Major Political Thinkers: Plato to Mill

An annotated guide to the major political thinkers from Plato to John Stuart Mill with a brief description of why their work is important and links to the recommended texts, and other readings.

The Author : Quentin Taylor is Professor of History and Political Science at Rogers State University. He has written widely on the political classics from Plato to Rawls.

A Guide to the "Major Political Thinkers: Plato to Mill", by Quentin Taylor

Introduction.

  • Collections:  Books on Political Theory
  • Exploring Ideas:  Readings on Political Thought
  • Quotations about Liberty and Power
  • Liberty Matters Online Forum

Political speculation in the West is as old as the Western tradition itself. Its origins may be traced as far back as Homer, but its foundations were laid by Plato and Aristotle. While many of the questions asked by political thinkers have remained the same —what is justice? — the answers have varied considerably over the last 2,400 years. The following selections represent the principal works of the major political philosophers, from the ancient Greeks and Romans to the mid-nineteenth century.

  • Collections:  The American Founding Fathers

The American Founders were familiar with the names of all these thinkers (except Mill) and had read many of their works, as evidenced by their own libraries and papers. For a list of the most frequently read political authors of the Founding Era, see Donald Lutz and for an essay on the “ Founding Father’s Library ,” see Forrest McDonald.

Plato (427 BC-347 BC) The Republic

As the first philosophical examination of “justice” in Western literature, the Republic occupies a seminal place in the history of political thought. Written in the form of a dialogue, Plato employs Socrates as a kind of discussion leader who seeks to discover justice in the individual by defining justice in the state. This discursive search leads Socrates-cum-Plato to reach some rather unexpected conclusions and to embrace some unconventional social practices and political arrangements, including the rule of philosophers. In addition to outlining the ideal state, Plato explores “corrupt” or “deviant” regimes (timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny) through an analysis of their leading symptoms and psychological foundations. While often denounced as an enemy of the “open society,” Plato challenges us to reexamine prevailing orthodoxies and reconsider the higher purposes of community.

Plato, "The Republic" in The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with Analyses and Introductions by B. Jowett, M.A. in Five Volumes . 3rd edition revised and corrected (Oxford University Press, 1892). 8/14/2014. < /titles/767#lf0131-03_head_001 >. The text is in the public domain.

Plato (427-347 BC) The Statesman

In the Republic , Plato suggests that ruling is a kind of science or craft and concludes that only those trained in this craft should be permitted to govern. In the Statesman , he attempts to carefully define this “royal science” and distinguish it from other activities. In the process a new element is introduced — adherence to law — which becomes the basis for evaluating good and bad forms of regime types (e.g., monarchy vs. tyranny). Those regimes which follow the law — although inferior to the untrammeled rule of true philosophers — are far better than those that do not. With this concession to non-ideal forms of government, Plato foreshadows his abandonment of philosophic rule in the Republic in favor of the “second-best” state of the Laws .

Plato, "The Statesman" in The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with Analyses and Introductions by B. Jowett, M.A. in Five Volumes. 3rd edition revised and corrected (Oxford University Press, 1892). 8/14/2014. < /titles/768#lf0131-04_head_016 >. The text is in the public domain.

Plato (427-347) The Laws

His last and longest dialogue, the Laws is Plato’s most important contribution to legal and political science. In the form of a discussion between an Athenian, a Spartan, and a Cretan, Plato outlines the “second-best” state (the “law state”) in painstaking detail. While retaining some of the idealism of the Republic , the Laws aims at a more realizable goal, a community based on the principle of moderation. Accordingly, Plato replaces the communal living arrangements of the Republic with private property and permits citizens a voice in the management of public affairs. He also prefigures the famous “mixed” or “balanced” constitution, observing that democracy should be tempered with monarchy. His provisions for making, revising, and teaching the laws is a tacit admission that the “royal science” of philosophers must give way to known and settled rules. Similarly, Plato’s interest in existing institutions and appreciation for imperfect regimes serves as a bridge to the more empirical and realistic politics of Aristotle.

Plato, "The Laws" in The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with Analyses and Introductions by B. Jowett, M.A. in Five Volumes. 3rd edition revised and corrected (Oxford University Press, 1892). 8/14/2014. < /titles/769#lf0131-05_head_018 >. The text is in the public domain.

Aristotle (384-322 BC) The Politics

Like his teacher Plato, Aristotle was interested in the nature of the political as such and deeply normative in his approach to politics. He was, however, more empirical and scientific in his method, writing treatises instead of dialogues and often handling his materials with considerable detachment. The result in the Politics is a far-reaching and often penetrating treatment of political life, from the origins and purpose of the state to the nuances of institutional arrangements. While Aristotle’s remarks on slavery, women, and laborers are often embarrassing to modern readers, his analysis of regime types (including the causes of their preservation and destruction) remains of perennial interest. His discussion of “polity”— a fusion of oligarchy and democracy — has been of particular significance in the history of popular government. Finally, his contention that a constitution is more than a set of political institutions, but also embodies a shared way of life, has proved a fruitful insight in the hands of subsequent thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville .

Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. into English with introduction, marginal analysis, essays, notes and indices by B. Jowett. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1885. 2 vols. Vol. 1. 8/14/2014. < /titles/579#lf0033-01_head_014 >. The text is in the public domain.

Cicero (106 BC-43 BC) The Laws (51 BC)

Statesman, orator, and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero became the most widely read and admired Roman author following the recovery of his major works during the Renaissance. Best known for his public orations, he also penned two theoretical works on politics, the Republic and the Laws . Cast in the form of dialogues, each work addresses several leading concerns of political life, e.g., the relation between liberty and equality, the nature of political leadership, and the interplay of institutions. The Laws is particuarly noteworthy for its treatment of Natural Law, which can be traced down through the centuries to our own day. (Echoes of Cicero may be found in such luminaries as Thomas Aquinas , John Locke , and Thomas Jefferson .) Regrettably, only a portion of the dialogue survives, yet its author’s reflections on law and public morality remain fresh and relevant.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Political Works of Marcus Tullius Cicero: Comprising his Treatise on the Commonwealth; and his Treatise on the Laws. Translated from the original, with Dissertations and Notes in Two Volumes. By Francis Barham, Esq. (London: Edmund Spettigue, 1841-42). Vol. 2. 8/14/2014. < /titles/545#lf0044-02_head_004 >. The text is in the public domain.

Cicero (106 BC-43 BC) The Republic (54 BC)

Like Plato’s dialogue of the same name, Cicero’s Republic embodies a comprehensive and ideal vision of political life. In addition to a search for justice, the discussants explore such foundational issues as the relation between the individual and the state, the qualities of the ideal statesman, and the nature of political knowledge. Additional themes include constitutional forms and their evolution, the social harmony of classes, and the influence of education on private morals and public virtue. Like the Laws , the Republic is a fragmentary work, but one that still resonates in the modern world.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Political Works of Marcus Tullius Cicero: Comprising his Treatise on the Commonwealth; and his Treatise on the Laws. Translated from the original, with Dissertations and Notes in Two Volumes. By Francis Barham, Esq . (London: Edmund Spettigue, 1841-42). Vol. 1. 8/14/2014. < /titles/546 >. The text is in the public domain.

Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274) On Law and Justice (1274)

St. Thomas Aquinas

The Online Library of Liberty hopes to add Thomas’s writings on law and justice in the near future.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892). 8/14/2014. < /titles/1967 >. The text is in the public domain.

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) The Prince (1513)

The Prince is at once the most famous and infamous work in the canon of political thought. Instead of considering questions of justice and the ideal state, Machiavelli proposed to advise a “new” prince on how to succesfully maintain power. Given the realities of human nature and politics, it is sometimes necessary for a prince to “do evil,” including acts of violence, deceit, and cruelty, in order to survive. For Machiavelli, the capacity for such acts is not an aberration of the political art, but an essential part of a ruler’s “skill set.” Such stark realism and the hard break with the Classical-Christian tradition has led many to denounce Machiavelli as an “immoralist,” an “advisor to tyrants,” and a “teacher of evil.” Others have defended the Prince for its author’s realistic appraisal of politics, shrewd psychological insights, and tough-minded advice for a dangerous world. This “little book” (as Machiavelli called it) will undoubtedly continue to provoke highly varied responses.

Niccolo Machiavelli, "The Prince" in The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, tr. from the Italian, by Christian E. Detmold (Boston, J. R. Osgood and company, 1882). Vol. 2. 8/14/2014. < /titles/775#lf0076-02_head_002 >. The text is in the public domain.

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) The Discourses (1513)

The Discourses on Livy is often described as Machiavelli’s “book on republics,” but this is not entirely accurate. He does focus on republics, ancient and modern, but he also discusses monarchies or princedoms. On the other hand, his advice in the Prince is often relevant to leaders of republics. There is, however, a tension between the republicanism of the Discourses and the autocracy of the Prince , for the same author who champions the cause of liberty and self-government in the former gives advice on preserving one-man rule in the latter. It is, however, possible to find a common thread in Machiavelli’s mode of analysis (realist and historical) and to view the Prince as a special instance of his political science and the Discourses as the core of this science, as well as the heart of his political creed. In recent years, it is the Machiavelli of the Discourses who has gained the attention (and often admiration) of scholars for reviving the republican tradition in the modern world.

Niccolo Machiavelli, "Discourses of the First Ten Books of Titus Livius" in The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, tr. from the Italian, by Christian E. Detmold (Boston, J. R. Osgood and company, 1882). Vol. 2. 8/14/2014. < /titles/775#lf0076-02_head_031 >. The text is in the public domain.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) Leviathan (1651)

Best known as the “father” of modern absolutism, Hobbes is also credited as the “father” of modern political science. In Leviathan , his principal work, the English philosopher endeavored to establish a new “science of politics” on the basis of the first principles of human nature. While his conclusion — that without an all-powerful Sovereign life would be a “war of all against all” — was largely rejected by his contemporaries, the novelty of his method and his reliance on natural law inaugurated a new era in political thinking. His use of the “social contract” as a method of explaining the origin and legitimacy of public authority would be adopted to more liberal ends by thinkers such as Locke and Rousseau . Moreover, Hobbes’s contention that men possess “natural” rights — that by nature individuals are free, equal, and autonomous — readily lent itself to theories of limited government. For this reason, Hobbes is often identified, paradoxically, as the “father” of modern liberalism. See, in particular, chapters 13-31.

Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes’s Leviathan reprinted from the edition of 1651 with an Essay by the Late W.G. Pogson Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909). 8/14/2014. < /titles/869 >. The text is in the public domain.

Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) Political Treatise (1677)

Spinoza’s fame as a philosopher largely rests on his Ethics , but he also made an important, if rather engimatic, contribution to political thought. While employing much of the language and framework of natural rights thinkers, Spinoza rejected natural law as a regulative principle and adopted an entirely prudential approach to questions of civic formation, obligation, legitimacy, and freedom. Often described as a Hobbesian, Spinoza differs in important respects from his English predecessor. He advanced ideas of religious toleration and freedom of expression, held that peace was more than just the absence of war, and identified positive aspects in different forms of government. That he adopted these positions on pragmatic, rather than principled, grounds and denied inherent natural rights, places Spinoza outside the mainstream of modern liberalism, but he ultimately endorsed a relatively democratic and open society.

Benedict de Spinoza, "A Political Treatise" in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, translated from the Latin, with an Introduction by R.H.M. Elwes, vol. 1 Introduction, Tractatus-Theologico-Politicus, Tractatus Politicus. Revised edition (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891). 8/14/2014. < /titles/1710#lf1321-01_head_042 >. The text is in the public domain.

John Locke (1632-1704) Second Treatise of Government (1690)

Few political thinkers have had such a profound and lasting influence as John Locke . His Second Treatise , written against the backdrop of political crisis and revolution, contains classic arguments against arbitrary and despotic government. Drawing on the tradition of natural law, Locke developed a theory of natural liberty that placed limits on civil authority. For Locke, government is founded in human need and arises from “inconveniences” in the “state of nature.” Like Hobbes , he finds the origins of political authority in the “social contract,” a voluntary agreement to enter into civil society. Unlike Hobbes, however, the sovereignty of the people is not permanently transferred to an absolute “Sovereign,” but is temporarily delegated to a government of limited power. Locke’s Second Treatise also made important contributions to the concepts of equality, rule of law, separation of powers, majoritarianism, and the right to revolution. Along with its theory of (private) property, the Second Treatise remains the seminal text of classical liberalism.

For additional reading see Eric Mack’s Introduction to the Political Thought of John Locke (in particular his Second Treatise of Government ).

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government , ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764). 8/14/2014. < /titles/222#lf0057_head_018 >. The text is in the public domain.

David Hume (1711-1776) Political Essays (1741, 1752)

Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Hume’s reputation as a major political thinker does not rest on a single systematic treastise, but rather on a series of topical essays. Hume also diverged from his English predecesors in his approach to politics, adopting a less abstract and more historical perspective. This led Hume to reject the idea of the social contract as an ahistorical fiction of dubious value: utility and interest are the mainsprings of government and the bases of community. In the Essays , Hume addresses many of the leading themes of political reflection, including property, obligation, liberty, and the forms of goverment. His essays on money, taxes, and commerce did much to establish modern political economy, and anticipated the doctrines of Hume’s friend, Adam Smith . His remarks on political parties and the balancing of opposed interests are believed to have significantly influenced James Madison , whose famous treatment of factions in Federalist 10 has a distinct Humean ring. See, especially, Part One, Essays 2-9, 12 and all of Part Two.

David Hume, "Foreword" in Essays Moral, Political, Literary, edited and with a Foreword, Notes, and Glossary by Eugene F. Miller, with an appendix of variant readings from the 1889 edition by T.H. Green and T.H. Grose, revised edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1987). 8/14/2014. < /titles/704#lf0059_head_001 >. The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.

Montesquieu (1689-1755) The Spirit of the Laws (1748)

Like Hume, Montesquieu’s approach to political thinking was historical, and his aim was less to construct a political theory than to understand law, liberty, and government in their various relations. In the Spirit of the Laws , Montesquieu explores these relations in great detail, considering the effects of climate, commerce, religion, and the family. This attention to the influence of social factors on law and government has led modern scholars to call him the “father” of sociology. Montesqueiu also engaged in the more conventional practice of regime analysis, with particular emphasis on the conditions that support political liberty. He is best known, however, for his discussion of the English constitution, his model of a modern free government. For Montesquieu, English liberty is the product of a balanced constitution, and specifically the separation of legislative and executive power. These reflections, as well as his observations on the conditions which support republics, would exercise a powerful influence on the American Founders, who appealed to Montesquieu — “that great man” — with considerable frequency. See in particular, Books 1-5 and 11.

Charles Louis de Secondat, "The Spirit of the Laws" in Baron de Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 1.8/14/2014. < /titles/837 >. The text is in the public domain.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) The Social Contract (1762)

“Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.” Thus begins the Social Contract , Rousseau’s principal work of political thought. Like Hobbes and Locke , Rousseau made use of the “social contract” to explain the origins of civil society, but in his version sovereignty is neither transferred nor delegated to the government, but remains with the people collectively. In Rousseau’s ideal republic, the citizens legislate directly in accordance with the “general will,” the common good. To recognize this good, citizens must be trained in virtue and roughly similar in circumstances. Only then will they be fit for self-government; only then will they be truly free. Rousseau’s model of a small city-state was out of step with the times, but his general ideas on liberty, equality, and democracy were highly influential. His treatment of these themes, however, is not without paradox, for there is a tendency toward collectivism and orthodoxy in many of his prescriptions. This aside, the Social Contract continues to inform debates over civic virtue and popular democracy, as well as present-day efforts to reconcile liberty, equality, and order.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract" in Ideal Empires and Republics. Rousseau’s Social Contract, More’s Utopia, Bacon’s New Atlantis, Campanella’s City of the Sun, with an Introduction by Charles M. Andrews (Washington: M. Walter Dunne, 1901). 8/14/2014. < /titles/2039#lf1414_head_004 >. The text is in the public domain.

Hamilton (1757-1804), Madison (1751-1836), and Jay (1745-1829) The Federalist (1788)

 

Begun as a series of newspaper articles, the Federalist papers were written under the pseudonym “Publius” in defense of the proposed Constitution drafted in the summer of 1787. In the process of answering the critics, Publius provided a thorough and far-ranging account of how the envisioned federal republic would secure order, protect liberty, and produce prosperity. Central to this account was a discussion of those “auxiliary precautions” or institutional safeguards that in the absence of “better motives” would serve to “counteract ambition.” Such “inventions of prudence” were required to preserve liberty and insure the stability of popular government. While written for a specific purpose — the Constitution’s adoption — the Federalist often soars above the immediate context to touch on the perennial themes of politics, making it the one great classic of American political thought. See, in particular, No. 10 (faction and the extended republic), No. 39 (republicanism and federalism), No. 51 (separation of powers and checks and balances), and No. 78 (judicial review).

George W. Carey, The Federalist (The Gideon Edition), Edited with an Introduction, Reader’s Guide, Constitutional Cross-reference, Index, and Glossary by George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001). 8/14/2014. < /titles/788 >. The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.

Edmund Burke (1729-1797) Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790)

Had Burke never penned the Reflections on the Revolution in France , he might be best remembered as the British politician who defended the rights and liberties of the American colonists. As it is, Burke is best known as an apostle of order, tradition, and authority; indeed, as the “father” of modern conservatism. Writing in response to the outbreak of the French Revolution, Burke predicted that the attempt to remodel French society and government on the basis of abstract notions, such as the “rights of man,” would end in disaster. His warning was not so much directed at the French as his own countrymen, some of whom were drawing inspiration from events in France to initiate reform in Britain. In the process of excoriating the leaders of the Revolution and their “preposterous way of reasoning,” Burke addressed the central questions of political speculation, arriving at general principles by way of history, human nature, and circumstances. If his conclusions appeared reactionary to many, his approach to the social order, with its emphasis on prudence, utility, and prescription, reflects a depth and subtlety that has few rivals in the history of political thought.

For additional reading see the Debate about the French Revolution .

Edmund Burke,"Reflections on the Revolution in France" in Select Works of Edmund Burke. A New Imprint of the Payne Edition. Foreword and Biographical Note by Francis Canavan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 2. 8/14/2014. < /titles/656 >. The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) On Liberty (1859)

A century-and-a-half after its appearance, On Liberty remains the classic defense of individual freedom and the open society. For Mill , human happiness — the “greatest good” — is only possible in a free society where individuals are at liberty to make decisions about their lives. These decisions, including what to think, say, read, and write, should be free from state interference and left to the discretion of individuals. Believing that discussion, debate, and diversity were essential to the progress of society, Mill called for the widest degree of latitude for individual expression and even encouraged “experiments in living.” As long as people respect the rights of others, they should be allowed to think and live as they choose. Some beliefs and ways of living might be better than others, but it was not the proper role of the state to regulate such matters. Unlike classial liberals, Mill did not base his argument for liberty on natural right, but on utility or the “greatest happiness” principle. While this led him into some curious paradoxes, his strong defense of individual liberty and self-determination place him in the vanguard of liberal thinkers.

John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVIII - Essays on Politics and Society Part I, ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by Alexander Brady (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). 8/14/2014. < /titles/233#lf0223-18_head_051 >. The online edition of the Collected Works is published under licence from the copyright holder, The University of Toronto Press. ©2006 The University of Toronto Press. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form or medium without the permission of The University of Toronto Press.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) Considerations of Representative Government (1861)

Considerations on Representative Government is sometimes characterized as the mold into which Mill poured the principles contained in On Liberty . With the belief that a government is never neutral in its effects, Mill proposed a number of broad reforms designed to better represent the electorate, improve the quality of representatives, and give experts a dominant role in legislating. If not exactly “illiberal,” a number of his proposals are less than democratic, even by the standards of the day. Basically, Mill envisioned an administrative state in which an elite bureaucracy would govern with the advice and consent of the legislature, whose principal function was to serve as a check on the executive. He did embrace popular government for its tendency to galvanize the energies of the people as well as encourage self-reliance and public- spiritedness. For Mill some type of high-toned republic represents the ideal. He did not, however, believe this model was suitable for less advanced peoples, whose level of development might require more autocratic methods.

John Stuart Mill, "Considerations of Representative Government" in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIX - Essays on Politics and Society Part II, ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by Alexander Brady (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). 8/14/2014. < /titles/234#lf0223-19_head_008 >. The online edition of the Collected Works is published under licence from the copyright holder, The University of Toronto Press. ©2006 The University of Toronto Press. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form or medium without the permission of The University of Toronto Press.

Encyclopedia Britannica

  • Games & Quizzes
  • History & Society
  • Science & Tech
  • Biographies
  • Animals & Nature
  • Geography & Travel
  • Arts & Culture
  • On This Day
  • One Good Fact
  • New Articles
  • Lifestyles & Social Issues
  • Philosophy & Religion
  • Politics, Law & Government
  • World History
  • Health & Medicine
  • Browse Biographies
  • Birds, Reptiles & Other Vertebrates
  • Bugs, Mollusks & Other Invertebrates
  • Environment
  • Fossils & Geologic Time
  • Entertainment & Pop Culture
  • Sports & Recreation
  • Visual Arts
  • Demystified
  • Image Galleries
  • Infographics
  • Top Questions
  • Britannica Kids
  • Saving Earth
  • Space Next 50
  • Student Center
  • Introduction
  • Cicero and the Stoics
  • St. Augustine
  • John of Salisbury
  • Machiavelli
  • Richard Hooker’s adapted Thomism
  • Montesquieu
  • Utilitarianism
  • Tocqueville
  • Liberal nationalism
  • American constitutionalism
  • Anarchism and utopianism
  • Saint-Simon and Comte
  • Marx and Engels
  • Lukács and Gramsci
  • Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse
  • Logical-positivist interlude
  • Libertarian and communitarian critiques
  • Foucault and postmodernism
  • Feminism and sexual equality
  • Contemporary questions

Code of Hammurabi

  • Where did Marxism come from?
  • Why is Marxism important?
  • How is Marxism different from other forms of socialism?
  • How does Marxism differ from Leninism?
  • What did Plato do?

John Locke (1632-1704) English philosopher, regarded as the father of British empiricism author of Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). His political philosophy exerted considerable influence on the American revolution and French revolution.

political philosophy

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

  • Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Political philosophy
  • Great Thinkers - Political Philosophy
  • Humanities LibreTexts - Political Philosophy
  • Loyola University Chicago - Department of Philosophy - Social and Political Philosophy
  • The Basics of Philosophy - Political Philosophy
  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Ancient Political Philosophy
  • The University of Texas at Austin - College of Liberal Arts - Political Philosophy
  • Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Political Philosophy: Methodology
  • Table Of Contents

Code of Hammurabi

political philosophy , branch of philosophy that is concerned, at the most abstract level, with the concepts and arguments involved in political opinion . The meaning of the term political is itself one of the major problems of political philosophy. Broadly, however, one may characterize as political all those practices and institutions that are concerned with government .

The central problem of political philosophy is how to deploy or limit public power so as to maintain the survival and enhance the quality of human life. Like all aspects of human experience, political philosophy is conditioned by environment and by the scope and limitations of mind , and the answers given by successive political philosophers to perennial problems reflect the knowledge and the assumptions of their times. Political philosophy, as distinct from the study of political and administrative organization, is more theoretical and normative than descriptive. It is inevitably related to general philosophy and is itself a subject of cultural anthropology , sociology , and the sociology of knowledge. As a normative discipline it is thus concerned with what ought, on various assumptions, to be and how this purpose can be promoted, rather than with a description of facts—although any realistic political theory is necessarily related to these facts. The political philosopher is thus not concerned so much, for example, with how pressure groups work or how, by various systems of voting, decisions are arrived at as with what the aims of the whole political process should be in the light of a particular philosophy of life.

There is thus a distinction between political philosophy, which reflects the world outlook of successive theorists and which demands an appreciation of their historical settings, and modern political science proper, which, insofar as it can be called a science , is empirical and descriptive. Political philosophy, however, is not merely unpractical speculation, though it may give rise to highly impractical myths: it is a vitally important aspect of life, and one that, for good or evil, has had decisive results on political action, for the assumptions on which political life is conducted clearly must influence what actually happens. Political philosophy may thus be viewed as one of the most important intellectual disciplines , for it sets standards of judgment and defines constructive purposes for the use of public power. Such consideration of the purposes for which power should be used is in a sense more urgent today than it was in earlier periods, for humankind has at its disposal the power either to create a world civilization in which modern technology can benefit the human race or to destroy itself in pursuit of political myths . The scope for political philosophy is thus great, the clarification of its purpose and limitations urgent—an aspect, indeed, of civilization’s survival.

Despite this unique aspect of the contemporary situation, and although ancient political philosophies were formulated under very different conditions, their study still illuminates vital questions today. Questions concerning the aims of government, the grounds of political obligation, the rights of individuals against the state, the basis of sovereignty , the relation of executive to legislative power, and the nature of political liberty and social justice have been asked and answered in many ways over the centuries. They are all fundamental to political philosophy and demand answers in terms of modern knowledge and opinion.

This article describes how these questions have been asked and answered by representative and influential political philosophers in the West, from Greco-Roman antiquity through the Middle Ages, early modern times, and the 19th, 20th, and early 21st centuries. During so long a time span the historical context of these formulations has changed profoundly, and an understanding of the political philosophers selected demands some account of their background. Because of limitations of space, only political philosophers of outstanding importance have been at all fully described, although many minor figures also are briefly discussed.

Open Yale Courses

You are here, plsc 114: introduction to political philosophy,  - introduction: what is political philosophy.

Professor Smith discusses the nature and scope of “political philosophy.” The oldest of the social sciences, the study of political philosophy must begin with the works of Plato and Aristotle, and examine in depth the fundamental concepts and categories of the study of politics. The questions “which regimes are best?” and “what constitutes good citizenship?” are posed and discussed in the context of Plato’s Apology.

Plato, Apology , translated with an introduction by Benjamin Jowett Courtesy of the University of Adelaide Library Electronic Texts Collection

http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/p/plato/p71ap/

Lecture Chapters

  • What Is Political Philosophy?
  • What Is a Regime?
  • Who Is a Statesman? What Is a Statesman?
  • What Is the Best Regime?
Transcript Audio Low Bandwidth Video High Bandwidth Video

 Let me start today by asking the question, “what is political philosophy?” Custom dictates that I say something about the subject matter of this course at its outset. This in some ways might seem a case of putting the cart before the horse, or the cart before the course maybe, because how can you say, how can we say what political philosophy is in advance of doing it? Anyway, let me try to say something that might be useful.

In one sense, you could say political philosophy is simply a branch or what we call a subfield of the field of political science. Yes, all right. It exists alongside of other areas of political inquiry like American government, comparative politics, and international relations. Yet in another sense, political philosophy is something much different than simply a subfield; it seems to be the oldest and most fundamental part of political science. Its purpose is to lay bare, as it were, the fundamental problems, the fundamental concepts and categories which frame the study of politics. In this respect it seems to me much less like just a branch of political science than the foundation of the entire discipline.

The study of political philosophy often begins as this course will do also, with the study of the great books or some of the great books of our field. Political philosophy is the oldest of the social sciences, and it can boast a wealth of heavy hitters from Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel, Tocqueville, Nietzsche, and so on. You might say that the best way to learn what political philosophy is, is simply to study and read the works of those who have shaped the field–yes, right? But to do that is, I recognize, not without dangers, often severe dangers of its own. Why study just these thinkers and not others? Is not any so-called list of great thinkers or great texts likely to be simply arbitrary and tell us more about what such a list excludes than what it includes? Furthermore, it would seem that the study of the great books or great thinkers of the past can easily degenerate into a kind of antiquarianism, into a sort of pedantry. We find ourselves easily intimidated by a list of famous names and end up not thinking for ourselves. Furthermore, doesn’t the study of old books, often very old books, risk overlooking the issues facing us today? What can Aristotle or Hobbes tells us about the world of globalization, of terrorism, of ethnic conflict and the like? Doesn’t political science make any progress? After all, economists no longer read Adam Smith. I hesitate to… I   hesitate to say that you will never read Adam Smith in an economics course here at Yale, and it is very unlikely that you will read Freud in your psychology classes. So why then does political science, apparently uniquely among the social sciences, continue to study Aristotle, Locke and other old books?

These are all real questions, and I raise them now myself because they are questions I want you to be thinking about as you do your reading and work through this course. I want you to remain alive to them throughout the semester. Yes? Okay. One reason I want to suggest that we continue to read these books is not because political science makes no progress, or that we are somehow uniquely fixated on an ancient past, but because these works provide us with the most basic questions that continue to guide our field. We continue to ask the same questions that were asked by Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and others. We may not accept their answers and it’s very likely that we do not, but their questions are often put with a kind of unrivaled clarity and insight. The fact is that there are still people in the world, many people, who regard themselves as Aristotelians, Thomists, Lockeans, Kantians, even the occasional Marxist can still be found in Ivy League universities. These doctrines have not simply been refuted, or replaced, or historically superceded; they remain in many ways constitutive of our most basis outlooks and attitudes. They are very much alive with us today, right. So political philosophy is not just some kind of strange historical appendage attached to the trunk of political science; it is constitutive of its deepest problems.

If you doubt the importance of the study of political ideas for politics, consider the works of a famous economist, John Maynard Keynes, everyone’s heard of him. Keynes wrote in 1935. “The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood….Practical men,” Keynes continues, practical men “who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back” [ , Chapter 24]. So this course will be devoted to the study of those “academic scribblers” who have written books that continue to impress and create the forms of authority with which we are familiar. But one thing we should not do, right, one thing we should not do is to approach these works as if they provide, somehow, answers, ready-made answers to the problems of today. Only we can provide answers to our problems. Rather, the great works provide us, so to speak, with a repository of fundamental or permanent questions that political scientists still continue to rely on in their work. The great thinkers are great not because they’ve created some set of museum pieces that can be catalogued, admired, and then safely ignored like a kind of antiquities gallery in the Metropolitan Museum of Art; but rather because they have defined the problems that all later thinkers and scholars have had to use in order to make sense of their world at all. Again, we still think in terms of the basic concepts and categories that were created for us long ago. Okay?

So one thing you will quickly note is that there are no permanent answers in a study of political philosophy. A famous mathematician once said, “Every question must have a correct answer, for every question one answer.” That itself is an eminently contestable proposition. Among the great thinkers there is profound disagreement over the answers to even the most fundamental questions concerning justice, concerning rights, concerning liberty. In political philosophy, it is never a sufficient answer to answer a question with a statement “because Plato says so,” or “because Nietzsche says so.” There are no final authorities in that respect in philosophy because even the greatest thinkers disagree profoundly with one another over their answers, and it is precisely this disagreement with one another that makes it possible for us, the readers today, to enter into their conversation. We are called upon first to read and listen, and then to judge “who’s right?” [and] “how do we know?” The only way to decide is not to defer to authority, whoever’s authority, but to rely on our own powers of reason and judgment, in other words the freedom of the human mind to determine for us what seems right or best. Okay?

But what are these problems that I’m referring to? What are these problems that constitute the subject matter of the study of politics? What are the questions that political scientists try to answer? Such a list may be long, but not infinitely so. Among the oldest and still most fundamental questions are: what is justice? What are the goals of a decent society? How should a citizen be educated? Why should I obey the law, and what are the limits, if any, to my obligation? What constitutes the ground of human dignity? Is it freedom? Is it virtue? Is it love, is it friendship? And of course, the all important question, even though political philosophers and political scientists rarely pronounce it, namely,  , what is God? Does he exist? And what does that imply for our obligations as human beings and citizens? Those are some of the most basic and fundamental problems of the study of politics, but you might say, where does one enter this debate? Which questions and which thinkers should one pick up for oneself?

Perhaps the oldest and most fundamental question that I wish to examine in the course of this semester is the question: what is a regime? What are regimes? What are regime politics? The term “regime” is a familiar one. We often hear today about shaping regimes or about changing regimes, but what is a regime? How many kinds are there? How are they defined? What holds them together, and what causes them to fall apart? Is there a single best regime? Those are the questions I want us to consider. The concept of the regime is perhaps the oldest and most fundamental of political ideas. It goes back to Plato and even before him. In fact, the title of the book that you will be reading part of for this semester, Plato’s  , is actually a translation of the Greek word   that means constitution or regime. The   is a book about the regime and all later political philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, and that means that it must provide a series of variations, so to speak, on Plato’s conception of the best regime. But what is a regime? Broadly speaking, a regime indicates a form of government, whether it is ruled by the one, a few, the many, or as more common, some mixture, a combination of these three ruling powers. The regime is defined in the first instance by how people are governed and how public offices are distributed by election, by birth, by lot, by outstanding personal qualities and achievements, and what constitutes a people’s rights and responsibilities. The regime again refers above all to a form of government. The political world does not present itself as simply an infinite variety of different shapes. It is structured and ordered into a few basic regime types. In this, I take it to be one of the most important propositions and insights of political science. Right? So far?

But there is a corollary to this insight. The regime is always something particular. It stands in a relation of opposition to other regime types, and as a consequence the possibility of conflict, of tension, and war is built in to the very structure of politics. Regimes are necessarily partisan, that is to say they instill certain loyalties and passions in the same way that one may feel partisanship to the New York Yankees or the Boston Red Sox, or to Yale over all rival colleges and institutions, right? Fierce loyalty, partisanship: it is inseparable from the character of regime politics. These passionate attachments are not merely something that take place, you might, say between different regimes, but even within them, as different parties and groups with loyalties and attachments contend for power, for honor, and for interest. Henry Adams once cynically reflected that politics is simply the “organization of hatreds,” and there is more than a grain of truth to this, right, although he did not say that it was also an attempt to channel and redirect those hatreds and animosities towards something like a common good. This raises the question whether it is possible to transform politics, to replace enmity and factional conflict with friendship, to replace conflict with harmony? Today it is the hope of many people, both here and abroad, that we might even overcome, might even transcend the basic structure of regime politics altogether and organize our world around global norms of justice and international law. Is such a thing possible? It can’t be ruled out, but such a world, I would note–let’s just say a world administered by international courts of law, by judges and judicial tribunals–would no longer be a political world. Politics only takes place within the context of the particular. It is only possible within the structure of the regime itself.

But a regime is more than simply a set of formal structures and institutions, okay? It consists of the entire way of life, the moral and religious practices, the habits, customs, and sentiments that make a people what they are. The regime constitutes an  , that is to say a distinctive character, that nurtures distinctive human types. Every regime shapes a common character, a common character type with distinctive traits and qualities. So the study of regime politics is in part a study of the distinctive national character types that constitutes a citizen body. To take an example of what I mean, when Tocqueville studied the American regime or the democratic regime, properly speaking, in  , he started first with our formal political institutions as enumerated in the Constitution, such things as the separation of powers, the division between state and federal government and so on, but then went on to look at such informal practices as American manners and morals, our tendency to form small civic associations, our peculiar moralism and religious life, our defensiveness about democracy and so on. All of these intellectual and moral customs and habits helped to constitute the democratic regime. And this regime–in this sense the regime describes the character or tone of a society. What a society finds most praiseworthy, what it looks up to, okay? You can’t understand a regime unless you understand, so to speak, what it stands for, what a people stand for, what they look up to as well as its, again, its structure of institutions and rights and privileges.

This raises a further set of questions that we will consider over the term. How are regimes founded, the founding of regimes? What brings them into being and sustains them over time? For thinkers like Tocqueville, for example, regimes are embedded in the deep structures of human history that have determined over long centuries the shape of our political institutions and the way we think about them. Yet other voices within the tradition–Plato, Machiavelli, Rousseau come to mind–believed that regimes can be self-consciously founded through deliberate acts of great statesmen or founding fathers as we might call them. These statesmen–Machiavelli for example refers to Romulus, Moses, Cyrus, as the founders that he looks to; we might think of men like Washington, Jefferson, Adams and the like–are shapers of peoples and institutions. The very first of the   by Alexander Hamilton even begins by posing this question in the starkest terms. “It has been frequently remarked,” Hamilton writes, “that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” There we see Hamilton asking the basic question about the founding of political institutions: are they created, as he puts it, by “reflection and choice,” that is to say by a deliberate act of statecraft and conscious human intelligence, or are regimes always the product of accident, circumstance, custom, and history?

But the idea that regimes may be created or founded by a set of deliberate acts raises a further question that we will study, and is inseparable from the study of regimes.  ? Who is a statesman? What is a statesman? Again, one of the oldest questions of political science, very rarely asked by the political science of today that is very skeptical of the language of statesmanship. In its oldest sense, political science simply was a science of statecraft. It was addressed to statesman or potential statesmen charged with steering the ship of state. What are the qualities necessary for sound statesmanship? How does statecraft differ from other kinds of activities? Must a good statesman, as Plato believed for example, be a philosopher versed in poetry, mathematics, and metaphysics? Or is statesmanship, as Aristotle believed, a purely practical skill requiring judgment based on deliberation and experience? Is a streak of cruelty and a willingness to act immorally necessary for statecraft, as Machiavelli infamously argued? Must the statesman be capable of literally transforming human nature, as Rousseau maintains, or is the sovereign a more or less faceless bureaucrat in manner of a modern CEO, as, for example, someone like Hobbes seems to have believed? All of our texts that we will read–the , the  , the  , the  –have different views on the qualities of statecraft and what are those qualities necessary to found and maintain states that we will be considering.

All of this, in a way, is another way of saying, or at least implying, okay, that political philosophy is an imminently  discipline, a practical field. Its purpose is not simply contemplation, its purpose is not reflection alone: it is advice giving. None of the people we will study this semester were cloistered scholars detached from the world, although this is a very common prejudice against political philosophy, that it is somehow uniquely sort of “pie in the sky” and detached from the world. But the great thinkers were very far from being just, so to speak, detached intellectuals. Plato undertook three long and dangerous voyages to Sicily in order to advise the King Dionysius. Aristotle famously was a tutor of Alexander the Great. Machiavelli spent a large part of his career in the foreign service of his native Florence, and wrote as an advisor to the Medici. Hobbes was the tutor to a royal household who followed the King into exile during the English Civil War. And Locke was associated with the Shaftsbury Circle who also was forced into exile after being accused of plotting against the English King. Rousseau had no official political connections, but he signed his name always Jean Jacques Rousseau, “citizen of Geneva,” and was approached to write constitutions for Poland and for the island of Corsica. And Tocqueville was a member of the French National Assembly whose experience of American democracy deeply affected the way he saw the future of Europe. So the great political thinkers were typically engaged in the politics of their times and help in that way to provide us, okay, with models for how we might think about ours.

But this goes in a slightly different direction as well. Not only is this study of the regime, as we’ve seen, as I’ve just tried to indicate, rooted in, in many ways, the practical experience of the thinkers we’ll be looking at; but the study of regime politics either implicitly or explicitly raises a question that goes beyond the boundary of any given society. A regime, as I’ve said, constitutes a people’s way of life, what they believe makes their life worth living, or to put it again slightly differently, what a people stand for. Although we are most familiar with the character of a modern democratic regime such as ours, the study of political philosophy is in many ways a kind of immersion into what we might call today comparative politics; that is to say it opens up to us the variety of regimes, each with its own distinctive set of claims or principles, each vying and potentially in conflict with all the others, okay? Underlying this cacophony of regimes is the question always, which of these regimes is best? What has or ought to have a claim on our loyalty and rational consent?

Political philosophy is always guided by the question of the best regime. But what   the best regime? Even to raise such a question seems to pose insuperable obstacles. Isn’t that a completely subjective judgment, what one thinks is the best regime? How could one begin such a study? Is the best regime, as the ancients tended to believe, Plato, Aristotle, and others, is it an aristocratic republic in which only the few best habitually rule; or is the best regime as the moderns believe, a democratic republic where in principle political office is open to all by virtue of their membership in society alone? Will the best regime be a small closed society that through generations has made a supreme sacrifice towards self-perfection? Think of that. Or will the best regime be a large cosmopolitan order embracing all human beings, perhaps even a kind of universal League of Nations consisting of all free and equal men and women?

Whatever form the best regime takes, however, it will always favor a certain kind of human being with a certain set of character traits. Is that type the common man, is it found in democracies; those of acquired taste and money, as in aristocracies; the warrior; or even the priest, as in theocracies? No, no question that I can think of can be more fundamental. And this finally raises the question of the relation between the best regime or the good regime, and what we could say are actually existing regimes, regimes that we are all familiar with. What function does the best regime play in political science? How does it guide our actions here and now? This issue received a kind of classic formulation in Aristotle’s distinction of what he called the good human being and the good citizen. For the good citizen–we’ll read this chapter later on in the  –for the good citizen you could say patriotism is enough, to uphold and defend the laws of your own country simply because they   your own is both necessary and sufficient. Such a view of citizen virtue runs into the obvious objection that the good citizen of one regime will be at odds with the good citizen of another: a good citizen of contemporary Iran will not be the same as the good citizen of contemporary America.

But the good citizen, Aristotle goes on to say, is not the same as the good human being, right? Where the good citizen is relative to the regime, you might say regime-specific, the good human being, so he believes, is good everywhere. The good human being loves what is good simply, not because it is his own, but because it   good. Some sense of this was demonstrated in Abraham Lincoln’s judgment about Henry Clay, an early idol of Lincoln’s. Lincoln wrote of Clay, “He loved his country,” he said, “partly because it was his own country”–  because it was his own country–;”but mainly because it was a free country.” His point, I think, is that Clay exhibited, at least on Lincoln’s telling, something of the philosopher, what he loved was an idea, the idea of freedom. That idea was not the property of one particular country, but it was constitutive of any good society. The good human being, it would seem, would be a philosopher, or at least would have something philosophical about him or her, and who may only be fully at home in the best regime. But of course the best regime lacks actuality. We all know that. It has never existed. The best regime embodies a supreme paradox, it would seem. It is superior in some ways to all actual regimes, but it has no concrete existence anywhere. This makes it difficult, you could say and this is Aristotle’s point, I think, this makes it difficult for the philosopher to be a good citizen of any actual regime. Philosophy will never feel fully or truly at home in any particular society. The philosopher can never be truly loyal to anyone or anything but what is best. Think of that: it raises a question about issues of love, loyalty, and friendship.

This tension, of course, between the best regime and any actual regime is the space that makes political philosophy possible. In the best regime, if we were to inhabit such, political philosophy would be unnecessary or redundant. It would wither away. Political philosophy exists and only exists in that… call it “zone of indeterminacy” between the “is” and the “ought,” between the actual and the ideal. This is why political philosophy is always and necessarily a potentially disturbing undertaking. Those who embark on the quest for knowledge of the best regime may not return the same people that they were before. You may return with very different loyalties and allegiances than you had in the beginning. But there is some compensation for this, I think. The ancients had a beautiful word, or at least the Greeks had a beautiful word, for this quest, for this desire for knowledge of the best regime. They called it   or love, right? The quest for knowledge of the best regime must necessarily be accompanied, sustained, and elevated by  . You may not have realized it when you walked in to this class today, but the study of political philosophy may be the highest tribute we pay to love. Think of that. And while you’re thinking about it you can start reading Plato’s   for Socrates which we will discuss for class on Wednesday. Okay? It’s nice to see you back, and have a very good but thoughtful September 11 .

[end of transcript]

  • Accessibility Statement
  • Introduction, Awards, and Recognitions
  • Table of Contents with Critical Media Literacy Connections
  • Updates & Latest Additions
  • Learning Pathway: Racial Justice and Black Lives Matter
  • Learning Pathway: Influential Women and Women's History/Herstory
  • Learning Pathway: Student Rights in School and Society
  • Learning Pathway: Elections 2024, 2022, & 2020
  • Learning Pathway: Current Events
  • Learning Pathway: Critical Media Literacy
  • Teacher-Designed Learning Plans
  • Topic 1. The Philosophical Foundations of the United States Political System
  • 1.1. The Government of Ancient Athens
  • 1.2. The Government of the Roman Republic
  • 1.3. Enlightenment Thinkers and Democratic Government
  • 1.4. British Influences on American Government
  • 1.5. Native American Influences on U.S. Government
  • Topic 2. The Development of the United States Government
  • 2.1. The Revolutionary Era and the Declaration of Independence
  • 2.2. The Articles of Confederation
  • 2.3. The Constitutional Convention
  • 2.4. Debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
  • 2.5. Articles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
  • Topic 3. Institutions of United States Government
  • 3.1. Branches of the Government and the Separation of Powers
  • 3.2. Checks and Balances Between the Branches of Government
  • 3.3. The Roles of the Congress, the President, and the Courts
  • 3.4. Elections and Nominations
  • 3.5. The Role of Political Parties
  • Topic 4. The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens
  • 4.1. Becoming a Citizen
  • 4.2. Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens and Non-Citizens
  • 4.3. Civic, Political, and Private Life
  • 4.4. Fundamental Principles and Values of American Political and Civic Life
  • 4.5. Voting and Citizen Participation in the Political Process
  • 4.6. Election Information
  • 4.7. Leadership and the Qualities of Political Leaders
  • 4.8. Cooperation Between Individuals and Elected Leaders
  • 4.9. Public Service as a Career
  • 4.10. Liberty in Conflict with Equality or Authority
  • 4.11. Political Courage and Those Who Affirmed or Denied Democratic Ideals
  • 4.12. The Role of Political Protest
  • 4.13. Public and Private Interest Groups, PACs, and Labor Unions
  • Topic 5. The Constitution, Amendments, and Supreme Court Decisions
  • 5.1. The Necessary and Proper Clause
  • 5.2. Amendments to the Constitution
  • 5.3. Constitutional Issues Related to the Civil War, Federal Power, and Individual Civil Rights
  • 5.4. Civil Rights and Equal Protection for Race, Gender, and Disability
  • 5.5. Marbury v. Madison and the Principle of Judicial Review
  • 5.6. Significant Supreme Court Decisions
  • Topic 6. The Structure of Massachusetts State and Local Government
  • 6.1. Functions of State and National Government
  • 6.2. United States and Massachusetts Constitutions
  • 6.3. Enumerated and Implied Powers
  • 6.4. Core Documents: The Protection of Individual Rights
  • 6.5. 10th Amendment to the Constitution
  • 6.6. Additional Provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution
  • 6.7. Responsibilities of Federal, State and Local Government
  • 6.8. Leadership Structure of the Massachusetts Government
  • 6.9. Tax-Supported Facilities and Services
  • 6.10. Components of Local Government
  • Topic 7. Freedom of the Press and News/Media Literacy
  • 7.1. Freedom of the Press
  • 7.2. Competing Information in a Free Press
  • 7.3. Writing the News: Different Formats and Their Functions
  • 7.4. Digital News and Social Media
  • 7.5. Evaluating Print and Online Media
  • 7.6. Analyzing Editorials, Editorial Cartoons, or Op-Ed Commentaries
  • Index of Terms
  • Translations

The Philosophical Foundations of the United States Political System

Choose a sign-in option.

Tools and Settings

Questions and Tasks

Citation and Embed Code

government assignment on political philosophers

Snapshot of Topic 1

Explore the topic's sub-chapters to learn more about the philosophical foundations of the United States political system.

Supporting Question

  • What were the roots of the ideas that influenced the development of the United States political system?

Massachusetts Standards [8.T1.1-5]

  • The Government of Ancient Athens
  • The Government of the Roman Republic
  • Enlightenment Thinkers and Democratic Government
  • British Influences on American Government
  • Native American Influences on American Government

Advanced Placement Standards for U.S. Government

  • AP Government and Politics Unit 1.1:  Ideas of Democracy
  • AP Government and Politics Unit 1.2:  Types of Democracy

Topic 1: The Philosophical Foundations of the United States Political System

Democracy   comes from the Greek words “demos” and “kratos,” meaning " rule by the people " ( Defining Democracy , Museum of Australian Democracy). Although the term does not appear in either the Declaration of Independence or the United States Constitution, democracy is the foundation for government in this country. Americans believe in government of the people, by the people, for the people.  

Democracy, as a framework of government, has evolved over the centuries and now includes concepts that are the foundations of civic and political life in our country: freedom, justice, liberty, individual rights and responsibilities, shared power, and a system of checks and balances among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government.

But, as researchers with the Varieties of Democracy project have noted, there is "no single agreed-upon list of what are (or aren't) issues of democracy" ( FiveThirtyEight , September 1, 2021). Some think about issues of electoral democracy such as the importance of free elections and a free press while others focus on social and economic democracy and issues around women's rights, civil liberties, economic justice, voting access, and overcoming the historical legacies of slavery and discrimination against people of color.

Here you can find five types of democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian) and issues associated with them.

Here are the essential elements of democracy as defined by the United Nations Commission of Human Rights in 2000:

  • Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
  • Freedom of association
  • Freedom of expression and opinion
  • Access to power and its exercise in accordance with the rule of law
  • The holding of periodic free and fair elections by universal suffrage and by secret ballot as the expression of the will of the people
  • A pluralistic system of political parties and organizations
  • The separation of powers
  • The independence of the judiciary
  • Transparency and accountability in public administration
  • Free, independent and pluralistic media

The governments and politics of Greece and Rome profoundly influenced America's founding generation. Comparing the educational backgrounds of George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, historian Thomas E. Ricks (2020) found Greco-Roman learning was "part of the culture; a way of looking at the world and set of values." Ricks notes further influences from Greece and Rome on our political system:

  • The United States "Senate" meets at the "Capitol."
  • Our political parties are "Republicans" or "Democrats."
  • The Supreme Court's  architecture recalls a Roman temple.
  • Latin phrases are familiar parts of the legal and political vocabularies.
  • The Roman word "virtue" (which in the 18th century meant putting the common good above self interest) appears some 6000 times in the writing of members of the Revolutionary generation.

At the same time, the Founders, as with their ancient world Greek and Roman predecessors, accepted human slavery and built that acceptance into the structures of American government as well as the fabric of American life.

Foundations of U.S. Political System Media Literacy Digital Choice Board

Screenshot of media literacy choice board for topic 1

Topic 1 Chapters

This content is provided to you freely by EdTech Books.

Access it online or download it at https://edtechbooks.org/democracy/topic1 .

government political philosophers

All Formats

Resource types, all resource types.

  • Rating Count
  • Price (Ascending)
  • Price (Descending)
  • Most Recent

Government political philosophers

Preview of Political Philosophers & Impact on American Government  Power Point Note Packet

Political Philosophers & Impact on American Government Power Point Note Packet

government assignment on political philosophers

  • Google Apps™

Preview of Political Philosophers Enlightenment American Government Webquest Worksheet

Political Philosophers Enlightenment American Government Webquest Worksheet

  • Internet Activities
  • Easel Activity

Preview of Political Philosophers Government Power Point, Worksheet, Webquest, Test, Bundle

Political Philosophers Government Power Point, Worksheet, Webquest, Test, Bundle

Preview of Political Philosophers American Government Printable Worksheet or Google Slides

Political Philosophers American Government Printable Worksheet or Google Slides

Preview of Political Philosophers Primary Source Documents and Writing Activity

Political Philosophers Primary Source Documents and Writing Activity

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosophy - Philosophy Lesson [P4C, Debates, Discussions, Civics]

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosopher Sort (Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke)

government assignment on political philosophers

  • Google Docs™

Preview of Political Philosophers Multiple Choice & Short Answer Test American Government

Political Philosophers Multiple Choice & Short Answer Test American Government

Preview of Political Theory - A Two-Part Introduction

Political Theory - A Two-Part Introduction

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosophers

government assignment on political philosophers

Exploring Theories of Government

government assignment on political philosophers

Key Government and Political Ideas of the Enlightenment

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosophers Presentation

government assignment on political philosophers

Foundations of Government Lecture Slide

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosopher Quiz

government assignment on political philosophers

  • Word Document File

Preview of Philosophers of the Enlightenment Essay - DBQ

Philosophers of the Enlightenment Essay - DBQ

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosopher Bio Cards

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosophers Jeopardy!

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosopher Worksheet

government assignment on political philosophers

Political Philosophy, Political & Economic Systems Unit

government assignment on political philosophers

Philosophers that Influenced American Government / An Introduction

government assignment on political philosophers

Solon's Word Search Puzzle - Classical Greek Philosophers - Philosophy Activity

government assignment on political philosophers

The Enlightenment Philosophers : Document Based Questions

government assignment on political philosophers

Enlightenment Philosophers /Thinkers Comparison Activity

government assignment on political philosophers

  • We're hiring
  • Help & FAQ
  • Privacy policy
  • Student privacy
  • Terms of service
  • Tell us what you think

SEP home page

  • Table of Contents
  • Random Entry
  • Chronological
  • Editorial Information
  • About the SEP
  • Editorial Board
  • How to Cite the SEP
  • Special Characters
  • Advanced Tools
  • Support the SEP
  • PDFs for SEP Friends
  • Make a Donation
  • SEPIA for Libraries
  • Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

  • Friends PDF Preview
  • Author and Citation Info
  • Back to Top

World Government

“World government” refers to the idea of all humankind united under one common political authority. Proposals for a unified global political authority have existed since ancient times—in the ambition of kings, popes and emperors, and the dreams of poets and philosophers. Recently, some have argued that a world government is already here, or nascent in contemporary conditions of capitalist globalization. There is much debate about whether global institutional developments towards a world state are inevitable or contingent, stable or subject to reversal, and whether unifying economic and political developments are to be desired or feared, justified or illegitimate, actively promoted or resisted.

Proponents of world government offer distinct reasons for why it is an ideal or necessary form of political organization. Some are motivated negatively and see world government as functionally the definitive solution to old and new human problems such as war and the development of weapons of mass destruction, global poverty and inequality, global financial instability, infectious disease and pandemics, and environmental degradation and climate change. More positively, some have advocated world government as a proper reflection of the unity of the cosmos, under reason or God, or as the teleological end-state of struggles for recognition or moral freedom or the perfection of humanity. Proponents have also differed historically in their views of the form of government that a world state should take. While medieval thinkers advocated world government under a single monarch or emperor who would possess supreme authority over all other lesser rulers, modern proponents of world government generally have not advocated a wholesale dismantling of the sovereign states system but incremental innovations in global institutional design to move humanity toward pacific world federalism or cosmopolitan democracy.

Critics of world government come from a wide political spectrum, from radical and postcolonial to liberal to far right political adherents. Critics have offered three main kinds of objections—to do with the feasibility, desirability and necessity of establishing a common global political authority.

This entry will, first, outline the historical development of ideas of world government, as well as objections to it, through a selective discussion of the idea’s history in Western political thought. The entry will focus on Dante’s medieval treatise on the necessity of a world monarch or emperor, and then consider mainly arguments by Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant that reveal more skepticism about world government as a solution to the problem of war and peace among sovereign states. The historical background section will continue with the revival of ideas of world government in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, prompted by imperial and colonial activity, technological developments, economic globalization, and the experience of two devastating world wars. While debates about world government during the Cold War were pervaded by the ideological division of the world, the section concludes with a discussion of the acceleration of neoliberal globalization, following the end of the Cold War, as well as resistance to it, on the prospects, promise, and perils of world state formation.

Second, the entry will explore debates in contemporary theory. One set of debates is located within international relations theory, between realist and neorealist, “international society”, liberal internationalist, republican, and constructivist schools, over the possibility and desirability of global structural transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. A second set of discussions about world government is located within contemporary liberal theory, between John Rawls and his cosmopolitan liberal critics, over the institutional implications of liberal commitments to both normative individualism and the value of freedom as collective self-determination. A third set of debates among contemporary republican and democratic theorists revolves around the question of whether a world state would fulfill or destroy the conditions necessary to support republican nondomination and democratic justice. A related, fourth set of debates involve critical and postcolonial theoretical critiques of the nascent global state emerging from the ascendancy of neoliberalism and persistence of patriarchal and racial capitalism.

There is lively debate between scholars within and between these sets of discussions about the feasibility, desirability, and necessity of uniting humanity under a world government. In current conditions, it is apparent that persistent and pervasive structural inequalities at the global level make health, security, prosperity, human rights, global justice, and environmental protection unevenly accessible, and seriously inaccessible, to a significant portion of the Earth’s inhabitants. In the context of the first two decades of the twenty-first century, it is uncertain whether world government is a political institutional project that, even if effectively pursued, would fulfill humanity’s collective aspirations for a sustainable peace of justice and freedom, or whether it will disappoint or haunt those who reach out for it.

1. Historical Background

2.1 international relations theory, 2.2 the liberal rejection of world government, 2.3 republican nondomination and global democracy, 2.4 critics of capitalism and a neoliberal world state, 3. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

—Alfred, Lord Tennyson, “Locksley Hall” (1837)

United States President Harry Truman, who oversaw the founding of the United Nations after the Second World War, kept these lines from Tennyson’s poem in his wallet (Kennedy 2006: xi). After this brutal global war that claimed over fifty million lives, just like after the previous world war in which almost ten million perished, ordinary people and statespersons alike sought to establish a post-war international order that would be able to prevent another war of global devastation from occurring. In fact, since the problem of war, or large-scale socially organized violence, has been with us throughout human history, the ideal of a universal community of humankind living in perpetual peace was not at all new.

Derek Heater’s history of ideas of world government and citizenship begins by noting their presence in ancient Chinese and Indian as well as Graeco-Roman thought (1996: ix–x). According to Heater, the concept of human unity produced an ideal that such unity ought to be expressed in political form. The exact nature of that form, however, has changed radically over time. While Stoic ideas about the oneness of the universe were politically inchoate, they inspired medieval Christian proposals for a global political authority; at the same time, the historical model of imperial Rome (or its myths) inspired medieval quests for world empire.

The Italian poet, philosopher, and statesperson, Dante (1265–1321), perhaps best articulated the Christian ideal of human unity and its expression through a world governed by a universal monarch. In The Banquet [ Convivio ], Dante argued that wars and all their causes would be eliminated if

the whole earth and all that humans can possess be a monarchy, that is, one government under one ruler. Because he possesses everything, the ruler would not desire to possess anything further, and thus, he would hold kings contentedly within the borders of their kingdoms, and keep peace among them. ( Convivio , bk 4, ch 4 [2000: 169])

In De Monarchia (1309–13: 8]), a full political treatise affirming universal monarchy, Dante draws on Aristotle to argue that human unity stems from a shared end, purpose or function, to develop and realize fully and constantly humanity’s distinct intellectual potential. In Book I, Dante argues that peace is a vital condition for realizing this end, and peace cannot be maintained if humanity is divided. Just as “[e]very kingdom divided against itself shall be laid waste” ( Monarchia bk 1, ch. V, quoting Luke 11:17 [1995: 10]), since humankind shares one goal,

there must therefore be one person who directs and rules mankind, and he is properly called “Monarch” or “Emperor”. And thus it is apparent that the well-being of the world requires that there be a monarchy or empire. ( Monarchia bk 1, ch. V [1995: 10])

Most importantly, when conflicts inevitably arise between two rulers who are equals, “there must be a third party of wider jurisdiction who rules over both of them by right”; a universal monarch is necessary as

a first and supreme judge, whose judgment resolves all disputes either directly or indirectly. ( Monarchia bk 1, ch. X [1995: 14])

In the absence of a universal monarch, humanity is “transformed into a many-headed beast”, striving after “conflicting things” ( Monarchia bk 1, ch. XVI [1995: 28]); humankind ordered under a universal monarch, however,

will most closely resemble God, by mirroring the principle of oneness or unity of which he is the supreme example. ( Monarchia bk 1, ch. VIII [1995: 19])

Dante completes his treatise by extolling the Roman Empire as a part of God’s providence ( Monarchia bks 2 and 3 [1995: 30–94). And while Dante argued for a universal emperor whose temporal power was distinct from the pope’s religious power, and not derivative from the latter, he envisioned that God’s will must require pope and emperor to forge a cooperative and conciliatory, rather than competitive and antagonistic, relationship.

The idea of uniting humanity under one empire or monarch, however, became an ambivalent appeal by the seventeenth century with the entrenchment in Europe of the system of sovereign states after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). At the same time, European encounters with non-European worlds precipitated European ambitions based on the principle of promoting civilization as an organizing framework for legitimizing European imperial and colonial expansion into other parts of the world (Keene 2002).

In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes (1588–1679) gave the quintessential formulation of sovereignty as supreme legal coercive authority over a particular population and territory. Hobbes argued that although mutual vulnerabilities and interests lead individuals to give up their liberties in the state of nature, in exchange for protection—thereby instituting sovereign states—the miseries that accompany a plurality of sovereign states are not as onerous to individuals, hence there is less rational basis for political organization to move towards a global leviathan:

because states uphold the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from the international state of nature, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men. (1651: ch. 13 [1986: 188])

Contrary to realist interpretations of Hobbes in international relations thought, Hobbes did not consider international law or cooperation between sovereign states to be impossible or impractical. Anticipating the development of international law, collective security organizations, the League of Nations and the United Nations, he affirmed the possibility and efficacy of leagues of commonwealths founded on the interests of states in peace and justice:

Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull [because they are allowed by the commonwealth], but also profitable for the time they last. (1651: ch. 22 [1986: 286])

In Hobbes, we find the first articulation of the argument that a world state is unnecessary, although he envisaged that the development of a lawful interstate order is possible, and potentially desirable.

In the eighteenth century, Charles Castel, Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743), in his Project for Making Peace Perpetual in Europe (1713), extended Hobbes’s argument that a rational interest in self-preservation necessitated the creation a domestic leviathan to the international realm, asserting that reason should lead the princes of Europe to form a federation of states by social contract. The contracting sovereigns would form a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, establishing a permanent Diet or Congress that would adjudicate all conflicts between the contracting parties. The federation would also proscribe as “a public enemy” (Rousseau 1756 [1917: 63]) any member who breaks the Treaty or disregards the decisions of the congress; in such a situation, all members would “arm and take the offensive, conjointly and at the common expense, against any State put to the ban of Europe” in order to enforce the decisions of the federation (1756 [1917: 61–4]). In other words, perpetual peace can be achieved if the princes of Europe would agree to relinquish their sovereign rights to make war or peace to a superior, federal body that guaranteed protection of their basic interests.

In his comments on this proposal, Rousseau (1712–78) acknowledged its perfect rationality:

Realize this Commonwealth of Europe for a single day, and you may be sure it will last forever; so fully would experience convince men that their own gain is to be found in the good of all. (1756 [1917: 93])

To Rousseau, however, existing societies had so thoroughly corrupted humans’ natural innocence that they were largely incapable of discovering their true or real interests. Thus, the Abbé’s proposals were not utopian, but they were not likely to be realized “because men are crazy, and to be sane in a world of madmen is itself a kind of madness” (1756 [1917: 91]). At the same time, Rousseau noted that the sovereigns of Europe were not likely to agree voluntarily to form such a federation:

No Federation could ever be established except by a revolution. That being so, which of us would dare say whether the League of Europe is a thing more to be desired or feared? It would perhaps do more harm in the moment than it would guard against for ages. (1756 [1917: 112])

This consequentialist objection to the idea of world government speculates that even if it were desirable, the process of creating a world government may produce more harm than good; the necessary evils committed on the road to establishing a world government would outweigh whatever benefits might result from its achievement.

Rousseau viewed war as a product of defectively ordered social institutions; it is states as public entities that make war, and individuals participate in wars only as members or citizens of states. Far from viewing the achievement of a domestic leviathan as moral progress, Rousseau noted that the condition of a world of entangled sovereign states puts human beings in more peril than if no such institutions existed at all. Isn’t it the case, he argued, that

each one of us being in the civil state as regards our fellow citizens, but in the state of nature as regards the rest of the world, we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only to kindle national wars a thousand times more terrible? And that, in joining a particular group of men, we have really declared ourselves the enemies of the whole race? (1756 [1917: 56])

In Rousseau’s view, the solution to war is to establish well-governed societies, along the lines he established in The Social Contract (1762); only in such contexts will human beings realize their full rational and moral potential. To establish perpetual peace, then, we should not pursue world government, but the moral perfection of states. A world of ideal societies would have no cause for war, and no need for world government.

Kant tried, in his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784), to refute the claim that the development of the domestic state constituted a moral step backwards for humankind, by placing it and its trials

in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing but slow development of man’s original [rational] capacities. (1784 [1991: 41])

Nature employs the “unsociableness of men” to motivate moral progress; thus war is a means by which nature moves states

to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences—that of abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgment, but solely from this great federation ( Foedus Amphictyonum ), from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will. (1784 [1991: 47])

This is the “inevitable outcome” (1784 [1991: 48]) of human history, a point Kant reiterated in Perpetual Peace [1795], when he argued that rationality dictated the formation of

an international state (civitas gentium), which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of the earth. (1784 [1991: 105])

In present conditions, however, Kant noted that “the positive idea of a world republic cannot be realized”, thus his treatise on perpetual peace begins with the social fact of a world of distinct but interacting states. What would be required, given such a world, to achieve perpetual peace? Kant makes three arguments. First, every state must have a republican constitution that guarantees the freedom and equality of citizens through the rule of law and representative political institutions. The internally well-ordered republican state is less likely to engage in wars without good reason;

under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. (1784 [1991: 100])

Second, such internally well-ordered states would need to enter into a “federation of peoples”, which is distinct from an “international state” (1784 [1991: 102]). A

pacific federation (foedus pacificum) … does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states. (1784 [1991: 104])

In this context, a federal union of free and independent states, he argued,

is still to be preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy.

His reasons against a universal monarchy combine fears of an all-powerful and powerless world government:

For the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy. (1784 [1991: 113])

Most forcefully articulating the tyranny objection, Kant argued that a “universal despotism” would end “in the graveyard of freedom” (1784 [1991: 114]). The third condition for perpetual peace in a world of distinct but interacting states is the observance of cosmopolitan right, which Kant limits to universal hospitality. Although the human race shares in common a right to the earth’s surface, Kant argued that strangers do not have entitlements to settle on foreign territory without the inhabitants’ agreement. Thus, cosmopolitan right justifies visiting a foreign land, but not conquering it, which Kant criticized the commercial states of his day to have done in “America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape” and East India (1784 [1991: 106]).

Kant’s views on the desirability of world government were clearly complex (Kokaz 2005: 87–92; Pogge 2009). On the one hand, Kant provides two of the most trenchant objections to world government. The tyranny argument posits that world government would descend into a global tyranny, hindering rather than enhancing the ideal of human autonomy (Kant 1795 [1991]). Instead of delivering impartial global justice and peace, a world government may form an inescapable tyranny that would have the power to make humanity serve its own interests, and opposition against which might engender incessant and intractable civil wars (Waltz 1979; DuFord 2017). In another argument against its desirability, the inevitable remoteness of a global political authority would dilute the laws, making them ineffectual and meaningless. The posited weakness of world government leads to objections based on its potential inefficiency and soullessness (Kant 1795 [1991]).

On the other hand, Kant also provides a republican vision of world government based on universal reason. His endorsement of the ideal of human unity prompted him to see a world republic, under which free and equal individuals, united by one global sovereign, would achieve a “fully juridical condition” (Pogge 2009: 198), as the ideal end of the progress of human history. At the same time, Kant’s faith in human unity through reason coexisted with his subscription to a theory of racial hierarchy in human development, and he came to be critical of the dominant modes of European expansionist policies in world politics in the late eighteenth century—through colonial wars, exploitation, and conquests—as undermining the moral progress of Europeans (Valdez 2019). More generally, Kant condemned any move towards a universal monarchy, because a monarchy, in contrast to a republic, does not guarantee, but undermines, the freedom and equality of individuals. Although a world republic is Kant’s ultimate political ideal, a universal despotic monarch that exercises power arbitrarily is equivalent to a global anarchic state of nature, which is his ultimate dystopia. In between lies his “realistic utopia” (Rawls 1999: 11–6) consisting of a federation of free (republican) states short of a world state. As Habermas has put it,

This weak conception of a voluntary association of states that are willing to coexist peacefully while nevertheless retaining their sovereignty seemed to recommend itself as a transitional stage en route to a world republic. (2010: 268)

Kant’s work shows that even in the eighteenth century, debates about world government were alive and well, including arguments by radical political cosmopolitans such as Anacharsis Cloots (Jean-Baptiste du Val-de-Grace, baron de Cloots, 1755–1794), who used social contract theory to advocate the abolition of the sovereign states system in favor of a universal republic encompassing all humanity (Kleingeld & Brown 2002). At the same time, philosophical projects for perpetual peace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were Eurocentric in adopting Europe as the centre of world order, in failing to recognize non-European peoples in equal standing, and in obscuring the global inequalities and injustices being established by European commercial enterprises and states (Pitts 2018: 6–7).

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed revivals of proposals for world government that were fueled by racialized theories of progress that buttressed European-led colonial and imperial expansion over much of the world, technological developments in travel and communications, the rapid ascent of a global capitalist system, as well as the devastating impact of wars fought with modern technology. Theories of “scientific racism” continued to pervade European thought on world order:

White supremacist visions of global governance circulated widely in the Anglo-American world. (Bell 2018: 871)

One of the most prominent proponents of world order, H.G. Wells (1866–1946), envisaged in 1901 a “New Republic” of Anglo-American dominance, and while he repudiated racial theories, his vision of a universal world state included a civilizing mission (Wells 1902; Bell 2018: 870). The construction of racial and civilizational hierarchies, backed by military domination, meant that the inclusion of non-Europeans and non-whites, whether in imperial projects, colonial civilizing missions, or later, in a system of formally independent states embedded in a capitalist global economy, would be marked by deep asymmetries and inequalities in standing, status, rights, burdens, and powers (Anghie 2005; Bell 2019; Getachew 2019).

In the Second World War, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, atomic scientists lobbied for the international control of atomic energy as a main function of world federalist government. Albert Einstein wrote in 1946 that technological developments had shrunk the planet, through increased economic interdependence and mutual vulnerability through weapons of mass destruction. Although his adherence to the idea of a world government to guarantee interstate peace preceded the development of nuclear weapons, Einstein’s advocacy gained momentum with the risk of nuclear annihilation:

A world government must be created which is able to solve conflicts between nations by judicial decision. This government must be based on a clear-cut constitution which is approved by the governments and nations and which gives it the sole disposition of offensive weapons. (1946 [1950: 132]; Nathan & Norden 1960)

Organizations such as the United World Federalists (UWF), established in 1947, called for the transformation of the United Nations into a universal federation of states with powers to control armaments. World peace required that states should give up their traditional unrestricted sovereign rights to amass weapons and wage war, and that they should submit their disputes to authoritative international institutions of adjudication and enforcement; world peace would only be achieved through the establishment of world law (Clark & Sohn 1958/1960 [1962]).

Calls for world government in the post-World War Two era implied a deep suspicion about the sovereign state’s potential as a vehicle for moral progress in world politics. Emery Reves’ influential The Anatomy of Peace, is a condemnation of the nation-state as a political institution: “The modern Bastille is the nation-state, no matter whether the jailers are conservative, liberal or socialist” (1945: 270). Echoing Rousseau, Reves argued that nation-states threaten human peace, justice and freedom, by diverting funds from important needs, prolonging a global climate of mistrust and fear, and creating a war machine that ultimately precipitates actual war. The experience of the world wars thus made it especially difficult to view states as agents of moral progress. David Mitrany, perhaps motivated by such suspicions, bracketed the idea of a world federation or world state, and focused on the role that “a spreading web of international activities and agencies” could play in the pursuit of world integration and peace (1966: 38; Trachtman 2013).

Some did not reject the nation-state per se , but only authoritarian nondemocratic states as unfit partners for building a peaceful world order. The Atlantic Union Committee (AUC), formed in 1949 by Clarence Streit, for example, called for a federal union of democratic states that would be the genesis of a

free world government, as nations are encouraged by example to practice the principles which would make them eligible for membership, namely the principles of representative government and protection of individual liberty by law. (1950, quoted in Baratta 2004: 470; for a critique see Rosenboim 2017)

In the context of the Cold War (1945–89), however, the division of the world into two ideologically opposed camps—led by the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—produced mutual distrust that pervaded the reception of all proposals for world government. Soviet opposition to all Western proposals as attempts to impose “American monopolistic capitalism” on the world (Goodman 1953: 234) made the world federalist movement’s goal of establishing a universal federation infeasible. The Soviet leadership also condemned the AUC’s proposal for an exclusive union of democracies as part of the Cold War rivalry—an attempt to strengthen the anti-communist (anti-Soviet) bloc.

In a distorted fashion, the Soviet Union became the historical manifestation of socialist or communist thought. Socialist ideas can be traced back to the French Revolution, but developed more fully as a response to negative aspects of the rapid growth of industry in the nineteenth century. At the same time that technological advancements promised great material progress, the changes they wrought in social and economic relations were not all positive. While the many workers, or “proletarians”, in new industrial factories worked under terrible conditions for meager wages, the few factory owners, “the bourgeoisie” or “capitalists”, amassed great wealth and power. According to Karl Marx (1818–1883), human history is a history of struggles not between nations or states, but between classes, created and destroyed by changing modes of production. The state as a centralized, coercive authority emerges under social modes of production at a certain stage of development, and is only necessary in a class society as the coercive instrument of the ruling class. The capitalist economic system, however, contains within it the seeds of its own destruction: capitalism necessitates the creation of an ever-growing proletarian class, and a global revolution by the proletariat will sweep away “the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally” (Marx & Engels 1848 [1988: 75]). The state will fall along with the fall of classes:

The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe. (Engels 1884 [1978: 755])

In a communist vision, capitalism is a necessary but transitional and ephemeral order of things; the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism by forces it unleashed itself is necessary to attain a new world order, “in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Marx & Engels 1848 [1988: 75]). World peace and freedom as nondomination for all (Roberts 2017), including freedom from the “alienated” or “estranged” labor (Marx 1844 [1978: 71–81]) produced under capitalism, will be achieved through the transformation of a capitalist to a communist social order:

In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end. (Marx & Engels 1848 [1988: 73])

The Russian revolutionary, V.I. Lenin (1870–1924), drew on Marx to argue that the proletarian class needed to seize the coercive apparatus of the state to oppress the resisters and exploiters, the bourgeoisie, however, Lenin was committed to world revolution, and to the view that the state is “the organ of class rule”, and that even the

proletarian state will begin to wither away immediately after its victory because the state is unnecessary and cannot exist in a society in which there are no class antagonisms. (Lenin 1918: 65)

In the context of the post-World War I world that witnessed the collapse of empires as well as the fortification of others, buttressed by the League of Nations, Lenin’s vision of a new communist world order entailed an appeal to the colonized to mount anti-imperialist revolutions. This contrasted with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s less radical interpretation of self-determination as good self-government, a formulation that was consistent with the civilizing narrative based on racial hierarchies, and the continuation and extension of a colonial international order (Pedersen 2015).

Later Soviet leaders and elites who rejected Western proposals for world federation somewhat inconsistently envisaged the transcendence of nation-states and world capitalism, and the establishment of a world socialist economy governed by a “Bolshevik World State” (Goodman 1953: 231). In communist ideology, ultimately, balance-of-power politics between states enjoying unrestricted sovereignty did not cause war; the real cause of war was capitalism. In practice, the Soviet Union’s internally and externally repressive policies made a mockery of socialist ideals of a classless society, or a world of peaceful socialist republics, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself spelled the practical end of one alternative to a capitalist world order.

The end of Cold War ideological divisions led some to have great expectations in the 1990s of enhanced global cooperation to rid humanity of the threat of global nuclear annihilation and to increase global commerce and spread prosperity, the material bases for building a truly global moral and political community of humankind. The end of the twentieth century was marked by an unbridled faith and optimism in the inexorable twin triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy as the end of history (Fukuyama 1992). With the collapse of Soviet-style state socialism, the world witnessed neoliberal transformations on a global scale, driven by the “ideology of free markets, trade liberalization, deregulation, and the small state” (Lüthi 2020: 596). Quinn Slobodian has described the paradoxical ascendancy of “globalist” neoliberalism, entailing the development of a world state and regulatory laws that privileged the “encasement” of markets from domestic democratic regulation and accountability, leading to an institutional project to redesign “states, laws, and other institutions to protect the market” (2018: 4 and 6). As neoliberalism spread on a global scale, so did the deterioration of conditions for robust democratic politics, precipitating serious backsliding of democratization.

The optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s was thus short-lived as a variety of persistent and deepening structural injustices of the modern international system produced conditions ripe for violent conflict and mass atrocities, the global war on terror after 2001, the global financial crisis of 2007–9, growing numbers of displaced people, rising socioeconomic inequality, and the hollowing out of social welfare protections, not to mention the disruptive consequences wrought by climate change, and the Covid-19 global pandemic. The persistence of racial subordination and gender inequalities, as well as the ascendancy of a neoliberal world order, have provoked much critical debate about how these and other dominating hierarchies, backed by powerful international institutions, law, states, and corporations, can be tamed or overthrown, or how the crises they generate may accelerate structural transformations at the global level in a more emancipatory direction.

2. Debates in Contemporary Political Theory

Contemporary international relations theory developed out of the urgent need to explain and predict the causes of war and peace in world politics. International relations theory has also developed in response to globalization, which has wrought “fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social existence” (Scheuerman 2002 [2018]), characterized by the uneven increase and intensification of social interconnectedness, economic integration, and the “shrinkage of geographic distance on a world scale” (Keohane 2001). While much of international relations theory’s approach to world government has remained focused on the problem of overcoming interstate anarchy for the sake of human security in the face of common global threats, a “global politics paradigm” (Zürn 2018) has emerged which understands world government as only one possible institutional development among others in a system of global governance characterized by the co-constitution of transnational, international and domestic realms of politics and political contestation.

Contemporary international “realists” or “neorealists” claim not to evaluate the contemporary states system in normative terms. They liken the international order to a Hobbesian state of nature, where notions of justice and injustice have no place, and in which each unit is rationally motivated to pursue every means within its power to assure its own survival, even at the expense of others’ basic interests. Some realists have thus held that ideas of world government constitute exercises in utopian thinking, and are utterly impractical as a goal for human political organization. Assuming that world government would lead to desirable outcomes such as perpetual peace, realists are skeptical that world government will ever materialize as an institutional reality, given the problems of egoistic or corrupted human nature, or the logic of international anarchy that characterizes a world of states, all jealously guarding their own sovereignty or claims to supreme authority. World government is thus infeasible as a solution to global problems because of the unsurpassable difficulties of establishing “authoritative hierarchies” at the global or international level (Krasner 1999: 42). Furthermore, Kenneth Waltz, in his seminal account of neorealism, Theory of International Politics , clearly favors a system of sovereign states over a world government (1979: 111–2). World government, according to Waltz, would not deliver universal, disinterested, impartial justice, order or security, but like domestic governments, it would be driven by its own particular or exclusive organizational interests, which it would pursue at the expense of the interests and freedom of states. This realist view thus provides a sobering antidote to liberal and other progressive narratives that foretell peace through interdependence.

William Scheuerman has argued (2011: 67–97), however, that so-called “classical” realists of the mid-twentieth century were more sympathetic to ideas of global institutional reform than contemporary realists. “Classical” and “progressive” realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr, E.H. Carr, and Hans Morgenthau, as well as John Herz and Frederick Schuman, supported a global reformist agenda, prompted by the advent of economic globalization, technological change, modern total warfare, and the nuclear revolution. Although a desirable end-goal, the feasibility of global political change towards a world government in the form of a global federal system, according to Reinhold Niebuhr, would depend on deeper global social integration and cohesion than was evident in the mid-twentieth century (Scheuerman 2011: 73). In addition, Niebuhr was concerned that absent the required social and cultural basis for global political unity, the achievement of world government would be undesirable, since in such conditions, a world government would require authoritarian devices to rule, raising the specter of a global tyrannical power (72–6). Others, such as James Burnham, posited that a world state could only arise through imperial conquest (Deudney 2019). Despite these caveats, realist prudence-based as well as functional arguments for a Weberian world state have gained traction again (Cabrera 2010; Ulaş 2016; Araujo 2018; Craig 2019).

“International society” theorists, or the “English school”, argue that although there is no central overriding authority above sovereign states, their relations are not wholly lawless or devoid of authoritative and enforceable norms and rules for conduct. The anarchy between states does not preclude the concept of a norm-governed society of states (Bull 1977). Since “international society” theorists do not see the absence of a central global authority as necessitating a state-eat-state world, they regard the idea of world government as unnecessary, and potentially dangerous, since it may serve as a cloak in the struggle for imperial domination between states. Martin Wight has noted that the moral ideals of cosmopolitanism typically translate in practice into political tyranny and imperialism (1991). As an alternative to world government, and echoing both Rousseau and Kant, Chris Brown forwards

the ideal of a plurality of morally autonomous, just communities related to one another in a framework of peace and law. (1995: 106)

Establishing an international society, ideally conceived, would make a supreme world government unnecessary. Andrew Hurrell, however, argues that

it is important to recognize the extent to which social, environmental and, above all, technological change is likely to affect the scale of governance challenges, the sources of control and governance, and the subjects of control. (2007: 293)

For these reasons, Hurrell does not consider a retreat to a traditional state-based pluralism to be feasible, but argues that the development of a “stable, effective and legitimate international society” requires redressing global inequality through the significant redistribution of political power to buttress the collective political agency of the weak and marginalized (2007: 318).Liberal internationalist accounts of world order are motivated by more than just the traditional preoccupation with problems of war and peace. This school of international relations thought, more than the preceding two, is explicitly critical of traditional accounts of state sovereignty. Richard Falk has depicted the contemporary world order as one of “inhumane governance”, identifying the following ills: global severe poverty affecting more than one billion human beings, denial of human rights to socially and culturally vulnerable groups, the persistent use and threat of war as an instrument of politics, environmental degradation, and the lack of transnational democratic accountability (1995: 1–2). A liberal internationalist agenda is advanced when progress is made on alleviating or correcting these ills. However, Falk is explicit that

humane governance can be achieved without world government, and that this is both the more likely and more desirable course of action. (1995: 8)

By world government, Falk means a form of global political organization that has, at minimum, the following features:

compulsory peaceful settlement of all disputes by third-party decision in accordance with law; general and complete disarmament at the state and regional levels; a global legislative capacity backed up by enforcement capabilities; and some form of centralized leadership. (1995: 7)

Instead of world government, Falk calls for “transnational democratic initiatives” from global civil society as well as United Nations reform, both of which would challenge and complement the statist and market forces that currently produce our contemporary global ills (1995: 207). Most liberal international theorists thus envision the need for authoritative international and global institutions that modify significantly the powers and prerogatives traditionally attributed to the sovereign state.

Anne-Marie Slaughter has also rejected the idea of cosmopolitan democracy and a global parliament as infeasible and unwieldy (2004: 8 and 238). Slaughter is an advocate of “global governance”, in the sense of “a much looser and less threatening concept of collective organization and regulation without coercion”, to solve common global problems such as transnational crime, terrorism, and environmental destruction (2004: 9). According to Slaughter, states are not unitary, but “disaggregated” and increasingly “networked” through information, enforcement, and harmonization networks (2004: 167)—producing

a world of governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governments—legislation, adjudication, implementation—interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts. (2004: 5)

A networked world order, she argues,

would be a more effective and potentially more just world order than either what we have today or a world government in which a set of global institutions perched above nation-states enforced global rules. (2004: 6–7)

Although Slaughter is keen to highlight the promise of “global governance through government networks” as “good public policy for the world and good national foreign policy” (2004: 261), she acknowledges that in contemporary world conditions of radical social, economic and political inequality between states and peoples, effective and fair global governance will require the networks comprising global governance to abide by the norms of “global deliberative equality”, toleration of reasonable and legitimate difference, and “positive comity” in the form of consultation and active assistance between organizations; in addition, global governance networks would need to be made more accountable through a system of checks and balances, and more responsive through the principle of subsidiarity (2004: 244–60). Without movement towards a more equitable world of mutual respect, however, it is difficult to see actually existing global governance networks operating in an impartial and generous spirit to help

all nations and their peoples to achieve greater peace, prosperity, stewardship of the earth, and minimum standards of human dignity. (2004: 166)

In this vein, Thomas Weiss has lamented the intellectual and political shifts in perspective from world government to global governance, arguing that current voluntary associations, organizations and networks at the global level are “so obviously inadequate” to meeting global challenges that we

are obliged to ask ourselves whether we can approach anything that resembles effective governance for the world without institutions with some supranational characteristics at the global level. (2009: 264)

While many contemporary international relations theorists seem to reject the feasibility, desirability, or necessity of world government, constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt has argued that the “logic of anarchy” contains within it the seeds of transformation towards a “global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence—a world state” (2003: 491). Using Aristotelian and Hegelian insights, Wendt offers a teleological account of the development of world order from an anarchic states system to a world state, arguing that

the struggle for recognition between states will have the same outcome as that between individuals, collective identity formation and eventually a state. (2003: 493)

Technological changes, especially those that increase the “costs of war” as well as “the scale on which it is possible to organize a state”, affect the struggle for recognition among states, undermining their self-sufficiency and making a world state “inevitable” (2003: 493–4). Wendt draws on the work of Daniel Deudney (1995 and 1999), who argued that the evolution of destructive technology makes states as vulnerable as individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature:

Hence nuclear one-worldism—just as the risks of the state of nature made it functional for individuals to submit to a common power, changes in the forces of destruction increasingly make it functional for states to do so as well. (Wendt 2003: 508)

Deudney, however, has recently argued that the world state solution, involving a top-down hierarchical mode of government, is impractical and conceptually dead; his proposed alternative is a “negarchic”, republican-federalist conception of world order that solves the problems of anarchy through the development of regimes of mutual restraint and obligation, but without the risk of despotism or totalitarianism accompanying hierarchical world government (2019 and 2020).

According to Wendt, however, the path of world state formation is inevitable, and would be characterized by the emergence of “a universal security community”, in which members expect to resolve conflicts peacefully rather than through force; a “universal collective security” system that ensures the protection of each member should “crimes” occur; and a “universal supranational authority” that can make binding authoritative decisions about the collective use of force (2003: 505). Driving this transformation is the struggle for recognition, and the

political development of the system will not end until the subjectivity of all individuals and groups is recognized and protected by a global Weberian state. (2003: 506; for a critique of teleological arguments about institutional forms, see Levy 2020)

Wendt recognizes that powerful states enjoying the benefits of asymmetrical recognition may be most resistant to world state formation. He argues, however, that with the diffusion of greater violence potential to smaller powers (such as al-Qaeda and North Korea),

the ability of Great Powers to insulate themselves from global demands for recognition will erode, making it more and more difficult to sustain a system in which their power and privileges are not tied to an enforceable rule of law. (2003: 524)

Based on the assumption that systems tend to develop toward stable end-states, a world state in which individuals and

states alike will have lost the negative freedom to engage in unilateral violence, but gained the positive freedom of fully recognized subjectivity. (2003: 525)

is the inevitable end-state of the human struggle for recognition. At the same time that Wendt sees world state formation as an inevitable trajectory of the struggle for recognition between individuals and groups, he argues that a world state could take various forms: while collectivizing organized violence, it need not collectivize on a global scale culture, economy or local politics; while requiring a structure that “can command and enforce a collective response to threats”, it need not abolish national armies, or require a single UN army; and while it requires a procedure for making binding choices,

it would not even require a world “government”, if by this we mean a unitary body with one leader whose decisions are final. (2003: 506)

We now turn to debates about world government among contemporary liberal theorists. Since the publication of John Rawls’s landmark A Theory of Justice in 1971, liberal theorists such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge have sought to formulate a cosmopolitan version of liberalism by extending Rawlsian principles of domestic justice to the international realm. According to Beitz, a cosmopolitan liberal conception of international morality is

concerned with the moral relations of members of a universal community in which state boundaries have a merely derivative significance. (1979 [1999a: 181–2])

Cosmopolitan liberalism evaluates the morality of domestic and international institutions based on “an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected” (1999b: 287). A cosmopolitan liberal theory of global justice thus begins with a conception of humanity as a common moral community of free and equal persons. There is debate among contemporary theorists about the relationship and distinction between moral cosmopolitanism and political or institutional cosmopolitanism in the form of a world state or government (Beitz 1994; Dufek 2013; Ypi 2013; Cabrera 2018 and 2019).

Contemporary liberal theorists have traditionally argued that world government, in the form of a global leviathan with supreme legislative, executive, adjudicative and enforcement powers, is largely unnecessary to solve problems such as war, global poverty, and environmental catastrophe. World government so conceived is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve the aims of a liberal agenda (Yack 2012). Even cosmopolitan liberals have not argued that moral cosmopolitanism necessarily entails political cosmopolitanism in the form of a world government.

Although Rawls himself rejects cosmopolitan liberalism, disagreeing with his liberal critics on several critical issues related to global distributive justice, they are united in their agreement that a world state is not part of a liberal ideal for world order. In his treatise on global order, The Law of Peoples , Rawls forwards the concept of a society of peoples, governed by principles that will accommodate “cooperative associations and federations among peoples, but will not affirm a world-state” (1999: 36). He explicitly states his reason for rejecting the idea of a world state or government:

Here I follow Kant’s lead in Perpetual Peace (1795) in thinking that a world government—by which I mean a unified political regime with the legal powers normally exercised by central governments—would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy. (1999: 36)

Other liberal thinkers have similarly rejected the desirability of world government in the form of a domestic state writ large to cover the entire globe (Beitz 1999b: 182; Jones 1999: 229; Tan 2000 and 2004; Pogge 1988: 285; Satz 1999: 77–8; Risse 2012).

In a related objection, “communitarian” liberals, such as Michael Walzer, argue against a centralized world government as a threat to social pluralism. Walzer thus endorses “sovereign statehood” as “a way of protecting distinct historical cultures, sometimes national, sometimes ethnic/religious in character”, and rejects a centralized global order because he does not

see how it could accommodate anything like the range of cultural and religious difference that we see around us today. … For some cultures and most orthodox religions can only survive if they are permitted degrees of separation that are incompatible with globalism. And so the survival of these groups would be at risk; under the rules of the global state, they would not be able to sustain and pass on their way of life. (2004: 172 and 176)

At the same time that distinct communities may constitute intrinsic human goods, Walzer also endorses social and political pluralism as an instrumental good: given the diversity of human values, he argues that they

are best pursued politically in circumstances where there are many avenues of pursuit, many agents in pursuit. The dream of a single agent—the enlightened despot, the civilizing imperium, the communist vanguard, the global state—is a delusion. (2004: 188)

A world of distinct, autonomous communities may be important to curbing the appetite of a hegemonic or global state to re-make the world in its own image. Liberal nationalists and communitarians thus object to world government due to the homogeneity argument—world government may be so strong and pervasive as to create a homogenizing effect, obliterating distinct cultures and communities that are intrinsically valuable. Liberal political pluralists (Muñiz-Fraticelli 2014) are concerned that any state, including a world government, could destroy associative groups that constitute legitimate sources of political authority; and by destroying the rich social pluralism that animates human life (Walzer 2004), produce a loss of value (Miller 2007; Valentini 2012).

The liberal rejection of world government, however, does not amount to an endorsement of the conventional system of sovereign states or the contemporary international order, “with its extreme injustices, crippling poverty, and inequalities” (Rawls 1999: 117). Rawls’s rejection of a world government does not negate the legitimacy and desirability of establishing international or transnational institutions to regulate cooperation between peoples and even to discharge certain common inter-societal duties. Thus, after his rejection of a world state, Rawls goes on to say that in a well-ordered society of peoples, organizations

(such as the United Nations ideally conceived) may have the authority to express for the society of well-ordered peoples their condemnation of unjust domestic institutions in other countries and clear cases of the violation of human rights. In grave cases they may try to correct them by economic sanctions, or even by military intervention. The scope of these powers covers all peoples and reaches their domestic affairs. (1999: 36)

Rawls’s vision of global order clearly rejects a world of atomistic sovereign states with the traditional powers of absolute sovereignty. Instead, his global vision includes “new institutions and practices” to “constrain outlaw states when they appear” (1999: 48), to promote human rights, and to discharge the duty of assistance owed to burdened societies.

Thomas Pogge argues that realizing

a peaceful and ecologically sound future will … require supranational institutions and organizations that limit the sovereignty rights of states more severely than is the current practice. (2000: 213)

He sees this development to be possible only when a majority of states are stable democracies (2000: 213–4). Pogge thus appears to agree with Rawls that the path to perpetual peace (and environmental safety) lies in promoting the development of well-ordered states, characterized by democratically representative, responsive and responsible domestic governments.

As these lines of argument by Rawls and Pogge suggest, liberals have been quick to reject framing the choice of world orders as one between either a world of traditional sovereign states or a world with a global central government. Pogge has asserted that liberals should

dispense with the traditional concept of sovereignty and leave behind all-or-nothing debates about world government.

Instead, he argues for an

intermediate solution that provides for some central organs of world government without, however, investing them with [exclusive] “ultimate sovereign power and authority”. (1988: 285)

In this “multi-layered scheme in which ultimate political authority is vertically dispersed”, states that retain ultimate political authority in some areas would be juxtaposed with a world government with “central coercive mechanisms of law enforcement” that has ultimate political authority in other areas (Pogge 2009: 205–6). Debra Satz has also argued that framing the choice as one between the current states system and “an all-powerful world-state” poses a false dilemma:

the contrast between a system of sovereign states and a centralized world-state is too crude. There are many other possibilities, including a state system restrained by international and intergovernmental institutions, a non-state-based economic system, a global separation-of-powers scheme, international federalism, and regional political-economic structures, such as those currently being developed in western Europe and the Americas (via NAFTA). (Satz 1999: 77–8)

Simon Caney has also endorsed a system of international institutions designed to

provide a reliable and effective means of protecting people’s basis interests (and instrumental consideration) and also to provide a fair forum for determining which rules should govern the global economy (a procedural component). (2006: 734)

As the many liberal proposals for moral improvement of the world order indicate, liberal objections to world government—whether they take the form of tyranny/homogeneity arguments and/or the inefficiency/soullessness objections—are not motivated by a complacent attitude towards the contemporary world order and its resulting conditions (Pogge 2000). As Charles Jones has put it, these valid and plausible objections to world government do not show that “the status quo is preferable to some alternative arrangement” (1999: 229). While liberal theorists acknowledge the tyrannical potential of a world government, they also acknowledge that “sovereign states are themselves often the cause of the rights-violations of their citizens” (1999: 229). Kok-Chor Tan characterizes liberal proposals for world order to involve, therefore, neither world government nor absolute state sovereignty. Instead, liberals have argued consistently for restrictions on the traditional powers of sovereignty, as well as for the vertical dispersion of sovereignty, “upwards towards supranational bodies, and also downwards toward particular communities within states” (2000: 101). In such a world order, states become “another level of appeal, and not the sole and final one” (2000: 101).

David Held argues that this dispersion of sovereignty is inevitable given that the nation-state does not exist in an insular world, but a highly interdependent and complex system: the contemporary reality consists of a globalized economy, international organizations, regional and global institutions, international law, and military alliances, all of which operate to shape and constrain individual states. Although national sovereignty still has a place in the contemporary world order,

interconnected authority structures … displace notions of sovereignty as an illimitable, indivisible and exclusive form of public power. (1995: 137)

In Held’s account of cosmopolitan democracy, the universal realization of the liberal ideal of autonomy, derived from Kant, ultimately requires long-term institutional developments such as the creation of a global parliament, an international criminal court, the demilitarization of states, and global distributive justice in the form of a guaranteed annual income for each individual (1995: 279–80). Although cosmopolitan theorists tend to reject the dichotomy posed between a political system of sovereign states and one with a centralized world government, and have tended to eschew the terminology of the world state in their accounts of global democratic institutional reform, William Scheuerman has argued that some of their proposals of supranational institutions mimic core attributes of traditional statehood, thus inadvertently bringing the world state back into liberal cosmopolitan visions of world order (2014). It is thus an open question whether “statist cosmopolitanism” (Ypi 2011), which considers states as viable agents of cosmopolitan justice, is feasible, or whether cosmopolitanism requires transcending the state system (Ulaş 2017).

Democratic, republican and critical theorists have become concerned with the global context of order and justice due to its importance for establishing protective external conditions for the moral and political achievements of centuries of domestic democratic political struggle. Traditionally, the main global threat was interstate war, thus the projects for perpetual peace. Today, democratic theorists worry that contemporary processes of globalization are undermining the achievements of democratic societies in the areas of civil and social rights such as access to education and healthcare, and the economic securities provided by the welfare state. From this perspective, economic globalization and the growing power of international and transnational institutions pose a potential threat to democratic ideals of civic equality and self-determination. The task of the democratic theorist is to think about how democracies can respond to these global developments in ways that best help preserve the fragile achievements of domestic democratic justice (Habermas 2004 [2006]; see also Scheuerman 2008). Increasingly, theorists of global democratic reform envisage the need to develop new institutions and practices of representation and accountability rather than merely to extend traditional constitutional models and electoral mechanisms of domestic democratic governance (Archibugi 2008; Macdonald 2008; Marchetti 2008; Tinnevelt 2012; Tanyi 2019; Erman 2019).

Key to discussions in democratic, republican and critical theory about global order and justice is the political ideal of nondomination. Neo-republican theorist Philip Pettit understands commitment to this ideal to entail reducing people’s vulnerability to alien control or the arbitrary power of others to interfere with their choices and their lives. In the international context, Pettit has outlined a “republican law of peoples” that has the twin goals of ensuring that every people is represented by a non-dominating government in a non-dominating international order (2010). Starting with a world of states, Pettit argues that a state which is “effective and representative of its people” fulfills the republican ideal of nondomination, and “it would be objectionably intrusive of other agents in the international order” to bypass such states and assume responsibility for its members (2010: 71–2). A legitimate international order is one

in which effective, representative states avoid domination—whether by another state, or by a non-state body—and seek to enable other states to be effective and representative too. (2010: 73)

In an international context, the sources of domination include other states; “non-domestic, private bodies” such as “corporations, churches, terrorist movements, even powerful individuals”; and “non-domestic, public bodies” such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010: 77). While representative states realize nondomination internally for their members, individuals’ enjoyment of freedom as nondomination is not secured unless their states are protected in their external relations from dominating strategies, including “intentional obstruction, coercion, deception, and manipulation” as well as “invigilation”, and “intimidation” (2010: 74).

Pettit’s account presupposes the legitimacy of domestic democracies that ensure nondomination as a starting point for thinking about a legitimate international order, and he explicitly rejects the idea of a world state, modeled on a domestic republican regime, as an infeasible remedy for the challenges posed by domination in an international context (2010: 81; but see Koenig-Archibugi 2011). There is no easy solution, but Pettit considers feasible improvements to the current international order can be made by further developing multilateral

international agencies and forums by means of which states can work out their problems and relations in a space of more or less common reasons

as well as fostering greater solidarity among subgroups of weaker states so that they can form rival blocs that can resist domination by more powerful agents (2010: 84). While Pettit is mostly concerned with the dominating potential of powerful states, and considers international agencies to be less threatening (2010: 86), Cécile Laborde adds to Pettit’s account not only a concern for agent-relative domination, but also, and more centrally, systemic domination, which entails a greater awareness of the dominating potential of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the World Bank (2010). One of the ways that powerful states dominate weak states is by “entrenching and institutionalizing” their dominant position through unfair international social structures in areas such as trade (2010: 57).

Indeed, Nancy Kokaz, in a republican interpretation of Rawls’s Law of Peoples , argues that “a global republic cannot be dismissed by a civic [republican] theory of global justice” (2005: 94). The civic pluralist ideal that is threatened by the advent of global capitalism and ensuing deracination requires “a global state powerful enough to protect local communities” from the homogenizing tendencies and “excesses of global capitalism” (2005: 93). In a further development of republican ideas about global order and justice, James Bohman has argued that a republican ideal of freedom as nondomination in the new global “circumstances of politics” requires political struggle in the direction of transnational democracy (2004 and 2007). According to Bohman,

under conditions of globalization, freedom from tyranny and domination cannot be achieved without extending our political ideals of democracy, community and membership. (2004: 352)

Not only are currently bounded democratic communities ineffective in resisting new global sources and forms of domination, they are also “potentially self-defeating”, constituting

a thousand tiny fortresses in which the oldest form of domination is practiced at many different levels: the domination of noncitizens by citizens, or nonmembers by members, using their ability to command noninterference much like those who live within gated communities. (2007: 175 and 180)

Daniele Archibugi has termed this

democratic schizophrenia: to engage in a certain [democratic] behavior on the inside and indulge in the opposite [undemocratic] behavior on the outside. (2008: 6)

Such vicious circles of “democratic domination” can only be overcome by making borders, membership and jurisdiction the subjects of democratic deliberation across dêmoi (Bohman 2007: 179). Whether or not democracy serves global justice depends on the possibility of transnational democratization, and Bohman sees two primary agents of such transformation, in democratic states pursuing “broadly federalist and regional projects of political integration”, such as the European Union, and in the less institutionalized activities of “participants in transnational public spheres and associations” (2007: 189). While some think that the formal development of regional or global institutions must be democratized in order to realize republican nondomination or democratic agency (Valentini 2012), others argue that global democracy may be justified mainly for its instrumental role in protecting and promoting

the fundamental interests of all the world’s citizens, rather than by that of maximizing citizens’ democratic agency

at the global level (Weinstock 2006: 10).

Critical theorist Iris Marion Young similarly calls for a global politics of nondomination, that would support “a vision of local and cultural autonomy in the context of global regulatory regimes” (2002: 237). Her model of global governance—“a post-sovereign alternative to the existing states system” (2000: 238)—entails a “decentred diverse democratic federalism” (2000: 253). While everyday governance would be primarily local, it would take place in the context of global regulatory regimes, built upon existing international institutions, that would be functionally defined to deal with

(1) peace and security, (2) environment, (3) trade and finance, (4) direct investment and capital utilization, (5) communications and transportation, (6) human rights, including labor standards and welfare rights, (7) citizenship and migration. (2002: 267)

Young envisages these global regulatory regimes to apply not only to states, but also to non-state organizations, such as corporations, and individuals. In terms of feasibility, Young points to the development of a robust “global public sphere” (Habermas 1998) as crucial to bringing about “stronger global regulatory institutions tied to principles of global and local democracy” (Young 2002: 272).

Increasingly, then, republican and democratic theorists view transnational and supranational institutions not as intrinsic threats to democratic freedom and justice, but as potentially instrumental institutional developments that are necessary to fortify the capacities of contemporary states to deliver on democratic and republican values. In this sense, supporting the development of transnational democratic institutions is consistent with upholding the values of national identity and belonging, and the proper functioning of states, by providing a robust framework to coordinate and discipline states into solving problems of human rights and global justice in areas such as labor, health, migration, and taxation, in a more fair, equitable, and non-dominating manner (Abizadeh 2008; Ronzoni 2012; Valentini 2012; Dietsch 2015; Fine & Ypi 2016; Cabrera 2018). Paradoxically, it may be that in conditions of globalization, only a world state can provide the essential supporting conditions for all states, including democratic ones, to enjoy effective and legitimate collective self-determination (Lu 2018). Thus, republican cosmopolitanism in the form of a world state may be less of an oxymoron than Pettit suggests.

An abiding controversy about the contemporary world economy is its potential to enhance or destroy societal goals of securing justice, freedom, and welfare provision, including the protection of human rights and democratic politics (Stiglitz 2002; Kinley 2009). Craig Murphy has worried that globalization would

inevitably be accompanied by the anti-democratic government of “expertise” or by the non-government of marketization at ever more inclusive levels. (2000: 800)

Economists have warned that the relationship between global economic integration, national self-determination, and democratic politics can be fraught (Rodrik 2011), and that capitalism has a tendency to reproduce and intensify inequality (Piketty 2013 [2014]). In the twentieth century, Immanuel Wallerstein (2011) developed the world-systems approach to analyzing the contradictions inherent in a capitalist world-system. Although imperial military competition gave way to a world of sovereign states in the era of decolonization, he noted that a capitalist world order perpetuates systems of domination to maintain capitalist interests, at the expense of the developing world. World-systems theory thus explains how capitalism forms a stable set of exploitative relations between core and peripheral states, resulting in an international division of labor that benefits the core at the expense of the periphery.

While world-systems theory posits that “economic exploitation of the periphery does not necessarily require direct political or military domination” (Kohn & Reddy 2006 [2017]), contemporary postcolonial theorists argue that the rise of neoliberal globalization can be marked by the establishment of international economic institutions that have dislocated the power of sovereign states to make economic decisions, and relocated them in international economic institutions—the WTO, IMF and World Bank—with effective enforcement powers.

Whereas realist, liberal and republican theorists typically posit that a world state is a possible futuristic institutional development to evolve from anarchy, postcolonial theorists have argued that anarchy does not accurately describe the global historical institutional reality. Some also argue that world government is already here, albeit in a nascent form (Albert et al. 2012; Goodin 2013). Critical and postcolonial theorists argue that the course of capitalist modernity has produced a nascent world state of neoliberal domination (Chimni 2004; Slobodian 2018). In such conditions of structural domination, a world state may be undesirable as a political project due to established and entrenched global hierarchies based on racist, patriarchal, and capitalist domination and exploitation (Robinson 1983; Pateman and Mills 2007). As B.S. Chimni has put it,

A network of economic, social and political [International Institutions] has been established or repositioned, at the initiative of the first world, and together they constitute a nascent global state whose function is to realize the interests of transnational capital and powerful states in the international system to the disadvantage of third world states and peoples. The evolving global state formation may therefore be described as having an imperial character. (2004: 1–2)

Although fragmented in structure, the future global state, according to Chimni, is in the process of congealing to actualize and legitimize a world-view that ultimately serves the transnational capitalist class comprising the owners of transnational capital. This class allies with the networks of international law and institutions to undermine the decision-making powers of states, especially those with weak institutional capacities, and to make decisions without transparency or effective participation of those affected.

While increasingly intrusive, the decisions of international economic and financial institutions remain largely unaccountable. According to Slobodian, neoliberal globalists actively sought to construct the institutions of the global economy to evade accountability, “to contain potential disruptions from the democratically empowered masses”, so that the global economy could be “protected from the demands of redistributive equality and social justice” (2018: 264). While the Washington Consensus seemed to be based on sound economic principles—that free markets “and competition enable the efficient allocation of scarce resources”—and forecast economic growth based on liberalizing trade, investment, and capital flows, its failure to produce growth or inclusive development in many countries has revealed the importance of empirical analysis to check ideological distortions of economic policy (Rodrik 2015). China’s economic transformation illuminates global challenges arising from the decline of “managerial capitalism”, or Fordism, which generated the regulatory state-model of governance, and the rise of “neoliberal capitalism”, or post-Fordism, defined by the “hollowing out” of the state, reduction of central regulatory capacity, coupled with flexible production processes disaggregated into production chains and networks, and increasing vulnerability of the peripheral workforce (Dowdle 2016: 207–229).

In response to these predicaments of contemporary capitalism, critical and postcolonial theorists emphasize that there is no option to return to a mythical world of autarkic or autonomous and insulated states with traditional sovereign prerogatives (Winter & Chambers-Letson 2015). Instead, globalized domination can only be transformed through globalizing transnational labor and social movements that struggle for greater democratization of the decision-making processes of both domestic and international institutions (Chimni 2004). In calling for a revision of the principles that regulate the relationship between the global economy and sovereign states, in order to buttress state power, especially of Third World states, against international economic and financial institutions, critical theorists join contemporary liberal (Isiksel 2020) and republican theorists who view the state as continuing to play an important role in securing equal human freedom. According to Adom Getachew, “postcolonial cosmopolitanism” acknowledges the persistent unequal integration and hierarchy produced by the world politics of empire, and views the reinforcement of the sovereign state, as well as the dispersion of sovereignty in regional federations and a redistributive international economic order, as key to anti-colonial struggles to resist domination and remake the world (2019: 34).

Given that the Eurocentric narrative of civilizational progress forwarded the nation-state as a marker of civilization, and fated Indigenous peoples to extinction with the advent of modernity, however, Indigenous political theorists have reason to be ambivalent about a Weberian state at any level of political organization. Some Indigenous political theorists have mounted radical challenges to the settler colonial state as well as the statist international order. Glen Coulthard’s critique of the liberal politics of multicultural recognition reveals that the struggle for recognition may not emancipate, but entrench subjects in the settler colonial subjectivity offered by the settler colonial state (2014). Following anti-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon, Coulthard argues that dominated agents need to struggle to create new decolonized frameworks of recognition that they can call their own, and not only seek equal recognition based on structures of settler colonial power, otherwise

the colonized will have failed to reestablish themselves as truly self-determining: as creators of the terms, values, and conditions by which they are to be recognized. (2014: 139)

Coulthard also understands the political project of Indigenous “resurgence” to be inextricably linked to the struggle to construct alternative social and economic systems to capitalism; thus for Indigenous resurgence to be successful, “capitalism must die” (2014: 173). Such Indigenous politics of refusal (Simpson 2014) of both statism and capitalism underscore that the struggle for recognition of Indigenous humanity in conditions of racial capitalist modernity entails radical structural transformations of global order (Lu 2017 and 2019).

The aim of much normative theorizing about global institutions and global justice is to interrogate whether a world government is feasible, desirable, or necessary for realizing human aspirations for just, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous relations between the diverse individuals and groups that comprise a common moral community of humankind. Some think that the idea of world government involves a paradox: however it is conceived institutionally, when the winning conditions exist for establishing a desirable form of world government—one that will guarantee human security with individual liberty, protect the environment, and advance global social justice—it will no longer be necessary (Nielsen 1988: 276). Once all governments, especially the most powerful ones, are willing to use their power to build government networks that promote global peace, justice and environmental protection, and to cede some traditional rights of sovereignty to supranational institutions in areas such as the use of military force, the management and protection of the environment and natural resources, and the distribution of wealth, the establishment of a global political authority might seem superfluous. As Alexander Wendt has pointed out, however, a stable end-state of world order development requires such ideal conditions, should they ever develop, to become institutionalized into a world state that enacts “a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence” (1988: 491); enforcement mechanisms are not superfluous, since there is always the possibility of violations by outlaw states and groups. In a similar vein, the Swedish philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö has argued that neither voluntary multilateral cooperation under conditions of anarchy, nor a hybrid arrangement of “ shared sovereignty between the world government and nation-states”, will be effective in resolving contemporary challenges in the realms of human security, global justice and the environment (2008: 122–125). Since sovereignty is indivisible, Tännsjö posits that a world state must have ultimate decision-making authority over nation-states over jurisdictional issues:

Unless there are sanctions available to the central authority to back up a decision as to where a question is to be handled, the system of states will be thrown back into a state of nature. (2008: 125–6)

From critical and postcolonial perspectives, however, the state of nature reference point of much of international relations theory is a normatively obscuring myth that occludes the hierarchies of structural domination that have pervaded the development of world order (Jahn 2000; Lu 2017: 120). Postcolonial and critical theorists often share the ethical concerns and moral commitments of normative theorists (Kohn 2013)—justice, equality, freedom, nondomination—but their theorizing focuses on the diagnostic task of analyzing the causes and character of contemporary structural and institutional developments, as well as the global processes and conditions that make them possible. They view contemporary global order, marked by radical imbalances and disparities produced by historic and ongoing structural injustices based on class, race, and gender, as serving certain functions and interests, in terms of what they naturalize, enable, suppress, and obscure. In 2020 and 2021, as a world divided by deep political, social and economic structural inequalities faces pandemic conditions, economic recession, and environmentally deleterious developments, the questions of whose sense of world community and whose global needs will define the global political agenda and order are more salient than ever.

  • Abizadeh, Arash, 2008, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders”, Political Theory , 36(1): 37–65. doi:10.1177/0090591707310090
  • Albert, Mathias, Gorm Harste, Heikki Patomäki, and Knud Erik Jørgensen, 2012, “Introduction: World State Futures”, Cooperation and Conflict , 47(2): 145–156. doi:10.1177/0010836712443165
  • Anghie, Antony, 2005, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511614262
  • Araujo, Marcelo de, 2018. “Cyberwar, Political Realism, and World State”, in From Social to Cyber Justice: Critical Views on Justice, Law and Ethics , Nythamar Oliveira, Marek Hrubec, and Emil Sobottka (eds.), Prague and Porto Alegre: Filosofia (Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic) and PUC-RS, pp. 387–398.
  • Archibugi, Daniele, 2008, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Baratta, Joseph Preston, 2004, The Politics of World Federation: United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control , 2 vols., Westport, CT: Praeger.
  • Beitz, Charles R., 1979 [1999a], Political Theory and International Relations , Princeton: Princeton University Press. Revised edition 1999.
  • –––, 1994, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System”, in Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives , Chris Brown (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 119–132.
  • –––, 1999b, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought”, World Politics , 51(2): 269–296. doi:10.1017/S0043887100008194
  • Bell, Duncan, 2018, “Founding the World State: H. G. Wells on Empire and the English-Speaking Peoples”, International Studies Quarterly , 62(4): 867–879. doi:10.1093/isq/sqy041
  • ––– (ed.), 2019, Empire, Race and Global Justice , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108576307
  • Bohman, James, 2004, “Republican Cosmopolitanism”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 12(3): 336–352. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00203.x
  • –––, 2007, Democracy Across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Brown, Chris, 1995, “International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community”, in International Relations Theory Today , Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
  • Bull, Hedley, 1977, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics , New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Cabrera, Luis, 2004, Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State , New York: Routledge.
  • –––, 2010, “Review Article: World Government: Renewed Debate, Persistent Challenges”, European Journal of International Relations , 16(3): 511–530. doi:10.1177/1354066109346888
  • ––– (ed.), 2018, Institutional Cosmopolitanism , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190905651.001.0001
  • –––, 2019, The Humble Cosmopolitan: Rights, Diversity, and Trans-state Democracy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190869502.001.0001
  • Caney, Simon, 2006, “Cosmopolitan Justice and Institutional Design: An Egalitarian Liberal Conception of Global Governance”, Social Theory and Practice , 32(4): 725–756. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200632437
  • Castel de Saint-Pierre, Charles-Irénée, 1713, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe ( Project for Making Peace Perpetual in Europe ), Utrecht: Antonine Schouten.
  • Chimni, B. S., 2004, “International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making”, European Journal of International Law , 15(1): 1–37. doi:10.1093/ejil/15.1.1
  • Clark, Grenville and Louis B. Sohn, 1958/1960 [1962], World Peace Through World Law , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (copyright 1958, published 1960). Revised second edition, 1962.
  • Coulthard, Glen Sean, 2014, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  • Craig, Campbell, 2019, “Solving the Nuclear Dilemma: Is a World State Necessary?”, Journal of International Political Theory , 15(3): 349–366. doi:10.1177/1755088218795981
  • Dante Alighieri, 1304–7 [2000], The Banquet [ Convivio ]. Translated by Kate Forham in Readings in Medieval Political Theory 1100–1400 , Cary J. Nederman and Kate Langdon Forhan (eds.), London: Routledge, 1993. Reprinted 2000 by Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • –––, 1309–13 [1995], De Monarchia . Translated as Monarchy , Prue Shaw (trans. and ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page numbers are from the Shaw edition.
  • Dietsch, Peter, 2015, Catching Capital: The Ethics of Tax Competition , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190251512.001.0001
  • Deudney, Daniel H., 1995, “Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the Real -State”, Daedalus , 124(2): 209–231.
  • –––, 1999, “Geopolitics and Change”, in New Thinking in International Relations Theory , Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 91–123.
  • –––, 2019, “Going Critical: Toward a Modified Nuclear One Worldism”, Journal of International Political Theory , 15(3): 367–385. doi:10.1177/1755088218796689
  • –––, 2020, Dark Skies: Space Expansionism, Planetary Geopolitics, and the Ends of Humanity , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190903343.001.0001
  • Dowdle, Michael W., 2016, “China’s Present as the World’s Future: China and ‘Rule of Law’ in a Post-Fordist World”, in Chinese Thought as Global Theory: Diversifying Knowledge Production in the Social Sciences and Humanities , Leigh K. Jenco (ed.), Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 207–229.
  • Dufek, Pavel, 2013, “Why Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism Requires a World-State”, International Theory , 5(2): 177–212. doi:10.1017/S1752971913000171
  • DuFord, Rochelle, 2017, “Must a World Government Violate the Right to Exit?”, Ethics & Global Politics , 10(1): 19–36. doi:10.1080/16544951.2017.1311482
  • Einstein, Albert, 1946 [1950], “Towards a World Government”, talk to the Rally of Students for Federal World Government, Chicago, 24 May 1946. First published in Out Of My Later Years: the Scientist, Philosopher and Man Portrayed Through His Own Words , New York: Philosophical Library, 131–133.
  • Engels, Friedrich, 1884 [1978], The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State , Reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader , Robert C. Tucker (ed.), second edition, New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 734–759.
  • Erman, Eva, 2019, “Does Global Democracy Require a World State?”, Philosophical Papers , 48(1): 123–153. doi:10.1080/05568641.2019.1588153
  • Falk, Richard A., 1995, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
  • Fine, Sarah and Lea Ypi (eds.), 2016, Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.001.0001
  • Fukuyama, Francis, 1992, The End of History and the Last Man , New York: Free Press.
  • Getachew, Adom, 2019, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Goodin, Robert E., 2013, “World Government Is Here!” in Varieties of Sovereignty and Citizenship , Sigal R. Ben-Porath and Rogers M. Smith (eds), Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 149–65.
  • Goodman, Elliot R., 1953, “The Soviet Union and World Government”, The Journal of Politics , 15(2): 231–253. doi:10.2307/2126058
  • Habermas, Jürgen, 1998, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove”, in The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory , Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 165–202.
  • –––, 2004 [2006], Der gespaltene Westen , Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Translated as The Divided West , C. Cronin (trans.), Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • –––, 2010, “A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society?” in The Cosmopolitanism Reader , Garrett W. Brown and David Held (eds.), Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 267–288.
  • Heater, Derek Benjamin, 1996, World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought , London: Macmillan.
  • Held, David, 1995, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
  • Hobbes, Thomas, 1651 [1986], Leviathan , Markham: Penguin.
  • Jahn, Beate, 2000, The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The Invention of the State of Nature , Basingstoke: Palgrave.
  • Hurrell, Andrew, 2007, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233106.001.0001
  • Isiksel, Turkuler, 2020, “Cosmopolitanism and International Economic Institutions”, The Journal of Politics , 82(1): 211–224. doi:10.1086/705743
  • Jones, Charles, 1999, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:0.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242221.001.0001
  • Kant, Immanuel, 1784 [1991], “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht”. Translated as “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, in Kant 1991: 41–53. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511809620.004
  • –––, 1795 [1991], Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf , Leipzig. Translated as “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, in Kant 1991: 93–130. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511809620.007
  • –––, 1991, Political Writings , H. B. Nisbet (trans.), Hans S. Reiss (ed.), second edition, New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511809620
  • Keene, Edward, 2002, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kennedy, Paul M., 2006, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations , New York: Harper Collins.
  • Keohane, Robert O., 2001, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World”, American Political Science Review , 95(1): 1–13. doi:10.1017/S0003055401000016
  • Kinley, David, 2009, Civilising Globalisation: Human Rights and the Global Economy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511803710
  • Kleingeld, Pauline and Eric Brown, 2002 [2006], “Cosmopolitanism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/cosmopolitanism/ >.
  • Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias, 2011, “Is Global Democracy Possible?”, European Journal of International Relations , 17(3): 519–542. doi:10.1177/1354066110366056
  • Kohn, Margaret, 2013, “Postcolonialism and Global Justice”, Journal of Global Ethics , 9(2): 187–200. doi:10.1080/17449626.2013.818459
  • Kohn, Margaret and Kavita Reddy, 2006 [2017], “Colonialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/colonialism/
  • Kokaz, Nancy, 2005, “Institutions for Global Justice”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , 31: 65–107. doi:10.1080/00455091.2005.10716850
  • Krasner, Stephen D., 1999, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Laborde, Cécile, 2010, “Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch”, European Journal of Political Theory , 9(1): 48–69. doi:10.1177/1474885109349404
  • Lenin, Vladimir I., 1918 [2014], State and Revolution , Todd Chretien, annotator, Chicago: Haymarket Books.
  • Levy, Jacob T., 2020, “Contra Politanism”, European Journal of Political Theory , 19(2): 162–183. doi:10.1177/1474885117718371
  • Lu, Catherine, 2017, Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781108329491
  • –––, 2018, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Democracy, and the World State”, in Cabrera 2018: 232–252.
  • –––, 2019, “Decolonizing Borders, Self-Determination, and Global Justice”, in Bell 2019: 251–272. doi:10.1017/9781108576307.012
  • Lüthi, Lorenz M., 2020, Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Macdonald, Terry, 2008, Global Stakeholder Democracy: Power and Representation Beyond Liberal States , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235001.001.0001
  • Marchetti, Raffaele, 2008, Global Democracy: For and Against , New York: Routledge.
  • Marx, Karl, 1844 [1978], Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 , Reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader , Robert C. Tucker (ed.), second edition, New York: W.W. Norton.
  • Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, 1848 [1988], The Communist Manifesto , Frederic L. Bender (ed.), New York: W.W. Norton.
  • Miller, David, 2007, National Responsibility and Global Justice , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235056.001.0001
  • Mitrany, David, 1966, A Working Peace System , Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
  • Muñiz-Fraticelli, Victor M., 2014, The Structure of Pluralism , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673889.001.0001
  • Murphy, Craig N., 2000, “Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood”, International Affairs , 76(4): 789–803. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.00165
  • Nathan, Otto and Heinz Norden (eds.), 1960, Einstein on Peace , New York: Simon and Schuster.
  • Nielsen, Kai, 1988, “World Government, Security, and Global Justice”, in Problems of International Justice , Steven Luper-Foy (ed.), Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 263–282.
  • Pateman, Carole and Charles W. Mills, 2007, The Contract and Domination , Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Pedersen, Susan, 2015, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570485.001.0001
  • Pettit, Philip, 2010, “A Republican Law of Peoples”, European Journal of Political Theory , 9(1): 70–94. doi:10.1177/1474885109349406
  • Piketty, Thomas, 2013 [2014], Le Capital au XXIe siècle , Paris: Seuil. Translated as Capital in the Twenty-First Century , Arthur Goldhammer (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.
  • Pitts, Jennifer, 2018, Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Pogge, Thomas, 1988, “Moral Progress”, in Problems of International Justice , Steven Luper-Foy (ed.), Boulder: Westview, pp. 283–304.
  • –––, 2000, World Poverty and Human Rights , Oxford: Polity Press.
  • –––, 2009, “Kant’s Vision of a Just World Order”, in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics , Thomas E. Hill (ed.), Chichester: Blackwell, pp. 196–208.
  • Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
  • –––, 1999, The Law of Peoples , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Reves, Emery, 1945, The Anatomy of Peace , New York: Harper and Brothers.
  • Risse, Mathias, 2012, On Global Justice , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Roberts, William Clare, 2017, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Robinson, Cedric J., 1983, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition , Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Rodrik, Dani, 2011, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy , New York: W.W. Norton.
  • –––, 2015, Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science , New York: W.W. Norton.
  • Ronzoni, Miriam, 2012, “Two Conceptions of State Sovereignty and Their Implications for Global Institutional Design”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 15(5): 573–591. doi:10.1080/13698230.2012.727306
  • Rosenboim, Or, 2017, The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950 , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Rousseau, Jacques, 1756 [1917], Projet de Paix Perpétuelle , translated as A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe in Rousseau 1917.
  • –––, 1762, Du contrat social; ou Principes du droit politique ( The Social Contract ), Amsterdam: Marc Michel Rey.
  • –––, 1917, A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and The State of War , Charles Edwyn Vaughan (trans.), London: Constable and Co. [ Rousseau 1917 available online ]
  • Satz, Debra, 1999, “Equality Of What among Whom? Thoughts on Cosmopolitanism, Statism, and Nationalism”, in Nomos XLI: Global Justice , Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (eds.), New York: New York University Press, pp. 67–85.
  • Scheuerman, William E., 2002 [2018], “Globalization” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/globalization/
  • –––, 2008, “Review Essay: Global Governance without Global Government?”, Political Theory , 36(1): 133–151. doi:10.1177/0090591707310100
  • –––, 2011, The Realist Case for Global Reform , Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • –––, 2014, “Cosmopolitanism and the World State”, Review of International Studies , 40(3): 419–441. doi:10.1017/S0260210513000417
  • Simpson, Audra, 2014, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States , Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
  • Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 2004, A New World Order , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Slobodian, Quinn, 2018, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Stiglitz, Joseph, 2002, Globalization and Its Discontents , New York: W.W. Norton.
  • Tan, Kok-Chor, 2000, Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice , University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
  • –––, 2004, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511490385
  • Tanyi, Attila, 2019, “Introduction to Special Issue: World Government”, Philosophical Papers , 48(1): 1–7.
  • Tännsjö, Torbjörn, 2008, Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government , Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
  • Tinnevelt, Ronald, 2012, “Federal World Government: The Road to Peace and Justice?”, Cooperation and Conflict , 47(2): 220–238. doi:10.1177/0010836712443173
  • Trachtman, Joel P., 2013, The Future of International Law: Global Government , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139565585
  • Ulaş, Luke, 2016, “Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government”, Political Studies , 64(1_suppl): 105–120. doi:10.1177/0032321715624424
  • –––, 2017, “Transforming (but Not Transcending) the State System? On Statist Cosmopolitanism”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 20(6): 657–676. doi:10.1080/13698230.2015.1048071
  • Valdez, Inés, 2019, Transnational Cosmopolitanism: Kant, Du Bois, and Justice as a Political Craft , New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108630047
  • Valentini, Laura, 2012, “Assessing the Global Order: Justice, Legitimacy, or Political Justice?”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 15(5): 593–612. doi:10.1080/13698230.2012.727307
  • –––, 2014, “No Global Demos, No Global Democracy? A Systematization and Critique”, Perspectives on Politics , 12(4): 789–807. doi:10.1017/S1537592714002138
  • Wallerstein, Immanuel, 2011, The Modern World System , 4 volumes, Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Waltz, Kenneth N., 1979, Theory of International Politics , Toronto: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.
  • Walzer, Michael, 2004, Arguing About War , New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Weinstock, Daniel M., 2006, “The Real World of (Global) Democracy”, Journal of Social Philosophy , 37(1): 6–20. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00300.x
  • Weiss, Thomas G., 2009, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government”, International Studies Quarterly , 53(2): 253–271. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00533.x
  • –––, 2014, Governing the World? Addressing “Problems without Passports” , Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
  • Wells, H.G., 1902, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought , London: Chapman and Hall.
  • Wendt, Alexander, 2003, “Why a World State Is Inevitable”, European Journal of International Relations , 9(4): 491–542. doi:10.1177/135406610394001
  • Wight, Martin, 1991, “The Three Traditions of International Theory”, in his International Theory: The Three Traditions , Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (eds), Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, pp. 7–24.
  • Winter, Yves and Joshua Chambers-Letson, 2015, “Shipwrecked Sovereignty: Neoliberalism and a Disputed Sunken Treasure”, Political Theory , 43(3): 287–311. doi:10.1177/0090591714555577
  • Yack, Bernard, 2012, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
  • Young, Iris Marion, 2000, “Hybrid Democracy: Iroquois Federalism and the Postcolonial Project”, in Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples , Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, and Will Sanders (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 237–258.
  • –––, 2002, Inclusion and Democracy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198297556.001.0001
  • Ypi, Lea, 2011, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593873.001.0001
  • –––, 2013, “Cosmopolitanism Without If and Without But”, in Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism: Critiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations , Gillian Brock (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–91. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678426.003.0004
  • Zürn, Michael, 2018, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198819974.001.0001
How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.
  • World Government Research Network
  • Citizens for Global Solutions
  • World Federalist Movement–Institute for Global Policy
  • World Beyond Borders

citizenship | cosmopolitanism | Dante Alighieri | globalization | Hobbes, Thomas | justice: international distributive | Kant, Immanuel | Rousseau, Jean Jacques | sovereignty | war

Copyright © 2021 by Catherine Lu < catherine . lu @ mcgill . ca >

  • Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

  • Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Drishti IAS

  • Classroom Programme
  • Interview Guidance
  • Online Programme
  • Drishti Store
  • My Bookmarks
  • My Progress
  • Change Password
  • From The Editor's Desk
  • How To Use The New Website
  • Help Centre

Achievers Corner

  • Topper's Interview
  • About Civil Services
  • UPSC Prelims Syllabus
  • GS Prelims Strategy
  • Prelims Analysis
  • GS Paper-I (Year Wise)
  • GS Paper-I (Subject Wise)
  • CSAT Strategy
  • Previous Years Papers
  • Practice Quiz
  • Weekly Revision MCQs
  • 60 Steps To Prelims
  • Prelims Refresher Programme 2020

Mains & Interview

  • Mains GS Syllabus
  • Mains GS Strategy
  • Mains Answer Writing Practice
  • Essay Strategy
  • Fodder For Essay
  • Model Essays
  • Drishti Essay Competition
  • Ethics Strategy
  • Ethics Case Studies
  • Ethics Discussion
  • Ethics Previous Years Q&As
  • Papers By Years
  • Papers By Subject
  • Be MAINS Ready
  • Awake Mains Examination 2020
  • Interview Strategy
  • Interview Guidance Programme

Current Affairs

  • Daily News & Editorial
  • Daily CA MCQs
  • Sansad TV Discussions
  • Monthly CA Consolidation
  • Monthly Editorial Consolidation
  • Monthly MCQ Consolidation

Drishti Specials

  • To The Point
  • Important Institutions
  • Learning Through Maps
  • PRS Capsule
  • Summary Of Reports
  • Gist Of Economic Survey

Study Material

  • NCERT Books
  • NIOS Study Material
  • IGNOU Study Material
  • Yojana & Kurukshetra
  • Chhatisgarh
  • Uttar Pradesh
  • Madhya Pradesh

Test Series

  • UPSC Prelims Test Series
  • UPSC Mains Test Series
  • UPPCS Prelims Test Series
  • UPPCS Mains Test Series
  • BPSC Prelims Test Series
  • RAS/RTS Prelims Test Series
  • Daily Editorial Analysis
  • YouTube PDF Downloads
  • Strategy By Toppers
  • Ethics - Definition & Concepts
  • Mastering Mains Answer Writing
  • Places in News
  • UPSC Mock Interview
  • PCS Mock Interview
  • Interview Insights
  • Prelims 2019
  • Product Promos

Drishti IAS Blog

  • Aristotle's Views on State, Man and Government

Aristotle's Views on State, Man and Government  Blogs Home

  • 23 Dec 2021

government assignment on political philosophers

Introduction

The subject of political science has evolved by questioning the nature and importance of concepts like state, constitution, citizenship, laws, and governments.

Aristotle, famously referred to as the father of political science, had laid the bricks of the subject. In this blog, you will read about his understanding of the state, classification of constitutions and the cycle of governments.

Aristotle: Father of Political Science

The first man to distinguish between various branches of knowledge had been Aristotle. He differentiated between meteorology, poetics, logic, biology, ethics, natural history, aesthetics, physics, rhetoric, metaphysics and even wrote extensively on these subjects.

He did not only lay the foundation stone of political science but also contributed significantly to its elaboration as well. "Politics", "Ethics", and "Rhetoric" are few among many of his works that hold discussions on questions of law, equality, justice, etc.

According to Aristotle, political science is a master science. He gives credit to political science as a master-art because, unlike other sciences that serve as a means to an end, political science pertains to the ends of human existence in itself. Aristotle, thus viewed political science as the end to human existence rather than as a means to it.

In his book, The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, "The supreme good... must be the object of the most authoritative of the sciences - some science which is a master craft. But such is manifestly the science of politics, for it is this that ordains which of the sciences are to exist in states, and what branches of knowledge the different classes of citizens are to learn, and up to what point."

His view demonstrates that political science dominates all other sciences. It explains his "Hierarchy of Ends" , implying that each branch of knowledge is merely a means and would ultimately serve the end of leading a good life. Note here that Greek philosophers and their view of politics share one common notion. They believe that the state comes into existence for the sake of life and continues for the sake of good life. Aristotle doesn't differ on this notion and is hence considered to view the science of politics as supreme to other sciences.

Aristotle and his view on State

Aristotle views the state as natural. According to him, the state is a necessary condition for all humans. Like Plato, he doesn't differentiate between state or society and, in a similar fashion, considers it to be essential for a good life. Thus, in his view, the State is a necessary condition of a good life .

Any human being cannot survive in isolation, and thus, a man and a woman establish a household. A village is formed when a family expands itself, and when many such villages are formed, a state comes into existence. As and when a state is formed and society is organised, human beings can meet their needs.

It is for the same reason that the state's existence is as important and natural as the presence of a family or village. However, most human associations are flawed and help to fulfil one or a few facets of the good life, but that's untrue for a state. He viewed the state as being able to meet the whole or all facets of a good life.

It is important to understand why he perceived the state as natural for humans. According to him, there is no difference between an animal or a human being, other than the fact that a human being has the desire and a sense of living a good life. What it means is that human beings become different from animals only if they exist in a state. It is the same desire to lead a good life that makes the formation of a state a natural thing to occur.

Aristotle and his view on Man

Aristotle believes that Man is a political animal . This analogy is intriguing because it does not only consider man to be a social animal but also interprets him as a political being. Aristotle uses the same concept of the good life to justify his consideration of a man as a political being. He asserts that all kinds of living beings happen to exist in groups, and thus, they can be understood as social animals. However, it is solely the quality of human beings to aspire for a good and qualitative life.

For human beings, satisfaction doesn't cease at survival; the constant aspiration to lead a good life makes them political beings by default. He says, "he who does not live in a state or who does not need a state is either a beast or a god".

State and its relation with Man

Aristotle is known for his dictum that State is prior to man . Chronologically, it is a man who appears before the state. Still, since it is the state that makes human beings capable of completing their needs and fulfilling the objective of a good life, the state is given priority over the man.

To understand how the state is before man, O.P Gauba uses the example of whole and part. A leg or a hand is a part of the body, but a leg or a hand without a body is useless; an individual without a state is incomplete, and it is the state that makes him whole.

Aristotle draws a relation between organ and organism. Each organ of a living being performs a specific function; each individual performs different responsibilities in society. The body consists of different organs performing varied functions, and the body ensures harmony in its functioning. Similarly, the state ensures the communion of various individuals, where the division of labour ensures cooperation and harmony in society.

Aristotle and his classification of governments and constitutions

The father of the science of politics owes the title to his name because he employed empirical inquiry as to his method. Aristotle was troubled by the instability that existed in Greek city-states' governments. He studied over 158 case histories of various city-states by sending his students to prepare case studies of various constitutions. He analysed almost 160 case histories. To be precise, it is believed that he analysed 158 case histories.

The case history of Athens is an important source to understand his classification of the constitutions. One can understand this fact based on two factors:

  • The number of individuals ruling the state: whether it is one person ruling the state, a few individuals or if it is a rule of many.
  • The intent of the ruler or rulers: whether the ruler is ruling for his state's interest (known as a normal form of government), or whether the ruler is looking after his self-interest (known as a perverted form of government).
Monarchy Tyranny
Aristocracy Oligarchy
Constitutional Democracy Democracy

(Source: politicalsciencereview.com)

  • If it is the rule of ONE, then it would be MONARCHY or a Kingship in an ideal form of government, or it would be despotism or TYRANNY in a perverted form.
  • If the rule is by FEW, it would be ARISTOCRACY in an ideal form of government or OLIGARCHY in a perverted form.
  • If the rule is by MANY, it would be POLITY or a constitutional government as the ideal form of government, and interestingly, DEMOCRACY in a perverted form.

According to Aristotle, without any adequate checks on a ruler's power, no form of government would be stable. He believes that power and virtue cannot coexist .

He has provided the cycle of change of governments over time. Kingship, a normal form of government, turns to tyranny when there is an absence of control over the monarch's power. Tyranny leads to a rebellion or a revolution by a few individuals who establish an aristocracy. Aristocracy can deteriorate and turn into an oligarchy, the perverted form. With time, a greater many rebels against oligarchy and supersede it with polity. Polity further decays in democracy when the many rulers begin to seek their self-interest. In the end, a single individual who seems virtuous establishes a monarchy, and the progression of ideal form and perverted form continues in a circular motion.

normal perverted normal perverted normal perverted

Aristotle gave the concept of a mixed constitution as a solution to prevent instability and establish a lasting form of government in the Greek city-state. He employed his idea of the "Golden Mean" to create stability. In his book "Ethics", he explains the Golden Mean as a middle path, which means that virtue lies between two extremes . Anything on an extreme end becomes a vice, and each virtue lies in the middle of the two extremes. For instance, courage is a virtue that lies between the two extremes of timidity and negligence.

His solution to bring a stable form of government is the combination of rule by few and rule by many. He discarded Monarchy because it would be corrupt from absolute power. Aristocracy would suit because few would make the rules. This would comprise the chosen minority who are educated and rich. However, in case of no checks on aristocracy, it would deteriorate. To prevent that, Aristotle suggests that the decisions made by the aristocracy should be ratified by the ordinary many. He says that "the people, though individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge, are collectively as good" .

Aristotle's suggestion of a judicious mixture between aristocracy and what is sometimes referred to as Polity or, at other times Democracy, embodies his belief in the Golden Mean formula. Hence, the competent, rich and educated would rule, but the ordinary citizens would check the aristocracy from exceeding their power by ratifying their decisions. In modern times, Aristotle's formula is arguably referred to as Constitutional Democracy.

government assignment on political philosophers

Annie Pruthi is currently pursuing her masters in Political Science from JMI, New Delhi and is a first division Arts graduate from Delhi University. She is an avid reader and an award-winning best-selling author. Her book "Will You Stay?" recently won the title of "Most Promising Book, 2020 (Fiction)" in the Coimbatore Literary Awards.

Comments (0)

government assignment on political philosophers

11.1 Historical Perspectives on Government

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

  • Explain the connection between Aristotle’s theory of virtue and political philosophy.
  • Compare views of a just society across cultures.

As political philosophies emerged in different cultures, their followers adopted notions of ideal societies and systems of government. This section examines the ideas of Aristotle and Plato in ancient Greece, Mozi in ancient China, and Al-Farabi in the early Islamic world.

The Just City in Ancient Greece

The history of political philosophy in the West can be traced back to ancient Greece . The term polis , from which is derived the word political , refers to the city-state, the basic unit of government in ancient Greece. Early inquiries were concerned with questions such as “Which qualities make for the best leader?” “Which is the best system of government for a city-state?” and “What is the role of a citizen?” For many philosophers, the most fundamental moral questions—such as “How should I treat others?” and “What constitutes a good life?”—are the basis for corollary political considerations. The philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE) links the two through the concept of telos , which means “goal directed.” All things in life have a goal, or an end purpose, he says. It is the goal of human beings to live a good life, which is only achievable by living a virtuous life. Acquiring virtue is a difficult task, requiring constant practice. The acquisition of virtue necessarily involves a community to provide education, model virtues, and provide opportunities for a person to behave virtuously. Therefore, living in a well-constructed political society is an essential part of living a good life. According to Aristotle, “This truth is attested by the experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits of right action—this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form of constitution from a bad one” (1996, 1103b20).

Plato and The Republic

Plato’s Republic is perhaps one of the best-known early texts examining the concept of a just society and the role of the citizen. Plato (ca. 428–348 BCE) uses a method of guided argumentation, known today as the Socratic method , to investigate the nature of justice. Using his mentor, Socrates, as the main interlocutor, Plato opens The Republic by asking what it means to live a just life, and the text evolves into a discussion about the nature of justice. Socrates asks, Is justice simply an instrument used by those in power, or is it something valuable in itself?

Socrates believes that behaving justly provides the greatest avenue to happiness, and he sets out to prove this idea by using the analogy of the just city. If a just city is more successful than an unjust one, he argues, it follows that a just man will be more successful than an unjust man. Much of Plato’s Republic imagines this just city. First, society is organized according to mutual need and differences in aptitude so that all the people can receive essential goods and services. For example, some people will be farmers, while others will be weavers. Gradually, the city begins to develop trade and introduce wages, which provide a basis of a good society. But commerce with outsiders opens the city to threats, so soldiers are needed to protect and defend the city. Soldiers of a just society must be exceptional in all virtues, including skill and courage, and must seek nothing for themselves while working only for the good of the society. Plato calls these soldiers guardians , and the development of the guardians is the main focus of the text because the guardians are the leaders of the society.

The Role of the Guardians

The guardians’ training begins when they are quite young, as they must be exposed only to things that will develop a strong character, inspire patriotic feelings, and emphasize the importance of courage and honor. The guardians must not be exposed to any narrative that dwells on misery, bad luck, illness, or grief or that portrays death or the afterlife as something to fear. Furthermore, they must live communally, and although allowed to marry, they hold children and property in common. Because the guardians begin their education at such an early age, they are taught to view their lifestyle not as a sacrifice but as the privilege of their station. The guardians who are considered to be the most virtuous, both morally and intellectually, eventually become the city’s rulers, known as philosopher-kings: “Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one . . . cities will never have rest from their evils” (1892, 473d–e).

Plato establishes the four virtues upon which the state should be founded: wisdom, courage, discipline, and justice. While wisdom and courage must be present in the guardians, all members of the city must be at least partially disciplined, performing their jobs and roles to maintain the peace and harmony of the state. Even for those who are allowed private property, accumulating wealth is discouraged because it encourages laziness and selfishness, traits that endanger the peace of the city. The theme of communal property appears several times in The Republic . Socrates claims that when things are shared in common (including women and children), sufferings and joys are also shared (461e). Thus, when one person loses something, the whole community loses, but when one gains something, the whole community gains. Second, when words such as mine are eliminated, conflicts over property are also eliminated, along with a sense of lack or suffering when someone else prospers. Communal sharing helps eliminate rebellion, strikes, and other forms of discontent and promotes social harmony, which is essential for a good society.

Plato’s notion of three tiers of society—guardians, auxiliaries, and laborers—corresponds with elements of the soul. Just as these three groups work together for the good of the city, reason and knowledge work together with discipline to overrule passions that threaten to disrupt the harmony of individuals. These three qualities allow individuals to be just and virtuous.

The Tradition of Exclusion

When thinking about foundational texts, we must pause to consider the missing voices of those denied a role in governance, which ironically represents a significant injustice embedded in early theories of justice. In ancient Greek texts, as in many texts that make up the foundational base of political philosophy, the citizenry generally consists of wealthy men. Women are excluded from consideration, as are those born into slavery (rights are occasionally extended to enslaved individuals obtained through war). According to Aristotle, women are by nature born into a lower hierarchy than men and are not reasonable enough to engage in political life. Aristotle also deems the elderly to be no longer competent to engage politically, while children (presumably male children) are not yet old enough to be competent: “The slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element; the female has it but it lacks authority; the child has it but it is incomplete” (1984, 1260a11). Aristotle’s requirements for citizenship are a bit murky. In his view, an unconditional citizen is one who can participate in government, holding either deliberative or judicial office. Nonetheless, Plato’s Republic does imagine a role for women as members of the ruling guardian class: “Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness” (1892, 456a).

Mohism in China

Roughly 8,000 miles east of the birthplace of The Republic , a group of thinkers called Mohists were engaged in similar conversations about justice and governance. Mohism arose during China’s Warring States era (481–221 BCE), a period of great social upheaval. Though this conflict was eventually resolved by the unification of the central states and the establishment of the Qin dynasty, the constant shifting of political boundaries led to a massive exchange of cultural, economic, and intellectual information. For this reason, this era is also known as the “‘hundred schools’ of thought” period (Fraser 2020, xi). The chapter on normative moral theory discusses the central tenets of Mohist thought; this section will examine its political ideals.

The Book of Mozi

The central tenets of Mohism can be found in the Mozi , an important text in Chinese philosophy. Compiled by followers of the teacher and reformer Mo Di, or Mozi (470–391 BCE), the Mozi explores a range of topics, including logic, economics, science, and political and ethical theory. Like Plato’s Republic , the Mozi explores what constitutes virtuous behavior and arrives at ideas of universal love and benevolence. Mohists evaluate behavior according to how well it benefits others. Governance should focus on how best to promote social welfare. The morality of an action or policy is determined by its outcome. According to the Mozi , aggression and injury to others, even in military operations, should be opposed.

Connections

The chapter on normative moral theory covers consequentialism in greater detail.

The Mohist Ruler in China

The Mohists believed that individuals are essentially good and want to do what is morally right, but they often lack an understanding of moral norms. Therefore, a virtuous and benevolent ruler is necessary to provide a standard of moral education and behavior. The Mozi describes social disorder in antiquity:

In the beginning of human life, when there was yet no law and government, the custom was “everybody according to his own idea.” Accordingly each man had his own idea, two men had two different ideas and ten men had ten different ideas—the more people the more different notions. And everybody approved of his own view and disapproved the views of others, and so arose mutual disapproval among men. (Mozi n.d., I.1)

To combat this disorder and establish a form of peaceful cooperation, it became necessary to identify a ruler. Thus, “Heaven” chose a sage ruler, “crown[ing] him emperor” and “charging him with the duty of unifying the wills in the empire” (Mozi n.d., II.2).

The sage ruler in turn chose three wise ministers to help him. However, they realized “the difficulty of unifying all the peoples in mountains and woods and those far distant,” so they further divided the empire and appointed feudal lords as local rulers, who in turn chose “ministers and secretaries and all the way down to the heads of districts and villages, sharing with them the duty of unifying the standards in the state” (Mozi n.d., II.2). Once this governmental hierarchy was established, the ruler issued an edict to the people to report moral misconduct among both the citizenry and the leaders. In this way, the Mozi says, people would behave judiciously and act in good character.

In the Warring States period, Mohism competed with Confucianism . With the rise of the Qin and Imperial dynasties that followed, it declined, although many of its tenets were absorbed into Confucianism, whose influence in China lasted over 2,000 years.

Al-Farabi’s View of Rulership

The emphasis on virtuous behavior as a condition for a civic peace can also be seen in the work of Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi (870–950 CE). While there is not much information regarding Al-Farabi’s life, it is known that he came to Baghdad during the golden age of Islam, likely from central Asia. Alongside Arab geographers and historians and Christian scholars translating texts from Greek to Arabic, Al-Farabi wrote and taught. Baghdad was home not only to the largest urban population at the time but also to great libraries and educational centers that produced advances in math, optics, astronomy, and biology. Al-Farabi fled Baghdad due to political turmoil later in his life and is believed to have died in Damascus. He remains an important thinker who influenced later, and perhaps better known, philosophers such as Avicenna and Averroes. Early biographers emphasize his contributions to the fields of logic and metaphysics, which are still recognized as pivotal today. Al-Farabi was one of the first Islamic philosophers to study Greek political philosophy and write about it (Fakhry 2002). He advances some of the Greeks’ ideas in his discussion of the supreme ruler and the city of excellence (Galston 1990). For this reason, he is often called the “second master,” with Aristotle being the first.

The Supreme Ruler

Al-Farabi’s supreme ruler is the founder of the city—not a historical founder, but rather one who possesses both practical and theoretical knowledge and is not bound by any precedent or prior authority. While a supreme ruler bases their decisions on careful analysis, their “successor” accepts and builds upon the judgments of the supreme ruler without subjecting those judgments to philosophical scrutiny (Galston 1990, 97).

The supreme ruler has knowledge of both political philosophy and political science. For Al-Farabi, political science is the practical understanding of statecraft, which includes managing political affairs. It is the job of political science to investigate the ways in which people live their lives, including their moral dispositions and inclinations, and to look at the motivations behind actions and determine whether their aim is “true happiness.” True happiness comes about through virtuous actions and the development of moral character. By contrast, presumed happiness focuses on things that corrupt, such as power, money, and material pleasures. Political philosophy is the theoretical knowledge needed to identify virtuous behavior.

Philosophical and Nonphilosophical Rulers

Al-Farabi draws a distinction between philosophical and nonphilosophical rulers. Nonphilosophical rulers may possess practical knowledge and be able to make judgments based on their experience observing and interacting with individuals in the city. They will be able to recognize patterns and similarities in conflict and thus make the fairest decisions possible to ensure the peace, even as they rely on the wisdom of the supreme ruler. On the other hand, philosophical rulers possess theoretical as well as practical knowledge and will be able to determine the wisdom of actions themselves (Galston 1990, 98). A philosophical ruler can become a supreme ruler, while a nonphilosophical ruler cannot.

Cities of Excellence

Like Plato’s Republic , Al-Farabi’s city must be ruled by a philosopher and seek to educate a class of philosopher-elites who can assist in the city’s management. The classes to which the citizens of the city belong are determined by the supreme ruler and are based on their natural attributes, actions, and behaviors (Galston 1990, 128). The overarching goal is to create a virtuous city or nation that gives its citizens the greatest chance of attaining true happiness.

This is in stark contrast to the immoral city, in which people embrace vices such as drunkenness and gluttony and prioritize money and status over virtuous actions. Citizens act in this way not out of ignorance but rather by choice. Such a people can never attain true happiness because their happiness is based on temporary things (Galston 1990). If a city is not ruled by a supreme ruler, however, it is not necessarily destined to become an immoral city, and its citizens may still be able to achieve true happiness through the pursuit of virtue. In the Political Regime , Al-Farabi states:

Among the necessary cities, there may be some that bring together all of the arts that procure what is necessary. Their ruler is the one who has fine governance and excellent stratagems for using [the citizens] so that they gain the necessary things and fine governance in preserving these things for them or who bestows these things on them from what he has. (quoted in Germann 2021)

Nonetheless, such a city can never be considered a city of excellence; its aim is to provide for the material well-being of its citizens, but it lacks philosophical understanding of well-being in a larger sense.

The city of excellence is governed by the practice of the “royal craft,” or the management of political affairs. The royal craft attempts to establish a social order based on positive character, virtuous behavior, and moral action. When the citizens of the city embody these principles and encourage others to embody them as well, a harmonious society results, one in which all inhabitants can achieve their greatest possible level of happiness and fulfillment

Think Like a Philosopher

Plato and Al-Farabi both thought that a just city should be ruled by a philosopher. What factors determine whether a government will make good decisions? Do you agree with Plato and Al-Farabi that these factors are the virtue and abilities of its leader or leadership? What role does the structure of the government play in how it makes decisions and how good those decisions are? Identify two or three good decisions your government has made. Using the SIFT or four moves approach from the chapter on critical thinking , research each decision. Then write a paragraph about each decision, describing how the decision was made. Explain why it does or does not support Plato’s and Al-Farabi’s position.

As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.

This book may not be used in the training of large language models or otherwise be ingested into large language models or generative AI offerings without OpenStax's permission.

Want to cite, share, or modify this book? This book uses the Creative Commons Attribution License and you must attribute OpenStax.

Access for free at https://openstax.org/books/introduction-philosophy/pages/1-introduction
  • Authors: Nathan Smith
  • Publisher/website: OpenStax
  • Book title: Introduction to Philosophy
  • Publication date: Jun 15, 2022
  • Location: Houston, Texas
  • Book URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-philosophy/pages/1-introduction
  • Section URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-philosophy/pages/11-1-historical-perspectives-on-government

© Dec 19, 2023 OpenStax. Textbook content produced by OpenStax is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License . The OpenStax name, OpenStax logo, OpenStax book covers, OpenStax CNX name, and OpenStax CNX logo are not subject to the Creative Commons license and may not be reproduced without the prior and express written consent of Rice University.

Philosophy Now: a magazine of ideas

Your complimentary articles

You’ve read one of your four complimentary articles for this month.

You can read four articles free per month. To have complete access to the thousands of philosophy articles on this site, please

The Great Government Philosophers

George fripley remembers four forgotten gurus of government..

Many great thinkers have spent years studying government and how it should work, but to find the origins from which modern political theory has grown we need to look back at the ancient civilizations of Rome, Greece and China. Four little-known philosophers from these periods have provided great guidance to government over the last two millennia. These are Obstrucius, Burocrates, Futilius and Dillayus.

Obstrucius – The First and Greatest

Not many people have heard of the great philosopher Obstrucius. He lived from 550 BC to 470 BC, at a time when China was still politically fragmented. He had many ideas about how governments should be run. There is no record of the death of Obstrucius, and it is widely rumoured that he is immortal and continues to run governments all over the world.

Although his guide for bureaucrats is now lost, some of his quotes remain. The list is extremely lengthy. However, I have included a selection of some of the more pertinent ones a new government employee should become familiar with:

• ‘By three methods may we run government: First, by obstruction, which is noblest; second, by procrastination, which is easiest; and third by out-sourcing, which is dearest.’

• ‘To be able to practice the five principles everywhere in government constitutes perfect virtue: Delay decisions , watch your back , show no initiative , don’t communicate , and remain anonymous .’

• ‘He who speaks without jargon will find it difficult to achieve promotion in government.’

• ‘The will to confuse, the desire to delay, the urge to reach complete anonymity: these are the keys that will unlock the door to public service excellence.’

Burocrates – The Greek Perspective

The pre-eminent Greek political philosopher was Burocrates. Born in 450 BC, Burocrates studied early democracy and saw government in a holistic manner. He regarded it as a form of art, and viewed public servants as artists whose job was to provide aesthetically-pleasing processes and outcomes in a manner that was not rushed by the mere inconvenience of time. He was a contemporary of Socrates, and it is rumoured that these two philosophers spent many hours discussing the relative merits of democracy and royal rule over large amounts of wine. He met his death in 385 BC when he found himself in an argument with another contemporary, Aristophanes, who accused him of having all the characteristics of the popular politicians he studied: a horrible voice, bad breeding, and a vulgar manner. They both died during the quarrel when their brains dribbled out of their ears due to the banality of their arguments.

Unfortunately Burocrates is not widely known, and few, if any, academics have seriously studied his work. Consequently very little is known about him. However, he leaves us with some notable quotes, including:

• ‘The pure art of government should be unsullied by the ticking of the clock.’

• ‘Where the path appears straight and without danger, extra care should be taken and your pace slowed.’

• ‘The vote is a precious thing, its value priceless. Never have so many people been kept happy by such a futile act.’

• ‘Let a politician announce decisions and keep him happy for a day. Let a politician think he made the decisions, and keep him happy for a whole term of government.’

Futilius – The Study of Committees

Ancient Rome had a philosopher who made a career out of investigating the process of committees – Futilius. Futilius carried out his work in the time of Lucius Cornelius Sulla, Gaius Julius Caesar and Augustus. He was born in Rome in 99 BC and died shortly after Julius Caesar in 40 BC. Invited to chair a committee, he decided to put his theories to the test, but was brutally stabbed to death by the committee’s executive officers after only three weeks. As with Burocrates, Futilius developed a great deal of advice that has stood the test of time, but has received little if no recognition for his work. Five of his best-known quotes are included here:

• ‘Chairs should every night call themselves to account. What decision have they delayed today? What proposals opposed? What innovation resisted? What public servant frustrated? Projects will abort of themselves if they be brought under this discipline.’

• ‘Be extremely vague, even to the point of deferral. Be extremely mysterious, even to the point of confusion. Thereby you can be the director of the public servant’s descent into insanity.’

• ‘All public servants servicing the Board pass through three stages. First, they are ridiculed. Second, they are violently opposed. Third, it is accepted that they are too difficult to change, and they are ignored.’

• ‘All Board meetings are based on procrastination. There is no place where the brakes are not applied. Offer the public servants hope to lure them in, and then trap them in a cage of frustration.’

• ‘Where no policy exists, ask for a new one; where a policy does exist, ask for a new one; where there is no need for a policy, insist on a new one.’

Dillayus – Out of the Shadow of Futilius

At the same time Nero was striding through the corridors of Rome, Dillayus was contemplating the complex area of government decision-making. He was born in Rome in 5 AD and grew up reading much of the work of Futilius. He identified areas that Futilius had not spent much time researching, and ended up specialising in the study of emergency situations where decisions appeared imminent.

He is perhaps not as well known as Futilius, and might not have the same standing. However he did produce a large body of work that remains relevant. He died in 64 AD when he was trapped in the great fire that swept Rome, after finding himself distracted by Nero’s fiddle playing and unable to decide on the best course of action. His gems of wisdom include:

• ‘If in doubt, employ an outside expert to review all information.’

• ‘The pure joy of procrastination is unrivalled by other experience in government.’

• ‘When all other means of obstruction have been exhausted, all that is left is public consultation, the mother of all delaying tactics.’

• ‘There is never enough information to make a decision. Those who disagree are not in possession of all the facts.’

• ‘When all is lost and a decision is inevitable, take solace in the fact that you did everything possible to prevent it.’

© George Fripley 2009

George Fripley lives in Australia and works for the government.

This site uses cookies to recognize users and allow us to analyse site usage. By continuing to browse the site with cookies enabled in your browser, you consent to the use of cookies in accordance with our privacy policy . X

Your cart is empty

You have no recently viewed items..

National Center for Constitutional Studies

  • (800) 388-4512
  • Free Civics Resources
  • Civics Curriculum Supplements
  • Submit Purchase Order
  • About our Seminar Program
  • How to Host a Seminar
  • Watch our Recorded Seminar
  • Declaration of Independence
  • United States Constitution
  • Bill of Rights
  • Amendments 11-27
  • Principles of Liberty
  • Proclaim Liberty (study Course)
  • The Weekly Constitution
  • Our Ageless Constitution
  • The Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Monetary Reform
  • Freedom Stories
  • Privacy Policy
  • Return Policy
  • Shipping & Delivery
  • Terms of Service

Government Philosophies and Their Impact on Society

Governments around the world are influenced by different philosophies that shape their structures, policies, and how they affect people and societies. In this article, we'll explore various government philosophies and their potential presence in the United States Constitution. Because the U.S. Constitution is unique to any other in the world, it incorporates various philosophical principles, making it challenging to describe the type of government it represents with a single political philosophy. Some of the government philosophies we will discuss were explicitly rejected by the American Founders, while others were adapted to enhance the concepts of limited government and representation. Although it's challenging to provide an exhaustive list, here are some of the major ones:

  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The U.S. Constitution established a representative democracy, with elected officials serving in various branches of government. A pure or direct democracy is a form of government in which citizens directly participate in decision-making and lawmaking processes. In a direct democracy, there are no representatives or elected officials who make decisions on behalf of the people. While the concept of a pure democracy may sound appealing in theory, it is often impractical in larger and more complex societies. In practice, many modern democracies, including the United States, operate as representative democracies or republics, where citizens elect representatives to make decisions on their behalf.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The United States Constitution establishes a republican form of government (see Article IV, Section 4 ), with elected representatives serving in the U.S. Congress and other state and local offices. (Note: 'Republicanism' should not be confused with the 'Republican Party' in the United States.) It is also worth noting that the term 'republic,' as a definition of a government, can be somewhat confusing since there are many different types of governments that identify as republics. Some of these include the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, and the Republic of Indonesia, to name just a few. For this reason, it is more accurate to refer to the United States as a Constitutional Republic rather than simply a republic because, while our government is a 'public matter,' it is also restrained by specific laws within written constitutions.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The United States rejected monarchy in favor of a republican system. However, the founders did see the wisdom in having quick decisive action at certain times, like national emergencies, and gave certain emergency powers to the President. Thus, there are elements of a monarchy in the Constitution.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The United States does not have a constitutional monarchy; instead, it is a federal republic with an elected president and a constitution that establishes a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Constitutional monarchies, on the other hand, combine elements of monarchy with constitutional principles, with the monarch typically serving as a ceremonial figurehead while elected officials hold governing authority. This system is most similar to Great Britain's governmental structure.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The Constitution was explicitly designed to prevent authoritarian or totalitarian rule by dividing powers among three branches of government (checks and balances) and further protecting individual rights through limiting federal power in the Bill of Rights.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : Communism was rejected by the framers of the Constitution because it destroys the incentive to work. Instead, they established a system where the people could keep the fruits of their labors.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The United States was founded with a capitalist economic system, but over time, elements of socialism, such as public education, social safety nets like Social Security and Medicare, and various government programs that influence the private sector, have been introduced. While socialism can seem appealing at first glance due to its focus on social welfare, it often involves centralized planning and government ownership, which can result in inefficiencies, lack of innovation, and economic stagnation. Additionally, in some cases, socialist systems have faced challenges related to human rights abuses and corruption, which can contribute to political instability.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The United States primarily operates under a capitalist economic system, promoting private enterprise and competition within a framework of laws and regulations. Capitalism has historically driven economic growth and innovation. However, it's important to note that socialism has also made inroads in many areas of American society, including public education and social safety nets, aiming to address social and economic challenges. Capitalism can sometimes get the blame for socialistic failings.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : While the Constitution absolutely advocates for individual rights and personal freedoms, some modern liberalistic philosophies have advocated for them in ways that lead to socialism. Since the United States is a republic, government is looked at as a matter of public concern, and citizens expect it to intervene in certain areas to safeguard individual rights and promote the common good. The question is, how does it do that without infringing on the rights of the people? The answer is relatively simple. Government should strive to protect equal rights and not try to ensure equality in things or outcomes. Protecting equal rights in society is based on a capitalistic principle that places few limits on a person’s ability to pursue whatever it is that makes them happy, with the understanding that they are able to keep the fruits of their labors. Of course, the law requires them to do it in a manner that does not infringe on another person’s rights. Capitalism provides an incentive for people to work hard, which, in turn, benefits society in several important ways, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Capitalism does, however, come with a caveat. If you don’t work, you don’t eat. In other words, personal initiative and responsibility are essential. This philosophy can seem harsh and unfeeling, which is the very reason modern social justice advocates promote other ways to be ‘equal’. It sounds much nicer to show up for the food after the little red hen did all the work, and how dare she deprive us of it. This philosophy has two primary deficiencies. First, it breeds dependency and laziness. Second, it destroys the incentive to work. In its very nature, it is socialism and not compatible with Americanism and the U.S. Constitution. (Please Note: Societies absolutely have a responsibility to help people in need, and this should be done through what Benjamin Franklin called “calculated compassion”. But that is a discussion for another time.)
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : While the Constitution protects individual rights, it also reflects conservative principles in its preservation of a constitutional republic and respect for established laws. This commitment to upholding traditional values and institutions contributes to the consistency and stability of the nation's governance from one generation to the next. Additionally, the Constitution's emphasis on limited government aligns with conservative ideals of minimizing state interference in the lives of citizens.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : Our exploration of governmental philosophies reveals that there's rarely a one-size-fits-all solution. In the early days, the American colonists, frustrated with top-down governance, declared independence and hastily drafted a governing document. At this stage, they leaned towards extreme libertarianism, particularly in the relationship between the national and state governments. However, they quickly realized their error and adjusted to find a more balanced approach to protecting individual rights and providing for the welfare of the entire union. In a similar way, libertarianism can be taken to an extreme on a local level. If local governments become so weak that they cannot protect the rights of the people they serves, mob rule and anarchy ensue. Thus, a balanced approach to libertarianism best ensures the protection of individual freedoms while maintaining essential governance. (Note: Libertarianism should not be confused with the platform of the Libertarian Party in the United States)
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The United States' Constitution and founding principles are fundamentally opposed to fascism, emphasizing democratic governance, checks and balances, and the protection of individual rights. Fascism typically involves the concentration of power in a single authority and often includes authoritarian and dictatorial leadership, which is contrary to the principles enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The U.S. Constitution incorporates federalism by delineating the division of powers between the federal government and state governments. This innovative federalist form of government, pioneered by the American Founding Fathers, represented a departure from previous systems and became a cornerstone of the nation's governance.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : The concept of confederalism can best be represented by the Articles of Confederation. After the American colonies declared independence from Britain, they hastily threw together a document that gave very limited powers to a national head. However, their experience with the Articles of Confederation during the Revolutionary War revealed significant challenges. The Articles failed primarily due to a weak central government that lacked the authority to levy taxes, regulate commerce, or raise a standing army. This led to financial instability, interstate disputes, and an inability to address pressing national issues, ultimately prompting the adoption of the more robust and effective United States Constitution in 1787.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : While many of the Founding Fathers recognized the value of religion in society, they deliberately excluded any reference to religion or religious principles in the 1787 Constitution. The First Amendment further reinforced their stance by establishing a hands-off policy regarding the national government's involvement in religion.
  • Application in the U.S. Constitution : While the Constitution does not explicitly endorse meritocracy, it indirectly promotes the principles essential for a meritocratic society. The concepts of equal protection under the law and the right to vote are regarded as fundamental in fostering a meritocratic system. In such a society, individuals are judged based on their abilities and merits rather than factors like social class or birthright.

In conclusion, the United States Constitution is unique in the world for the diverse range of governmental philosophies that shape its unique character. From democracy to federalism, and from liberalism to republicanism, the Constitution reflects the wisdom of its framers in balancing individual rights, the role of government, and the need for stability. These philosophies continue to influence American society and politics today, with ongoing debates about the appropriate balance between individual liberty and collective welfare. As the nation evolves, it remains essential to understand these foundational principles and their impact on the lives of individuals and the prosperity of the nation.

James B. Horton

Mention should be made to the 17th amendment which made Senators elected by the populace of a state instead of appointed by and Servant to the States. This drastically altered the power of the States and changed the structure and power of the Constitution. The House was to be the voice of the People, the Senate the voice of the States. This one step created most of the problems we have today. You should do several articles on this due to it’s far reaching effects.

James W. Sanderson

THANKS… for the Great article… diving a little deeper into the principles written into the original US Constitution. Hopefully, it will inspire individuals to learn more and practice more the proven principles of our Constitutional Republic…

Leave a comment

  • Choosing a selection results in a full page refresh.

Quick links

Getting started.

Learn about the greatest political success story in the world. As a citizens of the United States, you are part of that story. Click here to begin.

Follow us on

© 2024, National Center for Constitutional Studies Powered by Shopify

Let customers speak for us

Both service, price and product

These constitutions are fabulous and such an education tool. We have ordered many thousands and give them out to our customers in their boxes, rallies, schools and retail locations. Leave them where ever you go: Doctors, Restaraunt etc

How can Americans know what is being taken away if they don’t know their rights to being with.

Our family took the Constitution course from Dr. Skousen in the late seventies. It was a remarkable experience for all of us. Until my husband's passing in 2020 he always carried a pocket Constitution with him and gave them away frequently. Now I always have them in my purse. We must have given away hundreds during these forty-some years!

No, you're right! This book is good to study and review the Bill of Rights. I highly recommend it.

Our history is being destroyed and revised as we speak. It is up to us, We the People, to get actively involved in helping our children. Learn the true history about our country. Books prior to 1900 our founding fathers wrote themselves is a good source. This site is a good source. Also you can find material at books.google.com. I urge you to buy constitutions from this site and give them to schools during Constitution week. This is great. Anyone could host a class with this material.

  • Search Menu

Sign in through your institution

  • Browse content in Arts and Humanities
  • Browse content in Archaeology
  • Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
  • Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
  • Archaeology by Region
  • Archaeology of Religion
  • Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
  • Biblical Archaeology
  • Contemporary and Public Archaeology
  • Environmental Archaeology
  • Historical Archaeology
  • History and Theory of Archaeology
  • Industrial Archaeology
  • Landscape Archaeology
  • Mortuary Archaeology
  • Prehistoric Archaeology
  • Underwater Archaeology
  • Urban Archaeology
  • Zooarchaeology
  • Browse content in Architecture
  • Architectural Structure and Design
  • History of Architecture
  • Residential and Domestic Buildings
  • Theory of Architecture
  • Browse content in Art
  • Art Subjects and Themes
  • History of Art
  • Industrial and Commercial Art
  • Theory of Art
  • Biographical Studies
  • Byzantine Studies
  • Browse content in Classical Studies
  • Classical History
  • Classical Philosophy
  • Classical Mythology
  • Classical Literature
  • Classical Reception
  • Classical Art and Architecture
  • Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
  • Greek and Roman Epigraphy
  • Greek and Roman Law
  • Greek and Roman Papyrology
  • Greek and Roman Archaeology
  • Late Antiquity
  • Religion in the Ancient World
  • Digital Humanities
  • Browse content in History
  • Colonialism and Imperialism
  • Diplomatic History
  • Environmental History
  • Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
  • Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
  • Historical Geography
  • History by Period
  • History of Emotions
  • History of Agriculture
  • History of Education
  • History of Gender and Sexuality
  • Industrial History
  • Intellectual History
  • International History
  • Labour History
  • Legal and Constitutional History
  • Local and Family History
  • Maritime History
  • Military History
  • National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
  • Oral History
  • Political History
  • Public History
  • Regional and National History
  • Revolutions and Rebellions
  • Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
  • Social and Cultural History
  • Theory, Methods, and Historiography
  • Urban History
  • World History
  • Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
  • Language Learning (Specific Skills)
  • Language Teaching Theory and Methods
  • Browse content in Linguistics
  • Applied Linguistics
  • Cognitive Linguistics
  • Computational Linguistics
  • Forensic Linguistics
  • Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
  • Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
  • History of English
  • Language Acquisition
  • Language Evolution
  • Language Reference
  • Language Variation
  • Language Families
  • Lexicography
  • Linguistic Anthropology
  • Linguistic Theories
  • Linguistic Typology
  • Phonetics and Phonology
  • Psycholinguistics
  • Sociolinguistics
  • Translation and Interpretation
  • Writing Systems
  • Browse content in Literature
  • Bibliography
  • Children's Literature Studies
  • Literary Studies (Asian)
  • Literary Studies (European)
  • Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
  • Literary Studies (Romanticism)
  • Literary Studies (American)
  • Literary Studies (Modernism)
  • Literary Studies - World
  • Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
  • Literary Studies (19th Century)
  • Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
  • Literary Studies (African American Literature)
  • Literary Studies (British and Irish)
  • Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
  • Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
  • Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
  • Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
  • Literary Studies (History of the Book)
  • Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
  • Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
  • Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
  • Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
  • Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
  • Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
  • Literary Studies (War Literature)
  • Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
  • Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
  • Mythology and Folklore
  • Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
  • Browse content in Media Studies
  • Browse content in Music
  • Applied Music
  • Dance and Music
  • Ethics in Music
  • Ethnomusicology
  • Gender and Sexuality in Music
  • Medicine and Music
  • Music Cultures
  • Music and Religion
  • Music and Media
  • Music and Culture
  • Music Education and Pedagogy
  • Music Theory and Analysis
  • Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
  • Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
  • Musicology and Music History
  • Performance Practice and Studies
  • Race and Ethnicity in Music
  • Sound Studies
  • Browse content in Performing Arts
  • Browse content in Philosophy
  • Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
  • Epistemology
  • Feminist Philosophy
  • History of Western Philosophy
  • Metaphysics
  • Moral Philosophy
  • Non-Western Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
  • Philosophy of Language
  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Philosophy of Perception
  • Philosophy of Action
  • Philosophy of Law
  • Philosophy of Religion
  • Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
  • Practical Ethics
  • Social and Political Philosophy
  • Browse content in Religion
  • Biblical Studies
  • Christianity
  • East Asian Religions
  • History of Religion
  • Judaism and Jewish Studies
  • Qumran Studies
  • Religion and Education
  • Religion and Health
  • Religion and Politics
  • Religion and Science
  • Religion and Law
  • Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
  • Religious Studies
  • Browse content in Society and Culture
  • Cookery, Food, and Drink
  • Cultural Studies
  • Customs and Traditions
  • Ethical Issues and Debates
  • Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
  • Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
  • Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
  • Sports and Outdoor Recreation
  • Technology and Society
  • Travel and Holiday
  • Visual Culture
  • Browse content in Law
  • Arbitration
  • Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
  • Commercial Law
  • Company Law
  • Browse content in Comparative Law
  • Systems of Law
  • Competition Law
  • Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
  • Government Powers
  • Judicial Review
  • Local Government Law
  • Military and Defence Law
  • Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
  • Construction Law
  • Contract Law
  • Browse content in Criminal Law
  • Criminal Procedure
  • Criminal Evidence Law
  • Sentencing and Punishment
  • Employment and Labour Law
  • Environment and Energy Law
  • Browse content in Financial Law
  • Banking Law
  • Insolvency Law
  • History of Law
  • Human Rights and Immigration
  • Intellectual Property Law
  • Browse content in International Law
  • Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
  • Public International Law
  • IT and Communications Law
  • Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
  • Law and Politics
  • Law and Society
  • Browse content in Legal System and Practice
  • Courts and Procedure
  • Legal Skills and Practice
  • Primary Sources of Law
  • Regulation of Legal Profession
  • Medical and Healthcare Law
  • Browse content in Policing
  • Criminal Investigation and Detection
  • Police and Security Services
  • Police Procedure and Law
  • Police Regional Planning
  • Browse content in Property Law
  • Personal Property Law
  • Study and Revision
  • Terrorism and National Security Law
  • Browse content in Trusts Law
  • Wills and Probate or Succession
  • Browse content in Medicine and Health
  • Browse content in Allied Health Professions
  • Arts Therapies
  • Clinical Science
  • Dietetics and Nutrition
  • Occupational Therapy
  • Operating Department Practice
  • Physiotherapy
  • Radiography
  • Speech and Language Therapy
  • Browse content in Anaesthetics
  • General Anaesthesia
  • Neuroanaesthesia
  • Browse content in Clinical Medicine
  • Acute Medicine
  • Cardiovascular Medicine
  • Clinical Genetics
  • Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
  • Dermatology
  • Endocrinology and Diabetes
  • Gastroenterology
  • Genito-urinary Medicine
  • Geriatric Medicine
  • Infectious Diseases
  • Medical Toxicology
  • Medical Oncology
  • Pain Medicine
  • Palliative Medicine
  • Rehabilitation Medicine
  • Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
  • Rheumatology
  • Sleep Medicine
  • Sports and Exercise Medicine
  • Clinical Neuroscience
  • Community Medical Services
  • Critical Care
  • Emergency Medicine
  • Forensic Medicine
  • Haematology
  • History of Medicine
  • Browse content in Medical Dentistry
  • Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
  • Paediatric Dentistry
  • Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
  • Surgical Dentistry
  • Browse content in Medical Skills
  • Clinical Skills
  • Communication Skills
  • Nursing Skills
  • Surgical Skills
  • Medical Ethics
  • Medical Statistics and Methodology
  • Browse content in Neurology
  • Clinical Neurophysiology
  • Neuropathology
  • Nursing Studies
  • Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
  • Gynaecology
  • Occupational Medicine
  • Ophthalmology
  • Otolaryngology (ENT)
  • Browse content in Paediatrics
  • Neonatology
  • Browse content in Pathology
  • Chemical Pathology
  • Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
  • Histopathology
  • Medical Microbiology and Virology
  • Patient Education and Information
  • Browse content in Pharmacology
  • Psychopharmacology
  • Browse content in Popular Health
  • Caring for Others
  • Complementary and Alternative Medicine
  • Self-help and Personal Development
  • Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
  • Cell Biology
  • Molecular Biology and Genetics
  • Reproduction, Growth and Development
  • Primary Care
  • Professional Development in Medicine
  • Browse content in Psychiatry
  • Addiction Medicine
  • Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
  • Forensic Psychiatry
  • Learning Disabilities
  • Old Age Psychiatry
  • Psychotherapy
  • Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
  • Epidemiology
  • Public Health
  • Browse content in Radiology
  • Clinical Radiology
  • Interventional Radiology
  • Nuclear Medicine
  • Radiation Oncology
  • Reproductive Medicine
  • Browse content in Surgery
  • Cardiothoracic Surgery
  • Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
  • General Surgery
  • Neurosurgery
  • Paediatric Surgery
  • Peri-operative Care
  • Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
  • Surgical Oncology
  • Transplant Surgery
  • Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
  • Vascular Surgery
  • Browse content in Science and Mathematics
  • Browse content in Biological Sciences
  • Aquatic Biology
  • Biochemistry
  • Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
  • Developmental Biology
  • Ecology and Conservation
  • Evolutionary Biology
  • Genetics and Genomics
  • Microbiology
  • Molecular and Cell Biology
  • Natural History
  • Plant Sciences and Forestry
  • Research Methods in Life Sciences
  • Structural Biology
  • Systems Biology
  • Zoology and Animal Sciences
  • Browse content in Chemistry
  • Analytical Chemistry
  • Computational Chemistry
  • Crystallography
  • Environmental Chemistry
  • Industrial Chemistry
  • Inorganic Chemistry
  • Materials Chemistry
  • Medicinal Chemistry
  • Mineralogy and Gems
  • Organic Chemistry
  • Physical Chemistry
  • Polymer Chemistry
  • Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
  • Theoretical Chemistry
  • Browse content in Computer Science
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Architecture and Logic Design
  • Game Studies
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Mathematical Theory of Computation
  • Programming Languages
  • Software Engineering
  • Systems Analysis and Design
  • Virtual Reality
  • Browse content in Computing
  • Business Applications
  • Computer Security
  • Computer Games
  • Computer Networking and Communications
  • Digital Lifestyle
  • Graphical and Digital Media Applications
  • Operating Systems
  • Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
  • Atmospheric Sciences
  • Environmental Geography
  • Geology and the Lithosphere
  • Maps and Map-making
  • Meteorology and Climatology
  • Oceanography and Hydrology
  • Palaeontology
  • Physical Geography and Topography
  • Regional Geography
  • Soil Science
  • Urban Geography
  • Browse content in Engineering and Technology
  • Agriculture and Farming
  • Biological Engineering
  • Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
  • Electronics and Communications Engineering
  • Energy Technology
  • Engineering (General)
  • Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
  • History of Engineering and Technology
  • Mechanical Engineering and Materials
  • Technology of Industrial Chemistry
  • Transport Technology and Trades
  • Browse content in Environmental Science
  • Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
  • Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
  • Environmental Sustainability
  • Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
  • Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
  • Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
  • Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
  • Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
  • Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
  • History of Science and Technology
  • Browse content in Materials Science
  • Ceramics and Glasses
  • Composite Materials
  • Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
  • Nanotechnology
  • Browse content in Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Biomathematics and Statistics
  • History of Mathematics
  • Mathematical Education
  • Mathematical Finance
  • Mathematical Analysis
  • Numerical and Computational Mathematics
  • Probability and Statistics
  • Pure Mathematics
  • Browse content in Neuroscience
  • Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
  • Development of the Nervous System
  • Disorders of the Nervous System
  • History of Neuroscience
  • Invertebrate Neurobiology
  • Molecular and Cellular Systems
  • Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
  • Neuroscientific Techniques
  • Sensory and Motor Systems
  • Browse content in Physics
  • Astronomy and Astrophysics
  • Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
  • Biological and Medical Physics
  • Classical Mechanics
  • Computational Physics
  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
  • History of Physics
  • Mathematical and Statistical Physics
  • Measurement Science
  • Nuclear Physics
  • Particles and Fields
  • Plasma Physics
  • Quantum Physics
  • Relativity and Gravitation
  • Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
  • Browse content in Psychology
  • Affective Sciences
  • Clinical Psychology
  • Cognitive Psychology
  • Cognitive Neuroscience
  • Criminal and Forensic Psychology
  • Developmental Psychology
  • Educational Psychology
  • Evolutionary Psychology
  • Health Psychology
  • History and Systems in Psychology
  • Music Psychology
  • Neuropsychology
  • Organizational Psychology
  • Psychological Assessment and Testing
  • Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
  • Psychology Professional Development and Training
  • Research Methods in Psychology
  • Social Psychology
  • Browse content in Social Sciences
  • Browse content in Anthropology
  • Anthropology of Religion
  • Human Evolution
  • Medical Anthropology
  • Physical Anthropology
  • Regional Anthropology
  • Social and Cultural Anthropology
  • Theory and Practice of Anthropology
  • Browse content in Business and Management
  • Business Strategy
  • Business Ethics
  • Business History
  • Business and Government
  • Business and Technology
  • Business and the Environment
  • Comparative Management
  • Corporate Governance
  • Corporate Social Responsibility
  • Entrepreneurship
  • Health Management
  • Human Resource Management
  • Industrial and Employment Relations
  • Industry Studies
  • Information and Communication Technologies
  • International Business
  • Knowledge Management
  • Management and Management Techniques
  • Operations Management
  • Organizational Theory and Behaviour
  • Pensions and Pension Management
  • Public and Nonprofit Management
  • Strategic Management
  • Supply Chain Management
  • Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
  • Criminal Justice
  • Criminology
  • Forms of Crime
  • International and Comparative Criminology
  • Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
  • Development Studies
  • Browse content in Economics
  • Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
  • Asian Economics
  • Behavioural Finance
  • Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
  • Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
  • Economic Systems
  • Economic History
  • Economic Methodology
  • Economic Development and Growth
  • Financial Markets
  • Financial Institutions and Services
  • General Economics and Teaching
  • Health, Education, and Welfare
  • History of Economic Thought
  • International Economics
  • Labour and Demographic Economics
  • Law and Economics
  • Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
  • Microeconomics
  • Public Economics
  • Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
  • Welfare Economics
  • Browse content in Education
  • Adult Education and Continuous Learning
  • Care and Counselling of Students
  • Early Childhood and Elementary Education
  • Educational Equipment and Technology
  • Educational Strategies and Policy
  • Higher and Further Education
  • Organization and Management of Education
  • Philosophy and Theory of Education
  • Schools Studies
  • Secondary Education
  • Teaching of a Specific Subject
  • Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
  • Teaching Skills and Techniques
  • Browse content in Environment
  • Applied Ecology (Social Science)
  • Climate Change
  • Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
  • Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
  • Natural Disasters (Environment)
  • Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
  • Browse content in Human Geography
  • Cultural Geography
  • Economic Geography
  • Political Geography
  • Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
  • Communication Studies
  • Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
  • Browse content in Politics
  • African Politics
  • Asian Politics
  • Chinese Politics
  • Comparative Politics
  • Conflict Politics
  • Elections and Electoral Studies
  • Environmental Politics
  • Ethnic Politics
  • European Union
  • Foreign Policy
  • Gender and Politics
  • Human Rights and Politics
  • Indian Politics
  • International Relations
  • International Organization (Politics)
  • International Political Economy
  • Irish Politics
  • Latin American Politics
  • Middle Eastern Politics
  • Political Methodology
  • Political Communication
  • Political Philosophy
  • Political Sociology
  • Political Behaviour
  • Political Economy
  • Political Institutions
  • Political Theory
  • Politics and Law
  • Politics of Development
  • Public Administration
  • Public Policy
  • Quantitative Political Methodology
  • Regional Political Studies
  • Russian Politics
  • Security Studies
  • State and Local Government
  • UK Politics
  • US Politics
  • Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
  • African Studies
  • Asian Studies
  • East Asian Studies
  • Japanese Studies
  • Latin American Studies
  • Middle Eastern Studies
  • Native American Studies
  • Scottish Studies
  • Browse content in Research and Information
  • Research Methods
  • Browse content in Social Work
  • Addictions and Substance Misuse
  • Adoption and Fostering
  • Care of the Elderly
  • Child and Adolescent Social Work
  • Couple and Family Social Work
  • Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
  • Emergency Services
  • Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
  • International and Global Issues in Social Work
  • Mental and Behavioural Health
  • Social Justice and Human Rights
  • Social Policy and Advocacy
  • Social Work and Crime and Justice
  • Social Work Macro Practice
  • Social Work Practice Settings
  • Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
  • Welfare and Benefit Systems
  • Browse content in Sociology
  • Childhood Studies
  • Community Development
  • Comparative and Historical Sociology
  • Economic Sociology
  • Gender and Sexuality
  • Gerontology and Ageing
  • Health, Illness, and Medicine
  • Marriage and the Family
  • Migration Studies
  • Occupations, Professions, and Work
  • Organizations
  • Population and Demography
  • Race and Ethnicity
  • Social Theory
  • Social Movements and Social Change
  • Social Research and Statistics
  • Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
  • Sociology of Religion
  • Sociology of Education
  • Sport and Leisure
  • Urban and Rural Studies
  • Browse content in Warfare and Defence
  • Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
  • Land Forces and Warfare
  • Military Administration
  • Military Life and Institutions
  • Naval Forces and Warfare
  • Other Warfare and Defence Issues
  • Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
  • Weapons and Equipment

Cicero: Political Philosophy

  • < Previous chapter
  • Next chapter >

Cicero: Political Philosophy

3 Government

  • Published: January 2021
  • Cite Icon Cite
  • Permissions Icon Permissions

In On the commonwealth Cicero explores three main ideas, discussed here in turn. First introduced is the concept of a res publica itself, held together as an association of citizens by the justice inherent in a fairly based legal order. Then Cicero stresses the consilium (deliberation) needed to govern it, and above all secure and maintain its stability, with the recipe a ‘mixed’ system of government such as Republican Rome had historically evolved. Finally, he turns to the leadership required to supply that consilium and to carry it through in action, whether in the ordinary functioning of the res publica or in moments of crisis when its integrity is threatened and a ‘director ( rector ) of the commonwealth and initiator of public consilium ’ is needed. On laws presents and defends a more detailed account of the roles particularly of senate and people, and of their interaction, within the mixed constitution.

Personal account

  • Sign in with email/username & password
  • Get email alerts
  • Save searches
  • Purchase content
  • Activate your purchase/trial code
  • Add your ORCID iD

Institutional access

Sign in with a library card.

  • Sign in with username/password
  • Recommend to your librarian
  • Institutional account management
  • Get help with access

Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:

IP based access

Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.

Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.

  • Click Sign in through your institution.
  • Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
  • When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
  • Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.

If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.

Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.

Society Members

Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:

Sign in through society site

Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:

  • Click Sign in through society site.
  • When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.

If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.

Sign in using a personal account

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.

A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.

Viewing your signed in accounts

Click the account icon in the top right to:

  • View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
  • View the institutional accounts that are providing access.

Signed in but can't access content

Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.

For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.

Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.

Month: Total Views:
October 2022 13
November 2022 18
December 2022 11
January 2023 15
February 2023 9
March 2023 6
April 2023 21
May 2023 18
June 2023 2
July 2023 6
August 2023 6
September 2023 7
October 2023 3
November 2023 13
December 2023 11
January 2024 10
February 2024 12
March 2024 22
April 2024 18
May 2024 29
June 2024 2
  • About Oxford Academic
  • Publish journals with us
  • University press partners
  • What we publish
  • New features  
  • Open access
  • Rights and permissions
  • Accessibility
  • Advertising
  • Media enquiries
  • Oxford University Press
  • Oxford Languages
  • University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

  • Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
  • Cookie settings
  • Cookie policy
  • Privacy policy
  • Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

IMAGES

  1. Political Philosophers & Impact on American Government Power Point Note

    government assignment on political philosophers

  2. Political Philosophers Multiple Choice & Short Answer Test American

    government assignment on political philosophers

  3. PPT

    government assignment on political philosophers

  4. Political Philosophers Enlightenment American Government Webquest

    government assignment on political philosophers

  5. Political Philosophers Chart-1 1

    government assignment on political philosophers

  6. PPT

    government assignment on political philosophers

VIDEO

  1. Political science lecture 2 By Ahmad Ali Naqvi. Plato and Aristotle. Css and pms

  2. PAPER SCHEME- LEC: 01

  3. The State ! Concept and Basic Elements !

  4. Plato-Part-2 Western Political Thoughts I Statesman I By M Farhan Khan Abbasi

  5. DEMOCRACY IS ... (HD)

  6. CSSPS 05 Solve Assignment । UPRTOU Political Science Single Subject Solve Assignment । CSSPS 05

COMMENTS

  1. DOC AP Government Assignment on Political Philosophers

    Puritan, Oxford scholar, influential philosopher. Although Locke was a famous philosopher, he was actually trained for what profession? _Medical/physician_ The nature of Locke's political writings were troublesome enough for the aristocrats in England, but he got involved in something that got him into big trouble with the King.

  2. Major Political Thinkers: Plato to Mill

    Statesman, orator, and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero became the most widely read and admired Roman author following the recovery of his major works during the Renaissance. Best known for his public orations, he also penned two theoretical works on politics, the Republic and the Laws.Cast in the form of dialogues, each work addresses several leading concerns of political life, e.g., the ...

  3. Aristotle's Political Theory

    Aristotle (b. 384-d. 322 BCE), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and scientist. Along with his teacher Plato, Aristotle is generally regarded as one of the most influential ancient thinkers in a number of philosophical fields, including political theory. Aristotle was born in Stagira in northern Greece, and his father was a court physician ...

  4. Political philosophy

    political philosophy, branch of philosophy that is concerned, at the most abstract level, with the concepts and arguments involved in political opinion.The meaning of the term political is itself one of the major problems of political philosophy. Broadly, however, one may characterize as political all those practices and institutions that are concerned with government.

  5. Government Assignment on Political Philosophers.docx

    View Homework Help - Robert Trillet - Government Assignment on Political Philosophers.docx from AP GOV 678 at Central High School - 01. Government Assignment on Political Philosophers Name: Robert ... Government Assignment on Political Philosophers Name: Robert Trillet Period: 3rd Thomas Hobbes . He was born in 1588 and died in 1679.

  6. Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic

    So the Republic contributes to political philosophy in two main ways. I will take them up in turn, starting with four disputed features of Socrates' good city: its utopianism, communism, feminism, and totalitarianism. ... "Class Assignment and the Principle of Specialization in Plato's Republic," Proceedings of the Boston Area ...

  7. PDF Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau on Government

    2. Discuss central components embedded within the readings by each philosopher. These components could be compared and contrasted--for example, the state of nature, the social contract, the king, property, political power, forms of government. 3. Explore each philosopher's relationship to Enlightenment thinking and how it evolved over time. 4.

  8. List of political philosophers

    This is a list of notable political philosophers, including some who may be better known for their work in other areas of philosophy. The entries are in order by year of birth to show rough direction of influences and of development of political thought

  9. Introduction to Political Philosophy

    PLSC 114. About the Course. This course is intended as an introduction to political philosophy as seen through an examination of some of the major texts and thinkers of the Western political tradition. Three broad themes that are central to understanding political life are focused upon: the polis experience (Plato, Aristotle), the sovereign ...

  10. Plato: Political Philosophy

    Plato: Political Philosophy. Plato (c. 427-347 B.C.E.) developed such distinct areas of philosophy as epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. His deep influence on Western philosophy is asserted in the famous remark of Alfred North Whitehead: "the safest characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."

  11. PLSC 114

    Lecture 1 - Introduction: What Is Political Philosophy? Overview. Professor Smith discusses the nature and scope of "political philosophy." The oldest of the social sciences, the study of political philosophy must begin with the works of Plato and Aristotle, and examine in depth the fundamental concepts and categories of the study of politics.

  12. The Philosophical Foundations of the United States Political System

    Topic 1 explores the philosophical and historical origins of the United States system of democratic government, beginning with Ancient Athens and the Roman Republic and including how Enlightenment thinkers, North American colonial governments, and First People tribes influenced the writing of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the structure of U.S. government.

  13. Political philosophy

    Plato (left) and Aristotle (right), from a detail of The School of Athens, a fresco by Raphael.Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics secured the two Greek philosophers as two of the most influential political philosophers.. Political philosophy or political theory is the philosophical study of government, addressing questions about the nature, scope, and legitimacy of public agents and ...

  14. Locke, John: Political Philosophy

    John Locke: Political Philosophy. John Locke (1632-1704) presents an intriguing figure in the history of political philosophy whose brilliance of exposition and breadth of scholarly activity remains profoundly influential.. Locke proposed a radical conception of political philosophy deduced from the principle of self-ownership and the corollary right to own property, which in turn is based on ...

  15. Results for government political philosophers

    Included is a bundle of resources for an American Government class. Included is a Power Point, outlined note packet, tests, worksheet, and webquest that is used to introduce the political philosophers that helped shape the U.S. government. Included are John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Charles Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau for a high school ...

  16. World Government

    First published Mon Dec 4, 2006; substantive revision Tue Jan 5, 2021. "World government" refers to the idea of all humankind united under one common political authority. Proposals for a unified global political authority have existed since ancient times—in the ambition of kings, popes and emperors, and the dreams of poets and philosophers.

  17. Aristotle's Views on State, Man and Government

    Views. Introduction The subject of political science has evolved by questioning the nature and importance of concepts like state, constitution, citizenship, laws, and governments. Aristotle, famously referred to as the father of political science, had laid the bricks of the subject. In this blog, you will read about his understanding of the ...

  18. 11.1 Historical Perspectives on Government

    The guardians who are considered to be the most virtuous, both morally and intellectually, eventually become the city's rulers, known as philosopher-kings: "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one . . . cities will never have ...

  19. The Great Government Philosophers

    The Great Government Philosophers George Fripley remembers four forgotten gurus of government. Many great thinkers have spent years studying government and how it should work, but to find the origins from which modern political theory has grown we need to look back at the ancient civilizations of Rome, Greece and China. Four little-known ...

  20. Plato's Politics

    Oxford Handbooks. Collection: Oxford Handbooks Online. 1. Introduction. The dialogues that are most obviously important for Plato's political philosophy include: the Apology, the Crito, the Gorgias, the Laws, the Republic, and the Statesman. Further, there are many questions of political philosophy that Plato discusses in his dialogues.

  21. Government Philosophies and Their Impact on Society

    Additionally, the Constitution's emphasis on limited government aligns with conservative ideals of minimizing state interference in the lives of citizens. Libertarianism: A political philosophy that promotes maximum individual liberty and minimal government involvement in both personal and economic matters.

  22. Government

    First introduced is the concept of a res publica itself, held together as an association of citizens by the justice inherent in a fairly based legal order. Then Cicero stresses the consilium (deliberation) needed to govern it, and above all secure and maintain its stability, with the recipe a 'mixed' system of government such as Republican ...

  23. The Two Fundamental Philosophies Of Government. One Works. The ...

    The second basic philosophy of government is: There Is Safety in Numbers, Strength in Numbers, and We're All In This Together. Its adherents believe that the government should be a tool that ...