment of cholera.
• Describe the cholera outbreak in Yemen and identify the factors that contributed to the spread of the disease.
• Understand how separate events during the Yemeni civil war have affected the general state of healthcare in Yemen and the mortality rate of the population.
• Integrate knowledge of the disease and political issues to offer solutions to outbreak and epidemic scenarios.
• Demonstrate how widespread disease and limited resources place strain on medical institutions, resulting in significant disruptions in the effectiveness of healthcare delivery.

Yemen; cholera; outbreak; epidemic; infection; diarrhea; civil war; diarrheal disease; medical aid; humanitarian; sanitation; bacterium; Vibrio cholera; Yemeni civil war; hospital simulation; game-based learning

Subject Headings

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

High school, Undergraduate lower division

TOPICAL AREAS

Policy issues, Social issues

TYPE/METHODS

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Teaching notes are intended to help teachers select and adopt a case. They typically include a summary of the case, teaching objectives, information about the intended audience, details about how the case may be taught, and a list of references and resources.

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Answer Keys are protected and access to them is limited to paid subscribed instructors. To become a paid subscriber, purchase a subscription here .

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Materials & Media

Supplemental materials.

The PowerPoint presentation below can be used in class to structure and guide the case study activities.

• cholera_role_play.pptx (~4.4 MB)

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