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Yale Climate Connections

What is ‘climate justice’?

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Climate change, an inherently social issue, can upset anyone’s daily life in countless ways. But not all climate impacts are created equal, or distributed equally. From extreme weather to rising sea levels, the effects of climate change often have disproportionate effects on historically marginalized or underserved communities.

“Climate justice” is a term, and more than that a movement, that acknowledges climate change can have disproportionately harmful social, economic, and public health impacts on disinvested populations. Advocates for climate justice are striving to have these inequities addressed head-on through long-term mitigation and adaptation strategies.

The following are key factors to consider in thinking about climate justice:

1) Climate justice begins with recognizing key groups are differently affected by climate change.

From the United Nations and the IPCC to the NAACP , many organizations are connecting the dots between civil rights and climate change.

As a UN blog describes it: “The impacts of climate change will not be borne equally or fairly, between rich and poor, women and men, and older and younger generations.”

“Climate change is happening now and to all of us. No country or community is immune,” according to UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “And, as is always the case, the poor and vulnerable are the first to suffer and the worst hit.”

Generally, many victims of climate change also have disproportionately low responsibility for causing the emissions responsible for climate change in the first place – particularly youth or people of any age living in developing countries that produce fewer emissions per capita than is the case in the major polluting countries.

2) Climate impacts can exacerbate inequitable social conditions.

Low-income communities, people of color, indigenous people, people with disabilities, older or very young people, women – all can be more susceptible to risks posed by climate impacts like raging storms and floods, increasing wildfire, severe heat, poor air quality, access to food and water, and disappearing shorelines.

Here are a few examples of how some communities may be more affected by these impacts than others – and may have fewer resources to handle those impacts, too:

• Communities of color are often more at risk from air pollution, according to both the NAACP , the American Lung Association, and countless research papers.
• Seniors, people with disabilities , and people with chronic illnesses may have a harder time living through periods of severe heat, or being able to quickly and safely evacuate from major storms or fire.
• People with limited income may live in subsidized housing, which too often is located in a flood plain . Their housing options may also have inadequate insulation, mold problems, or air conditioning to effectively combat severe heat or cope with strong storms. Economically challenged people may also be hard-pressed to afford flood or fire insurance, rebuild homes, or pay for steep medical bills after catastrophe strikes.
• Language barriers can make it difficult for immigrant communities to get early information about incoming storms or weather disasters or wildfires, or to communicate effectively with first responders in the midst of an evacuation order.
• Some indigenous communities are already seeing their homes and livelihoods lost to rising sea levels or drought. For example, the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe has lost nearly all of its land and is relocating to higher ground.
• Prolonged drought and flooding can affect food supply or distribution, making it harder for people to access affordable, healthy food.
• Today’s youth and future generations will experience more profound impacts of climate change as it worsens over time, from direct adverse health impacts to the financial implications of needing to shore-up infrastructure and other adaptation and mitigation needs.

3) Momentum is building for climate justice solutions.

Organizations like the Climate Justice Alliance are working to bring race, gender, and class considerations to the center of the climate action discussion. The NAACP is also advocating for efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and advance clean energy while promoting food justice, transportation equity, and civil rights in emergency planning. And the UN and IPCC each continue to place greater emphasis on these issues.

In a June 29, 2020, Washington Post column headlined “ Climate Change is also a racial justice problem ,” reporter Sarah Kaplan wrote, “You can’t build a just and equitable society on a planet that’s been destabilized by human activities. Nor can you stop the world from warming without the experience and the expertise of those most affected by it.”

One indicator of the growing momentum of climate justice as a social issue is Democratic presidential hopeful Joe Biden’s campaign support for a “plan to secure environmental justice and equitable economic opportunity in a clean energy future…. Addressing environmental and climate justice is a core tenet.”

In the end, there is no single way to define, let alone champion, climate justice. But in combination with other current social justice movements – perhaps epitomized and including, but not limited to, the Black Lives Matter movement – many experts see climate justice becoming an increasingly significant component of overall concerns raised by climate change.

Also see: How inequality grows in the aftermath of hurricanes

Daisy Simmons

Daisy Simmons, assistant editor at Yale Climate Connections, is a creative, research-driven storyteller with 25 years of professional editorial experience. With a purposeful focus on covering solutions... More by Daisy Simmons

New to climate change?

Climate justice.

Some countries and populations have benefited more than others from the industries and technologies that are causing climate change. And at the same time, the countries that have benefited the least are more likely to be suffering first and worst because of climate change.

Climate justice is the principle that the benefits reaped from activities that cause climate change and the burdens of climate change impacts should be distributed fairly. Climate justice means that countries that became wealthy through unrestricted climate pollution have the greatest responsibility to not only stop warming the planet, but also to help other countries adapt to climate change and develop economically with nonpolluting technologies.

Climate justice also calls for fairness in environmental decision-making. The principle supports centering populations that are least responsible for, and most vulnerable to, the climate crisis as decision makers in global and regional plans to address the crisis. It also means acknowledging that climate change threatens basic human rights principles, which hold that all people are born with equal dignity and rights, including to food , water , and other resources needed to support health. Calling for climate justice, rather than climate action, has implications for policymaking, diplomacy, academic study and activism, by bringing attention to how different responses to climate change distribute harms and benefits, and who gets a role in forming those responses.

The unequal causes and effects of climate change

Wealthy, industrialized nations have released most of the greenhouse gas pollution to date — meaning they’ve played an outsized role in causing climate change. 4 Climate justice calls for these countries, along with multinational corporations that have become wealthy through polluting industries, to pay their “climate debt” to the rest of the world. In this view, stopping their greenhouse gas emissions, while hugely important, is not enough to fully pay the debt from over a century of pollution; these actors also have a responsibility to share wealth, technology, and other benefits of industrialization with the countries least responsible for the climate crisis, to help them cope with the effects of climate change and build clean energy systems and industries.

A climate justice perspective also brings attention to inequalities within countries. Within high and low income countries, wealthier people are more likely to enjoy energy-intensive homes, private cars, leisure travel, and other comforts that both exacerbate climate change and buffer them from impacts like extreme heat . Climate change also worsens pre-existing social inequalities stemming from structural racism, socioeconomic marginalization, and other forms of social exclusion. In the U.S., for example, communities of color and immigrant communities are more likely to be located in places where climate risks are more severe, such as in flood zones or urban heat islands . 5

The unequal impacts of taking action on climate change

Reducing climate pollution greatly benefits everyone. Yet the way we achieve these reductions could either improve or worsen current patterns of inequity for marginalized groups. For example, a carbon tax that makes it expensive to emit greenhouse gases is a part of many climate proposals; climate justice would additionally demand that these taxes be structured in a way that protects low-income people who are already struggling to pay for gasoline, home heating and cooling , and other basic energy needs. 6  

Additionally, the principle of a “just transition” considers the economic and labor impacts of a transition to a nonpolluting economy. This incorporates the needs of workers employed in—and the communities supported by—the fossil fuel industry and other industries that contribute to climate change. 7 For example, the U.S. federal government offers over $180 billion in funding to assist coal field and power plant communities in economic diversification, infrastructure and workforce development as the coal industry declines. 8

Climate justice as a movement

Calls for climate justice grew out of a larger “environmental justice” movement, which is concerned with the ways pollution, land degradation, and other environmental problems harm already vulnerable people and communities who have contributed the least to, but suffer the most from, environmental problems. Global South nations, Black, Indigenous, and other people of the global majority and women—who have been historically excluded from decision making—have led the push for climate justice, arguing that climate change endangers their health and livelihoods. In recent years, younger people have also been leading the call for just climate action, observing that they will bear the heaviest burden from the climate change that past generations have contributed to, and demanding immediate action from those in positions of power.

Published March 14, 2022.

1  King, Andrew D., and Luke J. Harrington. “The Inequality of Climate Change From 1.5 to 2°C of Global Warming.” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 45, no. 10, 28 May 2018, doi:10.1029/2018GL078430. 

2  Martin, Richard. “ Climate Change: Why the Tropical Poor Will Suffer Most. ” MIT Technology Review, 17 June 2015. 

3 Diffenbaugh, Noah S., and Marshall Burke. “ Global Warming Has Increased Global Economic Inequality .” PNAS, vol. 116, no. 20, 14 May 2019, doi:10.1073/pnas.1816020116.

4  Ritchie, Hannah. “ Who Has Contributed Most to Global CO2 Emissions? ” Our World in Data, 1 Oct. 2019. 

5  Gamble, J.L., et al. “ Ch. 9: Populations of Concern. ” The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, 4 Apr. 2016. 

6  Fremstad, Anders, and Mark Paul. “ The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Inequality .” Ecological Economics, vol. 163, 29 May 2019, doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.04.016.

7  Smith, Samantha. Just Transition Centre, 2017, Just Transition: A Report for the OECD . 

8   Interagency Working Group on Coal & Power Plant Communities & Economic Revitalization , 25 Feb 2022.

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Why Climate Change is an Environmental Justice Issue

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While COVID-19 has killed 200,000 Americans so far, communities of color have borne disproportionately greater impacts of the pandemic. Black, Indigenous and LatinX Americans are at least three times more likely to die of COVID than whites. In 23 states, there were 3.5 times more cases among American Indian and Alaskan Native communities than in white communities. Many of the reasons these communities of color are falling victim to the pandemic are the same reasons why they are hardest hit by the impacts of climate change.

How communities of color are affected by climate change

Climate change is a threat to everyone’s physical health, mental health, air, water, food and shelter, but some groups—socially and economically disadvantaged ones—face the greatest risks. This is because of where they live, their health, income, language barriers, and limited access to resources. In the U.S., these more vulnerable communities are largely the communities of color, immigrants, low-income communities and people for whom English is not their native language. As time goes on, they will suffer the worst impacts of climate change, unless we recognize that fighting climate change and environmental justice are inextricably linked.

The U.S. is facing warming temperatures and more intense and frequent heat waves as the climate changes. Higher temperatures lead to more deaths and illness, hospital and emergency room visits, and birth defects. Extreme heat can cause heat cramps, heat stroke, heat exhaustion, hyperthermia, and dehydration.

Disadvantaged communities have higher rates of health conditions such as heart disease, diabetes, asthma, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). Heat stress can exacerbate heart disease and diabetes, and warming temperatures result in more pollen and smog, which can worsen asthma and COPD. Heat waves also affect birth outcomes. A study of the impact of California heat waves from 1999 to 2011 on infants found that mortality rates were highest for Black infants. Moreover, disadvantaged communities often lack access to good medical care and health insurance.

African Americans are three times more likely than whites to live in old, crowded or inferior housing; residents of homes with poor insulation and no air conditioning are particularly susceptible to the effects of increased heat. In addition, low-income areas in cities have been found to be five to 12 degrees hotter than higher income neighborhoods because they have fewer trees and parks, and more asphalt that retains heat.

Extreme weather events

While climate change cannot be definitively linked to any particular extreme weather event, incidents of heat waves, droughts, wildfires, heavy downpours, winter storms, floods and hurricanes have increased and climate change is expected to make them more frequent and intense.

Extreme weather events can cause injury, illness, and death. Changes in precipitation patterns and warming water temperatures enable bacteria, viruses, parasites and toxic algae to flourish; heavy rains and flooding can pollute drinking water and increase water contamination, potentially causing gastrointestinal illnesses like diarrhea and damaging livers and kidneys.

Extreme weather events also disrupt electrical power, water systems and transportation, as well as the communication networks needed to access emergency services and health care. Disadvantaged communities are particularly at risk because subpar housing with old infrastructure may be more vulnerable to power outages, water issues and damage. Residents of these communities may lack adequate health care, medicines, health insurance, and access to public health warnings in a language they can understand. In addition, they may not have access to transportation to escape the impacts of extreme weather, or home insurance and other resources to relocate or rebuild after a disaster. Communities of color are also less likely to receive adequate protection against disasters or a prompt response in case of emergencies. In addition to physical hardships, the stress and anxiety of dealing with these impacts of extreme weather can end up exacerbating mental health problems such as depression, post-traumatic stress and suicide.

Poor air quality

While climate change does not cause poor air quality , burning fossil fuels does; and climate change can worsen air quality. Heat waves cause air masses to remain stagnant and prevent air pollution from moving away. Warmer temperatures lead to the creation of more smog, particularly during summer. And wildfires, fueled by heat waves and drought, produce smoke that contains toxic pollutants.

Living with polluted air can lead to heart and lung diseases, aggravate allergies and asthma and cause premature death. People who live in urban areas with air pollution, or who have medical conditions such as hypertension, diabetes, asthma or COPD, are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of air pollution.

Black people are three times more likely to die from air pollution than white people. This is in part because they are 70 percent more likely to live in counties that are in violation of federal air pollution standards. A University of Minnesota study found that, on average, people of color are exposed to 38 percent higher levels of nitrogen dioxide outdoor air pollution than white people. One reason for the high COVID-19 death rate among African Americans is that cumulative exposure to air pollution leads to a significant increase in the COVID death rate, according to a new peer-reviewed study.

More people of color live in places that are polluted with toxic waste, which can lead to illnesses such as cancer, heart disease, high blood pressure and asthma. These pre-existing conditions put people at higher risk for the more severe effects of COVID-19.

The fact that disadvantaged communities are in some of the most polluted environments in the U.S. is no coincidence. Communities of color are often chosen as sites for landfills, chemical plants, bus terminals and other dirty businesses because corporations know it’s harder for these residents to object. They usually lack the connections to lawmakers who could protect them and can’t afford to hire technical or legal help to put up a fight. They may not understand how they will be impacted, perhaps because the information is not in their native language. A 1987 report showed that race was the single most important factor in determining where to locate a toxic waste facility in the U.S. It found that “Communities with the greatest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities had the highest composition of racial and ethnic residents.”

For example, while Blacks make up only 13 percent of the U.S. population, 68 percent live within 30 miles of a coal plant. LatinX people are 17 percent of the population, but 39 percent of them live near coal plants. A new report found that about 2,000 official and potential highly contaminated Superfund sites are at risk of flooding due to sea level rise; the areas around these sites are mainly communities of color and low-income communities.

The link between climate change and environmental justice

Mary Annaïse Heglar , a climate justice essayist and former writer-in-residence at the Earth Institute, asserts that climate change is actually the product of racism. “It started with conquest, genocides, slavery, and colonialism,” she wrote . “That is the moment when White men’s relationship with living things became extractive and disharmonious. Everything was for the taking; everything was for sale. The fossil fuel industry was literally built on the backs and over the graves of Indigenous people around the globe, as they were forced off their land and either slaughtered or subjugated — from the Arab world to Africa, from Asia to the Americas. Again, it was no accident.”

The harmful impacts of climate change are linked to historical neglect and racism. When Black people migrated North from the South in the early 20th century, many did not have jobs or money; consequently they were forced to live in substandard housing. Jim Crow laws in the South reinforced racial segregation, prohibiting Blacks from moving into white neighborhoods. In the 1930s through the 1960s, the federal government’s “redlining” policy denied federally backed mortgages and credit to minority neighborhoods. As a result, African Americans had limited access to better homes and all the advantages that went with them—a healthy environment, better schools and healthcare, and more food options.

Prime examples of environmental injustice

Poor sanitation in the U.S.

Catherine Flowers,  founder of the Center for Rural Enterprise and Environmental Justice and a senior fellow for the Center for Earth Ethics , which is affiliated with the Earth Institute, is from Lowndes County, Alabama. As a child growing up in a poor, mostly Black rural area with less than 10,000 residents, she used an outhouse before her family installed indoor plumbing. After leaving to get an education, Flowers returned to Alabama in 2002 and still saw extreme disparities in rural wastewater treatment. She visited many homes with sewage backing up into their homes or pooling in their yards, as many residents couldn’t afford onsite wastewater treatment. She is still advocating for proper sanitation in Lowndes. As a result of her work, Baylor College’s National School of Tropical Medicine conducted a peer-reviewed study which showed that over 30 percent of Lowndes County residents had hookworm and other tropical parasites due to poor sanitation.

”We’re also seeing that there is a relationship between [wastewater and] COVID infections,” added Flowers. “We don’t know exactly what it is yet—but you can actually measure wastewater to determine the level of infections in the community before people start showing up with the illness.” In Lowndes, one of every 18 residents has COVID-19; it is one of the highest infection rates in the U.S.

Today, Flowers works at the intersection between climate change and wastewater throughout the U.S. “The more we see sea level rise, the more we’re going to have wastewater problems,” she said. Her new book, Waste, One Woman’s Fight Against America’s Dirty Secret , due out in November, shows how proper sanitation is essential as climate change will likely bring sewage to more backyards everywhere, not just in poor communities.

Cancer Alley

An 85-mile stretch along the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana, hosts the densest concentration of petrochemical companies in the U.S. There have been so many cases of cancer and death in the area that it became known as “Cancer Alley.”

Most of these petrochemical plants are situated near towns that are largely poor and Black. There are 30 large plants within 10 miles of mostly Black St. Gabriel, with 13 within three miles. St. James Parish, whose population is roughly half Black and half white, has over 30 petrochemical plants, but the majority are located in the district that is 80 percent Black.

These plants not only emit greenhouse gases that are exacerbating climate change, but the particulate matter they expel can contain hundreds of different chemicals. Chronic exposure to this air pollution can lead to heart and respiratory illnesses and diabetes. As such, it is no surprise that St. James Parish is among the 20 U.S. counties with the highest per-capita death rates from COVID-19.

Despite efforts of the residents to fight back, seven new petrochemical plants have been approved since 2015; five more are awaiting approval.

Hurricane Katrina

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3 storm, caused extensive destruction in New Orleans and its environs. More than half of the 1,200 people who died were Black and 80 percent of the homes that were destroyed belonged to Black residents. The mostly Black neighborhoods of New Orleans East and the Lower Ninth Ward were hit hardest by Katrina because while the levees in white areas had been shored up after earlier hurricanes, these poorer neighborhoods had received less government funding for flood protection. After the hurricane, when initial plans for rebuilding were in process, white neighborhoods again got priority, even if they had experienced less flooding. Eventually federal funds were directed toward the rebuilding of parts of the Lower Ninth Ward and New Orleans East and the strengthening of their levees.

In 2014, the city of Flint, MI, whose population is 56.6 percent Black, decided to draw its drinking water from the polluted Flint River in order to save money until a new pipeline from Lake Huron could be built. Previously the city had brought in treated drinking water from Detroit. Because the river had been used by industry as an illegal waste dump for many years, the water was corrosive, but officials failed to treat it. As a result, the water leached lead from the city’s aging pipelines. Officials claimed the water was safe, but more than 40 percent of the homes had elevated lead levels. As almost 100,000 residents — including 9,000 children — drank lead-laced water, lead levels in the children’s blood doubled and tripled in some neighborhoods, putting them at high risk for neurological damage.

In October, 2015, the city began importing water from Detroit again. An ongoing project to replace lead service pipes is expected to be complete by the end of November. And just recently, Flint victims were awarded a settlement of $600 million, with 80 percent of it designated for the affected children.

Steps to achieve environmental justice

As the founder of the Center for Rural Enterprise and Environmental Justice, Catherine Flowers works to implement the best practices to reduce environmental injustice. Here are some key strategies she prescribes.

• Acknowledge the damage and try to repair it.
• Clean up sites where environmental damage has been done.
• Create an equitable system for decision-making so there is not an undue burden placed on disadvantaged communities. “Lobbyists that represent these [polluting] companies shouldn’t have more influence than the people who live in the area that are impacted by it,” said Flowers. “We need to make sure that the people that live in the community are sitting at the table when decisions are being made about what’s located in their community.”
• Call out the officials who are making decisions that are not in the best interest of the people they represent.
• Vote to put in place representatives that listen to their constituents rather than the people and companies that donate to them.
• Provide climate training to help people become more engaged. For example, the Climate Reality Project (Flowers sits on its board of directors) trains everyday people to fight for solutions and change in their communities.
• Partner with universities to conduct peer-reviewed studies of health impacts to help validate and draw attention to the experiences of disadvantaged communities.
• Build cleaner and greener. “We cannot discount the impact this could have on communities around the world,” said Flowers. “If we don’t pollute and we have a Green New Deal to build better, cleaner, and greener, then we won’t have these environmental justice issues.”

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Injustice of any kind? It really does not matter. Unless people change their idea of materialism madness and understand the fact that they are threatened, we will get nowhere. When was the last time humans have done much of anything out of compassion if it would alter their own lifestyles?

I wonder if governments (particularly of modernized nations like America, the UK and China) have purposely chosen to ignore the issue of climate change? I agree that most of it falls on things like industrial shipping, transportation and processing, but governemnt incentivization is another issue with climate justice as a whole.

Simple VersionCOVID-19 has tragically claimed the lives of 200,000 Americans. However, it has disproportionately affected communities of color. Black, Indigenous, and LatinX Americans are at least three times more likely to die from COVID than their white counterparts. In 23 states, American Indian and Alaskan Native communities reported 3.5 times more cases compared to white communities. These same communities are also the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Factors such as location, health, income, language barriers, and limited resources contribute to their heightened susceptibility. These marginalized groups include communities of color, immigrants, low-income populations, and non-native English speakers. If not addressed, these groups will suffer the harshest consequences of climate change. It is crucial to acknowledge that addressing environmental justice and combating climate change go hand in hand. The rising temperatures and increased intensity of natural disasters in the U.S. are indicative of this pressing issue.

Hello Renée Cho,  I agree with your position on climate change; the events that occur heavily affect the health of the economy; Your connection with how COVID-19 still affects people with the rise of climate change events. We’ve been seeing records of air pollution continuing to showcase dramatic numbers. With the long-term symptoms of COVID-19 being asthma and heart complications, air pollution can worsen those problems and make survivors of COVID-19 vulnerable. Your connection with these ex-patients explains how aggressive climate change can change someone’s life around so negatively. Also, we’ve seen aggressive heat waves hitting across the globe sending people of all ages into hospitals. If adults and children are barely handling such temperatures, imagine how infants are the most susceptible to suffering from these heat waves as their bodies are not meant to withstand such heat. These heat waves are affecting ex-COVID-19 individuals with asthma as the thick air makes it difficult to breathe. We cannot afford such catastrophes caused by these damages. 

6/12/24, 2:48 pm

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Book Reviews

Greta thunberg's 'the climate book' urges world to keep climate justice out front.

Barbara J. King

Swedish climate campaigner Greta Thunberg waits in Erkelenz, Germany, to take part in a demonstration at a nearby a coal mine on Jan. 14. Michael Probst/AP hide caption

Swedish climate campaigner Greta Thunberg waits in Erkelenz, Germany, to take part in a demonstration at a nearby a coal mine on Jan. 14.

Climate activist Greta Thunberg who, at age 15, led school strikes every Friday in her home country of Sweden — a practice that caught on globally — has now, at 20, managed to bring together more than 100 scientists, environmental activists, journalists and writers to lay out exactly how and why it's clear that the climate crisis is happening.

Impressively, in The Climate Book, Thunberg and team — which includes well-known names like Margaret Atwood, George Monbiot, Bill McKibben and Robin Wall Kimmerer -- explain and offer action items in 84 compelling, bite-size chapters.

Most critically, they — and Thunberg herself in numerous brief essays of her own — explain what steps need to be taken without delay if the world is to have a reasonable chance of limiting global temperature rise as stated in the 2015 Paris Agreement. The document aims to keep the temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius (and better yet below 1.5 degrees Celsius).

The essays also explain why climate justice must be at the center of these efforts.

Reading The Climate Book at a deliberate pace over some weeks (it's a lot to absorb), the cumulative impact on my understanding of the crisis through its data, cross-cultural reflections, and paths for step-by-step change became mesmerizing.

If you think the rich nations of the world are making real progress towards achieving limits on global warming, think again. In one essay, Kevin Anderson, professor of energy and climate change at the Universities of Manchester, Uppsala and Bergen, puts it this way: "Wealthy nations must eliminate their use of fossils fuels by around 2030 for a likely chance of 1.5C, extending only around 2035 to 2040 for 2C... We are where we are precisely because for thirty years we've favoured make-believe over real mitigation."

What does Anderson mean by "make-believe"? In her own chapter, journalist Alexandra Urisman Otto describes her investigation into Swedish climate policy, specifically its net zero target for 2045. She discovered a discrepancy between the official number of greenhouse gases emitted each year — 50 million tons — and the real figure, 150 million tons. That lower, official figure leaves out "emissions from consumption and the burning of biomass," which means the target is way off, she writes. If all countries were off by that much, the world would be heading straight for a catastrophic increase of 2.5 to 3C.

What does that mean, emissions from consumption and the burning of biomass? John Barrett, professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Leeds, and Alice Garvey, sustainability researcher at the same university, explain that "emissions from consumption" means emissions are allocated to the country of the consumer, not the producer. Because industrial production is often outsourced to developing economies, in a world where climate justice were front and center, the consumer country (in this example, Sweden) would take the burden of lessening the emissions from consumption.

As for biomass, that refers to burning wood for energy, and sometimes other materials like kelp. Burning wood for energy causes more emissions per unit of energy than fossil fuels, explain Karl-Heinz Erb and Simone Gingrich, both social ecology professors at Vienna's University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences.

Alice Larkin, professor of climate science and energy policy at the University of Manchester, adds "a highly significant complication" to this disturbing picture: international aviation and shipping aren't typically accounted for in national emission targets, policies, and carbon budgets, either.

This under-reporting situation, I would wager, isn't known even by many climate-literate citizens. It certainly wasn't to me.

One urgent goal, then, is transparency in climate-emission figures. Beyond that, Thunberg says, distribution of climate budgets fairly across countries of the world must be a priority. Without climate justice, policies are unlikely to succeed. An especially effective subsection of the book, "We are not all in the same boat," brings this point to life.

Saleemul Huq, director of a Bangladeshi international center for climate change, puts the point squarely: The communities most devastated by climate change "are overwhelmingly poor people of colour." But Bangladeshi citizens shouldn't be thought of as passive victims, Huq emphasizes. Communities work together to prepare for the effects of climate disasters in ways not often seen in the global north. For example, "An elderly widow living alone will have two children from the high school assigned to go and pick her up" in case of hurricane or other emergency.

Globally, then, what to do? First, we can hold industrial and corporate interests accountable and push back on their messages placing the burden solely on the individual, a tactic that allows the worst of the status quo carbon-emissions activities to continue.

Beyond this, it's not enough "to become vegetarian for one day a week, offset our holiday trips to Thailand or switch our diesel SUV for an electric car," as Thunberg puts it. Participating in recycling may lead to feel-good moments, but in fact, in the words of Greenpeace activist Nina Schrank, it's "perhaps the greatest example of greenwashing on the planet today." Even the 9% of plastic that does get recycled ends up (after one or two cycles) dumped or burned.

Thunberg herself has given up flying. In the book she writes, "Frequent flying is by far the most climate-destructive individual activity you can engage in." Though she writes that lowering her personal carbon footprint isn't her specific goal in sailing (instead of flying) across the Atlantic — she hopes to convey the need for urgent, collective behavioral change. "If we do not see anyone else behaving as if we are in a crisis, then very few will understand that we actually are in a crisis," she writes.

We can join Thunberg in giving up- or at least reducing- a flying habit if we have one. Three further steps, out of many offered in the book, are these: Switch to plant-based diets. Support natural climate solutions, by protecting forests, salt marshes, mangroves, the oceans, and all the animal and plant life in these habitats. Pressure the media to go beyond the latest story on a heat wave or collapsing glacier to focus on root causes, time urgency, and solutions. Thunberg writes that "No entity other than the media has the opportunity to create the necessary transformation of our global society."

Social norms can and do change, Thunberg emphasizes. That's our greatest source of hope — but only if we keep climate justice front and center at every step.

Barbara J. King is a biological anthropologist emerita at William & Mary. Animals' Best Friends: Putting Compassion to Work for Animals in Captivity is her seventh book. Find her on Twitter @bjkingape

What is Climate Justice?

The six pillars.

Climate Justice recognizes the disproportionate impacts of climate change on low-income communities and communities of color around the world, the people and places least responsible for the problem.

It seeks solutions that address the root causes of climate change and in doing so, simultaneously address a broad range of social, racial, and environmental injustices. These solutions can be organized into Six Pillars of Climate Justice .

Just Transition

At its core, a just transition represents the transition of fossil fuel-based economies to equitable, regenerative, renewable energy-based systems. However, a just transition is not only centered around technological change. It emphasizes employment in renewable energy and other green sectors, sustainable land use practices, and broader political economic transformations.

Proposals for just transitions are being considered in diverse spaces including cities, suburban and peri-urban environments, and rural areas around the world. The Green New Deal, for example, is an innovative proposal that tackles both climate change and inequality and is therefore very much aligned with climate justice.

At the Center for Climate Justice, we support policies that advocate and plan for a just transition and an equitable and sustainable future.

Related Resources & Events

• Creating a Climate Action Plan Centered in Justice
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Social, Racial and Environmental Justice

Climate justice connects the climate crisis to the social, racial and environmental issues in which it is deeply entangled. It recognizes the disproportionate impacts of climate change on low-income and BIPOC communities around the world, the people and places least responsible for the problem.

For example, in refineries located in California’s Bay Area Oil Corridor low-income communities and communities of color are the most impacted by the presence of the petrochemical industry. Emissions from these facilities degrade air quality in this region, putting residents at higher risk for cancer, heart disease, respiratory problems such as asthma, and other life threatening health impacts.

The fate of these marginalized communities in California can be linked to impacts on Indigenous and local communities in western Amazon countries. In the Amazon, the legacy of oil development has also resulted in severe ecological damage and negative impacts on the health and livelihoods of Indigenous communities, producing waves of local resistance.

This example is not unique. There are many other instances of interconnected marginalizations all across the globe. The power of a climate justice approach is that by addressing the root causes of climate change, we simultaneously address a broad range of social, racial, and environmental injustices.

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Indigenous Climate Action

Indigenous communities around the world are facing some of the most severe climate impacts. Indigneous communities are not only reliant on their surrounding ecosystems for their lives and livelihoods; their identities are also deeply interwoven with the land and water. As a result, Indigenous Peoples are leading efforts in climate change mitigation and adaptation across the globe.

At the Center for Climate Justice, we nurture relationships with Indigenous communities by partnering with Indigenous Peoples in ways that respect and support their diverse ways of being and knowing in an effort to amplify their voices and promote Indigenous sovereignty. We know that some of the most effective climate solutions are created at the convergence of Indigenous knowledge and western science, so these collaborations are essential if we hope to address the climate crisis.

• Indigenous Peoples and Climate Justice by Kyle Powys Whyte
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Community Resilience and Adaptation

The impacts of climate change are being experienced every day around the world. The most marginalized communities, who are least responsible for the climate crisis, are facing the most severe consequences of climate change.

Resilience measures a community’s capacity to recover from a climate impact such as a hurricane, drought, or flood. Adaptation means reducing the ongoing and intensifying negative impacts of climate change within a community.

Low-income countries and communities often have lower capacity to adapt, and conventional models of economic development have been promoted as a strategy for increasing adaptive capacity. However, these models are based on the inequitable systems responsible for creating the problem in the first place.

Instead, we must view community resilience and adaptation from a social justice and equity perspective. This would inspire models such as food sovereignty, common property forest management, and energy democracy. It would support local communities in developing their own solutions and allow them to benefit directly from local climate action.

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Natural Climate Solutions

Natural climate solutions recognize the importance of forests and agricultural lands as critical ecosystems for equitable climate action. From a climate justice perspective, natural climate solutions take a systems approach and include regenerative farming, agroforestry, permaculture, urban gardens, and forest restoration.

Forests represent a particularly important climate change mitigation strategy. Most solutions focus solely on preventing future emissions, but forests have the ability to draw down and store atmospheric carbon. Tropical forests are important for biodiversity as well as to local and Indigenous communities who derive livelihood, cultural, and sacred value from these ecosystems.

Regenerative farming that is based on sustainable agricultural practices has the capacity to store more carbon in the soil. Climate justice calls for these practices to be in the hands of small and medium sized farmers as well as local and Indigenous communities.

A climate justice approach to natural climate solutions considers not just how the land is managed but who has access to it. It is critical that those who live on and steward the land have the autonomy and support to make decisions that generate social and ecological benefits for themselves, their communities, and the environment.

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Climate Education and Engagement

Given the amount of denial and misunderstanding surrounding the climate crisis, widespread climate education and engagement is fundamental to addressing the root causes of climate change. We need education not only based on climate science but also on the ways in which climate change is deeply intertwined with a range of other social, racial and environmental issues that define our daily lived experiences.

A populace better educated about climate justice will more fully understand why viewing climate change from a social justice and equity perspective is our best hope for solving the climate crisis.

With a widespread perspective that centers equity, we can build civic engagement to support candidates who recognize climate change as an urgent existential crisis, unite countries with science and a systems thinking approach, and take bold steps toward deep decarbonization that do not further inequities. This approach, which unites people around equity, has the power to make real and lasting system-wide change.

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Climate Justice in the Anthropocene: An Introductory Reading List

Justice discourse in the Anthropocene has shown us that perhaps we aren’t as homogeneous of an “Anthros” as we’d expect.

As the alarm bells have made it urgently clear—humanity has breached planetary boundaries —causing anthropogenic climate change and environmental disaster across the world. By burning fossil fuels, overconsuming material resources, and creating endless waste, we have disrupted Earth’s ecosystems, exacerbating natural hazards with effects lasting longer than human lifetimes. But who is the “we” being referred to here? The climate crisis is no longer a simple issue of “objective” science but an issue of political discourse and pop culture. Across the globe, the effects of anthropogenic climate change are experienced unevenly, disproportionately so for vulnerable communities within and between nations. We should be critical in our efforts to mitigate, adapt to, and be transformative in the face of climate change, ensuring that we are not weaponizing emergency in the process and ignoring issues of environmental justice and equity .

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Climate justice, a movement emerging from the US environmental justice movement in the 1960s, attempts to re-center communities most vulnerable to the climate crisis in decision-making. Rather than viewing the climate crisis as a result of a homogenous humanity that has degraded the planet, climate justice assigns responsibility to oppressive systems and actors that have fueled the crisis. This reading list provides an introduction to climate justice and seeks to unsettle some of the familiar, dominant discourses of climate change.

Mike Hulme, “ Geographical Work at the Boundaries of Climate Change ,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33, no. 1 (2008): 5–11.

To define climate change is a political act. Hulme explores key discourse, questions, issues, and framings around the anthropogenic climate crisis. He most notably unpacks the universalization of the climate crisis, the boundary-setting of global warming at 2° Celsius by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the exclusion of certain forms of knowledge generation. Hulme helps to set the scene for a critical climate justice, understanding how space, place, power, and culture form a normative understanding of the climate crisis.

Arvind Jasrotia, “ Fighting 2° Celsius: The Quest for Climate Justice ,” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 58, no. 1 (2016): 55–82.

The IPCC in the fifth assessment report concluded that for humanity to avoid catastrophic impacts from anthropogenic climate change, warming since pre-industrial times must remain under 2° Celsius. Jasrotia unpacks the way the IPCC, alongside other climate organizations, negotiated this target, and its disparate impacts on developing countries. Pointing out that “climate change presents the largest (re)distributive dilemma of human history,” Jasrotia considers the atmosphere as a global common, questioning how best to equitably distribute the carbon budget. He then takes the reader through critical junctures in the history of international climate negotiations and explores how different forms of power pervade these spaces.

Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “ The Rhetorics of Recognition in Geontopower ,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 48, no. 4 (2015): 428–42.

“Geontopower”—at the center of climate justice—challenges how we come to understand what’s considered life and non-life, and therefore, create structures of governance that rule over what we have come to understand as “non-life.” Povinelli challenges this distinction, as Indigenous communities across the world have done for centuries. It’s possible to blow up a mountain and extract its minerals because it’s considered non-life; as Povinelli notes, “we cannot take away a soul they [mountains] do not have.” Povinelli grounds the creation of geontopower in the history of colonialism and Indigenous erasure, providing context to how and why non-life (nature) is governed in an environmentally destructive way.

Rikard Warlenius, “ Decolonizing the Atmosphere: The Climate Justice Movement on Climate Debt ,” The Journal of Environment & Development 27, no. 2 (2018): 131–55.

A core tenet of the climate justice movement is the concept of climate debt: those historically and disproportionately responsible for the climate crisis must pay those who are on the frontlines of disaster. Warlenius explores this concept through the notion of “decolonizing the atmosphere,” or the idea that the colonial powers have not only subjugated peoples and lands but also have taken up disproportionately more atmospheric “space” by overshooting the global carbon budget. As developing countries begin to industrialize, there is little room for their fossil emissions in the atmosphere. Warlenius argues that this is unfair and unjust and that paying climate debt is one avenue where one can “simply ask those who made the mess to clean it up.”

Federico Demaria, François Schneider, Filka Sekulova, and Joan Martinez-Alier, “ What Is Degrowth? From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement ,” Environmental Values 22, no. 2 (2013): 191–215.

A popular call from activists, scientists, and academics alike is for degrowth discourse to be embedded in environmental policy. What is degrowth? “Degrowth” is a social movement that calls for the reduction of consumption (materialized as Gross Domestic Product) in developed nations while encouraging investment in social services and the care economy. As Demaria et al. explains, the term degrowth has re-politicized environmental issues, with the term and the movement both being oversimplified, co-opted, and simply misunderstood. This paper traces the idea of degrowth throughout history and geographies, attempting to capture the complexity and nuance of it as a call moving towards climate justice.

Kyle Powys Whyte, “ Indigenous Women, Climate Change Impacts, and Collective Action ,” Hypatia 29, no. 3 (2014): 599–616.

Indigenous communities are vital social actors in the fight against the anthropogenic climate crisis; as they steward approximately one-quarter of world’s land area and 40 percent of the world’s protected areas. For Indigenous communities especially, the anthropogenic climate crisis has the potential to completely disrupt what Whyte refers to as collective continuance , which captures Indigenous relationships with nature, secure Indigenous identities, and intergenerational sustainability of communal ties. Additionally, Whyte sheds light on the intersectional experiences of Indigenous women in the face of anthropogenic climate change.

Farhana Sultana, “ Suffering for Water, Suffering from Water: Emotional Geographies of Resource Access, Control, and Conflict ,” Geoforum 42, no. 2 (March 2011): 163–172.

Conflicts over safe water for consumption, agriculture, and production are often mediated by material and social relations.  Drawing upon political ecology scholarship, Sultana explores how this critical resource is even more troubled by emotional relations, that is, the relations between the home, individual body, space, and feelings. Her discussion helps clarify the connections between gender and natural resource management in moving towards climate justice. Using a case study from Bangladesh, she explores how issues of disparate access and use of water impact water, society, and gender relations.

Filomina Chioma Steady, “ Women, Climate Change and Liberation in Africa ,” Race, Gender & Class 21, no. 1/2 (2014): 312–33.

The impacts of climate crisis have been seen and felt by African women, who provide the bulk of labor for agriculture, water procurement, fuel, animal husbandry, and natural resource stewardship on that continent. Steady uses an ecofeminist lens to highlight the positions of African women in climate concerns, including the degradation of forests, water insecurity, agricultural yield variation, and mitigation of and adaptation to natural hazards. She also provides context to explain how neo-colonialism and globalization are key drivers of the continued maldevelopment of the African continent and the unique impact experienced by African women as a result.

Adelle Thomas, April Baptiste, Rosanne Martyr-Koller, Patrick Pringle, and Kevon Rhiney, “ Climate Change and Small Island Developing States ,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 45 (October 2020): 1–27.

Small Island Developing States (SIDs) have been identified by the United Nations as especially vulnerable to the anthropogenic climate crisis, primarily due to unpredicted sea level rise and the increased frequency and intensity of natural hazards. The Association of Small Island Developing States drove the 1.5° Celsius global temperature target at the 2015 Paris Climate Negotiations, bringing it down from 2° Celsius target in prior years. Thomas et al. notes that while SIDs have had a negligible impact on greenhouse gas emissions, they face disproportionately more risk, vulnerability, and exposure to natural hazards. The centering of SIDs in climate justice discourse has highlighted the need for climate reparations, loss and damage funding, and climate migration planning.

Avner de Shalit, “ Climate Change Refugees, Compensation, and Rectification ,” The Monist 94, no. 3 (2011): 310–28.

Who is pathologized as a result of climate change? De Shalit focuses on the evacuation and the destruction of homes due to natural hazards as “environmental displacement[s]” and explores how people become environmental refugees because of anthropogenic climate change. Solutions, such as loss and damage compensation, have been proposed to rectify the loss of space and place experienced by vulnerable communities. De Shalit challenges the notion of monetary compensation as an acceptable form of reparations for environmental refugees, arguing that not only does such compensation place a monetary value on a landscape that is incommensurable, but it gives license for polluters to continue worsening anthropogenic climate change—as they can simply pay for it later.

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Editor-in-Chief: William Shutkin

The Journal of Climate Resilience & Climate Justice (CRCJ) , is an online, open access resource providing research reports, case studies, essays, and opinions from the working edge of the climate resilience and climate justice fields written in a non-technical, digestible, and educational style for a broad audience.

This is an open access journal with no author publishing fees, made possible through the generous support of the Nell Newman Foundation and the Dean Witter Foundation.

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Climate Justice

Science continues to show that as the impacts of climate change accelerate, extreme weather events are taking a major toll in developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, home to some of the world’s largest youth populations. Global warming of 2˚C would put over half of Africa’s population at risk of undernourishment, as as of today, we have already reached about 1°C above pre-industrial levels (1850–1900). Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate.

“Climate change is happening now and to all of us. No country or community is immune,”  said UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “And, as is always the case, the poor and vulnerable are the first to suffer and the worst hit.”

The impacts of climate change will not be borne equally or fairly, between rich and poor, women and men, and older and younger generations. Consequently, there has been a growing focus on climate justice, which looks at the climate crisis through a human rights lens and on the belief that by working together we can create a better future for present and future generations.

During the UN General Assembly’s High-level Meeting on the Protection of the Global Climate for Present and Future Generations in March 2019, we spoke to Mary Robinson , the former President of Ireland and the current Chair of the Elders, and Deon Shekuza , a young climate activist from Namibia, about climate justice.

Climate justice “insists on a shift from a discourse on greenhouse gases and melting ice caps into a civil rights movement with the people and communities most vulnerable to climate impacts at its heart,” said Mary Robinson who is no stranger in the world of politics and human rights.

“Now, thanks to the recent marches, strikes and protests by hundreds of thousands of schoolchildren, we have begun to understand the intergenerational injustice of climate change,” she said, stressing the importance of intergenerational partnerships where young people are seen as “means of implementation” and “creators of opportunities” and not just beneficiaries.

She is having a frank conversation with Deon Shekuza, who co-founded the Namibian Youth on Renewable Energy, a NGO committed to mainstreaming young people in the energy sector and increase youth inclusion in decision-making.

Namibia, often referred to as the driest country south of the Sahara desert, is home to a large majority of people who depend on agriculture, fishing, forestry and conservation. Shekuza added that access to electricity is still largely available to only urban dwellers, but more than half of the country’s population lives in rural and informal settlements, many of them young people.

Young Africans like him are committed to breaking down climate science into a national conversation and connecting it to domestic social and economic values to build relevance.

“I think that is one of the challenges for the African youth in mobilizing themselves is that you are so disconnected and often when organizations are formed they have a hierarchical structure. I don’t think that climate change should be approached like that,” he said adding that policymakers need to make a commitment to ensure that youth voice, agency, and leadership are at the centre of policy discussions and decision-making.

Taking action on  climate change “is a noble cause.” he said. “You should have an open system for anybody who has the same motive as you to join.”

Youth Uprising

“The whole idea of the school climate strikes is also an issue of common but differentiated responsibility and respect of capabilities,” said Mary Robinson as she explains how we cannot expect a young person in a developing country “to go out of school to strike when the school system protects them from early child marriages, female genital mutilation, and so forth.

“There are more benefits for the young to stay in school.”

Tens of thousands of young people, mostly in the West, have taken to the streets in recent months with a clear and urgent message to world leaders – act now to save our planet and our future from the climate emergency. In response to their collective demands, the UN Secretary-General has urged world leaders to listen to the concerns of youth and present plans for the Climate Action Summit in September for concrete and ambitious solutions.

“My generation has failed to respond properly to the dramatic challenge of climate change. This is deeply felt by young people. No wonder they are angry,” added Guterres in a recent op-ed in The Guardian.

“Youth are the majority. Youth have to have their voice, their perspective and their urgency included,” said Robinson stressing the need to intensify the intergenerational dialogue on climate action.

“I think we should try to really ensure that the Climate Summit next September of the Secretary-General has a strong intergenerational link for urgency, for ambition, for ideas for innovation. That’s what young people are going to bring.”

The UN Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit will include a Youth Climate Summit which will serve as a platform for young people who are driving climate action. It will be held on 21 September and bring together some 500 young activist, entrepreneurs, innovators and change-makers from across the globe.

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• Experts: Why does ‘climate justice’ matter?

Carbon Brief Staff

The term “ climate justice ” captures the various ways in which global warming impacts people differently and the approaches that can be taken to address this problem “fairly”.

• Analysis: In-depth Q&A: What is ‘climate justice’?
• Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?
• Analysis: The lack of diversity in climate-science research
• Climate justice: The challenge of achieving a ‘just transition’ in agriculture
• Researchers: The barriers to climate science in the global south
• Guest post: An Indigenous peoples’ approach to climate justice

Climate-justice language has been used to describe everything from retrofitting the UK’s poorly insulated homes to supporting cyclone-struck communities in Mozambique. 

As part of a week-long series on climate justice, Carbon Brief has asked a range of scientists, policy experts and campaigners from around the world what the term means to them and why they think it is important.

These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full:

• Prof Kyle Whyte : “The climate justice movement…should not just be a movement that seeks to lower carbon footprints so that the world of privileged people is preserved.”
• Dr Adrienne Hollis : “Climate justice matters because we are in an era of racial and social reckoning.”
• Dr Jalonne White-Newsome : “I long for the day when low-income, black, Indigenous and people of colour do not suffer disproportionately from the irresponsible stewardship that we all contribute to.”
• Yeb Saño : “The climate crisis is a manifestation of the pervasive injustice that has brought us economic inequality, oppression, subjugation and exploitation.”
• Dr Kaveh Madani : “The people of the global south deserve the same quality of life as the people in the global north, but this remains unachievable for them unless there is a transfer of knowledge, technology and wealth.”
• Dr Mary Keogh and Gordon Rattray : “[People with disabilities] are…among those most impacted by climate change, whose human rights are most at risk of violation by inappropriate climate action and for whom true climate justice is essential.”
• Prof Henry Shue : “Justice obligates us to assist with development, and climate requires us to do so in ways that avoid increasing emissions.”
• Prof Chris Hilson : “Without attention to [climate justice], government policy on climate change may face backlash from groups in society that can ill afford the changes.”
• Sakshi Aravind : “[Climate justice is] our biggest opportunity to rebuild a world led by Indigenous knowledge forms, worldviews and ways of living.” 
• Dr Adelle Thomas : “Climate justice underscores the unfairness of countries and groups that have contributed the least to climate change being most at risk.”
• Dr Saleemul Huq : “The climate change issue can be characterised as pollution by rich people and rich countries adversely impacting poor people…This is morally wrong and every religion teaches that it is wrong.” 
• Adrián Martinez : “We call for justice because the current crisis is no longer fuelled by ignorance but by wilful greed.”
• Brandon Wu : “In global terms, [climate justice] means that wealthy countries like the US must lead by example when it comes to climate action.”
• Prof Kimberly Nicholas : “A key element of climate justice is for high emitters to rapidly reduce our own emissions. By doing so, we leave more space for people who need their emissions to survive, and we lessen their burden in facing increasing impacts of climate change they haven’t caused.”
• Osprey Orielle Lake : “Climate justice…requires us to invest in systemic change that centres care for land, women, frontline communities and community-led solutions.”

Systems of power, such as racial capitalism and colonialism, have typically inflicted harmful environmental and climatic change. The harms are inflicted by actions, such as land dispossession, forced relocation, deforestation, intensive agriculture, industrial development, and fossil fuel and extractive infrastructure. 

The compounded ecological impacts of capitalism and colonialism have rendered many communities and peoples – including Indigenous peoples and people of colour in North America – in situations where they are more vulnerable to climate change. 

The climate-justice movement has the opportunity to be a movement that is intersectional , connecting layers of sedimented injustices to current risks and threats. It should not just be a movement that seeks to lower carbon footprints so that the world of privileged people is preserved. Climate justice has to begin with the assumption that there is nothing normal about the environmental conditions of today, which were shaped largely by capitalism and colonialism. 

Climate-justice advocacy must involve being extremely appalled by the last several centuries of inaction to lower carbon emissions, which is not a new or unprecedented form of inaction. It is connected to generations of ecological violence that have not yet been reconciled, and are rarely acknowledged. 

Climate justice means calling out “false” solutions to mitigating climate change that seek to ease the energy transition for the fossil industry and privileged populations. Many of these false solutions involve mining, new infrastructure and exploitative profit and labour schemes that will generate further environmental and climate injustice.

I think of climate justice as an important part of a larger issue, environmental justice, which I envision as a huge umbrella with many spokes. Each spoke is an interrelated issue – climate justice, racial justice, immigration justice, criminal justice, gender justice, etc. 

These issues matter – climate justice matters – because our environment is not just where we live, pray, play, work and learn, it is also who we are, how we are treated and why. People are not affected by these issues equally, whether through intent or indifference.

Climate justice matters because we are in an era of racial and social reckoning and ensuring that justice and equity are incorporated into our actions. Climate justice focuses on correcting decades of structural racism which affect communities of colour, poor communities, rural communities and non-English speaking communities more than any other. Remember, long before our brothers and sisters of colour screamed that they could not breathe at the hands of the justice system, they (we) were choking on environmental pollution resulting from racist practices.

Climate justice matters because it forces people to work with and protect communities bearing the brunt of devastating hurricanes and accompanying flooding, disproportionate exposures to toxic substances, chronic flooding, premature deaths, chronic illnesses and more. Through it, we can begin to address a multitude of issues such as infrastructure (including housing quality and affordability, transportation, roads), economic apartheid, food apartheid, mental and physical health, climate gentrification and others. You cannot address climate justice without addressing these issues. That is why it matters.

In 2014, my five and seven-year-old daughters and I marched through the streets of New York with thousands of passionate people during the Peoples Climate March . The hope was that raising the consciousness of decision makers would move us closer to policy that would begin to address the root causes of climate change. Most importantly, the goal was to create systems that would actually protect black and brown folks in environments that were hazardous to their health and the wellbeing of their future generations. 

Why climate justice or environmental justice matters is not the question we should be asking. The question that has fuelled my work, my research, my advocacy and my ministry for the last 20-plus years has been simply this: Why do some people matter and other people do not? To answer that question, we must start with understanding what climate justice really is. 

Climate justice is an aspiration, a movement and a human right. It is not being afraid that every time it rains your home will flood, and being able to stay cool on extremely hot days. It is being able to afford “real” clean energy to power your households, public transportation, schools and senior living facilities. It is stopping the expansion of extractive industries, re-imagining solutions that benefit everyone and learning to value traditional scientific prediction models and mechanisms. 

It is preparing communities for the worst and ensuring easy, barrier-free access to relief and support to aid in the recovery after a climate disaster. It is realising that the toll on mental health is just as damaging as the levelling of a home in a storm, and accounting for that in the costs and solutions necessary to repair people’s lives.

It is acknowledging the destruction we have caused and showing our forgiveness to Mother Earth with our actions. It is sharing an understanding that black and brown people have suffered disproportionately from historic, systemic/institutional racism and environmental injustices that have made certain communities more vulnerable than others by no fault of their own. I long for the day when low-income, black, Indigenous and people of colour do not suffer disproportionately from the irresponsible stewardship that we all contribute to. 

I truly believe that each of us – in whatever role we play – has the power to achieve climate and environmental justice by ADAPT-ing: 

• Acknowledging the harm
• Demanding accountability
• Addressing racism, power and privilege
• Prioritising equity
• Transforming systems.

And seven years after the climate march, climate justice still matters to me because I want to be able to say to my two young, beautiful brown-skinned daughters that there will be a Mother Earth for you and your children to enjoy. 

All people deserve to live free of fear, full of confidence that the infrastructure won’t fail and the places and people that have suffered multiple environmental insults for decades will be equitably resourced and prepared to live in our new climate reality.

Climate justice is an issue that should sit at the core of our societies. Since the dawn of the climate crisis, brought about by the industrialisation of the world, it has been the people least responsible who bear the brunt of its worst impacts.  

In the Philippines, it has been the poorest sectors – our farming and fishing communities – who have been struggling the hardest since climate change has altered the patterns that previously have been relied on for generations to take advantage of timings for planting, harvesting, sailing out to sea and other such folk knowledge. They are also the first to experience extreme weather events that are super-fuelled by climate change and they experience it the worst. Ironically, they also contribute the least to carbon emissions and are additionally at a disadvantage to commercial fishers and agro-industrial corporations that make large contributions to carbon emissions.

The climate crisis is a manifestation of the pervasive injustice that has brought us economic inequality, oppression, subjugation and exploitation. Pursuing climate justice therefore allows us to get to the fundamental root and truth of the human condition. The climate crisis profoundly threatens real lives and livelihoods. It is a real, clear and present danger to the realisation of basic human rights. 

How then do we pursue climate justice? We stand up against every kind of injustice. We must hold those responsible to account, make them stop the damage they willfully cause, and rally the whole world to end the fossil fuel era. 

This is the spirit behind the Philippines’ Climate Justice and Human Rights Petition against the top corporate carbon polluters called the “ carbon majors ”, which include the world’s biggest oil, gas, coal and cement companies, such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, BHP Billiton, Glencore, Suncor and ConocoPhillips, among many others. 

The complaint was filed by a range of climate-justice advocates and, as a result of the petition, the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights launched the National Inquiry on Climate Change (NICC). This probe looked into whether the world’s largest carbon producers are violating or threatening to violate the human rights of all Filipinos by their significant contribution to climate change and failing to reduce emissions, despite having the capacity to do so. 

Climate justice matters because the scope of the climate change problem is not only limited to nature. This problem has a human dimension and when humans are involved, justice matters.

Obviously, we will not bear the climate change impacts fairly and equally. The marginalised, low income, Indigenous, minority and disadvantaged communities will be disproportionately impacted by global warming. They also have a much more limited capacity to mitigate climate change and cope with its consequences, compared to the wealthier groups. This means that climate change is going to increase the already significant inequalities around the world.

The discussions about climate justice are mostly focused on the disproportionate human “impacts” of climate change. But we must also worry about important inequalities in the levels of contribution to the “causes” of climate change. Justice principles call for taking historical responsibility for causing the problem into account. 

The wealthy nations’ resource-exhaustive, un-green economies together with their unsustainable and consumptive lifestyles created this problem. They have the ethical responsibility as well as the required capacity to take immediate climate action and help the poor nations. The people of the global south deserve the same quality of life as the people in the global north, but this remains unachievable for them unless there is a transfer of knowledge, technology and wealth from the advanced economies.

We must also care about the temporal and spatial dimensions of climate justice. Its temporal dimension necessitates paying attention to intergenerational climate justice and underlines the need for protecting the environmental rights of our children by taking climate action. The spatial dimension of climate justice reminds us about the heterogenous climate change impacts across space and geographic coordinates, calling for different levels of mitigation and adaptation efforts around the globe.

We have “unequal” responsibilities and levels of access to the necessary resources to secure an “equal” world under climate change.

People with disabilities have long been recognised as one of the groups living at the greatest risk of poverty, exposed to discrimination and continually facing attitudinal and accessibility barriers which prevent their participation in decision-making. They are, therefore, among those most impacted by climate change, whose human rights are most at risk of violation by inappropriate climate action and for whom true climate justice is essential. All of this is especially pertinent for people with disabilities living in low-income countries.

Achieving climate justice for all people with disabilities, so that efforts to adapt and mitigate its impact are achieved in a just, inclusive and egalitarian way, requires a transformation of economies and social systems. The necessary steps towards this transformation include ensuring meaningful participation of representative organisations of people with disabilities in climate policy forums and the development of climate adaptation and mitigation plans. This means ensuring that these processes – at all levels from global to national to local – are fully accessible. 

What is often forgotten is that people with disabilities are often natural problem solvers, used to finding solutions to overcome the barriers they face on an everyday basis. Taking a disability-inclusive approach means that these skills could bring innovative solutions to climate adaptation plans. 

As well as being a human right and a legal obligation, climate justice is an approach that will benefit everyone in society.

Climate justice means not allowing might (and wealth) to make right, but instead using power to protect the powerless. It has two dimensions: spatial, which is international justice, and temporal, which is intergenerational justice. In both dimensions climate justice is important because it grounds even greater urgency for ambitious mitigation than self-interest alone already does.

International climate justice means urgent ambitious mitigation in the form of investment in non-carbon energy infrastructure in less developed nations. This would allow them to develop even while climate change is slowed, by leap-frogging fossil-fuel infrastructure. Justice obligates us to assist with development and climate requires us to do so in ways that avoid increasing emissions. The wealthy developed nations have the resources to do this and the less developed do not. We control what they can do.

Intergenerational climate justice means urgent, ambitious mitigation in the form of non-carbon energy infrastructure in developed nations so that we do not trap future generations into a corner. If the global energy regime remains as unsustainable as it is, they will face choices between experimentation with untried, expensive and possibly inadequate technologies for carbon extraction and changes in lifestyle that generate social conflict and mass migration. Future generations will have to negotiate the global energy system we leave behind. We control what they must face.

Climate justice matters both for its own sake because it is morally right, but also instrumentally. Without attention to it, government policy on climate change may face backlash from groups in society that can ill afford the changes. There is a risk that the costs of decarbonising, particularly home heating and transport, may fall disproportionately on the poor.

When thinking about climate justice, though, there is often a temptation to consider only this “poor” side of the equation. Important as this is, there is a danger that it draws attention away from the other side of the climate justice equation, which is the rich. Climate justice is also a matter of ensuring that the rich do not take up more than their fair share of the remaining, finite carbon budget. Superyachts, private jets and space travel by the super-rich certainly fit the unfair share category, but so too do the SUVs, frequent flights and excessive consumerism of many of the merely rich.

Climate justice also matters too much to be hijacked by those who use it for their own nefarious purposes. Sadly, we have started to see that in the UK in recent months. Some on the right of the Conservative party have been using climate justice as a convenient cloak to argue against important policy changes needed for the country to deliver on its net-zero promises. Suddenly, a wing of the party that was silent on the injustice of the politics of austerity after the financial crisis is supposedly concerned about how poorer households will afford to move away from gas boilers for home heating. This is a valid concern, but the “just” answer is government subsidy and support for those households – climate justice should not be used as a Trojan horse excuse for climate delayism.

For better or worse, climate justice is a largely undefined phrase. However, a phrase does not lose its significance or relevance because it is not articulated through a specific set of terms. Those of us working on the notions of climate justice or Indigenous environmental justice have used the “undefined” nature of climate justice to articulate it as a phrase that embraces social and economic justice and the emancipatory struggle of black, Indigenous and people of colour. 

I work on encounters between law and indigeneity within settler courts. For me, climate justice is our opportunity to rethink and reframe knowledge about what constitutes justice and how it must be a necessary corollary of antiracist, anticapitalist, and anticolonial struggle. It is also our biggest opportunity to rebuild a world led by Indigenous knowledge forms, worldviews and ways of living.

Climate justice starts with the return of Indigenous land and the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty. If we are to avert a planetary crisis, we will have to dismantle settler colonialism and imperialism. What we are missing from a meaningful climate justice discourse is the diversity of voices, especially those who have struggled against extractive, imperialist and colonial forces for their survival. 

While we understand environmental justice as a concept, it is doubtful if we have understood how environmental inequalities replicate in climate change, how racial injustices are aggravated in experiencing the full force of climate catastrophes. Climate justice is a point of re-education and relearning for most of the world, especially the global north.

There has been some conversation around Indigenous knowledge as the way out of current climate crises, particularly after the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report . Indigenous knowledge is not free of Indigenous politics or sovereignty claims. Indigenous knowledge is not an apparatus one can put in place to save the western nations from an apocalypse and then conveniently discard without ever addressing the primary reasons which led us to this predicament in the first place. Climate justice aims to understand Indigenous knowledge as emerging from Indigenous connection to the land and re-establishing plural Indigenous sovereignties that were never ceded. 

Climate change has no borders – emissions contributed by one country or group have global consequences. Climate justice underscores the unfairness of countries and groups that have contributed the least to climate change being most at risk.

For example, small island developing states collectively contribute less than 1% of emissions that drive climate change but are already suffering significant impacts and face existential risks as global temperatures rise. 

Climate justice helps us to put into context the significant impacts of climate change that we are already experiencing today. We can better recognise that impacts of climate change are experienced much differently by a middle-income family in a developed country than they are by a poor migrant in the developing world. Recognising these differential impacts must lead to just and equitable climate action that addresses the needs of those that are unfairly put at risk.

My view is that the question should be “why does climate injustice matter?” Climate justice is an abstract notion that is not easy to explain or understand, but climate injustice is clear and visible and needs to be rectified. 

In this reframing, the climate change issue can be characterised as pollution by rich people and rich countries adversely impacting poor people, in both rich and poor countries. This is morally wrong and every religion teaches that it is wrong. 

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Therefore, if we accept this premise, then it is incumbent on each and every person on the planet to take requisite actions to tackle climate change. For those of us whose personal carbon footprint is higher than the global average we must try to reduce wherever we can. But that is not enough, so we also need to mobilise with allies to push our respective political leaders to take the actions they have already agreed to do in the Paris Agreement but are not doing in practice.

Finally, we should also reach out to the victims of human-induced climate change in the most vulnerable communities in developing countries to express solidarity and support, and to help them adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and also deal with the loss and damage that is now a reality. 

Justice is about acknowledging the rights of others. It is about respect and responsibility towards our community. Justice stands on the idea that we are accountable for our actions because we require peace and prosperity in our society. These values have been broken due to climate change.

Climate justice is a political movement born out of the unjust causes of climate change and the wilful irresponsibility of big carbon emitters. As our climate changes and its adverse effects destroy our communities across the globe, the unresolved questions of who is responsible and why there are no consequences for the harm caused inhibits peace and kills people. We call for justice because the current crisis is no longer fuelled by ignorance but by wilful greed and the immoral desire to provide no reparations for unjust harm.

Climate justice is about our right to have a community, live with dignity and see those who have harmed and profited be held accountable now.

Climate justice is the simple idea that those who have done the most to cause the climate crisis – and who have the most resources – must also do the most to fix it. In global terms, this means that wealthy countries like the US must lead by example when it comes to climate action by undertaking urgent emissions reductions at home and providing hugely ramped-up financial support for action in poorer countries.

The US obligation is enormous due to our historical pollution and national wealth. To even begin to approach our fair share , we must reduce emissions by 70% by 2030 and provide at least $800bn in international climate finance by 2030. To hold climate justice at the centre, these actions must be undertaken with the input and leadership of frontline communities, at home and abroad, to ensure no one is left behind.

A climate-just future is, thankfully, easy to imagine. Because of the nature of politics and power it may be hard to achieve, but given what is at stake, we have no choice but to fight for it.

We who have driven the most warming must drive the transformation to stop it. At the national level, this puts special responsibility on the US and Europe, where about 12% of the global population have spewed half the world’s fossil pollution. At the company level, it’s the 100 companies behind 71% of industrial greenhouse gas emissions. At the individual level, the super-rich “ polluter elite ” are clear offenders, but we can’t ignore those of us in the global richest 10%, earning $38,000 and up, who account for about half of household carbon pollution. 

A key element of climate justice is for high emitters to rapidly reduce our own emissions. By doing so, we leave more space for people who need their emissions to survive and we lessen their burden in facing increasing impacts of climate change they haven’t caused. Governments need to enact policies that stop allowing or incentivising climate destruction. Industries need a business plan that eliminates most of their climate pollution within the next 100 months and entirely stops adding carbon to the atmosphere soon after. 

Finally, high-emitting individuals also need to cut their own fossil energy overconsumption, most of which comes from frequent and long-distance plane and car travel . Meanwhile, the 3.6 billion poorest have room to triple their emissions to meet their needs. 

In a new perspective in Nature Energy led by Dr Kristian Steensen Nielsen , my colleagues and I argue for the transformative potential of the global elite – known as the middle class in many industrialised countries – taking five kinds of climate action. We can catalyse meaningful emissions reductions by reducing our own consumption; divesting our savings, pensions and investments from fossil fuels; through our personal and professional networks where we have influence; at work, and in community and civic life through our role in organisations; and as citizens, from voting to to participating in social movements. 

False solutions, white supremacy, colonisation and patriarchy have no place in any climate action plan. To confront this crisis, we need coherence across policy sectors, from trade to military spending to development, to confront these interconnections globally. It is imperative that governments and financial institutions adopt a just transition, care economies and feminist policies and frameworks. 

Climate justice requires us to not only address the climate crisis but to entirely dismantle the structures that brought us to this moment. Climate justice also requires us to invest in systemic change that centres care for land, women, frontline communities and community-led solutions. 

From food sovereignty to forest protection, fossil-fuel resistance to feminist climate policies, Indigenous rights to the rights of nature, women and frontline communities have been demonstrating climate-just solutions for decades. We need rights-based solutions grounded in justice and ecological integrity, while simultaneously building a new economy predicated on gender and racial justice, Indigenous rights, rights of nature and rights of future generations. 

There is a path forward for mitigating the worst impacts of the climate crisis and securing our collective future – however we must act rapidly. Women’s Earth and Climate Action Network (WECAN) International has organised a call to action for governments and financial institutions in the lead-up to COP26 demanding immediate climate action, signed by over 120 organizations representing millions of people. We can act now and we must act now!

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Climate Justice

There is overwhelming evidence that human activities are changing the climate system. [ 1 ] The emission of greenhouse gases is resulting in increased temperatures, rising sea-levels, and severe weather events (such as storm surges). These climatic changes raise a number of issues of justice. These include (but are not limited to) the following

• How do we assess the impacts of climate change?
• What climate responsibilities do current generations have to future generations?
• How should political actors take into account the risks and uncertainties involved in climate projections?
• Who has what responsibilities to address climate change?
• Given that there is a limited “greenhouse gas budget” how should it be distributed?
• What constraints should regulate and constrain climate policies?
• Given high levels of noncompliance with climate responsibilities how should we make trade-offs between competing principles of climate justice?

Before considering these normative issues, it is important to introduce some scientific terms. Climate scientists often refer to “mitigation” and “adaptation”. Mitigation involves either reducing the emission of greenhouse gases or creating greenhouse gas sinks (which absorb greenhouse gases), or both. Adaptation involves making changes to people’s context so that they can cope better with a world undergoing climatic changes. Examples of adaptation might be constructing buildings that can cope better with extreme heat, or building seawalls that can cope with storm surges. It is arguable that this typology is incomplete. Suppose that humans do not mitigate by enough so the climate system continues to change; and suppose that human societies also fail to implement the necessary adaptation policies and so people are unable to enjoy the kinds of lives to which they are entitled. Then, many would argue, they are entitled to compensation.

1. Isolationism and Integrationism

2. assessing climate impacts, 3.1 principles of intergenerational justice, 3.2 intertemporal discounting, 3.3 objections and concerns, 4. risk and uncertainty, 5.1 the climate action question, 5.2.1 the polluter pays principle, 5.2.2 the beneficiary pays principle, 5.2.3 the ability to pay principle, 5.3 the political action question and first-order and second-order responsibilities, 5.4 who are the duty bearers, 6.1 subsistence, 6.2 equality, 7.1 mitigation and alternative energy sources, 7.2 population, 7.3 geoengineering, 8. climate justice in a nonideal world, 9. concluding remarks, other internet resources, related entries.

It is helpful to draw attention to a distinction between two different ways in which one might approach issues of climate justice.

One approach—Isolationism—holds that it is best to treat the ethical issues posed by climate change in isolation from other issues (such as poverty, migration, trade and so forth). The isolationist seeks to bracket these other considerations and treat climate change on its own. A second approach—Integrationism—holds that it is best to treat the ethical issues posed by climate change in light of a general theory of justice and in conjunction with other issues (such as poverty, development and so on).

Some philosophers have adopted an isolationist approach. Some, for example, propose principles for allocating rights to emit greenhouse gases that treat greenhouse gases in isolation from other issues ( Section 6.2 ). Two related reasons are given for this approach. First, some argue that there is value in simplifying the issue, and since introducing these other concerns would complicate the question it is worth bracketing them out. Second, some make a related pragmatic argument about the implications of adopting an integrationist approach for reaching agreement in climate negotiations. They argue that insisting that climate justice be pursued in light of a general theory, and in conjunction with other issues, would be a recipe for deadlock because there is often deep disagreement about what theory of justice is correct. For this reason, they propose bracketing out other phenomena and treating climate change in isolation (Blomfield 2019: 24; Gosseries 2005: 283; L. Meyer & Roser 2006: 239).

In reply, those who favour an integrationist approach tend to offer the following considerations. First, they argue that in order to treat climate change in isolation there would need to be something special about it that warranted separate treatment. However, they argue, climate change is not special in this way. For example, it impacts on the same interests (people’s interests in food and water; their health; their access to land and so on) as other phenomena (such as the distribution of economic resources, poverty and poverty alleviation, migration, and trade). Furthermore, they claim that the same distributive principles seem to be salient for climate change as they are for other phenomena. If, for example, one thinks that individuals have human rights to meet their socio-economic needs then this should surely also bear on questions of climate justice too since it provides a reason to combat climate change and a reason to distribute responsibilities so that they do not burden the poor and vulnerable. Another way of putting this point is that when people engage in deliberation about, say, how the costs of tackling climate change should be distributed then—so Integrationists claim—they inescapably end up drawing on more general values (such as “people have a right to a decent standard of living” or “people should be accountable for their choices”) (Caney 2005: 763 & 765–766). If philosophers eschew Integrationism and they try to answer questions such as “who should bear the burdens of combating climate change?” in an isolationist fashion—bracketing out, for example, what economic rights persons have—then, so the argument runs, we end up with very counter-intuitive conclusions (Caney 2018b: 682–684).

Whether this is true or not cannot be fully resolved in advance. Rather it can only be decided by engaging in a normative analysis of climate change and seeing whether it is borne out.

A second point that those who favour an Integrationist approach might make is that climate change is causally interconnected with a wide variety of other phenomena—such as economic growth, poverty reduction, migration, health, trade, natural resource ownership, and cultural rights—such that it is artificial to treat it on its own. Climate change does not present itself to us as a discrete problem that can be treated separately. Rather it is part and parcel of a larger process. It is an upshot of people’s activity (primarily through the use of energy) and, as such, it is causally intertwined with economic growth, poverty alleviation, urban design, and land use. Furthermore, the effects of climatic change are often mediated through other factors such as poverty, existing infrastructures, and the responsiveness of political authorities. They interact with existing inequalities and vulnerability, producing what Leichenko and O’Brien (2008) term “double exposures”. In addition to this, the extraction of fossil fuels and the industry built around it often directly harm the same interests (such as health and access to land) that are harmed by the emission of greenhouse gases. So, from this point of view, it seems artificial to focus on the effect of the emissions rather than the whole phenomenon. Finally, the policies proposed to tackle climate change themselves affect a wide range of other phenomena (impacting on land use, access to food, health, poverty alleviation, biodiversity loss, individual liberty, and so on). Given this any attempt to cordon off climate change and apply principles of justice to it in isolation seems misguided and quixotic.

As we shall see—especially when we consider the distribution of responsibilities and the application of principles of distributive justice to the greenhouse gas budget—it matters a great deal whether one takes an Isolationist or Integrationist perspective.

With this point duly noted, we can turn to the substantive issues.

One question of justice that arises is “What account of persons” interests should be employed to evaluate the impacts of climate change?’ Such an account is needed for several reasons. First, we need it to design adaptation policies for we need to know what kind of protection people are entitled to and what interests ought to be protected. In addition to this, when we are considering proposed temperature targets we need to be able to evaluate them, and to do this we need to have some account of persons’ interests by which to compare the different possibilities. For many years the appropriate temperature target was assumed by many to be that of keeping the increase in global mean temperatures from pre-industrial times to below 2°C. However, some have campaigned for lower targets. This is reflected in the Paris Agreement (2015, Other Internet Resources ) which specified that the target should be

[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. (Article 2.1(a))

Others, by contrast, have argued that higher temperatures are permissible. For example, William Nordhaus, a leading climate economist, has argued that if we implement what he deems to be the “optimal” climate policy the temperature increase would be 3.5°C in 2100 (when compared to a 1900 baseline) (Nordhaus 2018: 348 Fig 4).

Theories of distributive justice concern the just distribution of burdens and benefits. We therefore need to know how we should conceive of “burdens” and “benefits”. Different theories of distributive justice have put forward different accounts of what it is that persons should have fair shares of (the distribuendum ) (see entries on distributive justice and egalitarianism ).

When we consider climate change, different accounts of the distribuendum are highly likely to converge in very many cases. Climate change results in many dying (because of severe weather events, such as extreme heatwaves, flooding, and storm surges). It leads to droughts and crop failure and thus threatens people’s interests in food and water. It leads to an increase in certain diseases. These impacts—threats to life, food and water, and to health—would be condemned by many, if not all, theories of distributive justice. (For a detailed discussion of the implications of different accounts of the distribuenda of distributive justice for the evaluation of climatic impacts see Page [2006: 50–77].)

Some, however, would argue that to limit our focus to these interests (in life, health, food and water) is too narrow. They hold that some persons have deep attachments to certain places, such as the land that they have traditionally inhabited, and that being rooted in a particular place is an integral part of what makes their life go well. On this view, forcible displacement results in a non-substitutable loss. This is highly pertinent in the case of climate change since many indigenous peoples will be forcibly displaced from traditional homelands. This is true both of those in small island states and coastal settlements, as well as of inland communities forced to move because of environmental degradation to their traditional lands. Many argue, on this basis, that climate change constitutes a form of cultural injustice (de Shalit 2011, Heyward 2014, Whyte 2016). An adequate theory of climate justice must then consider whether persons’ have such cultural rights.

This last example also helps to underscore another important point, namely that which account of persons’ interests is adopted can have considerable practical implications, affecting what temperature target to employ and what form adaptation should take.

The key issue here concerns the relationship between persons’ interests, on the one hand, and changes in the climate system, on the other. On some views people’s interests are such that a change in the climate system might—at least in principle—be made up for through adaptation and/or through the provision of other goods. If, for example, one thinks that distributive justice is concerned solely with persons’ wealth and income, then the loss of a good (such as one’s house) because of climatic changes can be compensated for by a transfer of wealth and/or income.

Other accounts of persons’ interests will not, however, sanction this kind of “compensation”. Those who think that some persons’ good is bound up with a certain place or territory will think that climate change inflicts on such people a loss that cannot be compensated for. Protecting their interests necessarily requires the environment to be a certain way (de Shalit 2011; Heyward 2014 esp. 156–157; Whyte 2016).

To put the point in other words, the key concern is about “substitutability” (Neumayer 2003: 37–40). The question is whether one can substitute the loss of nature with the provision of other goods. Different accounts of justice will yield different answers to this. This take us to a long-standing debate in ecological economics and ethics between proponents of what has been termed “weak sustainability” (which permits the substitution of capital for the loss of nature) and proponents of “strong sustainability” (which denies the possibility of such substitution) (Neumayer 2003).

Four further points are in order.

First, it would be a mistake simply to employ an account of the distribuendum and then apply that to evaluate climatic impacts without considering whether that account adequately reflects the values and ethical orientations of affected communities. See, in this context, Krushil Watene’s (2016) evaluation of the extent to which the “capability” approach can accommodate the insights of Maori philosophy concerning the value of nature. (See entry on capability approach for information on the capability approach and relevant sources.)

Second, it is worth noting that once one has an account of the relevant interests a further question is how one incorporates them into a theory of justice. For example, some have argued that many of the adverse impacts described above can accurately be described as threatening people’s human rights (Caney 2010b). This view maintains that persons have certain human rights—to life, health, water, food, not to be displaced—and that climate change is unjust because it violates these human rights. Others are sceptical of the applicability of human rights, arguing that they are too inflexible and are unable to provide guidance when trade-offs are necessary (Moellendorf 2014: 24–26 & 230–235).

Moellendorf suggests that we should instead adopt what he terms an “Antipoverty Principle”: this judges climate impacts (and climate policies) in terms of their impact on poverty (Moellendorf 2014: 22–24). This, however, will be vulnerable to the objection that it is unduly narrow in its focus, for climate change has harmful effects that cannot simply be reduced to its effect on poverty levels (such as its effects on political self-determination, people’s ability to practise their traditional ways of life, and their right not to be displaced) (Gardiner 2017: 441–443).

Another approach would be to follow the practice of many climate economists. They employ what they term the “social cost of carbon” where this calculates “a monetized value of the present and future damages caused by the emission of a ton of CO 2 ” (Fleurbaey et al. 2019: 84). What stance one adopts here will, then, depend on one’s more general theory of justice and normative public policy.

Third, the focus so far has been on the entitlements of individuals. However, some will argue that this is too restrictive and that a comprehensive account would include the rights of collective units to be self-determining. The clearest and starkest (but not, of course, the only) illustration of this is the destruction of small island states.

Fourth, the focus, so far, has been on the impacts on human beings. On some accounts, this is incomplete for it excludes nonhuman animals (Cripps 2013: chapter 4). Clearly, evaluating such claims raises questions that go beyond this entry. The point here is just that if the interests of other creatures are included then this will have implications for the evaluation of climatic impacts.

3. Intergenerational Justice

The question of what climate target to aim for will also depend on what responsibilities members of one generation have to future generations. The emission of some greenhouse gases can have an impact far into the future. For example, CO 2 lasts in the atmosphere for “hundreds of thousands of years” (Allen, Dube, & Solecki 2019: 64). So while climate change affects large numbers of people alive now, many of the impacts of climate change will fall on future generations. To know what temperature target is appropriate it is necessary, then, to have an account of our responsibilities to future generations and to know how much weight, if any, to attribute to their interests.

Such an account is also needed for two further reasons. First, the question of who should bear the burdens of climate change has an intergenerational dimension. Some, for example, have argued that it would be fair to impose some of the costs of mitigating (and adapting to) climate change on future generations (Rendall 2011).

Finally, there is a fixed quantity of greenhouse gases which can be emitted. [ 2 ] Considering how this should be shared also raises questions of intergenerational justice for if there is a fixed greenhouse gas budget we need to consider what claims, if any, future people have to emit greenhouse gases.

A number of different principles of intergenerational justice have been proposed. Many for example, adopt a sufficientarian position and hold that justice requires merely that all persons be above a certain specified threshold. (For sophisticated analyses see L. Meyer & Roser 2009 and Page 2006: 90–95; 2007.)

One challenge for this view will, of course, be determining how to specify this threshold. Many, however, will grant that a sufficiency condition is necessary even if it is hard to specify. Some may though query whether it is sufficient. For example, a sufficientarian view would allow members of one generation to leave future generations worse off than them just so long as they are above a certain threshold. This will strike many as too weak. Consider a case where one generation could leave future people much better off than the sufficientarian threshold at no (or little) cost. Here it would seem inadequate to say that current generations need only ensure that future people do not fall beneath the sufficientarian’s designated threshold.

Some adopt more demanding accounts of intertemporal justice which avoid these problems. For example, in their book Sustainability for a Warming Planet (2015) Humberto Llavador, John E. Roemer, and Joaquim Silvestre defend what they term “growth sustainability”. They explain it as follows:

Growth sustainability (say, at 25% per generation) means to find that path of economic activity that maximizes the welfare of the present generation, subject to guaranteeing that welfare grows at least at 25% per generation, forever after. (Llavador, Roemer & Silvestre 2015: 4)

The key idea is to maximise the standard of living of current generations but also commit to leaving future people better off by a certain proportion. Their argument comes in two steps. First, they think—along luck egalitarian lines—that there is a case for intergenerational equality. But then they add that current generations often desire to benefit the future and so there is a case for building in a commitment to bettering the condition of future people (Llavador, Roemer & Silvestre 2015: 4 & 35–36).

Others might query this second step, and, in particular, the claim that a “preference” to benefit others can ground an (enforceable) duty to do so. In general, whether people have a duty to others cannot be vindicated on the basis of a preference that some have to benefit others. This notwithstanding, some might still argue that where current generations can leave future generations better off than themselves at no cost, or at reasonable cost, then there is a duty to do so.

There is one other aspect that bears mentioning. So far the focus has been on what might term a vertical dimension (how well off the members of generations in the future [at, say, t 10 ] are when compared to earlier generations [at, say, t 1 ]). This does not, however, exhaust questions of intergenerational justice for one might think that members of one generation should also be concerned about the likely distribution within any future generation (so, what we might term a horizontal dimension). Those who adopt an egalitarian perspective, for example, might think that current generations have a duty to act in such a way that they do not create stark inequalities within future generations (Caney 2018a: 161–162 & 168; see also Fleurbaey et al. 2019: 93). This is relevant in this context because climate change tends to exacerbate existing inequalities (Hoegh-Guldberg, Jacob, & Taylor 2019: 244).

The focus of the previous subsection was on principles of intergenerational justice. Much of the literature on intergenerational justice and climate change has, however, engaged with economic analyses of the impacts of climate change, and economic analyses tend to employ the concept of a social discount rate to specify how people should treat future generations. Given this a comprehensive treatment of climate justice and future generations needs to discuss the concept of discounting (see entry on Frank Ramsey and intergenerational welfare economics ).

Roughly stated, social discount rates specify the extent to which persons should “discount” the future and should allocate resources to the current time as opposed to the future. The social discount rate has several component parts.

Time Discounting . One important component is “time discounting”: this involves allocating less moral weight to a person’s well-being the further into the future it is. Many philosophers have been highly critical of this approach, arguing that it is objectionable to discriminate against people on the basis of when they are alive. That, it is argued, penalises people for a property that lacks any moral significance (Caney 2014b: 323–327; Parfit 1984: 480–486; Rawls 1999: 259–262). Others would demur, and some have offered communitarian defences of special obligations to those who are temporally near (de Shalit 1995).

Growth Discounting . A second important component is what Nordhaus calls “growth discounting” (1997: 317). The idea here is clearly stated by the economist Nicholas Stern, who writes that we

should discount the consumption of future generations on the basis that they are likely to be richer than ourselves. This reason for discounting is, and should be, part of most models. (Stern 2008: 14)

Clearly what position one takes on this will depend on whether one adopts a broadly egalitarian position on intergenerational justice or not. If one thinks that egalitarian commitments should inform our policies towards future generations, and, if one thinks that those alive in the future will be wealthier (a crucial assumption that one might at least query) then there is a case for growth discounting. So one’s verdict on growth discounting will depend on the nature of one’s principle of intergenerational justice (sufficiency, equality, priority, Llavador et al.’s formulation and so on) as well as empirical assumptions about future growth (and one’s attitude to risk and uncertainty).

The previous subsections proceeded on the basis that there are duties of justice to future generations. It is worth noting here then that some dispute that. The reasons they do so are not peculiar to the case of climate change, and are familiar from general debates about intergenerational justice (see entry on intergenerational justice ).

For example, some have invoked Derek Parfit’s Non Identity Problem (Parfit 1984: chapter 16) to call into question claims that there are duties of justice to (remote) future generations (Broome 2012: 61–64). They argue that since the decisions made now affect who gets born in the future they do not harm future generations for they do not make them worse off than they would otherwise be (Broome 2012: 61–64; Parfit 1984: chapter 16).

This is not the place to discuss the Non Identity Problem in depth (see entry on nonidentity problem ). It is, however, perhaps worth noting that many are not persuaded that this argument shows that current generations lack duties of (climate) justice to future people. The nub of the issue is whether theories of justice are committed to a “narrow person-affecting” point of view (Parfit 1984: 393–395). Broome appears to assume that they are. However, many others maintain that justice to future generations should not be conceived of in such narrow person-affecting terms (e.g., Reiman 2007: esp. 83–86 & 88–92). Consider, for example, sufficientarian accounts of our responsibilities to the future. They maintain that there is a duty of justice to act in such a way that the standard of living of those who live in the future is above a certain threshold. They are not committed to the thought that persons act unjustly only if they render someone (future or present) worse off than they would otherwise have been. Their claim is simply that persons of one generation act unjustly if, other things being equal, the outcome of their actions is that those who are alive in the future have a lower-than-sufficiency standard of living (see the entry on intergenerational justice , sections 3 & 4). The same point could be made about other accounts, whether egalitarian, prioritarian or Llavador et al.’s view.

Another set of normative issues arises from the fact that climate projections are characterised by risk and uncertainty. A comprehensive analysis of climate justice needs, then, to consider the just way to respond to risk and uncertainty. To underscore why this matters it is salutary to consider the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report. Suppose that we take the appropriate target to be avoiding an increase in global mean temperatures of more than 1.5°C when compared with pre-industrial times. The quantity of greenhouse gases that can be permissibly emitted varies enormously depending on how risk-averse we think that our approach should be. According to the IPCC a 33% probability of meeting the 1.5°C target results in a greenhouse gas budget of 840 GtCO 2 whereas a 66% probability of meeting the same target results in a greenhouse budget of 420 GtCO 2 (Rogelj, Shindell, & Jiang 2019: 108). If we opt for the more risk averse approach, then, the volume of greenhouse gases than can be permissibly emitted is half the size that the budget would be if we opt for the less risk averse approach. One question that arises then is: How risk-averse should we be? How should policy-makers treat risk and uncertainty?

Two approaches have been adopted.

First, some employ traditional cost-benefit analysis and seek to derive the “expected value” of different scenarios by combining the probability of each state of affairs and its value and then choosing that policy with the greatest expected value (Broome 2012: 120–132). Fleurbaey et al. (2019: 97–100) provide an excellent short analysis of this approach and variants of it. Some query the validity of the “expected value” approach on the basis that our understanding of the future is so imperfect that we lack reliable probabilities (Gardiner 2011: 261–263; though see Broome 2012: 127–129).

Second, some adopt a version of the “precautionary principle”. To introduce this principle it is helpful to turn to Neil Manson’s excellent analysis of the precautionary principle (Manson 2002). Manson argues that all formulations of the precautionary principle contain three elements. In particular they include what he terms “a damage condition” (this states what kinds of bad outcomes are relevant), a “knowledge condition” (this states what kind of epistemic conditions are required—is it uncertainty or a certain level of risk?) and a “remedy” (this states the right response) (Manson 2002: 265). The central idea is that when people are engaged in a certain kind of action in which there is a prospect of harms of the relevant kind, and when our understanding of whether the harms will materialise satisfies the knowledge condition, then it is appropriate to adopt a precautionary policy (Manson 2002: esp. 265). Clearly, however, a great deal of work is needed to specify the three core features—how much harm and what kind of harm is relevant?; what epistemic conditions must hold?; what course of action is required (Manson 2002: 267)?

In his illuminating analysis of the precautionary principle Gardiner also identifies three essential features. There is a “threat of harm”; there is “[u]ncertainty of impact and causality”; and third there is a “precautionary response” (Gardiner 2006: 36).

Now some interpretations of the basic idea will be unduly risk averse (Gardiner 2006: 37). Gardiner himself draws on Rawls’s use of maximin, and argues that we should prioritise avoiding very bad outcomes when the following conditions are all satisfied: (1) people face options with a variety of different outcomes (including some potentially dire ones) but cannot ascertain the probabilities of these outcomes so are in a state of uncertainty, (2) people do not care greatly about how much they are better off than “the minimum that can be guaranteed by the maximin approach”, and (3) people care greatly about not falling beneath that minimum (Gardiner 2006: 47 & more generally 45–49). Under such circumstances, Gardiner argues, it would not make sense to take the risk of a dire outcome.

A related (though not identical) approach is adopted by Shue, who draws on Gardiner and Manson. Shue, like Gardiner, invokes three conditions. These are as follows:

(1) massive loss : the magnitude of the possible losses is massive; (2) threshold likelihood : the likelihood of the losses is significant, even if no precise probability can be specified, because (a) the mechanism by which the losses would occur is well understood, and (b) the conditions for the functioning of the mechanism are accumulating; and (3) non-excessive costs : the costs of prevention are not excessive (a) in light of the magnitude of the possible losses and (b) even considering the other important demands on our resources. (Shue 2014: 265; footnote omitted)

Shue’s claim, then, is that

[w]here these three features are all present, one ought to try urgently to make the outcome progressively more unlikely until the marginal costs of further efforts become excessive, irrespective of the outcome’s precise prior probability, which may not be known in any case. (Shue 2014: 265) [ 3 ]

Note that the “expected value” and the “precautionary” approaches disagree, at a fundamental level, about the relevance of probabilities. The first one relies on them to derive expected values, whereas the second does not rely on precise probabilities. (Indeed, Gardiner’s approach is intended to apply to cases of “uncertainty” [which is when we cannot specify probabilities] Gardiner [2006: 50].) This said, it seems likely that in practice they will converge, at least to some extent, in calling for aggressive mitigation policies.

5. Responsibilities

Suppose that we have identified what kinds of interests should be included in a theory of justice, what responsibilities persons owe to future people, and how to treat risk and uncertainty. These can guide us in determining what goals we should aim for. The next question to ask is ‘ Who has what responsibilities to meet these goals?’ It is helpful to break this question down into several parts. We can identify four further questions, which together would enable us to answer this question and tell us what would be a just distribution of climate responsibilities.

First, it is important to be clear on the content of the responsibilities. As noted at the start, climate scientists and policy-makers focus primarily (though not exclusively) on two kinds of policies—mitigation and adaptation. The first question, then, is “Who should engage in mitigation and adaptation, and to what extent?” Let us call this the Climate Action Question.

A second question is “Who should bear the costs of mitigation and adaptation?” Mitigation will often involve economic (and other) types of cost. For example, if a carbon tax is levied on goods then purchasers of those goods will be financially worse off. Sometimes mitigation policies come with benefits (for example, regulations discouraging car use are likely to improve air quality; encouraging people to cycle rather than drive may improve physical fitness). In many cases, however, the policies come with a cost. Likewise adaptation policies (such as designing cities to cope better with heatwaves) will come at a cost. Who should pay for these? Let us call this the Burden-Sharing Question.

A third question is Who has the responsibility to ensure that (a) those designated to engage in mitigation and adaptation do so and (b) those designated to bear any financial burdens discharge their responsibilities? Let us call this the Political Action Question.

The fourth question is rather different in kind. It asks, for all of the previous questions, what kinds of entities are the duty-bearers? Many will assume that governments have such responsibilities, but what about other actors? Are individuals duty-bearers? For example, do individuals have duties to engage in mitigation? Or does that duty fall exclusively on other actors?

Consider the first two questions. Very often these are treated together, but they are not necessarily the same. One might think, for example, that one agent has a responsibility to mitigate (on the grounds that doing so would be an effective way of making a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) but that others have a duty to bear some, or all, of the costs. In such a case, then, our answer to the Climate Action Question might be that X should mitigate, but our answer to the Burden-Sharing Question might be that Y should bear the cost involved in X ’s mitigating. To illustrate: one might think that developing countries should mitigate and should use clean technology instead of fossil fuels, but one might also think that the cost of the clean technology should be shouldered by others.

To give another illustration: one might think that current generations should mitigate climate change aggressively but that they can pass on some of the costs of doing so to future generations (Rendall 2011). (A version of this position is defended by Broome [2012: 47–48], and is introduced below— Section 8 .)

Of course, even though the questions are distinct this does not entail that they should be treated wholly separately. One might think, for example, that X should mitigate but only if others pay at least some (or even all) of the costs, and that if sufficient financial support is not forthcoming then X is not obligated. With this in mind, it is appropriate to turn to the Burden-Sharing Question. A considerable literature has developed around the question of who should bear the costs of combating climate change.

5.2 The Burden-Sharing Question

Three principles, in particular, have emerged.

One principle commonly referred to as the Polluter Pays Principle holds that burdens should be borne in proportion to how much an agent has emitted (Shue 2014: 182–186). This is an intuitively plausible approach. It reflects a widely held principle about responsibility, namely that we can, subject to certain conditions, hold agents responsible for their actions.

This noted, there are several complications. First, some argue that it is unfair to hold agents responsible for the harms resulting from their emission of greenhouse gases if they were excusably ignorant of the impact of their actions. They then argue that many of those who have emitted greenhouse gases in the past were excusably ignorant and so cannot be held liable.

Several replies have been given to this line of argument. First, on an empirical note, we can respond that for several decades now people could not plausibly claim to be excusably ignorant about the effects of greenhouse gas emissions. Of course, specifying precisely when one could no longer claim to be excusably ignorant will be hard, but the salient point is that there are limits to the extent to which one can plead excusable ignorance (Singer 2002: 34). [ 4 ] Second, some argue that it can be fair to ascribe burdens to those who were excusably ignorant of the harms of their emissions if those who emitted benefited sufficiently from the emissions. The rough thought here is that while someone might reasonably complain that it is unfair to penalise them for non-culpably contributing to harm, their case is considerably weakened if it is also the case that the harmful activity also created benefits for them. If they have benefited then making them pay would not be so onerous and might even leave them no worse off than if they had they not emitted. (For discussion of the “excusable ignorance” objection and responses to it see Gosseries [2004: 39–41].)

A second challenge draws attention to the fact that many emitters are no longer alive. Why, the objection goes, should those alive now foot the bill for the acts of previous generations? Again responses have been forthcoming. Some may adopt a collectivist approach and hold that the relevant agents are collective bodies like states, and so they hold that since country X emitted in the past country X should pay now. Some, by contrast, respond by appealing again to the idea of benefiting. They hold that individuals alive today (and in the future) enjoy benefits that result from previous emissions-generating activities and so have a duty to pay at least some of the costs incurred in their production. (For discussion see Neumayer [2000: 189], Shue [2014: 186] and Gosseries [2004: 41–55].)

There is a third challenge. What if persons need to engage in activities which emit greenhouse gases in order to enjoy a decent minimum standard of living? Many hold that it is unfair to make extremely poor people pay the cost of emitting greenhouse gases where doing so would push them beneath a decent standard of living. More generally, one might argue that if people are entitled to a certain standard of living (which need not be specified according to sufficientarian criteria, but could also be specified according to egalitarian or prioritarian or some other criteria) then it would be wrong to make them pay if doing so entails that they cannot enjoy that standard of living.

It is worth noting here that if one does think that the existing global poor should not be required to bear the costs of their emissions then this might also be relevant for one’s assessment of rich countries’ past emissions. For if developing countries now should not be financially penalised for the emissions that they incur when seeking to develop then should not the same be said of the emissions incurred by (now affluent) countries when they were also poor?

In light of these kinds of challenges many hold that the Polluter Pays Principle should be supplemented by other principles. As we have seen in the previous subsection some appeal to what has been termed the Beneficiary Pays Principle. This holds that agents should pay because, and to the extent that, they have benefited from the activities that involve the emission of greenhouse gases (Page 2012).

This approach faces a number of questions. One concerns which emissions come under its remit. Does it just cover cases that the Polluter Pays Principle cannot deal with (e.g., the emissions of the previous generations) (Duus-Otterström 2014)? Or does it have wider applicability?

Second, one might query whether benefiting is always sufficient to render someone liable to pay. Someone may, for example, benefit from emissions and yet remain very poor. If one thinks that the Polluter Pays Principle should not be applied in cases where it would push someone beneath a decent standard of living then one might, for the same reason, think that the Beneficiary Pays Principle is similarly constrained.

Note that if this reasoning is correct it supports the Integrationist approach outlined in Section 1 , for it suggests that when answering who should pay one should not bracket out more general considerations such as what rights, if any, persons have to enjoy a certain standard of living (such as an “equal standard of living” or a “minimum standard of living”).

This takes us to a third proposed principle. Some have argued that any burdens incurred by mitigation and adaptation should be distributed according to agents’ ability to pay. This principle is widely interpreted to mean that the greater an agent’s ability to pay the greater the proportion of the cost that they should be expected to pay (Shue 2014: 186–189; Moellendorf 2014: esp. 173–180).

One criticism of this principle is that it wholly divorces the question of who pays from questions about who caused the problem or who benefited from causing the problem. In addition to this, some argue that it relies on controversial moral assumptions, namely that the wealthy have a positive duty of assistance (Duus-Otterström 2014: 451–452).

Where one stands on the Ability to Pay Principle is likely to depend on one’s overall account of (global) distributive justice. For example, those who think that global justice requires a more equal world will, other things being equal, endorse a proposal that the costs should be borne primarily by the most advantaged and not by the world’s poorest.

(For further discussion of these three principles and the above objections to them, see Caney 2005, 2010a.)

Although much of the literature has focused on who should pay, there is another set of questions concerning responsibilities. To approach it, it is useful to distinguish between first-order and second-order responsibilities, where a first-order responsibility in this context is a responsibility either (a) to mitigate climate change or facilitate adaptation or (b) to bear the costs of mitigation or adaptation or both. A second-order responsibility, in this context, is a responsibility to take action that ensures that others comply with their first-order (climate) responsibilities. (The distinction between first- and second-order responsibilities is made by Onora O’Neill [2005: 428 & 433–436] and is applied to the case of climate change by Caney [2014a: 134–147].) Second-order responsibilities are responsibilities to change the social, economic and political environment so that agents comply with their first-order responsibilities. They can include, for example, disincentivising carbon-intensive options (through, say, carbon taxes or quotas or mandatory regulations) thereby inducing agents to comply with a first-order responsibility to mitigate. Or they can involve incentivising others to discharge their mitigation responsibilities by, for example, subsidising clean sources of energy or by designing the urban environment so that people are more likely to walk or cycle or use public transport rather than drive.

A similar idea is advanced by Elizabeth Cripps who refers to what she terms “promotional duties” (2013: 116 & chapter 6 [esp. 140–150]). These are “[d]uties to attempt to bring about the necessary collective action” (2013: 116). What actions might these involve? Cripps considers the promotional duties of individuals and suggests that these involve campaigning, running for election, signing petitions, sending letters to politicians, giving money to environmental organisations, and going on marches (2013: 143). Walter Sinnott-Armstrong also suggests that citizens have a duty to campaign for their governments to implement climate legislation (2010: 344). One might also add to this list of second-order responsibilities, duties to engage in civil disobedience and resistance against laws that result in unjustified emissions or inadequate levels of adaptation.

Two further points are worth noting. First, much of the focus has been on what we might term “positive” second-order responsibilities. They are “positive” because they require agents to take action. Given the arguments above, however, we also have good reason to think that there are “negative” second-order responsibilities as well. Whereas a positive second-order duty is a duty to take steps to ensure that others comply with their first-order responsibilities, a negative second-order duty would be a duty not to thwart or undermine initiatives to tackle climate change. This is relevant given the argument that some organisations—most notably fossil fuel companies and electric utilities companies, as well as some labour organisations—have gone to considerable lengths to undermine attempts to combat climate change (Mildenberger 2020; Oreskes & Conway 2010: chapter 6; Stokes 2020).

Second, the focus of many of those philosophers mentioned above has been on political institutions. While institutions are necessary they are likely to be insufficient. To arrive at a systematic and comprehensive account of agents’ second-order responsibilities it is worth starting with a political, social and economic analysis of why agents are not discharging responsibilities to mitigate and adapt. If we start with this we can then work back from it and identify what needs to be done by whom to bring about the necessary change. This is highly likely to involve changing ideologies (for example, those that foster fossil-fuel-driven growth), cultural practices, and social norms, as well as institutions.

We can turn now to the fourth question. What kind of agent is the duty-bearer?

It is helpful here to focus on responsibilities to mitigate since there has been considerable debate among philosophers as to whether individuals have responsibilities to limit their own personal emissions or not. Some, like Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, are sceptical of the proposition that individuals have duties to limit their own emissions. He considers a large number of separate commonsense moral principles and argues that none of these can be marshalled to show that individuals have a duty to limit their own emissions. One central theme in his argument is that individuals’ personal emissions make no difference (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010).

Two kinds of response have been made to these kinds of arguments. The first disputes the claim that individuals make no difference. Avram Hiller argues that

it is prima facie wrong to perform an act which has an expected amount of harm greater than another easily available alternative (Hiller 2011: 352)

and argues that individual emissions, while small, violate this principle. Similarly, Broome argues that individuals’ emissions create “expected harm” and they have a duty not to do so (Broome 2019). John Nolt argues in the same vein, and calculates the impact of a North Americans’ emissions over their lifetime (Nolt 2011).

A second response would be to appeal to a different kind of principle. For example, one might argue that we have a duty not to participate in collective processes which generate unjust outcomes. To do so would be stand in the wrong kind of relationship to such collective processes. Such a reply might seek to build on the work on “complicity” by Christopher Kutz (2000). In addition to a negative duty not to participate in such destructive processes one might also argue, as Tracy Isaacs has done, for a duty of individuals in “collective contexts” to form associations and create social forces for change (Isaacs 2011: chapter 5 esp. 144–155).

One further comment is in order. As noted above, while Sinnott-Armstrong believes that individuals do not have a moral responsibility to limit their emissions he does believe that individuals have political responsibilities to vote and to pressurise their representatives to pass climate legislation. As Hiller notes, this position may be unstable. The reasons Sinnott-Armstrong gives as to why individuals do not have mitigation responsibilities (their actions are inconsequential) would, if correct , also seem to establish that they do not have political responsibilities either. For one person’s vote is also almost certainly inconsequential (Hiller 2011: 364–365).

To sum up, then, if we consider who has what responsibilities to address climate change, it is helpful to distinguish between four questions. First, who should engage in mitigation and adaptation? Second, who should bear any cost involved in mitigation and adaptation? Third, who has the responsibility to ensure that the relevant duty bearers for questions 1 and 2 discharge their responsibilities? Finally, for each of the above we need to know “what kind of agent is being ascribed duties?”

6. Justice and the Greenhouse Gas Budget

One critical responsibility is to limit the emission of greenhouse gases. Many hold that, at the moment, some greenhouse gases can nonetheless be permissibly emitted. There is, then, a question about how the use of the remaining “greenhouse gas budget” can be distributed and among whom. As we have seen the size of the budget depends in part on what temperature target is selected and how risk averse we think we should be. To illustrate: the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC reported that if we want to have a probability of at least 67% of avoiding a more than 1.5°C increase in global mean temperatures then there is a budget of approximately 420 GtCO 2 (Rogelj, Shindell, & Jiang 2019: 108). (If we operate with a less ambitious target then the budget is quite different. See table 2.2 in Rogelj, Shindell, & Jiang [2019: 108].)

One key question then is, “How should this budget be shared?” What principles of distributive justice should be applied to this “good”?

One approach put forward by Henry Shue argues that rights to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed so as to meet peoples’ “subsistence” needs, and that such emissions should take priority over “luxury” emissions (Shue 2014: chapter 2). The focus on meeting basic needs here seems hard to dispute. Many philosophers and environmental campaigners have, however, argued that equality should be the guiding principle—and not subsistence (or not merely subsistence).

Many, that is, have endorsed what we might call the “equal per capita ” view. This holds that rights to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed equally. An important and influential statement of this position was affirmed by Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain in Global Warming in an Unequal World (1991). They start from the premise that the atmosphere is part of the “global commons” (see also Shiva 2016). They infer from this that it should be divided equally among all human beings. As they put it:

The question is how should this global common—the global carbon dioxide and methane sinks—be shared amongst the people of the world? … [I]n a world that aspires to such lofty ideals like global justice, equity and sustainability, this vital global common should be shared equally on a per capita basis. (Agarwal & Narain 1991: 9)

Similar positions have been taken by Dale Jamieson (2010: 272–273), and Steve Vanderheiden (2008: 107–109 & chapter 7 [esp. 226–227]). Peter Singer (2002: 43–44) has also argued for it for partly moral and partly pragmatic reasons.

Before noting objections, it is worth observing that that the “equal per capita view” encompasses a family of views and that one might distinguish between many different versions of this view. For example, one version holds that countries should be ascribed rights to emit greenhouse gases and that the size of their quota should vary in line with the number of people in their society (Agarwal & Narain 1991: 9–10). However, one might interpret it in a more individualistic way, and ascribe equal rights to emit to each individual.

In addition to this, there are different ways of treating past (and current) emissions. Some, for example, hold that countries have emission rights and that a country’s past emissions should be debited from its quota (Neumayer 2000: esp. 186). Others suggest disregarding past emissions and favour applying the equal per capita emissions approach to the remaining budget (Singer 2002: 43–44; Vanderheiden 2008: 229–230). Still others argue that we should phase in the equal per capita view gradually over time, and hence high emitters now will have more-than-equal emission rights at the start of the transition period, with their share decreasing until it reaches equality (A. Meyer 2000).

A number of different objections might be levelled against the equal per capita view (in all versions). First, some query why it is appropriate to treat this good in isolation. The equal per capita view is a paradigm case of an isolationist position. However, theories of distributive justice tend to focus on the fair distribution of a total package of goods (Bell 2008: esp. 250; Caney 2012: 265–271; Miller 2008: 142–143). Of course, sometimes, in special cases, we do treat goods (e.g., rights to vote) in isolation, but it is not at all clear why that reasoning should apply to this case and it is arguable that in these other cases they are grounded in a more general integrationist theory.

Second, it is worth asking why we should care about emissions at all. In themselves they do not matter to the people who generate them or who enjoy the goods and services whose production involves greenhouse gas emissions. They matter because they are a by-product of activities that people engage in to serve important human interests. More specifically they largely arise because of energy use (for building, heating, cooling, transporting, manufacturing, lighting and so on) and because of agriculture and land use change. Given this it makes sense to focus on protecting and promoting these interests (bearing in mind, of course, limits to emissions) not the distribution of emissions in themselves . Suppose, for example, that we compare two people, and let us suppose that both enjoy whatever one takes to be the fair distribution of goods overall. Suppose, for simplicity’s sake, that that is an equal standard of living. Suppose, however, that one meets her interests through fossil fuels and the other through solar energy, it is hard to see why that is necessarily unfair to the second person. True they emit less. But that is irrelevant given that they enjoy what is, ex hypothesi , the fair standard of living (Hayward 2007: 432–433 & 440–444; Caney 2012: 285–291). In short: to care about emissions is not to care about what really matters from the point of view of justice.

It is worth noting that this objection tells not only against the equal per capita view. It has force against all theories of distributive justice that treat the right to emit as a distribuendum . It would, for example, be an objection to the “subsistence emissions” approach originally pioneered by Shue (Hayward 2007).

There is a third problem with treating emissions as an appropriate distribuendum . The problem is that a dilemma arises when we consider our responsibilities to future generations. There seem to be several options. Option 1 would be to deny that there are duties of justice to future generations to ensure that they too have rights to emit greenhouse gases. Perhaps someone might hold that there are no duties of justice at all to them (1a). Or they might hold that there are but that they do not include leaving them rights to emit (1b). (1a) seems implausible in light of the points made in Section 3 ; and (1b) adopts a discriminatory attitude to future people that stands in need of moral justification.

A second option is to think that future people have rights and hence that, on the view under consideration, they too have an equal right to emit greenhouse gases. If, however, one thinks that all current and future persons are entitled to equal per capita emissions then we face two severe problems. (i) It will be exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to calculate how much everyone is entitled to. Furthermore, (ii), given the number of future and present people included the equal per capita share would surely be close to zero.

In light of these problems a better way forward would be not to focus on emissions per se , but rather to focus on meeting people’s interests in food and energy and so on, and to draw on other safe sources to meet these needs. What is imperative is to transition away from a carbon-based economy towards one not dependent on fossil fuels. Only in this way we can avoid the dilemma set out above.

7. Justice and Climate Policies

A further set of normative questions arises when we turn to consider what policies might be adopted to mitigate (and adapt to) climate change. Many policies that have been recommended or adopted themselves raise questions of justice. We can see this by considering three policy areas.

The first concerns other energy sources. In practice these can raise questions of justice. For example, the construction of hydroelectric plants can lead to the displacement of peoples from their homes and indigenous peoples from their traditional homelands. The use of biofuels can lead to increased food prices as crops are devoted to producing fuel. The use of nuclear energy can lead to health risks. The salient point here is that mitigation (and adaptation) policies may raise ethical questions.

How should one address these? One suggestion would be that we should draw on the same principles and values that one employs to evaluate climate impacts. So, if, for example, one thinks that climate change is unjust in part because it undermines the. enjoyment of individual human rights then it would seem to follow that one should seek to implement mitigation (and adaptation) policies that honour these individual human rights. And, if one thinks climate change is unjust, in part, because it undermines the cultural rights of indigenous peoples then, again, it would seem to follow one should seek to implement mitigation (and adaptation) policies that honour these. One’s answer to the challenges posed by the harmful side-effects of some mitigation policies would then be part of one’s overall theory.

Some philosophers have argued that a commitment to preventing dangerous climate change requires adopting policies designed to limit or reduce world population size (Cafaro 2012; Cripps 2015). Their argument is that population growth is one of the main factors contributing to climate change. Other things being equal, more people result in more emissions, so, given the direness of the situation policies need to be implemented which will sufficiently lower world population size. Some—like Sarah Conly—argue, on this basis, each couple has a right to no more than one child (Conly 2016).

Assessing such arguments requires a combination of empirical, normative and political analysis. A first step would be to consider all the determinants of climatic harms and to have a quantitative analysis of their effects and the extent to which their ecological footprint could be reduced. Such an analysis would include not simply the number of people, but also (1) the levels of consumption, (2) the extent of waste, (3) the nature of the energy system (does it use renewables or not?), (4) the distribution of access to clean technology, (5) the extent to which energy efficiency programmes are in place, (6) the extent to which fossil fuels are being subsidised, (7) the nature of the public transport system, (8) the urban infrastructure and the spatial organisation of cities, (9) building design, (10) the extent to which deforestation is reversed, and programmes of afforestation and reforestation are pursued, and so on (Caney 2020). To make a case for a Conly-style conclusion one would then have to show that either:

• the above are insufficient, or
• the above are (singly or in combination) sufficient but constitute a less desirable kind of response than limiting procreative choice, or, perhaps
• the above may be sufficient and more desirable than Conly’s response but they are less politically feasible.

Another challenge facing Conly’s conclusion is that it needs to show that the optimal response turns out to be 1 child per couple and that the same constraint applies equally to all irrespective of the size of their ecological footprint.

Ethical concerns about attempts to limit world population have long been expressed. For example, Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva argued in Ecofeminism (1993 [2014]) that programmes to limit world population reinforce control of women’s bodies. Furthermore, they object to proposals to curb world population growth that do not call into question the high consumption lifestyles of affluent countries, and instead convey the morally misleading message that responsibility for the environmental crisis lies with low-emitting developing countries (Mies & Vandana 1993 [2014: chapter 19]).

One additional climate policy needs also be mentioned, namely “geoengineering” the climate system, either by extracting carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (Carbon Dioxide Removal) or by seeking to block the sun’s rays (Solar Radiation Management). These raise a host of ethical issues.

One concern is that some forms of geoengineering can have harmful side-effects, ones that can harm already vulnerable people (a point which takes us back to Section 7.1 ). For example, some forms of solar radiation management may affect the monsoon season in India (Jamieson 2014: 220).

A second challenge is that while they may constitute a response to climate change in some sense, some geoengineering policies (like Solar Radiation Management), do not tackle other greenhouse-gas related problems like ocean acidification, whereas mitigation policies would (Jamieson 2014: 220).

A related concern is that geoengineering policies are unnecessary because other less risky policies (like mitigation) should be adopted.

A fourth problem concerns the political legitimacy of decisions to go ahead with geoengineering. Geoengineering policies can have wide-ranging impacts on many countries and so it would be problematic for some to engage in it unilaterally (Jamieson 2014: 222–224). If they are to be legitimate such world-shaping policies would stand in need of an inclusive decision-making process that is global in scope.

(For rich discussions of the ethical issues surrounding geoengineering see further Gardiner [2010; 2011: chapter 10], Jamieson [2014: 219–227] and, from a Confucian perspective, Wong [2015].)

The preceding sections have discussed different questions of justice that arise when considering how to respond to climate change, and they have explored different answers that can be given. One persistent feature of global and domestic climate policies is that there has been a high level of noncompliance with principles of climate justice. Given this, it is appropriate to ask: “What principles of justice should apply in the context of noncompliance?”

Different responses have been given. To locate them it may be helpful to set out the possibilities (Caney 2016).

• One response might be “duty-reallocation”. That is, one might propose a solution in which some bear some of the responsibilities that should, ideally, be borne by others.
• A second response might be to relax the moral constraints on mitigation policies, the aim being to make it more likely that non-complying agents will discharge their duties to mitigate.
• A third (related) response might be to adopt other extreme responses that one might think are normally unacceptable but permissible in an emergency.
• A fourth response might be to take a more proactive stance and seek to tackle the underlying structures which lead to noncompliance (for example, by designing institutions which reduce such noncompliance and undermining organisations which are thwarting successful climate action).
• A fifth response might be “target modification”. That is, one might lower one’s ambition, so whereas one might think that justice ideally requires a 1.5°C target one might accept a less ambitious target.

A number of philosophers have argued for a type (1)-like response . One version maintains that some (the advantaged) should take on more than their fair share of responsibilities. A second version is defended by Broome. He argues that current generations ought to reduce their emissions to tackle climate change and that they ought to absorb the costs of doing so. However, he also thinks that implementing an effective climate treaty is of paramount significance and that parties will not agree to one if they have to pay. In light of this he suggests that they should mitigate but pass on the costs to future generations (Broome 2012: 47–48). Broome thinks this involves an unjust distribution of costs but that it is nonetheless, all things considered, justified because it helps prevent dangerous climate change. Broome’s solution involves some (current people) making others (future people) bear an unjust burden. A third related position is defended by Eric Posner and David Weisbach (2010). They argue that a climate treaty is imperative but will not be feasible unless it leaves signatories to the climate treaty no worse off. They assume that the benefits from such a treaty will be such that there is a “surplus” and so no one need be worse off. However, if this assumption does not hold then their commitment to leaving high emitters no worse off might also entail that others bear an unjust burden (making it a type (1) response ). As they recognise, even if there is a surplus some powerful states may agree to a treaty only if they receive such extensive compensation that it leaves others with more than their fair share of responsibilities or burdens (Posner and Weisbach 2010: 181).

Consider now (2) : some might think that normally one should not convert a place of great natural beauty into giant fields of solar panels, but they might also think that, in dire circumstances, this prohibition can be overturned. If we now consider (3) : many would see geoengineering as a version of this kind of response. And if we turn to (4) : This is a corollary of some of the views discussed in Section 5.3 , which generally held that agents have political responsibilities to create just and effective institutions and responsibilities to combat ongoing campaigns to thwart effective climate action.

What response (or combination of responses) one thinks to be the least bad here will depend on one’s overall theory of justice. Sufficientarians, for example, may think that the affluent—those above the specified sufficiency threshold—should take on more than their fair share of burdens, but will reject the idea that any of the world’s poorest should be required to adopt response (1) (unless perhaps it is absolutely necessary for very large numbers of future people to enjoy what they are entitled to).

It is time to conclude. This entry has provided an overview of eight questions of justice that arise in the context of climate change. It is salutary to end by noting two points

First, it is worth noting that the focus has been on climate justice and that justice is not the only relevant value. When confronting the challenges of climate change (and the Anthropocene more generally) justice clearly plays a large role, but many would argue for the relevance of other kinds of moral consideration, including a recognition of the intrinsic value of the natural world. Climate ethics, one might say, includes more than justice.

Second, it is also worth noting that taking climate justice seriously may have major implications for existing economic institutions and ideologies (such as the valorisation of economic growth), as well as for political institutions (Gardiner 2011; Jamieson 2014). Some critics of the status quo believe that capitalism cannot cope with climate change. Some doubt the ability of our contemporary institutional architecture to address the current challenges facing humanity. Evaluating such claims clearly requires extensive empirical analysis. Only with the help of climate science, history, politics, economics, anthropology, political economy, sociology, science and technology studies, and law can we begin to address such claims. But philosophical analysis has its part to play and without an understanding of climate justice we lack a compass to guide us.

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• Published: 08 January 2024

Justice considerations in climate research

• Caroline Zimm   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-5603-1015 1   na1 ,
• Kian Mintz-Woo   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-9216-9561 1 , 2   na1 ,
• Elina Brutschin   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7040-3057 1 ,
• Susanne Hanger-Kopp   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7223-9991 1 , 3 ,
• Roman Hoffmann   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-3512-1737 1 ,
• Jarmo S. Kikstra   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-9405-1228 1 , 4 , 5 ,
• Michael Kuhn   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-0424-3221 1 ,
• Jihoon Min   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0020-1174 1 ,
• Raya Muttarak   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-0627-4451 1 , 6 ,
• Shonali Pachauri   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-8138-3178 1 ,
• Omkar Patange   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6075-8214 1 ,
• Keywan Riahi   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7193-3498 1 , 7 &
• Thomas Schinko   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1156-7574 1  

Nature Climate Change volume  14 ,  pages 22–30 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

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Climate change and decarbonization raise complex justice questions that researchers and policymakers must address. The distributions of greenhouse gas emissions rights and mitigation efforts have dominated justice discourses within scenario research, an integrative element of the IPCC. However, the space of justice considerations is much larger. At present, there is no consistent approach to comprehensively incorporate and examine justice considerations. Here we propose a conceptual framework grounded in philosophical theory for this purpose. We apply this framework to climate mitigation scenarios literature as proof of concept, enabling a more holistic and multidimensional investigation of justice. We identify areas of future research, including new metrics of service provisioning essential for human well-being.

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These authors contributed equally: Caroline Zimm, Kian Mintz-Woo.

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International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria

Caroline Zimm, Kian Mintz-Woo, Elina Brutschin, Susanne Hanger-Kopp, Roman Hoffmann, Jarmo S. Kikstra, Michael Kuhn, Jihoon Min, Raya Muttarak, Shonali Pachauri, Omkar Patange, Keywan Riahi & Thomas Schinko

Department of Philosophy and Environmental Research Institute, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland

Kian Mintz-Woo

Climate Policy Lab, Department for Environmental Systems Science, ETH Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland

Susanne Hanger-Kopp

The Grantham Institute for Climate Change and the Environment, Imperial College London, London, UK

Jarmo S. Kikstra

Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London, London, UK

Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

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University of Graz, Graz, Austria

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Zimm, C., Mintz-Woo, K., Brutschin, E. et al. Justice considerations in climate research. Nat. Clim. Chang. 14 , 22–30 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01869-0

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• DOI: 10.1080/2325548X.2024.2315334
• Corpus ID: 270481701

Climate Change Justice and Global Resource Commons: Local and Global Postcolonial Political Ecologies

• Dinesh Paudel , Brandon B. Derman , +2 authors Shangrila Joshi
• Published in The AAG Review of Books 2 April 2024
• Political Science, Environmental Science

59 References

Struggles for climate justice: uneven geographies and the politics of connection, climate justice in the majority world, the unbearable heaviness of climate coloniality, from climate adaptation to climate justice: critical reflections on the ipcc and himalayan climate knowledges, a plural climate studies framework for the himalayas, thinking algorithmically: the making of hegemonic knowledge in climate governance, taking science by surprise: the knowledge politics of the ipcc special report on 1.5 degrees, struggles for climate justice, “infrastructural geopolitics” of climate knowledge: the brazilian earth system model and the north-south knowledge divide, dangerous incrementalism of the paris agreement, related papers.

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Climate finance justice: International perspectives on climate policy, social justice, and capital

• Published: 31 July 2020
• Volume 161 , pages 243–249, ( 2020 )

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1 Introduction

In the 2015 Paris Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established, for the first time, the international community’s intention to direct sufficient finance to address climate change. Along with the goals of “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” and “increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change,” Article 2 of the Agreement recognized that “finance flows” were essential to achieve these longstanding goals of “low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (COP21 2015 ; Whitley et al. 2018 ). The UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) takes a comprehensive view of climate finance, defining it as finance aimed at “reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and… at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts” (SCF 2014 , 5). More specifically, climate finance typically consists of grants, loans, equity in the form of purchased shares, and debt relief. In the SCF’s Biennial Assessment of climate finance flows, total global funding in 2016 was calculated to be USD 681 billion, as a high-bound estimate. This was an increase of 17% over the previous two years, with most of the growth occurring in new private investments in renewable energy projects (SCF 2018 ).

The politics of climate finance are centered on the recognition that the Global North has disproportionately benefited from fossil fuel production and use, while the Global South experiences more severe hazard events, such as droughts and storms, with higher levels of vulnerability to them. According to this framing, the Global North has both the moral responsibility to fund climate change mitigation and adaptation responses and the greater capacity to do so. Climate finance is thus a reaction to historical and ongoing injustice at the same time that it needs to be interpreted through the framework of justice. In this special issue, we explore the multiple and contested intersections of climate justice and finance. What kinds of justice and injustice do we see in climate finance? And how does climate justice influence flows and constructions of capital?

The financial responsibility of the Global North was codified in the UNFCCC’s 2010 Cancún Agreements: “…developed country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries” (COP16 2010 ). The Paris Agreement extended this commitment through 2025. In order to assess the progress in meeting this target, it is necessary to have internationally agreed upon rules for counting what qualifies as climate finance. However, these rules do not exist (Roberts and Weikmans 2017 ). Despite the resulting ambiguity, the two leading organizations that track climate finance have produced similar estimates of Global North financing. The aforementioned 2018 Biennial Assessment conducted by the SCF found that USD 55.7 billion flowed to the Global South in 2016, a 30% increase over 2014 levels (SCF 2018 ). Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development produced a climate-related development finance database that recorded USD 56.7 billion of Global North funding in 2017 (OECD n.d. ). When we compare the estimate of USD 681 billion for the entirety of climate finance in 2016, we see that Global North funding under the Cancún pledge accounts for less than 10%. The majority of climate finance remains in the Global North to fund for-profit projects like renewable energy development (Yeo 2019 ).

The Paris Agreement establishes that there should be a balance in funding between adaptation and mitigation. However, approximately twice the amount of finance goes towards projects that are mitigation-only compared to adaptation-only (OECD n.d. ). This has consequences for the mode of climate financing because most mitigation funding comes in the form of debt financing that needs to be paid back, while most adaptation funding consists of grants (SCF 2018 ). Moreover, the amount of global funding that does go towards mitigation and adaptation is grossly insufficient. The IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C found that approximately USD 830 billion in “additional annual average energy-related investments” would need to be made between 2016 and 2050 to limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100 (Masson-Delmotte et al. 2018 , sec. C.2.6). Adaptation costs are estimated to range between USD 70 and 100 billion annually, according to the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (Chambwera et al. 2014 ). A more recent study by the United Nations Environment Programme found that annual adaptation costs in the Global South could increase to between USD 280 and 500 billion by 2050 (Puig et al. 2016 ).

2 Emergent themes in climate finance justice

Building from the movements against environmental racism and for environmental justice, climate justice as a distinct concept began to coalesce in the 1990s. A key moment was a meeting in Bali in preparation for the second Earth Summit, held in Johannesburg in 2002. The Bali Principles of Climate Justice were articulated by a coalition of groups, including CorpWatch, World Rainforest Movement, Friends of the Earth International, and the Indigenous Environmental Network. The 27 Bali Principles called for the elimination of greenhouse gases, “the rights of indigenous peoples and affected communities to represent and speak for themselves,” and the “recognition of a principle of ecological debt that industrialized governments and transnational corporations owe the rest of the world,” among other tenets common to the climate justice movement today (CorpWatch 2002 ). At COP13 (that is, the UNFCCC’s 13 th conference of the parties) in Bali in 2007, representatives from the Global South and low-income communities in the North united under the name “Climate Justice Now!”. The group issued a series of “genuine solutions” that echoed many of the Bali Principles, but also significantly called for “huge financial transfers from North to South, based on the repayment of climate debts and subject to democratic control” (Tokar 2019 ).

We can identify two major theoretically divergent approaches to climate justice. First, there are thinkers based in philosophy and environmental ethics (Jamieson 2010a , b and Shue 1995 ) who frame climate change as a result of historic and current carbon emissions. They are concerned with who is responsible for existing carbon emissions, how future emissions should be quantified and valued, and who pays for climate impacts, and why. Second, there are those who approach justice from the perspective of social movements, interrogating the role of marginalization in the experience and suffering of climate impacts (Roberts and Parks 2006 ; Bond 2012 ). They address how social movements have united and gained traction under the umbrella of global climate concerns to challenge existing social and environmental injustices.

Climate justice-based arguments for climate finance typically draw on the twin principles of historical responsibility for climate change and of the greater capacity to act (Sayegh 2019 ). As part of the neoliberal turn toward environmental management, the Global North’s increasing use of climate finance has included a reliance on markets and economic modelling, such as carbon taxes (Bumpus 2015 ), insurance (Johnson 2013 ), carbon offsets (Bumpus and Liverman 2008 ), payments for ecosystem services (McAfee and Shapiro 2010 ), cap and trade (Klinsky 2013 ), adaptation funds (Grasso 2009 ), and loss and damage compensation (Roberts and Huq 2015 ). But does this deployment of finance undermine other climate justice goals? What are the limits of using finance to pursue justice?

The articles in this special issue highlight several cross-cutting themes, including the reproduction of uneven development, the ongoing influence of increasingly weak institutions like the UNFCCC and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the continued reliance on problematic financial mechanisms to address climate change, like trust funds, carbon offsets, the Clean Development Mechanism, and REDD+, and the problems that arise when local oversight and expertise are devalued or excluded. Other authors found that there is a common reliance on financial mechanisms to do development work; that universal finance tools can be ill-suited to accomplishing climate justice rooted in a particular place; and that many of these financial tools are complex by design, making accountability to, and interest in, climate justice difficult.

Our aim in organizing this collection of articles is to highlight recurring themes in critical research that demonstrate tensions between concepts of justice and economic models, financial tools, and flows of capital. These themes include the role of finance mechanisms like carbon markets, carbon offsets, and the GCF in raising and disbursing development aid; the ways that civil society is challenging how and by whom climate finance is administered; how social movements are pushing for capital flows to be managed by grassroots organizations rather than supranational institutions like the World Bank (Lohmann 2008 ); and ultimately how the complexities of finance and bureaucracy often obfuscate injustice.

3 The articles in this special issue

The articles in this special issue cover a broad international survey of climate finance justice. They range from richly empirical studies grounded in particular projects and places to critical analyses of the implications of using finance to manage climate change and redress its attendant losses. We begin with Khan et al.’s review of climate adaptation finance under the UNFCCC, from the early years of the COP process, through the middle Copenhagen era, to our post-Paris Agreement age. Drawing on multiple forms of justice – distributive, procedural, recognition, compensatory, restitutive, corrective, and neoliberal – the authors examine how adaptation finance has been variously understood and contested over time as new norms and rules arise. In analyzing whether the governance and delivery of adaptation finance has become more just, they focus on the questions of how much finance should be allocated, and by whom. While noting the ongoing reluctance of wealthy countries to accept responsibility for the climate catastrophe, the authors show how those in power continue to control policy development, which has led to justice commitments with little promise of ever being honored.

In the Paris Agreement, loss and damage (L&D) joined mitigation and adaptation as the three fundamental pillars of climate change management. (L&D is an umbrella term that encompasses the social, political, economic, or cultural impacts that lie beyond our capacity to adapt to climate change.) Williams addresses the convergence of scientific, legal, and policy communities in dealing with the direct and indirect impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Namely, she focuses on the development of the research field of scientific attribution, lawsuits against fossil fuel companies, and UNFCCC negotiations for L&D. Within these three converging communities, Williams examines key conceptual and ethical issues concerning which communities become part of attribution studies and lawsuits, and which fossil fuel emitters are targeted by policy and the law. In doing so, Williams operationalizes an accountability-based approach to anthropogenic climate change by drawing on concepts of climate justice. She argues that an accountability-based approach should focus on those communities most impacted by climate change, in contrast to their relative neglect in detection and attribution work and in lawsuits. In addition, an accountability-based approach would also focus on the responsible agents, who can be identified by their significant contributions to emissions in combination with some improper act, such as negligence, the active avoidance of safer alternatives or blocking mitigation efforts.

In another policy-focused piece, Gifford examines the development and consequence of climate change mitigation products through an empirical focus on forest carbon offsets. By identifying three key ‘points of engagement’ in the carbon accounting process – baseline scenarios, additionality, and uncertainty – Gifford illustrates how activities deemed technical or apolitical are often spaces where uneven social and political interests are manipulated or obscured, leading to variable impacts in carbon sequestration and climate change mitigation. The article includes a review of the emergence of forest carbon offsets and how they evolved as objects of analysis in the social sciences, with a look at how accusations of carbon colonialism and fraud have led the mechanism to be reinvented in North/North contexts in the US. Conclusions are drawn from five years of field work, encompassing 77 interviews on forest carbon offsets in the Peruvian Amazon and in Maine, at the UNFCCC, at professional carbon market association meetings, civil society actions, and via participant observation in carbon accounting training courses.

Sauls shares another perspective on the use of conservation for climate change mitigation, as she questions how international climate finance can be used to protect forests in a way that accords with the affected communities’ own conceptions of justice. For a coalition of ten Indigenous and forest peoples’ groups in Mexico and Central America – the Mesoamerican Alliance of Peoples and Forests (AMPB) – one way to bring about more effective outcomes for mitigating climate change would be a variation on REDD+ that recognizes their territorial rights. While REDD+ funding typically relies on exogenous technical knowledge to calculate forest stocks and loss, the AMPB’s proposal of a Mesoamerican Territorial Fund (MTF) as an alternative climate change finance mechanism is designed to accomplish both climate benefits and strengthen AMPB members’ efforts for self-determination and support the survival of their cultural identities. However, there is a tension between the requirements that major donors place on entities to be fundable – for example, the need for performance-focused results – and the AMPB members’ demands for autonomy and equity. Ultimately, Sauls sees an opening for climate finance like the proposed MTF to accomplish distributive, procedural, and historical justice on the territorial scale.

Shumais and Mohamed similarly explore another type of climate finance deployed within least developed countries: Environmental Trust Funds (ETFs). Their article examines the characteristics that make ETFs successful, with a particular emphasis on the relatively overlooked experiences of Small Island Developing States. An ETF is a government-led investment vehicle that can raise and distribute financial resources to address environmental issues. The authors focus on the Maldives’s Climate Change Trust Fund (CCTF), which was set up in 2012 to enhance renewable energy, wetland management, coral reef monitoring and rainwater harvesting. Using the CCTF as a case study, the authors show that insufficient local expertise in renewable energy was a principal hindrance to the fund’s success. The authors also compare the Maldives’s CCTF with an ETF in Bhutan. They conclude that Bhutan’s use of an autonomous and politically independent organization to facilitate its fund’s projects led to greater success than in the Maldives where projects were directly managed by the ETF. Additional criteria for successful ETFs identified by the authors include stakeholder participation and the incorporation of objectives beyond those of the fund itself.

Cholibois explores another effort to expand renewable energy in the Global South, with a focus on the role that climate finance could have in Madagascar’s energy transition. If Madagascar can receive sufficient funding, the construction of large-scale renewable energy – in a country largely lacking a national grid – would allow it to bypass the conventional path of fossil fuel consumption. Cholibois argues that climate finance is necessary for countries that struggle to fund development projects, such as Madagascar, whose per capita GDP was lower in 2010 than fifty years earlier. Madagascar has received climate finance in the form of grants and loans. Grants-based electrification projects typically invest in complementary services, such as educational campaigns, and recognize the importance of bringing electricity to rural areas. However, the use of private capital, like concessional loans, is increasingly common in Madagascar, which risks excluding the poorest parts of rural Madagascar from the benefit of expanded electrification. This would undermine energy justice in the country by increasing inequality in access to electricity.

Finally, using the Lower Sesan 2 hydropower dam in Cambodia as a lens through which to consider flaws in the UN Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Baird and Green demonstrate that hydroelectricity’s promise of lowered greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions typically comes at the expense of other serious negative social and environmental consequences. The Lower Sesan, and other CDM-funded hydropower projects in Cambodia, have flooded forested areas, forced the relocation of communities, and blocked the migration of fish species. Moreover, there is often little proof that Cambodia’s hydropower projects needed CDM financing to be built. This fraud has undermined mitigation efforts and taken funding from projects that could have resulted in additional cuts to GHG. As the CDM is scheduled to end in 2020, there is the opportunity for its successor financing mechanism to rigorously uphold both clearly specified sustainable development goals and quantified reductions in carbon emissions.

A robust international movement has been organizing and advocating for climate justice for more than 10 years. And it has accomplished much. The Global North pledge at COP16 in Cancún to finance mitigation and adaptation was partly a response to the climate justice demands that asked wealthy countries to recognize their disproportionate responsibility for climate change and their capacity to act. Thus, because climate finance has been fundamentally framed as an issue of climate justice, we need to rigorously and comprehensively analyze the climate justice outcomes of these financial flows. We can state that the inability of the Global North to transfer USD 100 billion per year to the Global South, which is already insufficient for current needs, is in itself a failure of justice. As for how climate finance is being deployed, the articles in this special issue make clear that frequently the “winners” of financialized climate governance are neoliberal institutions, and other entities promoting market-based strategies for climate mitigation and adaptation. Ultimately, much of this research shows that justice remains more of a discursive tool than an action, with just climate finance still seemingly out of reach.

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Climate finance justice: International perspectives on climate policy, social justice, and capital. Climatic Change 161 , 243–249 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02790-7

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Published : 31 July 2020

Issue Date : July 2020

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02790-7

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The Most Important Climate Litigation Cases of 2024 and Why They Matter

The intensifying climate crisis is marked by a rise in severe weather events and economic insecurity for many. In 2024, climate litigation continues to emerge as a crucial strategy in tackling the ongoing crisis as more individuals, environmental groups, and communities seek legal avenues to hold governments and corporations accountable for their contributions to climate change. Here are some of this year’s most important climate lawsuits.

Climate ambition worldwide remains insufficient to address the climate crisis, leading to a surge in legal actions by individuals, groups, and governments seeking to enforce existing climate laws, integrate climate action into environmental laws, demand more ambitious climate policies, and establish clear human rights obligations affected by climate change.

As we have witnessed in the Global Climate Litigation Report 2023 , this year will also see a significant escalation in the battle against climate change, with a predicted global surge in environmental lawsuits. 

Governments and major corporations, known for their substantial environmental footprints, are likely to face legal challenges as their commercial activities often conflict with existing green legislation, whether at the state or global level. This is particularly relevant as more countries worldwide are pushing for comprehensive strategies to achieve net-zero emissions and a fossil fuel phaseout in the near future. 

Let us delve into some of the significant climate litigation cases unfolding this year.

You might also like: Elections 2024: How Much Do Voters Care About Climate?

10 Global Climate Lawsuits to Follow this Year

1. friends of the earth’s legal battles.

The climate advocacy organization Friends of the Earth has been at the forefront of legal actions against Royal Dutch Shell and ING Bank. This year, a Dutch court is scheduled to review an appeal by the Dutch arm of Friends of the Earth regarding a landmark ruling against oil giant Shell. This ruling marked the first instance where a private corporation was mandated to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. 

Additionally, the organization has initiated a climate lawsuit against Amsterdam-based global bank ING. The lawsuit demands that ING cease “contributing to dangerous climate change in the future” by discontinuing loans to fossil fuel customers who continue to expand oil, gas, and coal activities without a robust phase-out plan. ING has already responded by acknowledging the urgency of limiting global warming to 1.5C and the necessity of transitioning to a low-carbon economy. ING reaffirms its commitment to sustainability and expresses its willingness to engage in constructive dialogue or court proceedings if necessary.

2. Chicago’s climate litigation

Chicago is taking a bold step by suing five major oil and gas companies, including BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, and Shell, as well as the American Petroleum Institute, for their alleged role in contributing to climate change and its destructive impacts on the city. The lawsuit alleges that these companies have misled the public about the dangers of climate change and have actively worked to undermine scientific evidence. 

Chicago seeks to hold these companies accountable for the costs associated with climate change, including damage to property and infrastructure and is spending significant resources on climate projects in low-income communities. The case has been met with criticism from the American Petroleum Institute, which argues that climate policy should be determined by Congress rather than the courts.

3. Portuguese children’s climate case

Initiated in September 2020 by four Portuguese children and two young adults against 32 European governments, this case alleges human rights violations – right to life, right to privacy, right not to experience discrimination – as a consequence of the government’s inadequate action to address the climate crisis. The lawsuit represents the largest climate case ever to be brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg.

Centrally, the allegations address the expectations of children and youth and the rights of future generations to an environment that is not destroyed by climate change. If successful, the complaint could prompt the European Court, as well as national courts to demand faster carbon dioxide emission reductions from governments. A ruling in the case is expected in the first half of 2024.

More on the topic: Portugal’s Gen-Z Sues 32 Governments in Largest Climate Trial to Be Heard by Europe’s Top Human Rights Court

4. Pacific coast tribes litigate big oil for climate deception

The Makah and Shoalwater Bay Tribes, two federally recognized sovereign Native Nations in Washington state, are suing major oil and gas companies for their role in causing disastrous changes to the climate. The tribes argue that these changes have forced their communities to relocate to higher ground, resulting in millions of dollars in losses. 

They are seeking to hold ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, BP, ConocoPhillips, and Phillips 66 accountable for their deceptive conduct, including misleading marketing campaigns about the dangers of fossil fuels. If successful, the lawsuits would force the companies to pay for the damage caused by their actions. This case could signal a new avenue for tribal governments to recover climate costs from polluters.

5. California youth sue EPA over climate change

Our Children’s Trust , representing 18 California children, is taking legal action against the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The lawsuit alleges that the EPA violated the children’s constitutional rights by failing to protect them from the effects of climate change. The lead plaintiff, “Genesis B.,” a 17-year-old Long Beach resident, is unable to stay cool in her home during the day due to extreme heat days, which impacts her ability to focus on schoolwork.

Other plaintiffs, aged eight to 17, have experienced wildfires and flooding, forcing them to evacuate or cancel activities. The lawsuit claims the EPA’s inaction on carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels violates the children’s constitutional rights and seeks declarations about the environmental rights of children and the EPA’s responsibility to protect them.

6. California charges oil and gas companies for climate change misinformation

Joined by California Governor Gavin Newsom , State Attorney General Rob Bonta has filed a lawsuit against five major oil and gas companies ExxonMobil et al. and the American Petroleum Institute for misleading the public about climate change, marking a significant legal challenge against the fossil fuel industry. 

The lawsuit alleges that these companies have known since at least the 1960s that the burning of fossil fuels would warm the planet and change the climate, yet they have denied or downplayed these facts in their public statements and marketing. It seeks to hold these companies accountable for the damages caused by climate change in California and to prevent further false or misleading statements about the contribution of fossil fuel combustion to climate change.

You might also like: Leading the Way: California’s Trailblazing Efforts to Fight Climate Change

7. Elderly Swiss women challenge government over climate inaction

In 2024, an important ruling is anticipated from the case of older Swiss women who argue before the European Court of Human Rights that their government’s failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has violated their human rights. The women, all over 63, contend that more frequent and intense heatwaves – a result of climate change – are infringing on their rights to life and health. According to the group KlimaSeniorinnen (Senior Women for Climate Protection), the Swiss government is responsible for this harm due to its contribution to climate change and weak domestic emissions reduction policies.

The case, the first in the European Court of Human Rights, could set a significant legal precedent. The judges posed challenging questions during the hearing, such as the standards for evaluating the adequacy of governments’ climate policies under human rights law and the interpretation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to safeguard the rights of those vulnerable to climate change. 

This case, along with others like the Portuguese child-led climate allegations, scrutinizes government commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and urges European governments to demonstrate that their climate policies uphold human rights.

8. African communities seek justice

In May 2023, communities from South Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Uganda united to testify against corporate giants Shell and TotalEnergies at a groundbreaking People’s Tribunal, demanding reparations for health crises and environmental destruction caused by extractive projects. 

The Niger Delta, heavily impacted by Shell’s presence, continues to suffer from ecological devastation despite the company’s plans to withdraw from the region. In South Africa, a coastal community is fighting Shell’s offshore drilling, while Mozambicans and Ugandans shared stories of displacement and violence linked to Total’s gas exploration and pipeline projects. 

Recognizing health as collective and ecological, the People’s Health Tribunal seeks reparative justice beyond legal systems, envisioning a healing process for both people and the land.

Greenpeace International and the People’s Health Tribunal have joined forces to create a testimonial video, amplifying their voices and calling for reparations.

From the Niger Delta to the EACOP pipeline, communities are facing displacement, violence, and ecological destruction at the hands of @Shell and @TotalEnergies 💔 👀 WATCH their demands for reparations in our new video. #EndFossilCrimes #MakePollutersPay #PeoplesHealthTribunal pic.twitter.com/3LqlgK3fk1 — Greenpeace International (@Greenpeace) February 15, 2024

9. Norwegian state appeals ruling invalidating oil field approvals

In a landmark case , Greenpeace Nordic and Natur og Ungdom (Young Friends of the Earth Norway) last month secured a historic win in the Oslo District Court, which found the approvals of three oil fields in the North Sea invalid. 

The court issued an injunction forbidding the State from granting any new permits necessary to construct and produce from the fields, citing the government’s failure to assess the global climate effects of the fields before their approval. 

Despite the State’s appeal, the injunctions remain enforceable, halting development and production in all three fields. The organizations argue that the State’s actions violate the Norwegian Constitution, European Economic Area law, and international human rights commitments.

10. Hawaii’s youth climate advocates fight for environmental justice

Taliya Nishida, a high school sophomore from Hawaii, is among 14 youth advocates who sued the Hawaii Department of Transportation over transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions, as the state’s transportation systems have seen an increase in emissions in recent years. 

Nishida’s family lives off-grid on the Big Island, relying on solar panels and water catchments, and they have experienced firsthand the devastating effects of extreme weather events, such as flash floods. 

The lawsuit, Navahine F. v. Hawaii Department of Transportation, aims to compel the state to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and is scheduled to go to trial next summer. 

The lawsuit is also part of a growing international movement of young people taking climate action in the courts, seeking to hold governments and corporations accountable for their role in contributing to climate change.

Overall and Conclusion

The landscape of global climate litigation is constantly evolving , presenting a dynamic tapestry of challenges and opportunities. The implementation of court orders, especially those that assign responsibility for climate change, will demand innovative approaches. It is noteworthy that an increasing number of modern youth and women are actively engaging in climate justice .

Indigenous communities, who are already bearing a disproportionate burden, may increasingly turn to legal avenues for policy change and compensation. Today, we also see a surge in cases related to climate-induced migration and displacement, which raises complex questions about international law and human rights. However, there will also be cases aimed at impeding climate action, highlighting the necessity for robust legal defenses.

Featured image: Li-An Lim/Unsplash

You might also like: Just Transition Litigation: What Is It and How Can it Help Achieve a More Just Society?

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Future of Land and Housing

Why housing justice is key to climate justice.

Simon Drayton / Shutterstock.com

Yuliya panfil, june 18, 2024.

Summer has come, and it promises to be among the hottest on record.

It’s only June but Arizona is already baking under 110 degree temperatures. And the state’s most vulnerable residents are cooking too, trapped in flimsy mobile homes that landlords are prohibiting them from equipping with lifesaving A/C units. Mobile homes make up only 5 percent of the state’s housing stock, but account for almost 40 percent of heat deaths.

Meanwhile, communities in Florida, Texas and Puerto Rico are battening down the hatches for what promises to be an abnormally brutal hurricane season. But hatches look different, depending on wealth, class and race. Miami’s luxury towers are fortressed with hurricane-proof windows and flood panels, while Texas’ colonias , which house half a million of the state's poorest residents, are located inside the drainage areas of dams built to keep wealthier areas safe from flooding.

After the storms hit, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will unleash billions of dollars in housing reconstruction funds. And yet, FEMA has found that these offerings primarily go to wealthy and white residents, despite the fact that homes in low-income and minority neighborhoods are more likely to be heavily damaged. The result: poor residents of color are at once more likely to be displaced from their homes by natural disasters, and also more likely to remain displaced long-term, for lack of funding to rebuild.

Already in Northwest Arkansas, tornadoes destroyed hundreds of older homes over Memorial Day weekend. The people displaced — many of them old, poor or sick — are the ones least able to rebuild or relocate. And housing prices have risen so sharply in this corner of the state that homeowners insurance won’t cover the replacement value of their homes.

"People are going to have to go 20 or 30 miles out of town to find housing at the same prices," local leaders said in the days after. “[They’ll] be couch-surfing for months."

But at least homeowners in Arkansas have access to some form of homeowners insurance.

Large insurers have largely abandoned fire-prone California, and smaller ones risk becoming insolvent. As increasingly frequent and severe wildfires devastate hundreds of thousands of properties, private insurance companies’ bottom lines can't sustain coverage in an area they see as too climate-vulnerable to insure. The exodus has led to a kind of climate gentrification: the only homeowners who can remain in the state are those wealthy enough to afford the inflated prices of California’s insurer of last resort , or liquid enough not to need a mortgage loan.

For millions of us, where we live and the kind of home we live in will determine just how bad climate impacts will be, and how quickly we will be able to recover from them.

These examples make obvious a fact that most of us know intuitively: home is where the majority of Americans will experience the first and worst climate impacts. For millions of us, where we live and the kind of home we live in will determine just how bad climate impacts will be, and how quickly we will be able to recover from them.

And as Dana Bourland, Senior Vice President at JPB Foundation, recently wrote , our history of racist housing policies has led to the reality today that Black people, Indigenous people, and people of color are the most likely to lack access to safe and affordable housing — and to live in the most climate-vulnerable places.

These same populations are also less able to rebuild their homes, either because they lack liquidity or cannot access government or private dollars to finance repairs. And many are forced to stay in increasingly dangerous conditions because they lack the means to move away.

For all these reasons, access to safe, adequate, and affordable housing for all — otherwise known as housing justice — is perhaps the single most effective way to ensure climate justice.

Climate justice : a subset of the Environmental Justice movement that highlights the disparate impacts of climate change on vulnerable communities, and advocates for a fairer distribution of resources to address the impacts of climate change.

Housing justice : equitable access to safe, affordable, and adequate housing, regardless of their socioeconomic status, race, gender, or other characteristics. It is rooted in the belief that housing is a fundamental human right.

Community leaders know this well. One would be hard pressed to find a grassroots climate justice organization that does not include housing security within its platform.

Federal policymakers are also beginning to draw the link. HUD’s 2021 climate action plan , for example, recognizes the housing agency’s centrality in addressing the climate crisis and HUD’s subsequent annual budget requests have included hundreds of millions of dollars earmarked for increasing climate resilience and addressing environmental injustices.

And three recent federal legislative packages — the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), and the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) — offer trillions of dollars of funding for climate resilience, a significant portion of which can be used for housing.

But these national funds and directives don’t always reach the communities who need them.

As we’ve written before, most small towns lack the bureaucratic infrastructure to apply for and implement the federal climate programs that fund action on housing justice. In many cities and counties, climate-related bodies (to the extent they exist) are siloed from housing offices; many cities are unaware that the resilience and adaptation funds within the IRA can be used to build affordable housing, for example.

And because decisions related to this funding — from how it’s used to how it’s allocated — come from the top down, the outcomes can be unjust for local communities. For example: Harris County, Texas implements the nation’s only large scale mandatory buyout program for flood-prone homes. These buyouts are primarily occurring in Houston’s poor communities of color, leaving residents irate that their neighbors in wealthier and whiter (but equally flood-prone) areas are not being forced to move.

It turns out, this targeting is intentional: as county staff told Grist reporter Amal Ahmed , “HUD requires that certain grants benefit low and moderate-income communities.”

While it’s true that Black and brown neighborhoods are more likely to be in flood-prone areas, the funding incentives guiding the implementation of federal grant funds continue patterns of harm for marginalized residents. When frontline communities don’t participate in policy planning, well-intentioned climate justice policies result in perverse impacts.

Grassroots and community organizations have an easier time accessing and deploying philanthropic dollars, but few climate philanthropies provide money for housing. And over the last decade several large funders, including Ford Foundation and Omidyar Network, have wound down their housing investments — a perplexing choice in the midst of our country’s housing affordability crisis.

Where to next?

1. More funding for housing justice

A large and growing body of literature outlines the myriad ways in which housing forms the backbone of climate and environmental justice. Given the centrality of stable housing for achieving climate resilience, almost any housing justice investment will have either direct or knock-on impacts for bolstering climate justice.

And yet, housing is less affordable now than any point in recent memory. In other words: as climate impacts increase, the capacity of our housing to provide us with climate resilience is actually decreasing. And, the populations most at risk for climate impacts are exactly the ones experiencing the most significant housing affordability and housing stability shocks. By leaving these frontline families behind when it comes to safe and affordable housing, we are dealing a simultaneous blow to housing justice and to climate justice.

For all these reasons, any funder who cares about climate justice should be putting funds into housing security.

Given the centrality of stable housing for achieving climate resilience, almost any housing justice investment will have either direct or knock-on impacts for bolstering climate justice.

2. Solving the last mile problem for impacted communities

The good news is that the federal government is increasingly making the link between housing justice and climate justice in its policies, planning, and funding.

But we suffer from a last mile problem: the funds aren’t getting to the communities who need them most, and often the solutions that do reach communities aren’t necessarily the ones they would have opted for, if asked.

We must build the capacity of frontline communities to apply for and administer climate funding. That includes funding intermediary organizations like Houston-based Connective , which stood up an online system to help residents most impacted by the storm easily access home rebuilding funds. It also includes relaxing the overly burdensome federal and state guidelines around the allocation and use of climate funds.

3. Centering impacted communities in planning housing justice solutions

We must also include impacted communities in the design of climate-related housing justice initiatives. Residents often provide direct input into local housing policy decisions, often with the help of grassroots organizers. At their best, these examples of community-centered planning can lead to profound and sometimes surprising impacts. In Kingston, New York, for example, residents worked with the mayor to determine that a fitting solution for the city’s housing affordability crisis was to decrease rents. A state housing law allowed tenants to form a board that voted to decrease rent by 15 percent– an unprecedented solution to a common problem. In Kansas City, resident-led organizations pushed the city to establish a right to counsel program that provides free legal representation to every tenant in eviction court. The program has prevented more than 1,000 evictions since 2022.

One could imagine user-centered design processes yielding transformative changes to building codes, housing-related climate mitigation support, and post-disaster housing aid. Asking communities what they need and how they prefer to access assistance ensures that the climate justice solutions devised in Washington and state capitals are actually just.

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