competition and cooperation thesis statement

The Science of Choosing Between Cooperation and Competition

New work shows brain activity when deciding how cooperative to be..

Posted December 16, 2022 | Reviewed by Gary Drevitch

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• Every day, we make decisions to cooperate with others but sometimes we feel the need to compete.
• New research suggests that we constantly adjust how cooperative to be.
• Specific parts of the brain monitor our partners’ cooperation level and respond by changing how competitive we are.

By Andrea Pisauro, Ph.D. and Matthew Apps, Ph.D.; edited by Patricia Lockwood, Ph.D., and Jo Cutler, Ph.D.

We live in the most peaceful time in our species’ existence and global cooperation has expanded to unprecedented levels. Yet, sometimes cooperation breaks down and we witness unexpected conflicts . Psychologists, economists, and political scientists have long sought to understand when and why people compete rather than cooperate . A new study that looked at what happens in the brain when people make these decisions revealed fascinating new insights.

Economic Games

Interacting with others is complicated. We have to think about what we want, what other people want, what setting we are in, and then combine that information to decide how to behave. A key aspect is whether to be friendly or hostile. The complexity of social decisions makes it hard for scientists to understand how people choose between cooperating or competing. To solve this, scientists created games which simplify the interactions people have. In these games, players can get money, but the amount depends on both what they and other players choose.

A classic of this type of "economic game" that probes people’s decisions about whether to cooperate with each other is the Prisoner’s Dilemma . It goes like this: Two prisoners are interrogated by the police in separate rooms about a crime they have committed together, but for which the investigators have no evidence. If they both cooperate and refuse to confess, they might get away with it. However, if one of the prisoners betrays their accomplice, the one who chose to cooperate will be heavily punished, while the “defector” will walk away freely. Defecting can therefore seem appealing. Yet, there is a risk: If both accuse each other, investigators will send both to prison. This story became a game for two players. Both win some money if they each cooperate but are tempted to betray their partner to get more money (at the expense of the partner). However, if both players betray each other, neither receives any money.

Researchers have shown that people usually choose to cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma , even when they know they’ll never meet the other player again. When playing multiple times with the same person, players tend to retaliate after occasional betrayals, which in the long term also reduces the chances of further betrayals. This website allows you to play the game, and see for yourself how different attitudes toward cooperation can evolve over time in a population .

The prisoner’s dilemma has been really powerful to help researchers understand many different aspects of what makes people choose to cooperate, but it has limits. People always have to choose between only two options: cooperate or not. But in everyday life, things are not that simple. If a colleague is being difficult and then asks for help, we might not want to “fully” cooperate, but we also might not be too competitive. We might be a little bit cooperative to maintain harmony at work, but not expend too much energy being really helpful. How do people decide how cooperative to be? And how do they adjust their cooperation over time?

Measuring continuous changes in cooperation: The Space Dilemma

In our recent study published in Nature Communications , 54 volunteers played a new game in which they could be fully cooperative, fully competitive, or somewhere in between. We did this by getting two players to make decisions about where to position themselves in a virtual two-dimensional space where a reward would suddenly land. The person who was closest to the reward location won that round and the closer that winner was, the more money they received. Where the reward landed in the space was completely random. That meant players who put themselves in the middle were being competitive as they increased their chances of winning. However, the actual amount they won on average would usually be low, as the reward would often land far from the middle. On the other hand, the two players could cooperate by putting themselves at opposite ends of the space. In this case, each person’s chances of winning an individual round go down but when they do win, it will be a larger amount so they will earn more money across many rounds of the game. As in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this only works if both cooperate. If one goes to one end while the other tries to win in the middle, the latter will win much more often at the expense of the former. On each round, participants simply put themselves somewhere in the space, but they did this before seeing where the other player went. As participants levels of cooperation or competitiveness were measured by their location in the space, we called our new game the “Space Dilemma." We created different versions of the game, discouraging cooperation by gradually increasing the amount of money given to the winner and, conversely, the punishment for the loser.

People constantly adjust how cooperative they are

People were generally cooperative, but they became increasingly competitive when we boosted the amount they would lose if they got betrayed. They also constantly adjusted their response to the other players’ level of cooperation. We used a mathematical model to calculate how surprised a player would be at the other person’s position. We found that even when the position of the other player was just a little more competitive than expected, it led people to adjust their own position on the next round, making themselves more competitive.

One of the two participants played the game while we scanned their brain. We found that an area called the right temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) signalled how surprised players were at the other person’s level of cooperation. Parts of the medial prefrontal and cingulate cortex – brain areas linked to both making decisions and understanding others — put the surprise in context of how much money could be lost if they got betrayed, and guided decisions about how cooperative to be next time.

This study shows how people continuously adjust how cooperative they are, as the brain constantly monitors and reacts to others’ social behaviour. More generally, understanding what facilitates cooperative behaviours is essential for increasing people’s well-being and to ultimately reduce international conflicts and increase peace.

Fehr E, Schmidt KM. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1999;114(3). doi:10.1162/003355399556151

Rand DG, Nowak MA. Human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2013;17(8):413–425. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003

Stallen M, Sanfey AG. The cooperative brain. Neuroscientist. 2013;19(3). doi:10.1177/1073858412469728

Pisauro MA, Fouragnan EF, Arabadzhiyska DH, Apps MAJ, Philiastides MG. Neural implementation of computational mechanisms underlying the continuous trade-off between cooperation and competition. Nature Communications. 2022;13(1). doi:10.1038/s41467-022-34509-w

Flood MM. Some Experimental Games. Management Science. 1958;5(1). doi:10.1287/mnsc.5.1.5

Capraro V, Jordan JJ, Rand DG. Heuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments. Scientific Reports. 2014;4. doi:10.1038/srep06790

Axelrod R, Hamilton WD. The evolution of cooperation. Science. 1981;212(4489):1390–1396. doi:10.1126/science.7466396

Patricia Lockwood, Ph.D., is a Wellcome Trust/Royal Society Sir Henry Dale Fellow (Associate Professor) and Jacobs Foundation Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham, UK, where she leads the Social Decision Neuroscience Lab. Jo Cutler, Ph.D., is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Social Decision Neuroscience Lab at the University of Birmingham, UK.

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Competition in the Society: Positive and Negative Effects Essay

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Introduction

Works cited.

With escalating support for democracy and capitalism, value of competition has been absorbed in the society. Competition has emerged as an economic aspect in the society. Competition has positive and negative effects on the society. Notably, competition has reduced cooperation levels in the society. Loewen attempts to provide answers that revolve around the structure of the society.

He discusses different behaviors of people and impacts of social structures on the society. The book provides ideal recommendations on changes that the society should adopt. The essay will highlight benefits of competition in the society. Negative aspects associated with overemphasis on competition will also be presented. Advantages of cooperation and convergence of ideas will be scrutinized. A valid conclusion on whether the society can adopt cooperation model will be made.

Diversity is one of positive effects of competition on the society. There is a variety of products and services bringing the increase of consumer satisfaction. Diversity is embedded on innovation or creativity that every firm adopts, so as to enjoy competitive advantage. Prices of products and services are reduced, thus affecting consumers positively. Notably, price is competitive and salience is proportional to price of products. In this regard, consumers are more likely to purchase products that are cheap than buy the expensive ones. As a result, products are relatively cheaper since there are available substitutes as opposed to a situation of monopoly. High quality has also been embraced by firms as a way of satisfying consumers. Firms compete to deliver goods of high quality and low price to consumers so as to enjoy large market share.

Competition has shifted the focus from compliance to ethics. Businesses not only concentrate on satisfying existing legal concepts, but also wining over consumers. In process of maintaining loyalty and salience, businesses assume humanistic approach of doing what is morally right and acceptable by the society. Moreover, there is an inclination to the emotional aspect as the focus is on ensuring that products foster a long term and intrinsic relationship with consumers. As opposed to monopoly, competition ensures that needs of consumers are met in the best way possible. Businesses have to establish trust with consumers and ensure that presence of their products is felt rather than seen.

Competition has shifted the focus from services provided to relationship fostered. Competitive advantage is dependent on the extent, to which a firm adopts emotional approach. For marketing strategies to be effective, emotional element has to be present. Adoption of emotion by firms has increased consumer satisfaction thereby benefiting the society. Despite emergence of many firms, consumer’s welfare has been addressed in a humane way. All firms focus on fulfilling needs of consumers, as opposed to overemphasis on economic growth in a situation of monopoly. In this regard, competition fosters growth of many humanistic traits like honesty.

In spite of many benefits associated with competition in the society, there are negative aspects associated with the concept especially when it is overemphasized. “Stressing how middle class we are today is extremely problematic” (Loewen 206). Competition advocacy means that new entrants are encouraged to engage in business activities. Since consumer satisfaction is a competitive process, new entrants focus on meeting demands. It should, however, be noted that some approaches reduce willpower and rationality of consumers, thereby affecting the society negatively. For instance, some firms may take advantage of the fact that target consumers are middle class earners and have a need for cheap products. In such a case, competition would lead to emergence of products that are of low quality and price.

Despite the desire for cheap products, quality and safety should be emphasized, if competition is to be of help to the society. Suboptimal competition that reduces willpower of consumers, negatively affects the society. Further, increased population reduces cooperation and cohesion in the society. Cooperation of firms is associated with collective economic growth of society. Diversification is not always likely to affect the society positively. For instance, combined efforts by collection of firms are likely to benefit the society wholesomely and address the issue of classism. Over inclination on competition, on the other hand, promotes success of individuals and not groups.

Selfishness is one of the negative human aspects that are likely to arise, when competition is overemphasized. Competition means that individual firms will concentrate on their own satisfaction and profitability. Since competition is money driven, firms will only focus on achieving prestige and satisfaction. Lack of cohesion or cooperation will increase incidence of selfishness. There will be reluctance in combination of efforts and resources, since all firms will have similar goals of profitability that they want to enjoy individually.

It should be noted that competitive advantage can only be maintained, if there is rivalry especially among firms of the same industry. Competition that fails to satisfy the needs of consumers and entire society fosters negative human aspects. Dishonesty is also likely to be fostered especially in reducing will power of consumers. Increased competition will reduce business opportunities and new entrants will opt to engage in deceitful or unethical acts, so as to be able to secure market share. Deceitful acts like dishonesty will not draw collective concern, since individual firms concentrate only on their activities.

Despite increased advocacy for competition, it is not likely to affect the society in a positive way. As a matter of fact, a more collaborative model that emphasizes on cooperation has been preferred by most scholars. It should, however, be noted that adoption of a cooperative model is extremely difficult with increased competition. Profitability is one of the reasons why it is difficult for the society to adopt cooperative values. Every company focuses on maximization of profits and combined efforts would mean equal share of returns. In spite of the fact that combined efforts are likely to yield more results, individual firms prefer enjoying undivided benefits.

Supremacy and brand dominance that are sought by most firms would be of no value, if cooperative model was to be adopted by the society. Further, it is difficult to assume a cooperative model since firms are not equal. For instance, those firms that are enjoying a competitive advantage would find it hard to combine their efforts with new entrants. Some companies may lack sufficient capital required in establishment of a cooperative relationship. Creativity would also render cooperation of firms difficult. Strategies of diversification are not uniform and it would be impossible to cover all of them in a unified approach.

Despite the fact that human beings are social, cooperation is not automatic. Human beings live in societies that are shaped by many factors including identity and classicism. Human beings identify with social environment and perceive people from other places as foreigners. “Social class determines how people think about society” (Loewen 209). Behaviors and thoughts of people are influenced by social structures. In spite of the fact that people from different places socialize, cooperation is a process that calls for more identity and intimacy.

For instance, development of human beings is influenced by different surroundings. Notably, cooperation is difficult since human beings are influenced by environments differently and do not have similar interests. Further, individualization perception that focuses on personal victory discourages incidence of cooperation. Just like firms, individuals feel that they can succeed on their own and prefer individual approach to cooperative one. Moreover, people have different qualities that cannot exist in cooperation but assume individual approach.

Social factors like classism and racism also reduce the degree of cooperation. Human beings are influenced by social structures that they live in. Since the society focuses more on competition than cooperation, human beings will tend to compete rather than cooperate. Competition is associated with individual success as opposed to cooperation that highlights group success. In this regard, competition is more important to human beings than cooperation.

Competition is preferred to cooperation due to existing social structures. It should, however, be noted that adoption of a cooperative model is likely to lead to more benefits in the society than the competitive approach. “Social class is most important variable in the society” (Loewen 207). It determines the degree of cooperation and competition. Cooperation addresses needs of all people in the society, while competition favors welfare of those who are well endowed. Cooperation further transcends beyond objective of economic growth to social and psychological needs of the society. Cooperation would ensure combined efforts by firms in the society hence increased profitability. For instance, firms could combine their capital and share operational costs, thereby targeting a wider market.

In this regard, a firm that previously had insufficient capital could end up venturing in business hence economic growth. Firms that have already established markets at a national level could expand to the global level through cooperation. As a matter of fact, cooperation has been associated with success by most scholars in recent years. Cooperation is the best way to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor. Cooperation is likely to ensure collective benefits for society at a global level, as opposed to competition that benefits few affluent.

Our society has been influenced by social structures like competition to a large extent. As much as cooperation model might be attractive to the society, the process of its adoption would be difficult. “Few high schools offer anthropology courses” (Loewen 297). In this regard, social structures should be tamed in a way that promotes cooperation. Such changes can be interpreted as a process of taming the society. Despite the fact that taming the society would be a difficult process, it is possible to restructure the society.

Social structures are made by human beings and restructuring would mean reviewing existing organs. For instance, environment that influences human development can be manipulated in desired way. Incorporation of desired aspects in social environments like curriculum is a viable way to restructure the society. It should, however, be observed that results can only be realized gradually and not instantly. In this regard, young or future generations are likely to demonstrate a perfect version of the desired structure of the society.

Competition is one of existing social structures in the society today. The concept is associated with positive and negative effects in the society. Ideal competition promotes satisfaction of consumers, but overemphasis is likely to harbor adverse effects. Cooperation approach is better than competition model since it ensures collective benefits. Cooperation narrows the gap between poor and affluent significantly. The model is, however, difficult for most firms, since economic gain assumes high priority in the society. Despite the fact that taming is a long term strategy, it is the most ideal approach to restructure the society.

Loewen, James. Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong . New York: New York Press, 1995. Print.

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How to Write a Thesis Statement | 4 Steps & Examples

Published on January 11, 2019 by Shona McCombes . Revised on August 15, 2023 by Eoghan Ryan.

A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . It usually comes near the end of your introduction .

Your thesis will look a bit different depending on the type of essay you’re writing. But the thesis statement should always clearly state the main idea you want to get across. Everything else in your essay should relate back to this idea.

You can write your thesis statement by following four simple steps:

• Start with a question
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What is a thesis statement, placement of the thesis statement, step 1: start with a question, step 2: write your initial answer, step 3: develop your answer, step 4: refine your thesis statement, types of thesis statements, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about thesis statements.

A thesis statement summarizes the central points of your essay. It is a signpost telling the reader what the essay will argue and why.

The best thesis statements are:

• Concise: A good thesis statement is short and sweet—don’t use more words than necessary. State your point clearly and directly in one or two sentences.
• Contentious: Your thesis shouldn’t be a simple statement of fact that everyone already knows. A good thesis statement is a claim that requires further evidence or analysis to back it up.
• Coherent: Everything mentioned in your thesis statement must be supported and explained in the rest of your paper.

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The thesis statement generally appears at the end of your essay introduction or research paper introduction .

The spread of the internet has had a world-changing effect, not least on the world of education. The use of the internet in academic contexts and among young people more generally is hotly debated. For many who did not grow up with this technology, its effects seem alarming and potentially harmful. This concern, while understandable, is misguided. The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education: the internet facilitates easier access to information, exposure to different perspectives, and a flexible learning environment for both students and teachers.

You should come up with an initial thesis, sometimes called a working thesis , early in the writing process . As soon as you’ve decided on your essay topic , you need to work out what you want to say about it—a clear thesis will give your essay direction and structure.

You might already have a question in your assignment, but if not, try to come up with your own. What would you like to find out or decide about your topic?

For example, you might ask:

After some initial research, you can formulate a tentative answer to this question. At this stage it can be simple, and it should guide the research process and writing process .

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Now you need to consider why this is your answer and how you will convince your reader to agree with you. As you read more about your topic and begin writing, your answer should get more detailed.

In your essay about the internet and education, the thesis states your position and sketches out the key arguments you’ll use to support it.

The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education because it facilitates easier access to information.

In your essay about braille, the thesis statement summarizes the key historical development that you’ll explain.

The invention of braille in the 19th century transformed the lives of blind people, allowing them to participate more actively in public life.

A strong thesis statement should tell the reader:

• Why you hold this position
• What they’ll learn from your essay
• The key points of your argument or narrative

The final thesis statement doesn’t just state your position, but summarizes your overall argument or the entire topic you’re going to explain. To strengthen a weak thesis statement, it can help to consider the broader context of your topic.

These examples are more specific and show that you’ll explore your topic in depth.

Your thesis statement should match the goals of your essay, which vary depending on the type of essay you’re writing:

• In an argumentative essay , your thesis statement should take a strong position. Your aim in the essay is to convince your reader of this thesis based on evidence and logical reasoning.
• In an expository essay , you’ll aim to explain the facts of a topic or process. Your thesis statement doesn’t have to include a strong opinion in this case, but it should clearly state the central point you want to make, and mention the key elements you’ll explain.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

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A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . Everything else you write should relate to this key idea.

The thesis statement is essential in any academic essay or research paper for two main reasons:

• It gives your writing direction and focus.
• It gives the reader a concise summary of your main point.

Without a clear thesis statement, an essay can end up rambling and unfocused, leaving your reader unsure of exactly what you want to say.

Follow these four steps to come up with a thesis statement :

• Ask a question about your topic .
• Write your initial answer.
• Develop your answer by including reasons.
• Refine your answer, adding more detail and nuance.

The thesis statement should be placed at the end of your essay introduction .

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Cooperation and Competition: Theory and Research

• David W. Johnson , Roger T. Johnson
• Published 1 April 1989
• Economics, Political Science

2,853 Citations

Cooperative learning, cooperation and competition as partners, coordination to market technology : the contribution of cooperative goals and interaction, introduction: cooperation and competition in the sciences, cooperation and competition, competitive embeddedness and the emergence of interfirm cooperation, intellectual legacy: cooperation and competition, working with customers: cooperation and competition in relational marketing, cooperative controversies in the classroom, can interpersonal competition be constructive within organizations, related papers.

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Home > College of Arts and Sciences > Philosophy > PHILOSOPHY_THESES > 325

Philosophy Theses

Together after all: competition and joint action.

Antonio Monaco , Georgia State University Follow

Date of Award

Spring 5-4-2023

Degree Type

Degree name.

Master of Arts (MA)

First Advisor

Andrea Scarantino

Second Advisor

Daniel Weiskopf

Competition and cooperation are often perceived as opposites, but there is a middle ground in which they come together: competitive games like chess or soccer. Leading accounts of joint action theory fail to explain games of this sort. I propose a definition of cooperative competitions as joint events in which agents possess a joint competitive intention . An agent has a joint competitive intention when a) she has the goal to win or snatch an advantage over her opponent, b) she agrees to act in an uncoerced way, and c) she has the intention to follow the norms governing the activity in question. Finally, I defend my definition from objections and show how my account can helpfully reframe our understanding of what a cooperation is to make room for agonistic aims.

https://doi.org/10.57709/35296862

Recommended Citation

Monaco, Antonio, "Together After All: Competition and Joint Action." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2023. doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/35296862

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Article Contents

Introduction, the “problem” of “strategic competition”, the why and how of conceptual analysis, tracing the concept of “strategic competition” across time, acknowledgements, conflict of interest statement..

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Strategic Competition and US–China Relations: A Conceptual Analysis

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Stephanie Christine Winkler, Strategic Competition and US–China Relations: A Conceptual Analysis, The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Volume 16, Issue 3, Autumn 2023, Pages 333–356, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poad008

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Despite much attention on “strategic competition” between the USA and China following the declaration of China as America’s “strategic competitor,” the concept’s meanings, origins, as well as different analytical and political functions remain poorly understood. The present article fills this lacuna by conducting a conceptual study of “strategic competition” that traces the concept and its evolution over time. The article finds that there was never a singular or universally applicable meaning of “strategic competition”. When the concept first appeared during the détente era, politicians and scholars referred to the reality of needing to curtail “strategic competition” between the USA and the Soviet Union, and seek cooperative relations, such as through arms reduction treaties. In the late 1990s, the label “strategic competitor” became central to political efforts by the Bush administration to justify their pursuit of military power, deterrence, and American hegemony. Since the Trump administration in the late 2010s, “strategic competition” became a goal to pursue in US-China relations rather than something to be managed. Not recognizing the historical evolution of the term and its many different variations is analytically poor and politically dangerous, and impedes the development of a modus vivendi between the two great powers.

Over the past decade, scholars and policymakers alike have struggled to make sense of the past, present, and future of US–China relations and debated how best to characterise the bilateral relationship. Are the USA and China locked in a “Thucydides’ Trap” and hence inevitably bound to engage in “great power competition”? Do they seek a “new type of great power relations”? Or are they in the middle of a new “Cold War”? Since the 2017 National Security Strategy called China a “strategic competitor,” 1 however, the “strategic competition” label has become the key frame whereby the administration refers to US–China relations. Since then, various scholars have examined the implications of “strategic competition” for China, the USA, and other countries, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific. 2 Shortly after its inauguration, the Biden administration declared “strategic competition” as “the frame through which [it sees the US–China] relationship.” 3 Following in the footsteps of the Trump administration, the Biden administration continued to more or less overhaul all elements of US–China policy to adjust to the realities of “strategic competition.”

In spite of such wide-ranging attention, however, “strategic competition” remains poorly understood. Scholars, journalists, and politicians reiterate the concept across articles, documents, and speeches, broadly agreeing that it heralds the dawn of a new era of bilateral relations, but otherwise take for granted the concept itself and its understanding. 4 Among other issues, it is unclear whether “strategic competition” is predominantly a way of understanding international politics, a cause of conflict in international politics, or a policy project. The purpose of the present article is to fill this lacuna and unpack the notion of “strategic competition.” Specifically, it asks where the concept comes from, what it means, and what it does as a label to characterise US–China relations. To do so, the article presents a conceptual study of the “strategic competition” concept across time. The material underpinning the analysis consists chiefly of academic literature, governmental speeches, statements, and documents, as well as other public sources (e.g. newspaper articles and think tank reports). Based on an analysis of the material, the article demonstrates that there is no singular, commonsensical meaning of “strategic competition,” but rather that the concept has undergone significant yet hitherto unrecognised shifts in time.

Historically, the concept first emerged amidst the détente era of the 1970s that saw arms agreements and other forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union. In this context, “strategic competition” was used to refer to how powerful states typically engage in intense competition across different domains, including military, economics, and culture. In this understanding of the concept, politicians and scholars accepted “strategic competition” as a reality of international politics that was ultimately inevitable, but which, to avoid escalation, both parties needed to manage meticulously. Against the background of widespread contestation in regard to US–China policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, politicians from the George W. Bush administration began to use their recognition of “strategic competition” with China as a political tool whereby to distinguish themselves from the Clinton administration, reorient US foreign policy in the post–Cold War era, and impede China’s rise. As a result, the concept’s association with cooperation changed to that of deterrence, military power, and American hegemony. Since 2017, both the Donald J. Trump and Joseph Biden administrations have advanced the concept as a goal to pursue, rather than as something to be aware of, manage, or stabilise. Despite the centrality of “strategic competition” to US foreign policy, neither administration has defined the concept’s goals, means, or limitations. Ultimately, this sparse and ahistorical interpretation of “strategic competition” drives a downward spiral of ever more tense relations between the USA and China.

The article is organised as follows. First, it visits the literature on “strategic competition” to demonstrate how most observers take the concept’s meaning for granted and neglect the many different and at times contradictory ways whereby it has been used. The ensuing section introduces how a conceptual analysis of “strategic competition” that pays particular attention to the historical evolution and political dimension of the concept can address this problem and provide a greater grasp of “strategic competition.” The empirical section of the present article zooms in on four distinct eras wherein “strategic competition” has assumed vastly different meanings. Finally, the article concludes by discussing the main findings and offering some comments on the prospects of US–China relations.

Since publication of the 2017 US National Security Strategy , the term “strategic competition” has become ubiquitous in political, academic, and media discourse. 5 But despite the consensus which appears to have emerged that we live in a new era of “strategic competition” between the USA and China, we know remarkably little about the concept, its origins, or its meanings. Indeed, the bulk of academic literature on “strategic competition”—in examining the reasons for the fundamental shift in US–China relations, 6 how the USA and China perceive and pursue “strategic competition,” including in specific issue areas, 7 and how other countries in the region and beyond adjust to the realities of “strategic competition”—takes for granted a common understanding of the term. 8 The few studies attempting to provide a more fundamental understanding of what “strategic competition” actually means typically locate the concept on a spectrum between cooperation and armed conflict, before rapidly moving on to examine other kinds of questions against the background of “strategic competition,” including, for instance, US foreign policy and issue selection. 9 “Strategic competition” is thus little more than a scope condition for state behaviour, rather than the central foreign policy principle that has ostensibly guided both the Trump and Biden administrations.

One fundamental challenge to approaching the concept is that of the strikingly different regards and circumstances whereby scholars, journalists, and politicians use “strategic competition.” 10 Is it an academic concept and thus an abstract description of our present world? Is it the inevitable reality of relations between states? Is it a theory to explain something in the world? Is it a particular era in world history? Is it a policy framework that organises foreign policy? Is it the thrust of US–China relations or the cause of its disintegration? Is it politicians’ realisation of how politics works, or their conscious choice to pursue a particular kind of politics? The means to an end, or an end in itself?

At first sight, the coexistence of these different takes on and usages of “strategic competition” might not seem overly problematic. After all, the terms that politicians, bureaucrats, and analysts use are notorious for their vagueness, other examples including the “rules-based international order,” 11 the “Indo-Pacific,” 12 the “Belt and Road Initiative,” 13 or a “new type of Great Power Relations.” 14 Although their ambiguity might frustrate scholars, the literature on the role of policy ideas has long since argued that ambiguous terms are often popular and hence ubiquitous precisely because they appeal to different target groups, by virtue of leaving sufficient space for actors to fill in the blanks and thus specify a given term according to their own concerns and needs. 15

However, failing to distinguish between the various functions and roles that “strategic competition” assumes generates several drawbacks. For one, it exacerbates conceptual confusion, as people talking about different things might unwittingly use this same term, which dilutes the value of the concept in practically all circumstances as regards its role in explanatory theories, in analytical frameworks, or in guiding policy. Second, unless meticulously disentangled, the concept’s different functions are prone to reinforce each other. There is hence a danger of description becoming prescription, which, in turn, once more informs description. That is to say, because “strategic competition” characterises the world, states need to pursue “strategic competition”; therefore, the world is ever more often described as driven by “strategic competition.” 16 The concept might thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, and closely related, the failure to distinguish between the different functions of strategic competition makes treating the term as morally neutral next to impossible. Consequently, the space between academia and politics dwindles, and “strategic competition” becomes little more than a political slogan. In short, not recognising the coexistence of different takes on “strategic competition” is analytically poor and politically dangerous, particularly in view of how central “strategic competition” seems to have become to global politics since 2017.

To address these problems and provide a better grasp of “strategic competition,” the present article draws from recent critical scholarship on conceptual analysis, to which it henceforth subjects “strategic competition.” 17 This approach to conceptual analysis operates through an understanding of concepts as thinking tools that all kinds of observers, from academia, to politics, to journalism, use to make sense of their environment, 18 in contrast to “scientific” approaches to conceptual analysis, which seek to purge concepts of ambiguity, personal bias, and politics, thus to render them accurate analytical tools of social science research. 19 Doing so shifts the analysis away from what a concept truly is , to what a concept does in and for socio-political and academic discourse. 20 Concepts are thus not simply indicators of reality (i.e. epiphenomenal), but factors of change. 21

Central to this understanding of concepts is the notion of a conceptual web whereby similar, supporting, or contrastive concepts endow a given concept with meaning. The concept of “peace,” for instance, becomes meaningful through such supporting concepts as “security,” “freedom,” and “harmony,” as well as through its juxtaposition with “war.” 22 Since this makes it possible to tug on different parts of a concept’s surrounding web, thus to emphasise that concept’s different dimensions, most social science concepts are “essentially contested,” which makes fully fixating their meaning practically impossible. 23 Disputes around the meaning, scope, or applicability of concepts thus typically go beyond semantic or methodological squabbles but often signify political contention regarding how to understand and organise the world. 24 Thus understood, defining political reality in one way or another requires complicity in the construction of the said reality, whether or not this political dimension is wanted or even recognised. 25

To engage in a conceptual analysis thus entails a careful examination of the concept’s conceptual web, as well as the possible political dimension of conceptual work. It moreover requires one to examine the general context wherein the concept is situated. 26 This could be the role of a term in a specific theory, for instance, that of “power” in realist theories of International Relations (IR). 27 As a concept’s material and socio-political context also significantly shapes its trajectory, the analysis must focus on who uses the concept, where, when, how, and to what purpose, which entails drawing out the institutional and financial background that allows conceptual work. 28 For instance, exactly how prolific the “Thucydides’ Trap” would have become in either academia or policy circles had the notion originated in a German university rather than in the Harvard Kennedy School is uncertain. Finally, conceptual analysis requires appreciation of the history and historicity of concepts. Even though the terminology of a concept might be new, it must nevertheless be crafted from something sufficiently (but not too) familiar to allow for novel articulations. 29 Joseph Nye might have coined the term “soft power” in the late 1980s, but the underlying notion of attraction as a form of power reaches back to ancient philosophy. 30 Indeed, concepts have histories that not only resonate through to the present and future but which help to understand how we came to the present in the first place. In this way, many concepts are Janus-faced, meaning that they intertwine the past with the present. 31 For this reason, to understand the contemporary usage and role of a concept in political, social, and academic discourses, it is necessary to trace that concept’s origins, conceptual webs, and contestations across both time and space.

As to subjecting “strategic competition” to such a conceptual analysis, this means, first and foremost, understanding the term as a thinking tool used in academic, political, and journalistic circles to both understand and shape political reality. The article may thus develop a deeper understanding of the concept and how its conceptual web has evolved at different points in time. This, in turn, makes it possible to address the various meanings and functions that “strategic competition” has historically assumed, whether in regard to worldview, theory, or policy project. Especially at a time when most in academia and politics seem to have accepted “strategic competition” as commonsensical and inevitable, it will thus become clear that there is no singular meaning of the concept (or its implications) that is, or ever has been, universally true and that should therefore be accepted by all parties involved.

Material suitable for conceptual analysis typically consists of news articles, books, governmental documents, and policy reports, among others. The present article has predominantly focused on the various performances of “strategic competition” in US political discourse 32 but has also collected and analysed material from academic and journalistic discourse. To capture the evolution of the term’s conceptual web, the collection went as far back as was necessary to find references to “strategic competition,” placing the starting point during the Cold War era. To capture political discourse, the article has retrieved documents via the American Presidency Project and the Congressional Database . 33 In regard to the role of the concept in academic discourse, the article has predominantly focused on the Web of Science database, which allows for controlled filtering of the results, hence making it possible to limit the results to “strategic competition” in international politics (rather than, say, business). To access the concept’s role in news articles, the article has queried the Factiva database and limited results to “major news and business sources from the USA.” In total, around 1600 documents were collected. All of the documents prior to 2017 were read and analysed. Given the quantity of documents post-2016, priority was given to proclamations from the US leadership (presidents and state secretaries) and documents where the term “strategic competition” featured in the title. The remaining documents were skimmed through to ensure completeness. Figure 1 shows the distribution of documents across time and discourse communities.

Number of Documents Referrencing “Strategic Competition” in Different Discourse Families

Mapping the Conceptual Web

Based on a qualitative analysis of the collected material, it is possible to distinguish four eras wherein the conceptual web surrounding “strategic competition” took on distinct forms. They were the détente era, the late 1990s, the Trump era since 2017, and the Biden era since early 2020. Before delving into those eras, however, it is necessary to consider certain possible configurations of the conceptual web encompassing “strategic competition,” as this will provide a deeper grasp of possible variations. A natural starting point is to split the concept into its two linguistic components and delve into the intuitive and also more academic understandings and associations of each one. It will then become possible to examine how the adjective “strategic” might principally modify the noun “competition.”

On the most fundamental level, “competition is a situation in which rivals seek to outdo each other in obtaining some scarce end.” 34 There are several fields with which competition is typically associated, and where most of the conventional thinking about the term originates. Evolutionary biology, wherein competition is typically associated with the survival of the fittest and elimination of rivals, is one such field. These terms support concepts that imbue competition with meaning. One important consequence of competition in the natural world, however, is not just that of the survival of some species and extinction of others, but also the phenomena of specialisation and diversity, such as when animals adapt in order to fill different niches. Competition is often juxtaposed with “cooperation” (i.e. as a contrastive concept), yet, in the natural (and social) world, competition for scarce resources is often a primary reason for cooperation within species, such as when humans cooperated, whether against natural hazards or rival groups, to increase their chances of survival. 35 Thus, cooperation can also function as a supporting concept.

The business world, where competition between firms (for profit, customers, material, new markets, and others) constitutes a major driving force of the market, is also synonymous with competition. In this business sense, competition carries both negative and positive associations. On the one hand, it can drive innovation, efficiency, and other consumer benefits, including better products at lower prices. On the other hand, it can also exacerbate the misallocation or waste of resources in a race to the bottom that leaves firms and consumers alike worse off. Given the negative and positive dimensions of competition, states typically encourage, but also regulate, competition, both to prevent negative consequences resulting from ruthless competition and to prevent the emergence of monopolies or unfair market practices. 36

In political theory, competition is central to thinking about political organisation, including the emergence of the state. Hobbes’ “war of all against all,” for instance, is driven by fierce competition among individuals for survival, since no Leviathan can curtail the state of nature. This thinking has also made the notion of competition between states under anarchy fundamental to thinking about international politics. Among IR theories, realist theories in particular emphasise competition for security and/or power as central to state behaviour. 37 Other theories focus more on possibilities of cooperation between states, and how international law and organisations might overcome or curtail anarchy to facilitate a more ordered and peaceful world. 38

The conceptual web around competition is thus shaped by similar, supporting, and contrastive concepts, such as rivalry, anarchy, innovation, or cooperation, which have become crucial to making competition meaningful. These associations rarely need to be made explicit, but arguably undergird much of the thinking about international politics among policymakers, politicians, journalists, and the general public. Of note here is that competition constitutes the natural, fundamental, and thus practically inevitable behaviour of species, including humans and states, and thus becomes the underlying natural state of the world as a whole. At the same time, there is principally broad agreement that competition is to be encouraged, shaped, and controlled in a productive, rather than destructive way.

The addition of the adjective “strategic” modifies and narrows competition down to a specific form of competition. Insofar as being strategic is typically associated with intentionality, the modifier implies that “strategic competition” can be juxtaposed with mindless or aimless competition. There is a small but important difference here between mindless and aimless, in that the former suggests a lack of awareness, while the latter implies a lack of direction. However, the concept of strategy has its own complicated history and conceptual web, which it brings to “strategic competition.” 39 Since antiquity, much writing has focused on strategy in the sense of military strategy. Over time, the concept has undergone significant change, having become increasingly associated not just with military warfare, but with thinking about the purpose and aims of policy and, more broadly, the use of force. 40 In military thinking, strategy involves a “systematic analysis of ends and means” that requires the careful selection of why, when, how, and where to compete against a rival, particularly when taking into consideration that resources are often finite and mistakes hence costly. 41 In this way, strategy operates on a level above tactics. Another rendition of strategy that comes closer to the (just as complicated) notion of grand strategy is that meaning to focus and plan for the long term, necessitating a clear-eyed perspective on the state’s highest priorities and utilisation of all dimensions of statecraft, including military, diplomatic, and economic means. 42 The conceptual web around strategy is thus characterised by similar, supporting, and contrastive concepts, such as mindless/purposeful, ends–means analysis, and military or statecraft.

The discussion in this section is summarised in  Figure 2 , which visualises exactly what configurations of the conceptual web encompassing “strategic competition” are, in principle, possible. As will become clear throughout the empirical analysis of the evolution of the conceptual web encompassing “strategic competition,” it has taken on distinct forms in four different eras, each of which are discussed in succession.

Intuitive Conceptual Web Encompassing “Strategic Competition”

“Strategic Competition” During the Cold War

Based on analysis of the collected material, “strategic competition” began to feature in political discourse in the late 1960s. Prior to this, the use of the term was negligible. Of course, the Cold War as an era was characterised by stiff competition between the USA and the Soviet Union across a range of different areas, from science and technology, arms, economics, and finance, to ideology and alliances. Yet, prior to the détente period of the 1970s, neither scholars, politicians, nor journalists referred to such competition as strategic .

Instead, during the early Cold War, US assessments of its relationship with the Soviet Union emphasised two factors as central to the crisis. They were the rapid change in power distribution after the end of WWII and the Communist, totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union and its quest for world domination. As a global conflict, US leaders concluded that the Soviet Union threatened the US way of life and thus survival, hence warranting a careful response. Indeed, NSC-68, one of the most fundamental US policy documents, notes: “What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarisation of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.” 43 The heart of the conflict was thus attributed to a fundamental ideological difference with the Soviet Union, coupled with its expansionist design, rather than anything related to the inevitable nature of international politics.

Following this assessment, the USA considered different policy options, including a return to isolation, overturning the Soviet Union by force, negotiating for a solution that would recognise spheres of influence, and pursuit of a balance-of-power approach. Eventually, the USA settled on a strategy of containment, which included a rapid build-up of US military deterrence capabilities, the checking of Communist expansion worldwide, and constructing and leading a liberal international order, as well as encouraging the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. 44 Although not made explicit, competition (such as for the hearts and minds of the world) became an unspoken consequence, rather than something that was seen or identified as a cause or driver of the adversarial relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

By the late 1960s, the Cold War had entered a new phase, as the USA under Richard Nixon embarked on an era of détente with the Soviet Union that saw increased communication, negotiations, and treaties with the Soviet Union, and overall easing of tensions. It is in this context that the term “strategic competition” first appeared in political discourse. Senator Edward W. Brooke notes, in one of the first references in congressional records, how

More than at any time in the post-war period, it may be possible for us and the Soviets, acting together, to choose the risks we will bear, to ease the strains on our societies by reducing the burdens and hazards of unending strategic competition. The moment is opportune, and the opportunity is too precious to lose. 45

In a radio address from 1971, President Richard Nixon argued that

The strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union have produced the most searching examination of the nature of strategic competition ever conducted between our two nations. Each side has had the chance to explain at length the concerns caused by the posture of the other side. The talks have been conducted in a serious way without the old lapses into propaganda. 46

Two years later, Nixon maintained towards Congress that “conditions might be optimal for reaching agreement to limit strategic competition” and that a core objective of his efforts for arms control was to “break the momentum and moderate the process of strategic competition.” 47 In a similar fashion, Jimmy Carter cautioned in 1979 that rejecting Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 2 (SALT 2), an arms agreement, would mean that “each crisis, each confrontation, each point of friction … would occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic stability.” 48

As one can see from these quotations, the term “strategic competition” occurs predominantly in the context of debates on how to limit the excesses of US–Soviet “strategic competition.” Although the concept and its meaning are taken for granted in these examples, it becomes clear that “strategic competition” is seen as a dangerous dimension of international politics, and as such, as the underlying tenor of US–Soviet relations. Put differently, “strategic competition” functions predominantly here as a conceptualisation of the world and its phenomena, rather than as an era or political project. Such “strategic competition” cannot be avoided, but needs to be carefully managed as it will otherwise consume too many resources and risk accidental war between two nuclear powers. Hence, the term’s original emergence connects closely to the view that rivals can and should cooperate to stabilise their relations to avoid (nuclear) disaster, with arms agreements and other forms of cooperation as the chief mechanisms. In this way, the notion of “strategic competition” is closely intertwined with the era of détente in the 1970s.

Particularly noteworthy in the political discourse is how “strategic competition” typically co-occurs with discussions about efforts towards arms reductions and, in particular, the SALT 1 and SALT 2. In this context, strategic arms and their reduction are juxtaposed with tactical arms. While the latter usually refers to (nuclear) weapons used during battle, strategic arms refer to those intended to be launched against a rival’s homeland. In this way, SALT 1 and SALT 2, and “strategic” more generally, are strongly tied to military thinking. Given the relevance of the treaties and widespread discussions about them, the “strategic” notion became ubiquitous in political and journalistic discourse. The modifier thus became more readily applicable in other contexts, which explains how it could become attached to “competition” without the need for any conceptual work introducing “strategic competition” as a novel concept. Indeed, in this context, “strategic” does little to modify “competition”; thus, “strategic competition” could emerge as a commonsensical, rather than an alternative way to talk and think about US–Soviet relations. By the time “strategic competition” had widely featured in political discourse, however, the connection to nuclear weapons and their reduction remained, but the connection to tactical weapons was left behind. 49

Journalist discourse during this period in large part mirrors the political discourse surrounding “strategic competition,” as, for instance, several articles in The Washington Post demonstrate. 50 Academic discourse, on the other hand, made, in principle, little of “strategic competition,” and the term occurs only occasionally in the context of books or chapters on arms reduction efforts. That said, in one of the few comprehensive discussions of the concept during the Cold War era, Albert, when seeking to model the nature of US competition with the USSR, draws from research on the “strategic competition” between firms, proposing that the “ultimate goal of this competition is monopolistic control of the market—in this case, the world.” 51 However, although the study illustrates that the business connection of competition resonated also with the world of political analysis, his and other studies (often associated with war colleges or the RAND Corporation) gained scant traction. 52

Following the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the era of détente came to an end and animosity between the USA and the Soviet Union resumed. With it, references to “strategic competition” and its management receded to the extent, once more, of being rarely seen. In spite of the intense rivalry between the Soviet Union and the USA that the 1980s characterised, however, such rivalry was seldom referred to as “strategic.” After the Cold War, USA’s original strategic competitor, the Soviet Union, dissolved, and although the USA had competition—consider, for instance, the economic miracle of East Asia’s trading states—the immediate post–Cold War period was one of triumph, wherein it seemed that the success of the USA in the Cold War signified an “end of history” and, with it, strategic competitors. 53 Thus, for the rest of the Cold War and much of the 1990s, the term “strategic competition” remained a dormant, but readily available term in political discourse.

In sum, “strategic competition” in the Cold War period became meaningful predominantly through its connection to concepts such as (avoiding) nuclear disaster, détente, strategic arms reduction, and cooperation: concepts that in this configuration of the conceptual web support (rather than contrast with) “strategic competition.” The notion of “strategic competition” is thus grounded in an understanding that “strategic competition” is what defines US–Soviet relations and which does not need to be made explicit. Visually, this can be expressed in  Figure 3 .

Conceptual Web Encompassing “Strategic Competition” in the 1970s

“Strategic Competition” in the Post–Cold War Era: The USA and China

By the late 1990s, the term “strategic competition” had once more risen to prominence in the context of George W. Bush’s electoral campaign against the incumbent Vice President Al Gore, incumbent President Bill Clinton having been ineligible to run for a third term due to presidential term limits. Criticising Clinton’s accommodating approach to China, Bush argued, “While we can find some areas of agreement such as opening their markets, [the Chinese] need to be viewed as a competitor, and a strategic competitor . We need to be tough and firm.” 54 In a similar fashion, future Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued that China needed to be seen as a strategic competitor because it, “would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favour.” 55 Soon-to-be Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz similarly held that China was “the major strategic competitor and potential threat to the United States.” 56 And although not directly referencing China, the authors of one of the key neoconservative texts of the era also made clear that the USA needed to focus on “strategic competition” in East Asia and that one of its main military missions was to “deter the rise of a new great-power competitor.” 57

Hence, “strategic competition” having been used during the détente era to describe US–Soviet relations, the term was now applied to characterise US relations with China. To some degree, doing so signified conscious recognition of the contentious nature of international politics, wherein two powerful states, given the incompatibility of their systems, are bound to compete with each other sooner or later—a view that also resonated with certain contemporary scholarly literature. 58 At the same time, the label “strategic competitor” also assumed crucial political functions that went beyond an understanding of the nature of international politics, thus constituting a clear example of the political dimension of conceptual work. Put differently, “strategic competition” functioned as both a conceptual device to understand contemporary politics and a tool to shape the political reality.

As such a political tool, it demonstrated a visible break from the Clinton administration, whose focus was on trade and engagement with China. 59 Indeed, the term “strategic competitor” lent itself well insofar as juxtaposing Bush’s promise to be tough on China with Clinton’s framework of a “strategic partnership” with China. 60 “Strategic partnership” thus became a contrastive concept that amplified the significance of “strategic competition,” as well as being an instrument whereby to contrast Bush’s foreign policy with Clinton’s. Moreover, labelling China as a “strategic competitor” made it possible to cast the country as a similar challenge to what the Soviet Union constituted during the Cold War. The “strategic competition” concept was hence consciously used to interweave USA’s present with its past.

After the end of the Cold War, the USA had indeed, as Condoleezza Rice put it, “found it exceedingly difficult to define the national interest in the absence of Soviet power.” 61 With hindsight, it was clear to many observers that stiff competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War had done much to order US foreign policy and political priorities. Of course, as seen in the previous section, other than in the détente era, competition with the Soviet Union was barely mentioned, the focus of policy planners and analysts having been on more concrete strategies, in particular, the containment policy. Amidst the climate of the early 2000s, promoting the notion of “strategic competition” as if it had always been central to US foreign policy—albeit either disregarded or forgotten by preceding administrations—allowed Bush and his advisors to refocus US attention on what they perceived as the country’s main objective, namely, the pursuit of security and power. In so doing, the “strategic competition” label became an ordering device to bring clarity to US purpose and identity in the post–Cold War era by filling the vacuum left by virtue of the Soviet Union’s demise. 62 The conceptual web around “strategic competition” thus became tied to the notions of long-term planning and grand strategy, rather than to the more prevalent military dimension of the détente era. Hence, in view of the understanding of China as a “strategic competitor,” the USA needed to devise its foreign policy, which to the Bush administration revolved around deterring China’s rise. After Bush took office, his administration indeed retreated from cooperative relations with China, as underlined by the president’s remark that the USA was prepared to do “whatever it took to defend Taiwan.” 63

As it turned out, there was insufficient time for the Bush administration to flesh out what it actually meant by “strategic competition,” the 9/11 terrorist attacks having shifted Bush’s foreign policy priorities and prompted his waging of the war on terror. A curious side effect of the terrorist attack was that of US–China relations’ restored amity and the two states’ expanded cooperation, in regard to not only the global struggle against terrorism but also other issues, such as North Korea, global health, and environmental threats. 64 As a contemporary newspaper article reported via reference to the Bush administration’s close advisors, “All talk of ‘strategic competition’ has been omitted from Mr. Bush’s comments, officials say, and his aides have quietly sanded away all the hard edges from the message he will deliver to his Chinese hosts in his visit, starting on Thursday.” 65 Rather than evoking the strategic competitor label, the 2002 National Security Strategy instead emphasised that the USA was seeking a “constructive relationship with a changing China,” and that it would not “allow [differences] to preclude cooperation where we agree.” 66 In short, “strategic competition” did not progress within political discourse from a vague promise to be tough with China to an actual policy-making framework.

Shambaugh suggested, in one of the few contemporary academic discussions on “strategic competition,” that “strategic competition” “may be a more empirically appropriate description of the US-China relationship in the present period,” as the USA and China were “locked in an ambiguous relationship with elements of conflict, coexistence, and cooperation.” Importantly, he also observed that competition does not necessarily imply adversarialism and cited several areas where the USA and China should develop robust cooperation because “becoming adversaries is … the principal policy challenge to avoid.” 67 Beyond such limited discussions, however, “strategic competition” did not receive in-depth treatment in either academic or journalistic circles. But even though Shambaugh’s arguments drew little attention at the time, the distinction between conflict, coexistence, and cooperation laid an important basis for thinking about competition as located on a spectrum between conflict and cooperation, which would resurface two decades later.

In the years following the short-lived “strategic competition” moment in the Bush era, references to the term waned once more. The concept underwent an important shift, however. During the détente era, it referred to an inevitable side effect of international politics that required careful management, and as such, one closely associated with arms control, and cooperation with competitors to prevent disaster. Through the Bush campaign, the recognition of “strategic competition” had become a goal in its own right and a conscious choice, even though Bush would later renege on it. “Strategic competition” functioned as a signifier in domestic contestation—in regard to not only US–China policy but also US overall purpose in the post–Cold War era. In so doing, the term became closely connected with an outlook on foreign policy that privileged military power, deterrence, and Pax Americana to deal with the anarchic nature of world politics, wherein the quest for security and power constituted overarching policy goals. Although the “strategic competition” concept was benched in the aftermath of 9/11, by this point, the conceptual web encompassing the concept had significantly changed from that of the détente era, in that the concept’s original associations with cooperation and stabilisation had given way to those with deterrence, confrontation , and security/power . This conceptual web is visualised in  Figure 4 .

Conceptual Web Encompassing “Strategic Competition” in the Early 2000s

“Strategic Competition” in a New Era under Donald Trump

During the Obama years, the term “strategic competition” again played only a minor role, Obama’s focus being on increased cooperation with China. 68 Even amidst the “pivot to Asia,” the administration took pains to emphasise that it did not see China as a strategic competitor. 69 The “strategic competition” label made a forceful return, however, upon Donald Trump’s election. Specifically, the publication of the 2017 National Security Strategy emphasised that the USA is now in “a new era of strategic competition” as the “revisionist powers of China and Russia” challenge the USA 70 and that caused this reversal.

The underlying reasons for the deterioration in US–China relations at that point in time have been a topic of considerable debate among observers. But no consensus has been reached, due to their focus on different elements which are thus, implicitly, the culprits of such deterioration. For some observers, a key reason lies in how, amidst the polarised US domestic political climate that emerged in the mid-2010s, China was one of the few policy areas wherein bipartisan cooperation had been possible. 71 Others emphasised Trump’s tendency to lay any economic grievances at China’s door, thus reaching out to US working class. Highlighting China’s alleged attempts to influence elections also provided an opportunity to deflect attention from Russia’s possible electoral interferences. 72 Yet other observers emphasise how getting tough with China improved Trump’s attractiveness to national security hawks and human rights advocates alike. Meanwhile, different executive departments and interest groups cited the grave threat that China represented as justification for their most favoured policy, such as increased military spending. 73 Other observers still attribute the deterioration to predominant structural factors, including China’s growing capabilities, the worldwide rise of populism, and the globalism crisis, insofar as their being the chief drivers of “strategic competition.” 74 Finally, certain commentators blame Chinese politics, including the consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Xi Jinping, the growing confidence and assertiveness of Chinese diplomats, and China’s generally expanding global influence. 75

In any event, Trump’s recognition of China as a strategic competitor picked up directly where George W. Bush’s left off. As such, Trump and his advisors promoted the label in an effort to demonstrate their resolve to “get tough” with China and to extricate themselves from the engagement period years that began with Clinton’s 1994 National Security Strategy. Thus, the administration used the term to both shape the understanding of contemporary politics and affect political change through a more confrontational foreign policy towards China. Specifically, the central message the administration wanted to convey was that the USA now found itself in a “new era” of “strategic competition” that required it to “use all of the tools of statecraft … to protect its … interests.” 76 Importantly, this era was heralded by China and Russia, due to their “revisionist” ambitions that threatened US security. In this understanding, “strategic competition” boiled down to the Trump administration’s conscious choice to pursue China and Russia, since those states had elected to become revisionist powers. “Strategic competition” was thus not, as perceived during the détente era, a natural condition of great-power politics, but rather a consequence of idiosyncratic factors.

Beyond this, exactly what “strategic competition” signified to the Trump administration was never fully specified. In contrast to the Bush era, however, Trump’s administration largely followed through with its foreign policy of embarking on a “whole-of-government” approach against China, whereby all executive departments were encouraged to be tough on the PRC. 77 Thus, while the focus of “strategic competition” in the Bush administration was, in principle, on long-term planning in regard to US purpose in the world, while that of political leaders of the détente era was on ways to prevent the escalation of “strategic competition,” the Trump administration was proactive in seeking “strategic competition” in all areas. Despite the ostensible emphasis on statecraft, however, which would suggest certain conceptual ties to long-term planning and grand strategy, other than confronting China in all areas of politics there was, in practice, little coordination or planning as regards defining the areas, means, and goals of “strategic competition,” as several critics of the Bush administration also observed. 78 “Strategic competition” thus remained vague enough for the administration’s various executive departments to decide for themselves how they wanted to understand and enforce strategic competition. Consequently, the term never moved beyond a broad, rhetorical device whose focus was on confronting China in whatever way possible. The conceptual web for this new era of “strategic competition” is visualised in  Figure 5 .

Conceptual Web Encompassing “Strategic Competition” in the Trump Era

“Strategic Competition” in the Biden Era

By the time the Biden administration assumed office, bilateral relations had hit a historical low. In the spring of 2019, Biden continued to dismiss the view of China as a geopolitical competitor, ridiculing the idea that China was “going to eat our lunch.” 79 Criticised by rivals and advisors alike for his naivety, however, Biden developed a firmer stance on China over the course of 2020, arguing that China represented a “special challenge” in “playing a long game by extending its global reach, promoting its own political model, and investing in the technology of the future,” all of which signified that the USA did in fact need to “get tough” with China. 80 Thus, despite speculations that Biden might be willing to reset bilateral relations, it became rapidly clear that his administration intended to follow in the footsteps of its predecessor, the Trump administration.

Biden has subsequently called China USA’s “most serious competitor” whose “aggressive, coercive action” the USA will “confront,” “counter,” and “push back on.” 81 Others in the administration have mirrored such language: State Secretary Anthony Blinken emphasised that “‘strategic competition’ is the frame through which we see [the US–China] relationship.” 82 Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin referred to China as the “number-one pacing challenge for the United States.” 83 And CIA Director William Burns called China “a formidable, authoritarian adversary.” 84 Meanwhile, the National Security Council indicated that China was its priority and that “work on China expands into virtually every NSC directorate.” 85

What does the concept of “strategic competition” mean and, more to the point, do for the Biden administration? For one, “strategic competition” entails the recognition that international politics is, in essence, competitive and that the USA and China are engaged in such competition. Similar to the concept’s usage in the early 2000s, the label thus challenges the view that great powers can coexist peacefully, particularly when their visions of world order diverge. In this context, members of the Biden administration often hold that China “is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order, and increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” 86

The label, moreover, indicates a break with past decades of US–China policy by virtue of the similarity of its use to that reminiscent of Bush and Trump. But Bush and Trump used the label to criticise the preceding administrations, while Biden’s usage is more subtle, given his (and many of his advisors’) role in the Obama administration, wherein cooperation with China was a pillar of US foreign policy. For the Biden administration, recognition of “strategic competition” signifies a more general “China reckoning,” as discussed in the eponymously titled and widely discussed article of 2018. 87 In the wake of this reassessment of the past and present, the foreign policy elite slowly but surely came to terms with the idea that China was not about to change to US liking and that for this reason the USA needed to alter its understanding of and approach to China. In the highly volatile domestic political climate of the USA, recognition of “strategic competition” thus became one of the few things politicians and analysts could agree upon. The term thus also served as a unifying force across political divides. 88 Using “strategic competition,” therefore, allowed the Biden administration to both intervene conceptually and advance a political project.

In contrast to the Trump administration’s “all-of-government” approach to China, the Biden administration’s recognition of “strategic competition” was followed by an assessment of US–China policy by various agencies, 89 accordingly followed up in Congress through the establishment of a committee whose task was to “investigate and submit policy recommendations concerning the status of the economic, technological, and security progress of the Chinese Communist Party and its competition with the United States.” 90 Such work is guided by an overarching understanding that a chief task of the USA lies in, “preparing for the conflict of the future and winning the ‘strategic competition’ for the 21st century.” 91 In practice, this meant that the Biden administration emphasised how it will compete with China in some areas, confront it in others, and cooperate with it in yet other domains, 92 in a fashion that mirrors academic discussion of “strategic competition” in the early 2000s. 93 In perhaps the most concrete explanation of strategic competition as a policy project, the Biden administration singled out three key issue areas: (1) domestic (economic) strength and innovation, (2) alliances, and (3) American values. 94

First, enhancing US economic strength and investing in science and technology refer to the notion that the USA needs to be strong domestically to be able to deal with the—predominantly economic—challenges from China. Examples of how to implement such an approach to “strategic competition” include, for instance, the original $2 trillion American Jobs Plan proposal, presented as a necessary investment to make sure that China would not be able to “eat America’s lunch”; wide-ranging investments in science and development; and more protectionist measures, such as maintaining most elements of Trump’s trade war, sanctioning Chinese companies with links to the defence and surveillance sectors, seeking to limit the diffusion of technology to China, and imposing tech restrictions on China. 95 The business dimension of the term is clearly apparent in this approach to “strategic competition,” which is often presented as necessary, wholesome, and something that may strengthen domestic cohesion and cooperation, as well as innovation and progress. 96 At the same time, given US market power, the protectionist elements of Biden’s policy are also connotative of unfair business competition, frequent criticism from Washington regarding Chinese unfair practices notwithstanding.

Second, the Biden administration also seeks, together with its partners and allies, “strategic competition.” As such, the administration has focused on restoring trust in US commitment to its partners and worked towards aligning with them in order to share its understanding of China as a strategic competitor that must be faced through strong alliances. Be it during the Munich Security Conference, 97 North Atlantic Treaty Organization meetings, 98 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defence Lloyd J. Austin’s journey to Japan and South Korea, 99 or prior to Biden’s trip to Europe, 100 the messaging has been on track in emphasising US commitments to lead through its alliances. Importantly, the Biden administration sees the work of alliance repairing as key to its understanding of what winning “strategic competition” entails. During the 2021 Munich security conference, for instance, Biden stated: “We must prepare together for a long-term strategic competition with China. How the United States, Europe, and Asia work together to secure the peace and defend our shared values and advance our prosperity across the Pacific will be among the most consequential efforts we undertake.” 101 Although the Ukraine War has forced the Biden administration to focus on Europe, it nevertheless maintains that its top priority lies in the Indo-Pacific. 102

Finally, the Biden administration has underlined that engaging in “strategic competition” with China necessarily raises the issues of values and human rights. Referring to the China challenge, Biden has emphasised that US–China relations also need to be seen as a “battle between the utility of democracies in the 21st century and autocracies.” 103 Hence, labelling China as a strategic competitor also suggests competition for the reputation and benefits of one political system over another. For this reason, it has become essential for the USA to “prove democracy works,” 104 particularly in light of the domestic turbulence in the USA after Biden’s election. It is also in this context that certain analysts present the dangers of China’s influence in the USA as an assault on and exploitation of US democracy. 105 Although to counter these problems the Biden administration tries to improve the functioning of democracy, it has also expanded the work of the CIA and FBI. 106 Internationally, meanwhile, it has frequently emphasised the democratic values shared with its partners in juxtaposition with China’s authoritarianism. For instance, the purpose of Biden’s first trip to Europe was “America rallying the world’s democracies,” 107 while the “summit of democracies” was intended to “renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world.” 108 Especially since the outbreak of the Ukraine War, the USA has repeatedly emphasised the inherent conflict between authoritarian, rule-breaking states such as Russia–China and the democratic states that support the liberal international order. 109

Taken as a whole, therefore, the Biden administration has taken various measures to enact “strategic competition” with China in the three areas that it perceives as essential. However, the Biden administration is striking in how seldom its usage and understanding of “strategic competition” goes beyond a broadly shared, yet implicit agreement that “strategic competition”’ is what defines US–China relations and must hence be pursued. Put differently, although the Biden administration has rhetorically emphasised that it regards “strategic competition” as its principal policy approach, practically speaking, this only operates according to a narrow understanding of the term which means little more than competing for the sake of competition in practically all domains. Indeed, the Biden administration has never specified what the goals, means, and limitations of “strategic competition” are. Exactly what is the USA competing for, and what would winning “strategic competition” entail? A military, economic, or ideological defeat of China? Of the Communist Party? Containment of China? A balance-of-power arrangement, or a sphere-of-influence model that envisions a modus vivendi ? The change of China’s regime? What are the means to any of these ends, and to what extent are the resources available and political realities supportive of such goals?

The conceptual web around “strategic competition” in the Biden era is thus comparatively sparse, tracking neither the historical use of the term nor any of its conventional associations ( Figure 6 ). For instance, “strategic competition” was a starting point of policy-making—not its goal—both during the détente era and the Bush era. The détente era focused on the military dimension and dangers of unbridled strategic competition, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons, and sought to curtail and manage such competition before disaster could strike. The Bush administration, meanwhile, advanced the recognition of “strategic competition” to add impetus to its long-term planning and US role in the world, thus preventing China’s rise. For the Biden administration, “strategic competition” seems to relate only to a general awareness and recognition of the adversarial nature of international politics, beyond which there is little to suggest a particularly mindful approach to “strategic competition,” a means/ends assessment of the USA’s goals and capabilities, or more conscious long-term planning. Put differently, even though “strategic competition” seemingly serves as the Biden administration’s main foreign policy principle, there is scant probity behind its emergence as a guiding precept.

Conceptual Web Encompassing “Strategic Competition” in the Biden Era

The purpose of the present article was to unpack the concept of “strategic competition.” In arguing that the concept and its meaning should not be taken for granted, it has demonstrated the extent to which the term has fluctuated, as regards different meanings and associations throughout different time periods. By subjecting “strategic competition” to a conceptual analysis, the article has shifted attention from what “strategic competition” consists in to what it does for different observers, and more broadly, for politics. This, in turn, helps to understand why and how the label exists in so many different variations, and how it can alternatively refer to an era, a cause of conflict, a worldview, or a policy project. It thus addresses some of the weaknesses in the literature on “strategic competition,” lessens some of the resultant conceptual confusion, and provides a deeper understanding of “strategic competition” that appreciates the messiness and complexity of the term.

Through its empirical analysis, the article has pinpointed a clear political dimension to “strategic competition” as a concept that political actors have used to explain international politics in a particular way, which has also often functioned as the starting point for distinct political projects, hence instrumentalised by politicians to steer political action. Having risen to prominence in the 1970s, the concept first functioned in the context of the détente era. Specifically, the USA sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union, such as through arms control, with the explicit aim of curtailing the negative effects of “strategic competition” and so avoiding its escalation. Here, “strategic competition” and its recognition served as a starting point that underpinned the détente policy project. In this configuration of the conceptual web, “strategic competition” consisted in the natural state of international politics and US–Soviet relations. There was no need to think about what made such competition strategic; instead, inclusion of the adjective “strategic” was no more than a residual side effect of ongoing discussions on the limiting of strategic arms.

When détente ended, the term fell dormant through to the early 2000s when George W. Bush and his administration reactivated it. It was at that point that “cooperation,” hitherto used as a supporting concept of “strategic competition,” began to be contrasted with it. The label then became closely associated with long-term planning, deterrence, military power, and American hegemony. In so doing, the “strategic competition” became part and parcel of domestic contestation over the purpose of US foreign and security policy in the post–Cold War era.

Owing to the USA’s preoccupation with the war on terror, the notion of China as a strategic competitor more or less evaporated. But the Trump presidency resurrected the label to justify a “whole-of-government” approach whose function was to set it apart from preceding administrations and push back on China. However, in contrast to previous eras, “strategic competition” was to the administration little more than a vague recognition of competitive bilateral relations, so no coherent “strategic competition” strategy ensued. The Biden administration, on the other hand, has sought to translate the recognition of “strategic competition” into an active pursuit of “strategic competition” as a goal in its own right. However, the article finds that, although the Biden administration emphasises the location of strategic competition as being on a spectrum between conflict and cooperation, it is yet to define the objectives, means, domains, and boundaries pertaining to “strategic competition.” Ever since the Trump administration, “strategic competition,” therefore, has become a political project and hence central to contemporary politics, but one which, in neglecting the conventional ways of thinking about strategic competition, is largely ahistorical and thus oblivious to the lessons of the past. Indeed, whereas the concept was previously used as the starting point of careful policy planning, “strategic competition” nowadays seems mainly to be pursued for purposes of “strategic competition.”

Understanding these different usages and performances of “strategic competition” is important. First, it is otherwise impossible to understand the role that the concept has played and continues to play in politics. Second, if the term is intended to function as more than just a political slogan, it is important to distinguish analytically the situations wherein its predominant function is that of a sense-making tool unequivocally used to steer political action. As such, there is a clear possibility that failing to distinguish between “strategic competition”—as either a somewhat neutral description of the world or an explicit policy project—reinforces the impression that it constitutes a natural development of global politics, rather than a particular rendition and configuration of politics at this discrete point in time. In fact, much speaks for another way in which “strategic competition” has begun to function, namely, as a self-fulfilling prophecy that drives US–China relations towards ever more tense territory. In this context, recent events in bilateral relations, such as the fallout over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in the summer of 2022 and the balloon incident in early 2023, suggest that no serious mechanisms to de-escalate in the event of crisis are in place. Seemingly, little political will exists to manage and navigate relations in a fashion that does not lead to conflict.

This, in turn, begs the question, what comes next for US–China relations? Are we to expect ever-increasing competition in virtually all domains, yet without a clear purpose? An optimistic reading of the evolution of the “strategic competition” concept suggests that, perhaps sometime in the not too distant future, political leaders in the USA might take a look at how the concept was originally used and conclude that recognition of strategic competition is principally a starting point, rather than the end of policy-making, and hence embark on a means/ends assessment that includes a realistic outlook on what is politically, economically, and environmentally feasible. At this point, “strategic competition” would cease to function as a political slogan or a political project and give way to the formulation of a foreign policy strategy that includes clearly defined goals and the means to achieve them. Of course, whether this means that the USA concludes, as it did during the détente era, that unbridled “strategic competition” needs to be managed to prevent nuclear disaster or whether it would spur a foreign policy that actively seeks containment, rollback, or even a swift toppling of China and the CCP remains to be seen.

For helpful comments on earlier versions of the present article, I would like to thank Kjell Engelbrekt, Stefan Borg, Antoine Bousquet, Sofia Ledberg, Peter Haldén, Nina Krickel-Choi, Malin Karlsson, and Cassandra Hokka Zakrisson.

None declared.

The present article has been written as part of the project “The evolution of transatlantic and European security policy.” The article has received funding from the Swedish Ministry of Defense and the Swedish Research Council (2021-06652).

The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf .

For some examples, consider Kai He and Mingjiang Li, “Understanding the Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US-China Strategic Competition, Regional Actors, and Beyond,” International Affairs , Vol. 96, No. 1 (2020), pp. 1–7; Nishino Junya, “South Korea’s Diplomacy in an Era of US-China Strategic Competition,” Asia-Pacific Review , Vol. 28, No. 2 (2021), pp. 107–34; Ken Masujima, “Development and Strategic Competition in Asia: Toward Polarization?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific , Vol. 21, No. 1 (2021), pp. 91–120; Benjamin Schreer, “Why US-Sino Strategic Competition Is Good for Australia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 73, No. 5 (2019), pp. 431–48; A. Tidwell, “Strategic Competition and the Evolving Role of Indo-Pacific Paradiplomacy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 75, No. 1 (2021), pp. 103–19; Jue Zhang and Ju Xu, “China-US Strategic Competition and the Descent of a Porous Curtain,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 14, No. 3 (2021), pp. 321–52; Jianren Zhou, “Power Transition and Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy: Why China and the US March towards Strategic Competition?” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 12, No. 1 (2019), pp. 1–34.

Ned Price, “Department Press Briefing Transcripts,” 2 February 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-february-2-2021/ .

He and Li, “Understanding the Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific”; Ryan Hass, “How China Is Responding to Escalating Strategic Competition with the US,” Brookings Institute , 1 March 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-china-is-responding-to-escalating-strategic-competition-with-the-us/ ; Jisi Wang and Hu Ran, “From Cooperative Partnership to Strategic Competition: A Review of China–U.S. Relations 2009–2019,” China International Strategy Review , Vol. 1, No. 1 (2019), pp. 1–10. For a welcome exception, see Ali Wyne, America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing US Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition (Cambridge, Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2022).

Figure 1 shows the rapid increase of references to strategic competition in these different discourse communities. See the end of this section for a detailed discussion of data retrieval.

Wang and Ran, “From Cooperative Partnership to Strategic Competition”; Zhaohui Wang and Jinghan Zeng, “From Economic Cooperation to Strategic Competition: Understanding the US-China Trade Disputes through the Transformed Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science , Vol. 25, No. 1 (2020), pp. 49–69; Zhang and Xu, “China-US Strategic Competition and the Descent of a Porous Curtain.”

Xuetong Yan, “Bipolar Rivalry in the Early Digital Age,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 13, No. 3 (2020), pp. 313–41; Chan M. Hong and Jungsik Um, “US Space Power Augmentation and Security Strategy against China,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. 34, No. 1 (2022), pp. 59–79; He and Li, “Understanding the Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific”; Terence Roehrig, “The United States and Asia in 2021,” Asian Survey , Vol. 62, No. 1 (2022), pp. 1–14; Stephanie Winkler, “U.S.-Chinese Strategic Competition and the Ukraine War: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security,” Czech Journal of International Relations , Vol. 58, No. 1 (2023), pp. 1–32.

Jaeyoung Kim, “The Agency of Secondary States in Order Transition in the Indo-Pacific,” The Pacific Review (2022), pp. 1–29; Sian Troath, “The Development of Robotics and Autonomous Systems in Australia: Key Issues, Actors, and Discourses,” Australian Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 77, No. 1 (2023), pp. 65–84; Victor D. Cha, “Allied Decoupling in an Era of US–China Strategic Competition,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 13, No. 4 (2020), pp. 509–36; Stephen R. Nagy, “US-China Strategic Competition and Converging Middle Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” Strategic Analysis , Vol. 46, No. 3 (2022), pp. 260–76.

Michael J. Mazarr, Bryan A. Frederick, and Yvonne K. Crane, Understanding a New Era of Strategic Competition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022); Daniel Burkhart and Alison Woody, “Strategic Competition: Beyond Peace and War,” Joint Force Quarterly , Vol. 86 (2017), pp. 20–7; Chengqiu Wu, “Decoding US–China Strategic Competition: Comparative Leverages and Issue Selection,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 16, No. 1 (2023), pp. 31–60.

Note, for instance, the many different ways that members of the Biden administration refer to strategic competition: not only as something that needs to be “vigorous, intensive and principled,” that America needs to “account for,” “win,” prevent from “tipping into conflict,” but also as an “era,” a “prism,” or a “defining feature of the 21st century.” Wu’s scholarly treatment of strategic competition calls strategic competition a “theory,” “phenomenon,” “concept,” “main thrust of US–China relations,” or a “type of relationship” that the USA and China entered into in 2017. See Joseph R. Biden, “FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy,” The American Presidency Project , 12 October 2022, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy ; The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki,” 25 January 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/01/25/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-january-25-2021/ ; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with China,” 12 May 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/ ; Price, “Department Press Briefing Transcripts”; The White House, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official Previewing the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 20 September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/09/20/background-press-call-by-a-senior-administration-official-previewing-the-76th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/ ; Joseph R. Biden, “Press Release—President-elect Biden Announces Key Nominees for Department of Defense,” The American Presidency Project , 30 December 2020, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-release-president-elect-biden-announces-key-nominees-for-department-defense ; U.S. Department of State, “Counterterrorism Lessons Learned to Face Future Threats,” 2 April 2023, https://www.state.gov/counterterrorism-lessons-learned-to-face-future-threats/ ; Wu, “Decoding US–China Strategic Competition.”

Adam Breuer and Alastair I. Johnston, “Memes, Narratives and the Emergent US–China Security Dilemma,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 32, No. 4 (2019), pp. 429–55.

Chengxin Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 68, No. 4 (2014), pp. 453–69.

Jinghan Zeng, “Narrating China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Global Policy , Vol. 10, No. 2 (2019), pp. 207–16.

Qi Hao, “China Debates the ‘New Type of Great Power Relations,’” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 8, No. 4 (2015), pp. 349–70.

See, e.g. Daniel Béland and Robert H. Cox, “Introduction,” in Daniel Béland and Robert H. Cox, eds., Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 9; Gustav Meibauer, “Ambiguous Specificity: The Production of Foreign Policy Bullshit in Electoral Contexts,” Politics , Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021), pp. 15–30.

This phenomenon is typically referred to as “reification,” see Patrick T. Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp. 7–8.

Building, in particular, on Felix Berenskoetter, “Unpacking Concepts,” in Felix Berenskoetter, ed., Concepts in World Politics (London: SAGE, 2016), pp. 1–20; Piki Ish-Shalom, ed., Concepts at Work: On the Linguistic Infrastructure of World Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021).

Berenskoetter, “Unpacking Concepts,” p. 4.

Similarly, e.g., Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

Berenskoetter, “Unpacking Concepts,” pp. 13–5.

Reinhardt Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 80; Berenskoetter, “Unpacking Concepts,” p. 2.

Oliver P. Richmond and Felix Berenskoetter, “Peace,” in Berenskoetter, ed., Concepts in World Politics , pp. 107–24.

W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Vol. 56 (1955), pp. 167–98.

William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

Piki Ish-Shalom, “Introduction,” in Ish-Shalom, ed., Concepts at Work , p. 5; Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki, “Introduction: The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion,” in Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki, eds., The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1–16; Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse .

Berenskoetter, “Unpacking Concepts,” pp. 7–9.

Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism, and Constructivism (London: Routledge, 2013).

Christian Bueger and Felix Bethke, “Actor-Networking the ‘Failed State’—An Enquiry into the Life of Concepts,” Journal of International Relations and Development , Vol. 17, No. 1 (2014), pp. 30–60.

Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy , p. 79.

Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept,” Palgrave Communications , Vol. 3, No. 1 (2017), p. 2.

Reinhardt Koselleck, “Introduction and Prefaces to the ‘Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,’” Contributions to the History of Concepts , Vol. 6, No. 1 (2011), p. 9.

In order to be concise, the article has focused its analysis on US discourse surrounding strategic competition, thus not taking into account either Soviet or Chinese understandings of and approaches to the concept.

All these databases have shortcomings. As regards political discourse, no database allows for a systematic query across all dimensions of US politics, which is why the article selected presidential and congressional documents as a proxy. Nevertheless, these sources provide a good overview of the various discourse communities and their understanding and usage of strategic competition. The Web of Science , for instance, does not include a reliable database for academic books, and while the article also queried Google Books , there is little control over the results or insight into which books may or may not be indexed. It does, moreover, capture all English-language, not just US, discourse. Factiva does not return results prior to the 1970s, but a search of the New York Times historical archives suggests that, in any event, the term experienced negligible mention at that time.

Jonathan Hearn, The Domestication of Competition: Social Evolution and Liberal Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), p. 4.

Hearn, The Domestication of Competition , pp. 4–9; John R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird’s-Eye View of World History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).

George J. Stigler, “Competition,” in Matias Vernengo, Esteban Perez Caldentey, and Barkley J. Rosser, Jr., eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 1–9.

Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), pp. 197–230; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 3; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History , Vol. 18, No. 4 (1988), p. 616.

Kelly-Kate S. Pease, International Organizations: Perspectives on Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2018).

This is not because strategy was a special concept; it rather speaks to the fluidity and complexity of language.

Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 3–35.

Jan Angstrom and Jerker Widen, Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 10.

Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” Security Studies , Vol. 27, No. 1 (2018), p. 27.

National Security Council, “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” 31 January 1950, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/national-security-council-report-nsc-68-united-states-objectives-and-programs-national , p. 8.

Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 82–113.

Edward W. Brooke, “A Choice of Risks: The Dilemmas of National Security,” Congressional Record, Senate , 91st Congress, 1st Session (1969), Vol. 115, Part 8.

Richard Nixon, “Radio Address About Second Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress,” The American Presidency Project , 25 February 1971, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-about-second-annual-foreign-policy-report-the-congress .

Richard Nixon, “Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” The American Presidency Project , 3 May 1973, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fourth-annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy .

Jimmy Carter, “Remarks at a Special Convocation of the Georgia Institute of Technology,” The American Presidency Project , 20 February 1979, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/atlanta-georgia-remarks-special-convocation-the-georgia-institute-technology . For similar examples, see Richard Nixon, “Letter to the Speaker of the House Transmitting the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms,” The American Presidency Project , 13 June 1972, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-the-speaker-the-house-transmitting-the-antiballistic-missile-treaty-and-the-interim ; Jimmy Carter, “New York Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association,” The American Presidency Project , 25 April 1979, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/new-york-city-new-york-remarks-the-annual-convention-the-american-newspaper-publishers .

Note for instance that there are no references to “tactical competition” in any discourse family.

Alton Frye, “The High Risks of Neutron Weapons; The Neutron Bomb Risks,” The Washington Post , 17 July 1977, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1977/07/17/the-high-risks-of-neutron-weapons/c6cc0947-ae2d-4466-a1c3-eae43aba8830/ ; Don Oberdorfer, “U.S., Soviet Assessing Policies As ‘Crescendo of Crisis’ Fades; Perspectives Widen as ‘Crescendo’ Dims,” The Washington Post , 2 March 1980, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/03/02/us-soviet-assessing-policies-as-crescendo-of-crisis-fades/8b43f479-0216-4dfa-b068-704ed2635450/ .

Bernard S. Albert, “The Strategic Competition with the USSR—What Is It and How Are We Doing?” Comparative Strategy , Vol. 1, No. 3 (1979), p. 144.

Colin S. Gray, “Soviet-American Strategic Competition: Instruments, Doctrines and Purposes,” in Long–Range U.S.—U.S.S.R Competition: National Security Implications , Proceedings of National Security Affairs Conference, July 12–14, 1976 (Washington: National Defense University, 1976), pp. 36–53; Albert, Ibid .

Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest , Vol. 16 (1989), pp. 3–18; Samuel P. Huntington, “No Exit: The Errors of Endism,” The National Interest , Vol. 17 (1989), pp. 3–11.

Cited in Richard Baum, “From ‘Strategic Partners’ to ‘Strategic Competitors’: George W. Bush and the Politics of US China Policy,” Journal of East Asian Studies , Vol. 1, No. 2 (2001), p. 192.

Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 79, No. 1 (2000), p. 56.

Cited in Baum, “From ‘Strategic Partners’ to ‘Strategic Competitors’,” p. 203.

Thomas Donnelly, Donald Kagan, and Gary Schmitt, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century,” Project for the New American Century , September 2000, https://ia803100.us.archive.org/32/items/RebuildingAmericasDefenses/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf .

See especially David Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors,” Survival , Vol. 42, No. 1 (2000), pp. 97–115; Liselotte Odgaard, “The South China Sea: ASEAN’s Security Concerns about China,” Security Dialogue , Vol. 34, No. 1 (2003), pp. 11–24.

The White House, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” July 1994, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1994.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121219-500 .

The White House, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” October 1998, https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/1998.pdf , p. 43; see also Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations”; Jianwei Wang, “China: A Challenge or Opportunity for the United States?” Journal of East Asian Studies , Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003), p. 299; Baum, “From ‘Strategic Partners’ to ‘Strategic Competitors.’”

Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” p. 45.

See also Chengxin Pan, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political , Vol. 29, No. 3 (2004), pp. 305–31; William A. Callahan, “The Rise of China. How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power,” Review of International Studies , Vol. 31, No. 4 (2005), pp. 701–14; David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

Martin Kettle and John Hooper, “Military Force an Option to Defend Taiwan, Warns Bush,” The Guardian , 26 April 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/26/china.usa .

Paul J. Smith, “China’s Economic and Political Rise: Implications for Global Terrorism and U.S.–China Cooperation,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , Vol. 32, No. 7 (2009), pp. 627–45; Nancy B. Tucker, “The Evolution of U.S.-China Relations,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Tangled Titans : The United States and China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), p. 48.

David E. Sanger, “Bush’s New Focus Requires a Shift in His China Policy,” The New York Times , 18 October 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/world/nation-challenged-commander-chief-bush-s-new-focus-requires-shift-his-china.html .

The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2002, https://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/10/ . The 2002 National Security Strategy also emphasised the importance of democratic developments in China to the future relationship, but progress in that arena was not seen as a precondition for cooperation.

Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations,” pp. 97, 99, and 113.

The White House, “U.S.-China Joint Statement,” 17 November 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement ; see also Robert G. Sutter, US-China Relations: Perilous Past, Uncertain Present (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 151.

Barack Obama, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, and NSC Senior Director for Asia Danny Russel,” The American Presidency Project , 16 November 2011, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-deputy-national-security-advisor-for-strategic .

Donald J. Trump, “Press Release—President Donald J. Trump Announces a National Security Strategy to Advance America’s Interests,” The American Presidency Project , 18 December 2017, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-release-president-donald-j-trump-announces-national-security-strategy-advance ; The White House, “National security strategy of the United States of America.”

David Brooks, “How China Brings Us Together,” The New York Times , 14 February 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/opinion/china-economy.html .

For examples of such arguments, see for instance Mark Landler, “Trump Accuses China of Interfering in Midterm Elections,” The New York Times , 26 September 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/asia/trump-china-election.html ; see also Josh Rogin, “A New Stealth Threat from China,” The Washington Post , 10 December 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/chinas-foreign-influencers-are-causing-alarm-in-washington/2017/12/10/98227264-dc58-11e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html ; Hal Brands and Toshi Yoshihara, “How to Wage Political Warfare,” The National Interest , 16 December 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-wage-political-warfare-38802 ; Stephanie C. Winkler and Björn Jerdén, “US Foreign Policy Elites and the Great Rejuvenation of the Ideological China Threat: The Role of Rhetoric and the Ideologization of Geopolitical Threats,” Journal of International Relations and Development , Vol. 26, No. 1 (2023), pp. 159–84.

Christopher Layne, “Preventing the China-U.S. Cold War from Turning Hot,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 13, No. 3 (2020), pp. 343–85.

See, e.g, Minghao Zhao, “Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics , Vol. 12, No. 3 (2019), pp. 371–94.

Hal Brands and Jake Sullivan, “China Has Two Paths to Global Domination,” Foreign Policy , 22 May 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/china-superpower-two-paths-global-domination-cold-war/ ; Martin Wolf, “China Is Now Exposed to One Man’s Whims,” Financial Times , 28 February 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/38996858-1af0-11e8-956a-43db76e69936 .

Trump, “Press Release—President Donald J. Trump Announces a National Security Strategy to Advance America’s Interests.”

Fumiaki Kubo, “Reading the Trump Administration’s China Policy,” Asia-Pacific Review , Vol. 26, No. 1 (2019), pp. 58–76.

See especially M. T. Fravel et al., “Opinion: China Is Not an Enemy,” The Washington Post , 3 July 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html .

Felicia Sonmez, “Biden Says China Is ‘Not Competition for Us,’ Prompting Pushback from Both Parties,” The Washington Post , 2 May 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-says-china-is-not-competition-for-us-prompting-pushback-from-republicans/2019/05/01/4ae4e738-6c68-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html .

Joseph R. Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs , 23 January 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again .

Singled out are the realms of economics, human rights, intellectual property, and global governance. The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” 5 February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/ .

Price, “Department Press Briefing Transcripts.”

US Department of Defence, “Pentagon Press Secretary and China Task Force Director Update Reporters on Department of Defence Operations,” 11 February 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2501999/pentagon-press-secretary-and-china-task-force-director-update-reporters-on-depa/ .

Patricia Zengerle and Mark Hosenball, “Biden CIA Nominee Burns to Focus on ‘Authoritarian Adversary’ China,” Reuters , 24 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-cia-idUSKBN2AO19B .

Daniel W. Drezner, “Let’s Check In on the China Gap!,” The Washington Post , 3 February 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/02/03/lets-check-china-gap/ .

Antony J. Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” 26 May 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ .

Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 97, No. 2 (2018), pp. 60–70.

Wyne, America’s Great-Power Opportunity .

Such as, for instance, by a Pentagon China task force US Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary and China Task Force Director Update Reporters on Department of Defense Operations.”

“H.Res.11: Establishing the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party,” 118th Congress , https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-resolution/11 .

Biden, “Press Release—President-elect Biden Announces Key Nominees for Department of Defense.”

The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” March 2021, https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021_Interim.pdf ; The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World”; Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations.”

Shambaugh, Ibid .

The White House, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference,” 25 March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/25/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference/ ; The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Council of Economic Advisers Member Jared Bernstein,” 5 February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/02/05/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-council-of-economic-advisers-member-jared-bernstein-february-5-2021/ .

David Dollar, “What Does Biden’s First 100 Days Tell Us about His Approach to China?” Brookings Institute , 26 April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/04/26/what-does-bidens-first-100-days-tell-us-about-his-approach-to-china/ ; Vincent Ni, “Biden Sanctions Chinese Companies as Beijing Says ‘Normal Communication’ Resumed,” The Guardian , 4 June 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/03/biden-bans-us-investment-chinese-military-tech-surveillance ; “Biden Administration Imposes Sweeping Tech Restrictions on China,” The Guardian , 7 October 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/07/biden-administration-tech-restrictions-china .

In this regard, some journalists emphasise that this form of healthy and fair competition can spur much-needed progress in climate change as both countries race to find solutions. A. S. Erickson and Gabriel Collins, “Competition with China Can Save the Planet Pressure, Not Partnership, Will Spur Progress on Climate Change,” Foreign Affairs , 13 April 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-13/competition-china-can-save-planet?gad=1&gclid=CjwKCAjwg-GjBhBnEiwAMUvNW2DCs_bUcJVvwqMmbEC2Dgam5xgPJCg5pRaxa8ZNxp5jFWxLTwmmDxoCKc8QAvD_BwE ; D. Colgan and Nicholas L. Miller, “The Rewards of Rivalry US-Chinese Competition Can Spur Climate Progress,” Foreign Affairs , 1 November 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/rewards-rivalry-us-china-competition-can-spur-climate-progress .

The White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” 19 February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/ .

Paul Sonne and Michael Birnbaum, “Biden Administration Takes More Cooperative Approach to Its First High-Level NATO Meeting,” The Washington Post , 17 February 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/nato-meeting-biden-trump/2021/02/16/b42d00d0-709f-11eb-a4eb-44012a612cf9_story.html .

US Department of State, “Reaffirming the Unbreakable US-Japan Alliance,” 17 March 2021, https://www.state.gov/reaffirming-the-unbreakable-u-s-japan-alliance/ ; U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (‘2+2’),” 18 March 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2021-republic-of-korea-united-states-foreign-and-defense-ministerial-meeting-22/ .

Joseph R. Biden, “My Trip to Europe Is about America Rallying the World’s Democracies,” The Washington Post , 6 June 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/05/joe-biden-europe-trip-agenda/ .

The White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference.”

US Department of Defense, “Defense Official Says Indo-Pacific Is the Priority Theater; China Is DOD’s Pacing Challenge,” 9 March 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2961183/defense-official-says-indo-pacific-is-the-priority-theater-china-is-dods-pacing/ .

David E. Sanger, “Biden Defines His Underlying Challenge with China: ‘Prove Democracy Works,’” The New York Times , 26 March 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/politics/biden-china-democracy.html .

See Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2019).

Zengerle and Hosenball, “Biden CIA Nominee Burns to Focus on ‘Authoritarian Adversary’ China”; Martin Matishak and Andrew Desiderio, “Intel Chiefs Sound Alarm on China in Global Threats Hearing,” Politico , 14 April 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/14/intel-chiefs-china-global-threats-481485 .

Biden, “My Trip to Europe Is about America Rallying the World’s Democracies.”

Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again.”

Winkler, “US-Chinese Strategic Competition and the Ukraine War.”

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Cooperation and Competition

By morton deutsch, this article summary written by: conflict research consortium staff.

Citation : Morton Deutsch. "Cooperation and Competition." Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, eds.,  The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice  San Francisco: Jossey-Bas Publishers, 2000, pp. 21-40.

Most conflicts involve a mix of cooperative and competitive motives, and so Deutsch develops a theory of cooperation and competition in order to better understand conflict processes and resolutions.

A key element in understanding cooperation/competition is the type of goal interdependence found between the involved parties. Parties goals' may be negatively interdependent--one party's success correlating with the other's failure. Such situations tend to yield competitive relationships with a win-lose orientation. Parties' goals may be positively interdependent--success correlating with success, or failure with failure. These situations tend to yield cooperative relationships where the parties have a win-win orientation.

Cooperative relationships display a number of positive characteristics, including more effective communication and coordination, open and friendly attitudes, a sense of mutuality and a willingness to increase the other's power. Competitive processes tend to yield the inverse, negative effects: obstructed communication, inability to coordinate activities, suspicion and a lack of self-confidence, desire to reduce the other's power and to dominate them.

Deutsch's research "suggests that constructive processes of conflict resolution are similar to cooperative processes of problem solving, and destructive processes of conflict resolution are similar to competitive processes."(p. 27) A key question then is how to foster cooperative relationships. In response Deutsch offers his eponymous Crude Law of Social Relations: "The characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also tend to elicit that type of social relationship."(p. 29) Friendly, empowering gestures tend to evoke cooperative responses. Suspicious, domineering attitudes tend to provoke competitive responses.

Deutsch identifies some of the implications that this theory of cooperation and competition has for our understanding of conflict, for our practice of conflict management, and for training in conflict resolution. A cooperative orientation on the part of the parties will facilitate constructive resolution of a conflict. Social support is key to creating and maintaining such a cooperative orientation. Constructive resolution is also more likely when the parties can reframe their understanding of their goals and conflict, coming to see their respective goals as positively interdependent and the conflict as a joint problem. This initial reframing, and so constructive resolutions, will be facilitated by the parties' adherence to the norms of cooperation. These norms include honesty, respect, responsiveness, acknowledging responsibility and extending forgiveness, emphasizing the positive and seeking common ground. Constructive conflict resolution rests on the very basic values of reciprocity, human equality, human fallibility, shared community, and nonviolence. These values are widely shared, and can provide common ground between otherwise starkly opposed parties.

In addition to these attitudes and values, effective conflict management requires skills and knowledge. First are the skills required to establish and maintain effective working relationships between the various parties and third parties to a conflict. Second are the skills needed to sustain a cooperative conflict resolution process over the course of the conflict. Third are the skills for developing effective group problem-solving and decision-making processes.

These theoretical insights also have implications for practitioner training. The teaching methods and the learning context itself should embody the cooperative, constructive problem-solving orientation. Practitioners will also need access to a supportive environment, if they are to maintain their own cooperative attitudes in the face of unfavorable or even hostile conflict situations. Finally, Deutsch emphasizes the need for practitioners to reflect upon their own practice and their own frameworks for conflict resolution, so that they may both learn from and contribute to the growing understanding of conflict and its resolution.

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Conceptual Framework of Coopetition: A Comparative Study of Coopetition Configurations in Multinational Companies and Large and Small and Medium Enterprises

• Original Research
• Published: 24 August 2024

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• Sahar Ayadi   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-3813-0180 1 ,
• Laurent Tabourot   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4470-4785 1 &
• Lotfi Khrifech   ORCID: orcid.org/0009-0008-2604-151X 2  

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This article focuses on the development of a conceptual framework for analyzing coopetition, a strategy that combines both collaboration and competition between competing firms. The aim of this framework is to capture the relational complexity of coopetition and dispel the ambiguity surrounding previous research on the outcomes of coopetition, which has often been limited to financial impact. Coopetition has many advantages for a variety of companies, regardless of their size or sector of activity. Our main contribution lies in the creation of a comprehensive analytical framework for exploring coopetition in different dimensions, such as types, forms and modes of governance, to determine corporate performance indicators. Our multifactorial approach integrates all the parameters of coopetition, particularly for very small businesses (VSEs) and small and medium–sized enterprises (SMEs), with the goal of defining the conditions for success. Methodologically, our qualitative analysis includes case studies of large manufacturing companies that have successfully implemented coopetition practices. Moreover, we explore the presence of coopetition in VSEs and SMEs. We highlight the specific strategies they have adopted and the results they have achieved. By qualitatively comparing cases of coopetition between large companies and cases of coopetition between SMEs, we are able to identify the specific strategies they have adopted and the results they have achieved.

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The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. We declare that all the data are available in the thesis.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the Editor-in-Chief and esteemed reviewers. Their expertise and insights have made a significant contribution to our work. In the context of this research conducted within the framework of my thesis, it is essential to acknowledge the diversity of competing interests that have shaped this study. The results obtained stem from an independent academic effort aimed at elucidating crucial questions raised in the field of management sciences. We would like to emphasize that this work was funded impartially through the SYMME laboratory-Annecy France, ensuring the integrity and objectivity of the results presented in this article. Transparency regarding the sources of funding is crucial for honest scientific communication, and we are committed to providing a balanced analysis based on the data collected during this research.

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SA: Conceptualized the study, developed the methodology, performed data analysis, used fsQCA Software and wrote the original manuscript. LT: Executed visualization codes to enhance result presentation, and critically revised the manuscript for significant intellectual content. LK: Conceived and designed the study, contributed to methodology development, performed reliability checks for data analysis, and critically revised the manuscript.

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Ayadi, S., Tabourot, L. & Khrifech, L. Conceptual Framework of Coopetition: A Comparative Study of Coopetition Configurations in Multinational Companies and Large and Small and Medium Enterprises. JGBC (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42943-024-00100-x

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Systematic approach to academic teamwork as basis of effective cooperation.

1. Introduction

2. materials and methods, 3. theoretical research, the second task, 5. discussion.

• The composition of teams according to the results of the role test had a positive impact on team results.
• The formation of teams according to the results of the role test had a positive impact on satisfaction only if training and training in cooperation were set before the joint task.
• Teams that were assembled based on the balance of team roles and their representation in the team show the best results in the shortest time.
• Conflicting personality traits did not have negative consequences on team results.
• Knowledge and training on how to work together in a team had a positive impact on team results.
• The own formation of teams based on social relations and camaraderie did not contribute to better results; the results were average to low.
• A capable and charismatic leader can quickly motivate team members to achieve team goals and shorten the time to achieve them.
• Spreading knowledge within the team and common synergy can help overall results and especially improve knowledge work and logical thinking of members.
• Conflicting personality traits did not support the satisfaction of individual team members.
• Conflicts in teams, so-called team extremes, arise from the individual abilities of team members, passion for the fulfillment of the team’s common goals, the feeling of belonging to the team, the composition of the topic, and also a random variable.
• The definition of the cooperative relationship: In this first move, it is about assessing the intention of the cooperation from the position of the individual members of the cooperation comparatively and building the common goals of the cooperation. These goals will subsequently result in a common strategy for their realization.
• As a second move, it is necessary to ensure cooperation in a mutually created environment through information sharing and communication. This leads to the dissemination of knowledge and experience in the cooperative relationship and thus builds the development and growth of the members of the cooperative.
• Support for mutual cooperation is necessary for building a relationship, building individual joint activities to fulfill the goals of cooperation. Establishing and strengthening common relationships are necessary for the creation of long-term partnerships. This constitutes the third move of the strategy.
• The fourth move of the strategy is the very adaptation and coordination of joint activities in a cooperative relationship and mutual acceptance of the cultures of the cooperating companies, which will create an efficient and creative work environment.
• The cooperative relationship is built on common values, which means that it is trust in the relationship, loyalty, and the principle of reciprocity that need to be developed for bilateral cooperation as it gradually advances to the set goals as the fifth move of the strategy.
• The sixth move of the strategy concerns human capital. Cooperation based on the development of human potential and two-way interaction of employees of cooperating enterprises supports the positive direction of cooperation.
• A cooperative relationship needs to formulate the conditions and rules of cooperation as the seventh move. After the previous steps and fine-tuning of mutual and functioning cooperation, the company management can look at the conditions and rules they have created for a functioning relationship and evaluate and possibly change them so that the cooperation becomes sustainable in the long term.
• The eighth step is the creation of common solutions that fulfill the common goals of cooperation established at the beginning. This contributes to the very justification of the importance of cooperation.

6. Conclusions

Author contributions, data availability statement, conflicts of interest.

• They are given cut pieces of paper with the blank side up. (It is ideal to have the papers cut into one paragraph each, so that they can be divided well between teams with different team members of 4–5. The cutting, however, takes a lot of time, so we cut them into five pieces and if there were fewer of them in the team, then we told them to divide them somehow.) They should write the correct solution on paper along with the time and log-in.
• An online stopwatch is flashed on the projector (the site is a bunch), and they are told that they can turn the paper around and the stopwatch starts.
• Their teamwork is monitored during work. (Do they each read their own and then just communicate? Do they put it together and everyone reads everything? Do they try to work together at all?...)
• When they log in, the time is checked to see if they are cheating and if they have the correct solution. If so, we told them to write how they proceeded as a team (not to explain their solution, but only how they worked together)—mainly Excel entries.
• The robbery was reported on Friday morning at 8:00 a.m. on November 12. The bank was closed from 17:00 the previous day.
• Miss Margaret Ellington, a sales assistant at the bank, was the first to discover the robbery. The vault door was blown up with dynamite.
• The president of the bank, Mr. Albert Greenbags, left town before the robbery was reported. He was arrested by Mexican authorities at the airport in Mexico City at lunchtime on Friday, November 12.
• The bank president had long-term marital problems because his wife was spending all their money and he had been talking about leaving his wife for a long time.
• The front door was opened with a key.
• The only people who had keys to the front door were the porter and the bank president.
• Miss Ellington often borrowed a key from the bank president so that she could come to work early if she had a lot of work.
• A suspicious person was standing near the bank on Thursday, November 11, observing bank employees and customers.
• A considerable quantity of dynamite was stolen from the Acme Construction Company on Wednesday, November 10th.
• Acme employee Howard Ellington said a suspicious person with a similar description to the one standing outside the bank was also seen on Acme property on the afternoon of Wednesday, November 11th.
• The suspect’s name is Dirsey Flowers, who was recently kicked out of a nearby university. The police found him in the town of East Birdwatch, 10 km from the city, with a robbed bank.
• Dirsey Flowers had $ 500 on him when the police caught him and before he was caught, he threw an unknown package into the river.
• Anastasia Walflower of East Birdwatch said she bought $ 500 worth of Native American Love Beads from Dirsey Flowers to resell in her shop.
• Anastasia said that Dirsey slept over at her parents’ house on the night of November 11th and left after a nice breakfast on Friday, November 12th in the morning.
• Police were initially unable to locate doorman Elwood Smith because he appeared to have disappeared.
• Miss Ellington said that her brother Howard saw Mr. Smith running from the bank on his way to a cafe on Thursday evening, November 11, at around 11pm.
• The FBI later on November 12 arrested Mr. Smith in another US state in the city of Dogwalk, where he arrived on flight 414 at 5:00 pm on November 11.
• An airline employee confirmed the arrival of Mr. Smith.
• Mr. Greenbags was the only person who had a key to the safe.
• No aircraft flew from Dogwalk between 16.00 on 11 November and 7.00 on 12 November.
• In addition to keeping payroll, Mr. Ellington was also responsible for the dynamite inventory at Acme.
• Mr. Greenbags’ half-brother, Mr. Arthur Nodough, was always very jealous of him.
• Nodough had been drinking at a bar on Friday and appeared in Chicago on Monday, November 8, carrying a large amount of cash.
• Arthur wanted to marry Camelia Smith.
• Miss Ellington said that Mr. Smith often flirted with her.
• Mr. Smith’s father, working as a gold prospector, died in September.
• Mr. Greenbags waited in the terminal at O’Hare Airport for 16 h due to prior engine failure.

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Holubčík, M.; Soviar, J.; Rechtorík, M. Systematic Approach to Academic Teamwork as Basis of Effective Cooperation. Systems 2024 , 12 , 329. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090329

Holubčík M, Soviar J, Rechtorík M. Systematic Approach to Academic Teamwork as Basis of Effective Cooperation. Systems . 2024; 12(9):329. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090329

Holubčík, Martin, Jakub Soviar, and Miroslav Rechtorík. 2024. "Systematic Approach to Academic Teamwork as Basis of Effective Cooperation" Systems 12, no. 9: 329. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090329

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