what is enlightenment essay by kant

A Summary and Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’

By Dr Oliver Tearle (Loughborough University)

‘What is Enlightenment?’, full title ‘Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, is a 1784 essay by the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). As the longer title suggests, Kant’s essay is a response to a question (posed by a clergyman, Reverend Johann Friedrich Zöllner) concerning the nature of philosophical enlightenment .

What is enlightenment, and how best might it be achieved in a civilised society? These are the key questions Kant addresses, and poses answers to, in his essay, which can be read in full here . Below, we summarise the main points of his argument and offer an analysis of Kant’s position.

‘What is Enlightenment?’: summary

Kant begins ‘What is Enlightenment?’ by asserting that enlightenment is man’s emergence from self-imposed immaturity. He defines ‘immaturity’ here as the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. Kant’s message to his readers is that they should have the courage to use their own understanding, rather than relying on another person’s guidance. That is the ‘motto’ of enlightenment.

Kant acknowledges that remaining ‘immature’ is the easy option for most people, because it’s the lazy option. People can turn to a priest to be their moral conscience for them, or a doctor to determine their diet. Women have been rendered perpetually immature by men in order to keep them meek and ignorant.

The key to enlightenment, Kant asserts, is freedom. If people are granted that, enlightenment will follow. The problem is that most people aren’t free. Even those ‘guardians’ and authority figures who keep others enslaved are themselves victim of this system, which they inherit from those who have gone before them.

Kant distinguishes between what he considers a public freedom to exercise one’s reason (and to question the way things are) and the civic duty we have to obey orders without questioning them. For instance, a soldier engaged in military action cannot afford to question the order his superior gives him: he needs to obey the order without question, because that is his ‘civic’ duty at that moment.

But off-duty, if that soldier wished to philosophise publicly (e.g., in the role of a scholar) about the flaws in the military system, he should be free to do so.

The same goes for paying taxes. One can argue in parliament, or write pamphlets and newspaper articles about whether high taxation is a good thing (i.e., exercising one’s public duty to question things), but when the taxman sends you a bill, you’d better pay up (i.e., observe your civic duty).

Kant invites us to consider whether a society of priests could set down some rules which would be binding for generations to come. He says this would be wrong, because it denies future generations the chance to question such rules, and social development would be impeded as a result. He also argues that an enlightened monarch would allow his subjects true freedom to think and do as they wish in religious matters, and the monarch should keep his nose out of such matters.

Next, Kant argues that, at the time of writing, people are not living in an ‘enlightened age’ but in an ‘age of enlightenment’: that is, we’ve not attained full enlightenment yet because the process is a long one, but progress is (gradually) being made, thanks largely to the enlightened monarch under whom Kant himself is living, Frederick the Great.

Kant concludes ‘What is Enlightenment?’ by considering the difference between civil and intellectual and spiritual freedom. Perhaps paradoxically, the less civil freedom people have, the more intellectual freedom they gain, and as their intellectual abilities grow, so the health of a particular society grows as governments can start treating people with dignity.

‘What is Enlightenment?’: analysis

‘What is Enlightenment?’ is concerned with every citizen’s public right to use their reason: everyone in a civilised society, Kant argues, should have the freedom to question the status quo and take part in a debate about how society should be governed and maintained. But such public rights and freedoms need to be balanced by the citizen’s private or civic responsibility to obey the law, and observe the status quo, when required to.

In other words, even while we discuss and philosophise about how to improve society, we have to live in the one we currently have, and civilisation would break down if people chose, for instance, to stop following laws they considered unjust or refused to pay their taxes because they disagreed with the levels of taxation.

‘What is Enlightenment?’ is fundamentally a clarion-call to people about the need to ‘dare to be wise’. What is required is not merely intellect but also a willingness to engage one’s reason and exercise that reason upon the everyday things that govern our lives: political systems, financial structures, education, trade, and much else.

Enlightenment is mankind’s coming-to-maturity, a willingness to think for oneself and emerge from an immature state where we hand over the power and responsibility to authority figures, whether they’re priests, doctors, teachers, or politicians.

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English 233: Introduction to Western Humanities — Baroque and Enlightenment"

Kant's place in the history of Western philosophy

The immensely influential German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) spent his entire life in Koenigsberg, in the northern part of East Prussia, and is now known as Kaliningrad, in Russia.

His mature work, which began to appear in 1781, is considered the culmination of early modern philosophy. So decisive was his "Copernican revolution in philosophy" (as he liked to call his central critical "move"), that almost all subsequent work in philosophy can be described as "post-Kantian" in some important respect or another.

When Kant came upon the scene, modern European philosophy was divided into two camps. The predominant current in Britain was empiricist: the main figures were Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The ruling trend on the Continent was rationalist: the central figures were Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Rationalists insisted that to count as knowledge, belief ought to be certain, and that certainty can be achieved only through reasoning by valid inferential steps from undoubtable axioms -- principles whose denial led to contradiction or which were simply self-evident upon inspection. These ideas, and reason itself, they believed to be inborn in every member of the species -- "innate." Empiricists argued that the existence of innate ideas was an illusion, and that knowledge is acquired only through experience, and (ultimately) through the senses. Such knowledge, however, could in principle never be certain, but was always subject to correction in the light of further experience.

Kant took up the conflicting claims of the empirical and rationalist traditions and found a way that he believed managed both to account for their respective inadequacies and yet to incorporate important aspects of each. The way he did so, however, was radically re-orienting. He boldly turned a deep-seated traditional assumption on its head. And the result was that certain concerns traditionally at the center of philosophical debate were ruled out as intrinsically hopeless from the standpoint of knowledge, and no longer worth pursuing.

Both modernist currents -- as well as the traditional scholasticism and ancient authorities they undertook to displace -- were concerned to discover how our knowledge might correspond to external objects (however variously these objects of knowledge were conceived). Kant's originality was to suggest that this "common sense" way of thinking of the relations of subject and object, of mind and world, might be "the wrong way round." Copernicus had proposed that our conviction that the sun circles the earth might be mistaken, and that various difficulties that had theretofore proved intractable within the framework of that assumption might be made to disappear if astronomers were to invert it, and explore what could be explained if the earth were understood to circle the sun. Kant proposed that we invert the assumption that our knowledge conforms to the nature of objects , and explore the assumption that objects conform to our ways of knowing .

These ways of knowing, according to Kant, were of two kinds, inasmuch as objects appear to us under the double aspect of sensible and intelligible things. In sensation, objects disclose themselves to us through the "forms of sensibility" -- i.e., modes characteristic of our consciousness -- that we call space and time. That is, Kant argues, space and time are not to be thought of as objective properties of the world independent of human consciousness, but as the way in which objects are apprehended by human consciousness. And insofar as objects are "thought," i.e., capable of being reasoned about, they must, whatever they may be in themselves, submit to certain pure relational concepts of the mind (Kant calls these "categories"). Among these, crucially for science (as for everyday practical affairs), is the idea of causality, according to which nothing happens that is not the result of antecedent conditions sufficient to bring it about. In other words, it is an insistence of the rational constitution of human beings -- and not necessarily of objects "in themselves" -- that happenings be neither "self-caused" nor "uncaused." Equally crucial for science (and everyday life), are basic quantitative notions (e.g., unity and multiplicity), without which we could not calculate certain consequences of spatial and temporal relations.

You can think of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) as a radical extension of ideas you are already familiar with. Recall the arguments Galileo used to wedge a distinction between "secondary" and "primary" qualities, and from this distinction think back to Bacon's class of "Idols of the Tribe." It might at first glance seem that Protagoras, who held that "man is the measure of all things," is closer to the Kantian position than Bacon, who denies this. But if the way Protagoras' maxim has been construed in the course of history is correct, then he meant that the human mind can be relied upon as putting us in contact with objective properties of things in the world. Bacon's point was that "the human mind is like a false mirror that distorts and discolors what it reflects, mixing its own nature with that of the world." Note that this very figure of speech makes it clear that, ironically, Bacon was thinking of color per se as an objective quality of objects, or at least of the light streaming from them into the eye. (He's saying only that our perceptual apparatus works changes [he does not specify what sort!] in a way that is analogous to the manner in which a defective mirror transmits an image altered in colors and shapes from what was received by the mirror at its outside surface.) However, as 17th-century thinkers went on to insist, the idea that objects "in nature" (i.e., imagined as independent of human sensory apprehension of them, or "in themselves") are possessed of color properties is an illusion. And, indeed, since then modern physics has developed a quite impressive theory of light that gives a specific picture of how this is supposed to be: color phenomena are that into which, in our experience, the physical constitution of the human species (lens, retina, optic nerves, visual cortex) converts (a certain limited range of) electromagnetic energy selectively reflected from various surfaces. That is, "in color" is how we, in virtue of our particular shared perceptual equipment, experience a world that color predicates -- "red," "yellow," "green," etc. -- simply do not apply to. Light waves are hypothesized to have quite definite, and mathematically formulable properties -- wave shapes, with lengths, frequencies, and amplitudes. Of the particular combination of electromagnetic energies falling upon them, different surfaces (your shirt, a leaf) selectively absorb only the energy arriving in specific frequency ranges, and turn back the rest. Their properties are not "blue," "green," etc., but whatever structural or electronic features that determine which combinations of light energy of particular frequencies it absorbs, and which it reflects to your eye that your sensory equipment in turn "translates" into the experience of "blue," "green," etc.

Similarly, as Galileo was able to argue even in the 17th Century, the thermal sensation we have of hot and cold objects is no more a property of those objects themselves than the tickling sensation we have when stroked by a feature is a property "in" the feather (as if the feather were experiencing tickling constantly, and only imparts this to us, by allowing it to flow into us, when we get stroked by it). Galileo hazarded the guess that different states of heat in objects must be different rates of motion of the tiny particles that make up the (cruder) entities we call objects. (Some two centuries after Galileo, this approach was developed into the modern theory of thermodynamics by the French engineer Nicolas-Léonard Sadi Carnot, the German physicist Rudolf Clausius, and the British physicist Lord Kelvin.)

Galileo's conviction, however, was that "the Book of Nature is written in mathematics." That is, while he saw clearly that such qualities as smells, tastes, colors, heat and cold (as those terms were exclusively used in his day, i.e., as descriptions of sensations) were properties of the perceiving subject rather than of the world of objects that gave rise to them when mediated by our species constitution, Galileo believed that other directly perceivable qualities -- such as shape, weight, relative motion (and ratios among these such as densities, speeds, rates of vibration -- were real properties of objects that vision, touch, and calculation (a form of reasoning) can lay hold of. Galileo regards these latter as causally prior to the others, which exist only in us, as a result of the working of these real qualities upon our sensory apparatus. Hence the jargon of "primary" and "secondary" qualities. But in reviving Pythagoras' conviction that "the language of nature is number," he was stopping short of Kant, who argues that space and time themselves are "modes of sensibility," rather than properties of the objective world, and, moreover, that it is our mind's prior structuring by the categories (of causality and quantitative relationships) to which space and time yield a world of objects susceptible to being rationally understood. The world, whatever it is in itself, discloses itself to us only through experiences we have that exhibit temporal and spatial aspects. But what we experience is what our nature converts whatever is out there into, for us, and can never be taken to be an aspect of "things in themselves."

Only insofar as the world appears to us through these modes (space & time, plus the categories of thought, like causation and number) can it be known, says Kant. But these modes are characteristic of us as subjects, not objective properties of the world of objects in themselves.

The work of Kant's last 2 decades is notoriously difficult reading, however, and is not in its details a part of the story that it is the central business of our course to develop. That is why in our course we are not going to take up a selection from one of his philosophical treatises, but will confine ourselves to a famous essay he wrote for a newspaper directed at the non-specialist reading public. Before proceeding to that, though, we need to note a couple of additional points.

One is that one of the results of his approach was to show that certain central problems of traditional "metaphysics" were in principle incapable of being solved. In particular: although Kant believed that he had explained how knowledge of nature and of certain basic moral universals is possible, his way of doing so had the consequence that certain questions (Kant called them "transcendental" questions) -- concerning the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, and the freedom of the will -- cannot, in their very nature, ever be resolved by appeal to any possible experience. But this means that answers pro or con concerning them can necessarily never aspire to being knowledge . Now that in turn means that certain basic elements of the Judeo Christian religious outlook are relegated strictly to faith -- and in a way that makes "faith" indistinguishable from logically just "begging the question." Put another way: faith in this sense invites itself to be seen as i ntrinsically irrational , so that it is impossible to give an account of it that divorces it from mere (conscious or unconscious) feelings. But if faith itself is basically an expression of wishes, desire, and fears, it finds itself embarrassed within the context of the very religious tradition which had elevated it (as both Catholicism and Protestantism do) as an essential factor in salvation. For within that same religious tradition, passions, desires and fears (and self-regarding wishes in general) are held in suspicion, as expressions of concupiscence.

As already mentioned, Kant did not confine his attention solely to philosophy of science and metaphysics. He also set out, in his Critique of Practical Reason and in his Fundamentals of the Metaphysic of Morals to examine whether ethics -- like science, but unlike metaphysics -- can be shown to rest upon a rational foundation. Kant's answer was a resounding "Yes." He maintained that practical reason -- the dictates of our rational faculties when applied to questions of action, that is, of decisions, or acts of will -- was capable of determining what the morally right course of action would consist in, in a given situation. He used the term "categorical imperative" to refer to obligations that are binding upon rational agents in any situation whatever. (He distinguishes categorical imperatives from hypothetical imperatives, which are rules or maxims that govern our conduct if we adopt certain ends -- for example, if we decide to seek to maximize profit in a business enterprise, or if we want to live as long as possible, or if we want to be loyal to the king. Imperatives that are binding "categorically," in contrast, are binding period.) One formulation he gives the categorical imperative is: act only on that maxim that you can consistently will to be acted upon universally -- that is, by all agents in all circumstances. An example of a maxim that is ruled ou t by this formula is the principle that we should keep our promises when it is in our interests to do so, but should break them whenever doing so would be to our advantage. Kant points out how the categorical imperative applies to this principle as a candidate for being recognized as a moral principle: if everyone were always to break his promises whenever it suited him to do so, promises would no longer be a feature of social life because, since no one would believe them, no one would bother to give them. It is, he says, logically impossible for one to will that everyone break promises when it suits since one could not do so if there were no promises in the first place.

This is not the place to go into the criticisms that have been lodged against Kant's claims on behalf of categorical imperatives, of the formulations he offers of them, and of the examples he puts forward to illustrate their import. Instead we need to note what Kant was seeking to do -- what the nature of his project was. It was a project that would make no sense to St. Augustine, to Thomas Aquinas, to Luther, to Calvin, or to a pope. For Kant's aim was to show how the natural constitution of man as such -- and specifically, human reasoning. which determines what is and is not consistent -- was competent to settle all ethical questions, completely without reference to the will of any divine being . The criterion he appealed to for doing this was that any ethical principle be universal , that is, that it apply equally to everyone. In the moral sphere there are no special privileges for "nobles."

Kant was thus thoroughly in sympathy with the aims of the French Revolution, which enunciated the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen -- declaring the equalit y of all before the law on the basis of natura l rights. The basis of the legitimacy of this, in Kant's view, is that Reason (considered as a capacity, though not necessarily as an active skill) is the possession of all human beings by nature (i.e., in virtue of their being born with the constitution characteristic of the species). For it is by Reason that we can agree, Kant holds, that a maxim like the one about breaking promises when convenient cannot be consistently be willed to be universal. And it is this shared human competence that makes unnecessary any appeal to the Will of God, and hence appeals to Holy Scripture, or to a divinely appointed human authority, or to one's own private (merely individual) communications with God (as in the case of mystics and prophets). Such appeals themselves, in any case, inevitably beg the question at issue, and this because they require commitments on "metaphysical" issues that are intrinsically incapable of being solved by rational means. For Kant, this means not that they rely on something nobler and more authoritative than human reason (that is what Luther's claim that "faith is God's work in man" amounts to), but that they have entered the seas of irrationality. To do this is to open the door to being arbitrary and capricious, and in the end to be able to prevail only by resort to violence when confronted with other people who do not accept (say) the divinity of Jesus, or the prophet-hood of Mohammed.

Keep in mind, then, where Kant believes his following his own reason leads, together with his conviction that reason (considered as a capacity, though not necessarily as an actively realized skill) is a faculty shared among all non-impaired human beings, by nature. If you do this, you'll be able to appreciate in a deeper way what he understood to be at stake in the position he put before the general reading public in his essay, "What Is Enlightenment?" This he published in 1784 in a Berlin newspaper. While much of his major work still lay in the future, his Critique of Pure Reason had already appeared, and his reputation in Europe was made. The Revolution in France, too, was still to come. (The Bastille would fall in 1789, and Louis XVI would go to the guillotine in 1792.) But the assumptions shared by many of its major actors are clear to be seen -- even on the other side of Europe.

Translation by Lewis White Beck, from Immanuel Kant, On History , ed., with an introduction, by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 3:

Translation by A.F.M. Willich, from Immanuel Kant, Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political and Various Philosophical Subjects (London, 1798, 1799); reprinted in Frank E. Manuel, ed., The Enlightenment (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 35.

Translation by Peter Gay, from Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West , 2 vols., 2nd Ed. (1954), I, 1071; reprinted in Gay, The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 384.

A bit more breezy, but still to the point, might be something like this:

And now, for those eager for German, here’s the original as Kant wrote it:

° unmündig: This German term covers two conditions that in English and American law are distinguished as " non compos mentis " (a Latin term applied to adults who cannot manage their own affairs, because they "don’t have mastery of their minds") and "minority" in the sense of "not being of age." It comes from the word Mund ("mouth"), and thus literally means "not being able to speak for oneself. Correspondingly, the term for "legal guardian" is Vormünder — "one who speaks for another."

Some points of reference:

c. 19-18 BC. The Roman poet Horace, writing during the reign of the Emperor Augustus, composes the Epistles to the Pisos , also known subsequently as the Ars Poetica (the Art of Poetry), three verse letters consisting of almost 30 maxims for the guidance of young poets. One of these is Sapere aude! ("Dare to know!")

First performance of the third and final version of Tartuffe , at the Palais-Royal, before King Louis XIV. A head-of-household (Orgon) chooses a religious guru (Tartuffe) to regulate the conduct of himself and his family, eventually committing all his personal affairs into the hands of this guardian of virtue, with nearly disastrous results, since Tartuffe is a conniving hypocrite.

An important circle in the German Enlightenment, The Society of the Friends of Truth, adopts as its motto Horace's maxim Sapere aude!

First appearance of Voltaire's Candide . Recall this passage, which begins with the Venetian senator Pococurante's summing up for his visitors his views of the authors whose works comprise his library.

"Fools admire everything in an author of reputation. For my part, I read only to please myself. I like only that which serves my purpose." Candide, having been educated never to judge for himself, was much surprised at what he heard. Martin found there was a good deal of reason in Pococurante's remarks.

First edition of Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary , including the article entitled " Freedom of Thought ," in the form of a dialogue between the Englishman Lord Boldmind and the Portuguese Count Medroso (whose name means "fearful," "timorous," "frightened," "afraid").

Voltaire publishes Dialogues between A, B, and C . The Eighth and Ninth Conversations concern, respectively, "Bodily Serfs" and "Spiritual Serfs." ( Esprit in French means both "sprit" and "intellect.")

Kant publishes "What Is Enlightenment? " in the Berlinischer Monatscrift , a Berlin monthly directed to the general public.

The English poet William Blake calls attention to the phenomenon of "mind-forged manacles" in his poem " London ."

The German poet Bertolt Brecht addresses a few words to his countrymen who, put up with the uncertainties of the Weimar Republic and the Great Depression, looked with hope at the ascension to power of Adolph Hitler: " I hear you don't want to learn anything. "

Sometime in the 1970s.

Kansas State University decides to comply with the ruling of the United States Supreme Court that public universities do not stand in loco parentis (in the place of parents) with respect to students who attend them, and therefore have no business unilaterally regulating their private conduct.

Permission is granted for non-commercial educational use; all other rights reserved.

Immanuel Kant on “Enlightenment”

The Thinking Lane

An analysis of Kant’s famous essay, and its relevance in the modern era.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most influential philosophers, Immanuel Kant published “Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” in December 1784. It was intended as a reply to Reverend Johann Friedrich Zöllner’s year old question (What is enlightenment?).

Kant’s essay defines enlightenment, explores reasons for its lack, and specifies the preconditions that make its achievement possible. He claims that freedom is the foremost prerequisite for acquiring enlightenment. Kant boldly refuted church and state paternalism while praising Frederick II of Prussia for being a liberal monarch.

Immanuel Kant describes enlightenment as man’s emancipation from “self-incurred tutelage”.

The opening lines of the essay, which define enlightenment as the inability of a person to think for oneself because of the lack of courage, and not intellect, are widely quoted.

MEANING OF ENLIGHTENMENT

Answering the title question in the opening paragraph of his essay, Kant states that “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred tutelage (Unmündigkeit in German)”. Tutelage means guardianship, and self-incurred guardianship means either the individual or certain actors in the society have presumed the role of a guardian for that individual.

Tutelage means guardianship, but here, Kant uses it to refer to lack of resolution and intellectual courage . He elucidates that a lack of intellect or understanding is not the underlying cause of lack of enlightenment; it is the paucity of courage to use one’s own wisdom and reason without external guidance.

In simpler words, enlightenment is the state of being free from immaturity that one causes oneself. This immaturity is the inability that one has in thinking for oneself, and the habit of relying on others’ opinions for guidance. This immature individual is incapable of forming their own understanding or judgement of things.

Kant uses the German word “ Unmündigkeit ”, which, when literally translated, means “legal adulthood. “Unmündig”, the word it has been derived from, means “closed-mouthed” or “dependent”.

Since Kant’s moral philosophy centers around the concept of autonomy , he highlights the contrast between an intellectually independent, mature or “enlightened” person and an intellectually dependent, immature and “non-enlightened” person.

He then states that this deficiency (of intellectual freedom) is common among the masses as it is also considered threatening by most. Therefore, he aptly coins the effective motto of Enlightenment as “sapere aude!” , translated to — “dare to be wise”.

REASONS FOR THE LACK OF ENLIGHTENMENT

Kant elucidates that an immature person is so because they let other people make decisions for them, so much so that they become dependent on them and start to find independent thinking difficult.

Kant provides a vivid analogy to illustrate this claim. The government, claims Kant, tames and trains citizens like animals. They are instructed to not cross certain lines, and told of the danger that would befall them if they do. This makes the citizens too scared to even try. Then, the government provides these gullible citizens with a set of beliefs and judgements that they unthinkingly accept, adding to their own immaturity.

Kant gives four reasons for a human’s self incurred tutelage — laziness, cowardice, domination and complacency.

Humans often find it bothersome to reason on their own or to push the horizons of their knowledge independently. To simply obey others without questioning them is a much easier alternative.

Also, their laziness is further encouraged by their cowardice. Because they are so used to following the norm, they are afraid of crossing over into uncharted territories. They fear failure in their venture to independence.

This is seen as an opportunity for some smart(er) people, who gain control of the public and lull them into submission and obedience. The few smart ‘elites’ exaggerate the benefits of following ‘their’ norm and overstate the dangers that exist outside of it.

Kant then compares humans to domestic cattle who are so comfortable with their complacency that they remain silently in their serfdom shackles, without challenging the elites or the norm.

This gullible public is education and knowledge deprived, and stays stuck in the vicious circle of immaturity and tutelage.

ENLIGHTENMENT : INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

The public, at large, is comfortable with blindly following the guidance of Church and Monarchy, two of the main guiding institutions in the society. Because of their lack of will to be autonomous, the immature public is incapable of accepting the uncomfortable task of thinking for themselves.

Here, Kant adds that even if the public did try to overthrow the norm that has been imposed on them, they would still be confined by their own uncultivated minds.

Kant highlights the comparative ease of attaining enlightenment as a group (in society) as compared to a lone individual.

His reason for making this claim is that the journey of an individual achieving enlightenment on their own is exceedingly difficult because that person will i nevitably commit mistakes . These mistakes could discourage that person as breaking old patterns of habit (here, it refers to blind obedience) is extremely challenging. This implies that two qualities that such a candidate should possess to become free of immaturity are vigor and fearlessness.

Kant believed that an individual’s freedom is completely useless, as only the use of the combined public’s freedom is useful in reaching an enlightened state.

Kant expressed that for a society to be enlightened, its citizens should obey laws. At the same time, they should have the strength to criticize what they think to be unjust.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ENLIGHTENMENT

After analyzing the cause of immaturity and tutelage in the public, Kant proposes a solution. Kant states that the tools required to attain enlightenment are freedom and reason. These tools would enable the masses to think independently, act wisely and “be treated in accordance with their dignity”.

Kant emphasizes that freedom is the first and foremost prerequisite for the attainment of enlightenment. He justifies this by claiming that a person who has the right to express their thoughts and judgements without the fear of punishment will offer uninhibited ideas.

By this, Kant expresses his advocacy for the freedom of speech and tolerance for divergent opinions. Note that Kant cautions that this freedom of expression must not act as a hindrance in the individual performing their duties to the society.

Kant firmly believes that the enlightenment of leaders is necessary for the subsequent enlightenment of the public . He gives the example of monarchy in which, only a monarch who is truly enlightened would grant their subjects the vital freedom to think without getting offended by their opposing viewpoints, and punishing them for it.

In his bold statement, Kant states that “his (monarch’s) law giving authority rests on uniting the general public will on his own”. By this, he is reinstating that a monarch’s wishes are the representation of the public’s wishes. He expresses support for a government that, instead of intimidating its citizens, encourages them . This government would take into account the wishes and interests of its citizens instead of imposing its absolute and unmoving authority on them.

Reason is the key to overthrowing immaturity and self-incurred tutelage. Kant hopes that, given freedom, the general public will become a force of free thinking.

He points out that there will always exist some people who do not comply with the norm of tutelage and think for themselves. These people will help the rest cultivate their minds.

Drawing reference to the era he lived in, Kant notes that “a revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism… or power seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking.”

While acknowledging the great impact that the American Revolution had in Europe, Kant warns that new prejudices will take the place of the old ones and renew the cycle of the tutelage of the “great unthinking masses.”

ANALYSIS OF KANT’S IDEAS IN THE DEMOCRATIC ERA

The 18th century was a very different age as compared to the modern 21st century. At that time, Monarchy — the widely prevalent mode of governance was also considered the most ideal one. But now that title has unanimously been transferred to Democracy. This raises serious questions for the relevance of Kant’s enlightenment in the current era.

Kant describes revolutions as being counterproductive as they replace the old norm with a new one. This new imposition is just like the old one — in the sense that it has no decreasing effect on the public’s immaturity. However this claim is far from true when it comes to democracy (which is a revolution). Here, people have a say in selecting their leaders and they also have the power to unanimously change them if they feel dissatisfied with their governance.

Freedom or liberty is often represented as the chief principle of democracy. The public has the freedom to either re-elect or change their representatives, based on their performance.

It should be noted that many of Kant’s ideas hinted at the intellectual success of systems like democracy, where there is freedom of thought and speech. This idea is undoubtedly relevant in the current age.

RELEVANCE OF KANT’S IDEAS

One common criticism for Immanuel Kant theories is that they are impractical and vague, rendering them useless for practical application. Rationality is a big part of one’s personality, and these two are often inseparable. That is why it is hard for even philosophers to come up with universally applicable principles.

Because Kant and other enlightenment philosophers belonged to the same era, their ideas were not completely independent of their cultural influence.

With time, culture evolves and the validity of old ideas decreases.

That being said, laziness, cowardice, domination and complacency. the four ‘reasons’ for the lack of enlightenment, are still as relevant today as they were back then. The only difference is that in this ‘age of enlightenment’, we are getting much better at spotting and working towards alleviating these vices.

In this essay, Kant sheds light on the reasons for lack of enlightenment and requirements for acquiring it. He describes enlightenment as the process of shedding intellectual bondage that had been persisting for centuries.

While he admitted that monarchies exploited their authority by robbing people of education and forcing them to comply with the monarch’s will, he thought of the general public as the culprit for their own immaturity.

Kant strongly expresses the importance of public use of freedom for the attainment of enlightenment. He believes that if the masses started expressing themselves freely in public spaces, their ideas and inputs will influence those of authority. Consequently, decision making would not be an isolated process.

Kant expertly quotes that — “Are we living in an enlightened age? No, but we live in an age of enlightenment.”

While his theory has been subjected to a lot of criticism, its historical significance cannot be denied. Kant’s theory continues to be an important tool that helps in understanding the meaning of enlightenment.

Written by The Thinking Lane

Hi! I am Kritika Parakh. I am a philosophy grad trying to make sense of philosophical topics. Any criticism/corrections/comments are welcome.

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> Practical Philosophy
> An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? (1784)

Book contents

Frontmatter
General editors' preface
General introduction
Review of Schulz's Attempt at an introduction to a doctrine of morals for all human beings regardless of different religions (1783)
An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? (1784)
On the wrongfulness of unauthorized publication of books (1785)
Groundwork of The metaphysics of morals (1785)
Review of Gottlieb Hufeland's Essay on the principle of natural right (1786) [translated and edited by Allen Wood]
Kraus's review of Ulrich's Eleutheriology (1788)
Critique of practical reason (1788)
On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793)
Toward perpetual peace (1795)
The metaphysics of morals (1797)
On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy (1797)
On turning out books (1798) [translated and edited by Allen Wood]
Editorial notes
Index of names
Index of subjects

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012

Introduction

Since the eighteenth century was the “Age of Enlightenment,” it was appropriate to ask “What is Enlightenment?” Kant's answer to the question appeared in the December 1784 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift . As his concluding note indicates, the September issue, which Kant had not yet received, contained an essay on the same topic by Moses Mendelssohn. The occasion for both replies to the question could have been an essay in the December 1783 issue, “Is It Advisable to Sanction Marriage through Religion?” by Johann Friedrich Zöllner, which contained the passage “ What is Enlightenment ? The question, which is almost as important as the question What is truth ?, should be answered before one begins to enlighten others. And yet I have never found it answered anywhere.”

As might be expected, Kant's answer and Mendelssohn's were not in agreement. Consistently with his eudaimonism, Mendelssohn had located enlightenment in the cultivation of what Kant would call the theoretical, as distinguished from the practical, use of one's intellectual powers. To this extent, Kant's reply to Garve in “Theory and Practice” would serve against Mendelssohn as well.

Kant's insistence upon freedom of the press, in the present context as the instrument of enlightenment, reappears in virtually all his political writings. A number of points introduced here – Kant's distinction between the public and the private use of reason, his principles of scriptural exegesis, his views about what kind of sect a government could sanction consistently with its own interest – were elaborated in a treatise written in 1794, which had to be withheld from publication because of the repressive measures of Frederick the Great's nephew and successor.

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Immanuel Kant
Edited by Mary J. Gregor
Introduction by Allen W. Wood , Stanford University, California
Book: Practical Philosophy
Online publication: 05 June 2012
Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813306.005

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What Is Enlightenment?

By immanuel kant.

What Is Enlightenment? Summary

Kant begins his essay by defining enlightenment as humanity’s emergence from immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to think without external help. Such immaturity is self-imposed, as its cause lies not in a lack of capacity, but in fear. He coins a motto for the Enlightenment: “Sapere aude!” (Latin for "dare to know") which he glosses as, “Have the courage to use your own understanding!” Laziness and cowardice are the two major obstacles to enlightenment. Kant claims that while people are naturally endowed with the capacity for intellectual maturity, they prefer the ease of being led. People rely on authorities to think and make decisions, making it easy for societal guardians to control and exploit them.

After defining enlightenment and mentioning its barriers, Kant goes on to suggest possible paths to achieving it. Kant recognizes the difficulty of freeing oneself from immaturity through personal effort. He also dismisses a rebellion against the guardians, as this only ends oppression temporarily. He suggests that real enlightenment arises from a collective effort, and it happens slowly. To achieve enlightenment, nothing is needed besides freedom. Once society is granted freedom, the public will enlighten itself. Initially, a few individual pioneers will come to think independently, then they will spark enlightenment among the rest of the society.

Kant finetunes his discussion of freedom by distinguishing between the public and private uses of reason. The public use of reason refers to people’s free expression of their opinions in public, in writing. The private use of reason relates to people’s specific social roles, and particularly, the performance of their occupational duties. He argues that the public use of reason should be given complete freedom, allowing citizens to debate and argue on all social matters, whereas the private use of reason should be restricted to maintain public order. For instance, while a soldier must obey orders, he should be able to question them in writing addressed to the general public; he questions not in his capacity as a soldier, but as a “scholar.” Enlightenment, as Kant sees it, is an intrinsic part of human progress. Any attempts to hinder enlightenment violate fundamental human rights.

Kant believes that the society of his time is an “age of enlightenment” but not an “enlightened age.” This means that the restraints on free thinking are slowly being lifted, but not entirely. He approves of enlightened monarchs such as Frederick the Great of Prussia, who grants religious freedom to his subjects. An enlightened ruler, in Kant’s view, doesn't impose religious beliefs on his people. Instead, he allows freedom of religion and speech. Only such a ruler can lead his people out of immaturity. When the ruler permits freedom in all areas, including art, science, and religion, people can naturally come out of barbarism themselves.

Kant concludes by emphasizing the urgency of religious freedom. This is because authorities are less interested in controlling thoughts in areas like arts and sciences. He warns that restrictions on religious freedom are the most harmful of all. An enlightened ruler sees the value of intellectual freedom. Such a ruler recognizes that freedom of speech threatens neither society nor the ruler’s sovereignty. For enlightenment to spread, a ruler must be both enlightened, allowing freedom of speech, and at the same time equipped to maintain order with a strong army. The spirit of this kind of leadership is exemplified by the motto “Argue as much as you like, and about what you like, but obey !” Eventually, the influence of enlightenment will extend to governmental systems, reshaping the social sphere, and leading to a state that respects the autonomy of its citizens.

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What is Enlightenment?

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What Is Enlightenment? study guide contains a biography of Immanuel Kant, literature essays, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

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Immanuel Kant

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Immanuel Kant's definition and significance of "enlightenment" in his essay "What is Enlightenment?"

Immanuel Kant defines "enlightenment" as humanity's emergence from self-imposed immaturity, which is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. He emphasizes the importance of individual freedom and reason, arguing that enlightenment is achieved through the courage to think for oneself. This concept is significant as it highlights the value of intellectual independence and the critical role of reason in personal and societal progress.

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How does Immanuel Kant define "enlightenment" and its significance?

Kant believed that we only see the appearance of things (phenomena). We don’t see things-in-themselves (noumena). If we did see noumena, we would automatically choose the correct moral or logical option.

Since we only see the appearance of things, we are forced to make a choice. To make the correct choice, we cannot rely solely on the appearance of things; we must also use reason. If our reasoning brings us to the conclusion that 2=2=4, then we can choose that this is true in the material world as well.

The same concept goes for moral and social decisions. We must choose the correct option if it agrees with our individual reason. It is our moral obligation to do so. In other words, we must make a decision as if it adheres to a universal law. Kant called this duty of decision the “categorical imperative.” In order to make these decisions, we have to use reason and this requires that we think for ourselves. We cannot rely solely on our sense perceptions just as we cannot rely solely on what others have told us. For example, if you live in a society that endorses oppression or hate, you have the moral responsibility to be brave enough to use your individual reasoning to decide this is wrong. And you must act according to that reason.

In his essay , “Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Kant said the Enlightenment was:

Mankind’s final coming of age, the emancipation of the human consciousness from an immature state of ignorance and error.

In Kant’s context, an individual becomes enlightened when he/she has the courage to act and think without the guidance of another. If an overall social enlightenment occurs, it is because the world has individually and collectively reached an era in history when they begin to think for themselves. Kant notes that the majority would probably continue to conform: too scared to think for themselves.

Enlightened individuals must not be restricted by thoughts of previous generations. Enlightenment entails progress. Only an individual who is courageous enough to think and reason for her/himself is able to make the best dutiful decision when faced with any choice: a categorical imperative.

This is significant for many reasons. One is that this established the idea that reasoned, individual thought is necessary to make moral decisions and it is also necessary when challening authority figures or public opinion. Kant established that the enlightened person must be courageous. This is also significant in that an enlightened ruler must be courageous enough to allow free thought and speech. These are the keys to an enlightened society.

Cite this page as follows:

Lulos, Jason. "Immanuel Kant's definition and significance of "enlightenment" in his essay "What is Enlightenment?"" edited by eNotes Editorial, 3 Feb. 2011, https://www.enotes.com/topics/immanuel-kant/questions/immanuel-kant-s-definition-and-significance-of-3128338.

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What does Kant mean by "enlightenment" in his essay "What is Enlightenment?"

According to Immanuel Kant , enlightenment is a person’s ability to analyze and understand events without making use of another person’s guidance; it is a person’s ability to reason. He explains that most people fail to achieve enlightenment because of laziness or/and fear of the unknown, or rather fear of failure. People are slow to develop their own critical analysis skills because there are already many others willing to do this for them—what Kant calls guardians. The guardians include pastors, whose work it is to read and understand the Bible, or whatever spiritual book that is specific to a religion, and then present their findings to the congregation; doctors, who have studied medicine and whose work it is to diagnose illnesses, give prescriptions, and so on. The result is that people are not incentivized to seek personal enlightenment; they would rather pay others, the guardians, to help them out, to think for them.

Kant goes on to discuss freedom as a core component of enlightenment. Towards this end, he identifies two forms of reasoning: the public and the private “use of one’s reason.” He defines “private use of one’s reason” as reasoning employed by an individual in a civic post or formal position of appointment or employment, such as a civil servant, police officer, church minister, or senator. He notes that an individual’s reasoning in such a capacity is restrained by his or her office, hence not free, as he or she will be “carrying out the orders of others.” On the other hand, an individual’s reasoning out of the private domain (public use of reason) should be unrestrained (free) so that, for instance, a pastor in his public use of reason should be free to “publish his criticisms of the weaknesses of the existing institutions.” He notes that many of the hindrances to enlightenment are being done away with as people gain more freedom in their thinking.

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Lulos, Jason. "Immanuel Kant's definition and significance of "enlightenment" in his essay "What is Enlightenment?"" edited by eNotes Editorial, 24 Jan. 2013, https://www.enotes.com/topics/immanuel-kant/questions/immanuel-kant-s-definition-and-significance-of-3128338.

Kant's "What is Enlightenment?" (1784)

Early modern rationality.

Immanuel's Kant's "What is Enlightenment" was one of his popular essays, written when he was sixty, and it comes at the end of the eighteenth century--what is sometimes regarded as the end of the Enlightenment. In many ways it functions as a good summary of the period's attitudes towards knowledge, the divine, authority, tradition, the individual, education, and the state. Not, of course, the attitudes of all or even most, but the attitudes of a certain intellectual and cultural elite are reflected therein.

For Kant, reliance upon any authority, other than the human mind, is to be kept an intellectual child, dependent on the paternalism of civil, religious, or academic authorities. In Kant's view an unthinking acceptance of what the state or church leadership tells you can only lead to oppression and a cattle-like state for the masses. Thus, political freedom is absolutely necessary for mental and emotional enlightenment. Public doubt must be possible for both the state and the church. Therefore, the monarch should not meddle in matters of the people's religion.

How does Kant contrast the role of a soldier or clergy from the scholar? Why does he see it as an important difference?
Why does Kant make a distinction between "an enlightened age " and "an age of enlightenment"? What's the difference?
Is Kant right that the government should stay out of religion? Why or why not?
Can authority ever be trusted without question? Under what conditions?
What does Kant trust in? What does he not trust in?
How does Kant see the individual in relation to the divine, to the state, to education?
Kant uses the term Aufklärung not Erleuchtung . What is the difference in the two ideas?
Read over the passage by Roger Lundin below. What might it suggest about Kant's view of authority and originality? What makes the older view different?

"Descartes and [other Enlightenment figures] began the slow transformation of Western culture from the model of authority (from the Latin auctor , meaning 'author' or 'originator') to that of originality. Before Descartes, originality had meant the creative appropriation of the thought of one's immediate predecessors; after him, it involved the adoption of an unprecedented point of view. Descartes's break with the past had established a compelling pattern for the future; it legitimated the desire at the heart of modernity: the urge to become one's own origin, author, and father " (13). --Roger Lundin

[Lundin, Roger. et al. The Promise of Hermeneutics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.]

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What Is Enlightenment?

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Analysis: “What Is Enlightenment?”

Kant’s essay on enlightenment finds him arguing with more passion and less technical detail than one usually finds in his work. He is also writing for a popular (though likely still well-read) audience , so he spends less time on his argument’s finer points in favor of making his claims forcefully and concisely.

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What is Enlightenment?

Samuel Fleischacker, What is Enlightenment? , Routledge, 2013, 235pp., $31.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780415497817.

Reviewed by James Schmidt, Boston University

Samuel Fleischacker argues that Immanuel Kant's discussion of the question "What is Enlightenment?" provides " both the notion of enlightenment that has been criticized for its arrogant aspiration to replace all traditional ways of life with liberal individualism and a much more open, flexible ideal that can help us resist our arrogant aspirations" (1). The former, which Fleischacker dubs "maximum enlightenment" (hereafter, MaxE), is antagonistic towards most forms of religious belief, convinced of the beneficence of science, and suspicious of tradition. In contrast, the "minimalist Enlightenment" (hereafter, MinE) is more modest: it is concerned with " how one holds one's views, not what views one holds" and requires only that "one holds one's belief as a result of thinking responsibly for oneself, rather than as dogma . . . seeks reasons for one's beliefs, opens them to correction by others, and recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of one's reasons" (169).

What is Enlightenment? traces the history of these two conceptions of enlightenment and argues for the virtues of the minimalist conception. Chapters 1 and 2 lay out the contesting versions of enlightenment (MinE and MaxE) found in Kant. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the critique of MaxE in Hamann, Burke, Novalis, Schelling, and Hegel. Chapter 5 explores how Kant's maximalist conception was taken up in the works of the left-Hegelians and Karl Marx. Subsequent chapters examine the critiques of MaxE mounted by Nietzsche and Heidegger (Chapter 6), Horkheimer, Adorno, and Foucault (Chapter 7), and by the diverse group of thinkers (including Emmanuel Eze, Charles Mills, Carol Gilligan, Robin Schott, Linda Nicholson, Lucius Outlaw, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Hans-Georg Gadamer) whom the author dubs "difference critics" (Chapter 8). A brief discussion of the rehabilitation of Kant's MinE undertaken by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and (in his later works) Foucault follows (Chapters 9), and the book ends with two chapters assessing this rehabilitation (Chapter 10) and suggesting how its shortcomings might be remedied (Chapter 11).

The book has much to recommend it. It ranges widely and discusses a variety of thinkers, both familiar and somewhat less familiar. It is attentive to discussions of the concept of enlightenment that Kant provided in texts other than the now-familiar essay from 1784 (e.g., his 1786 contribution to the Pantheism Dispute "What is Orientation in Thinking?") and examines the implications of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), which Fleischacker sees as articulating the "maximalist" tendencies in Kant's concept of enlightenment. Though book's treatment of Foucault as both a critic of MaxE and a defender of MinE is, at first, somewhat puzzling, it nevertheless captures something of the complexity of Foucault's relationship with both Kant and the idea of enlightenment.

It also has a few minor, though in most cases understandable, shortcomings. The book would have benefitted from a consideration of "maximalists" of a more recent vintage than the brief account of Marx and his left-Hegelian predecessors in Chapter 5. At least a passing discussion of the way in which Karl Popper framed his critical rationalism along self-consciously Kantian lines might have been welcome, especially given Popper's affection for Kant's 1784 essay. The chapter on "difference critics" merges lines of criticism that do easily blend together. Critics who see Kant -- and, more generally, the Enlightenment -- as insufficiently attentive to the categories of race and gender generally work within different traditions than either Gadamer or MacIntyre, and these differences are only partly bridged by the brief discussion of the concept of "horizon" on pages 126-127. Disentangling these lines of argument would allow for a contrast between neo-Aristotelean critiques of the Enlightenment and the variety of post-modernist criticisms that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (along with Popper, Derrida and Lyotard are also missing in action). Finally, one might quibble with the treatment of Kant's response to the question "What is enlightenment?" as somehow analogous to the quartet of questions ("What can I know?, What ought I to do?, What may I hope?, and What is man?") that Kant posed in his Lectures on Logic . [1] While Kant may have written the most famous answer to the question "What is enlightenment?" the question itself (as Fleischacker notes at the outset) was posed by the clergyman Johann Friedrich Zöllner in an article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift . To give credit where it is due, the question that this book is exploring is Zöllner's, not Kant's.

Somewhat more problematic is the assumption that the various thinkers who appear in the book were, in fact, wrestling with the implications of the set of ideas that Fleischacker sees as fundamental to "Kantian enlightenment." While Hamann (who puts in a brief appearance on pp. 43-44) provided a detailed, albeit difficult, critique of Kant's 1784 essay, Burke -- who figures much more prominently in the book (see pp. 50-57) -- did not. Burke's German followers August Rehberg and Friedrich von Gentz seem to have been familiar with Kant's answer, but they are mentioned only in passing (see 46-47). The young Hegel was a reader of the Berlinische Monatsschrift , but while it is hard to see how he could not have been familiar with Kant's responses, all that survives in his Nachlass is a transcription of Moses Mendelssohn's response to Zöllner's question. [2]

Marx and the left Hegelians figure in the book as the principal heirs of the "maximalist" version of "Kantian enlightenment." But the evidence for their debts to Kant is also rather slim. Fleischacker describes Feuerbach as "clearly a representative of the maximalist version of Kantian enlightenment," but concedes that Feuerbach's familiarity with Kant does not seem to have gone beyond first Critique (76-77). The case for Kant's influence on Marx is not much stronger: Fleischacker cites an 1837 letter from Marx to his father mentioning that he has been reading Kant, notes a passing use of the phrase "categorical imperative" in one of Marx's early writings, and observes that Marx frequently used the word "critique" (81). Why assume, then, that Kant's account of enlightenment -- important though it may be today -- had much influence on nineteenth-century "maximalists"? It was not as if they were at a loss for other thinkers on whom they could draw. The left-Hegelian Edgar Bauer's edition of texts by "German enlighteners of the eighteenth century" included works by Karl Friedrich Bahrdt, Johann August Eberhard, Johann Heinrich Schulz, Andreas Riem, and other now-forgotten figures, but nothing by Kant. [3] And Marx, of course, was quite familiar with the works of the French philosophes and Scottish moralists.

The difficulty of taking Kant's account of enlightenment as the standard against which all later discussions are to be measured is perhaps nowhere clearer than in the brief discussion of Nietzsche (94-98). After observing that Nietzsche rarely engaged in a detailed discussion of Kant's work and instead limited himself to "broad caricature" and "Sneering remarks" (95), Fleischacker suggests, "If we stress Nietzsche's talk of the need for courageous thought, which shatters illusions, Nietzsche can be understood as a maximalist heir to Kantian enlightenment, whatever he thought of Kant himself" (97). But, while Nietzsche may well, at various points in his career, have championed positions that resemble those associated with MaxE, does this justify our viewing him as Kant's heir? When Nietzsche discussed the Enlightenment, he tended to focus on French thinkers and, when he sought eighteenth-century predecessors, he opted for Voltaire -- for him, the great defender of an "aristocratic" enlightenment -- rather than Kant, whom he saw as having been "bitten by the moral tarantula Rousseau." [4]

It would be misguided, however, to view What is Enlighenment? as a reception history of Kant's essay. Fleischacker 's chief concern is philosophical, not historical, and Kant has pride of place in this account not because his answer to Zöllner's question has been particularly influential (though, over the last century, it has been), but rather because the tensions found in Kant's account allegedly recur in later thinkers, whether Kant's answer mattered to them (as is clearly the case with Foucault and Habermas) or not (as would appear to be the case with the various nineteenth-century thinkers discussed in the book). As Fleischacker explains at the close of the second of his two chapters on Kant,

Kant is simply torn between a view on which enlightenment provides the minimal constraints on reasonable conversation, and a view on which it leads to a very specific set of results, on which all reasonable conversationalists should converge. Because Kant was torn on this, he bequeathed an ambiguous legacy on the question of enlightenment to his successors. (39)

For this reason, "the distinction between maximalist and minimalist Kantian enlightenments" is used "to organize the history" that unfolds in the chapters that follow (39).

Characterizing Kant as "torn" between MinE and MaxE implies that he was both aware of the conflict between maximalist and minimalist concepts of enlightenment and unable to commit himself to one concept or the other. Fleischacker argues that Kant articulated a "minimalist" conception in his 1784 answer to Zöllner and in "What is Orientation in Thinking?" but went on to embrace a "maximalist" conception in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and The Conflict of the Faculties (1798). While Kant's "minimalist" conception "identified enlightenment with an opened-process of reasoning, structured on general principles" that would be "compatible with a wide variety of views," his "maximalist" conception assumed that the process of "thinking for oneself" would rule out certain beliefs, including (1) religions that privilege ritual or conformity to scripture over moral principles (Fleischacker notes the critique of "Priestcraft" in Religion §3) and (2) philosophical positions that lapse into "enthusiasm" by failing to recognize the limits of reason. He argues that the critique of ritual and scripture is reflected in Kant's "notorious hope that Jews, if they turn to pure moral religion and 'throw off the garb of [their] ancient cult,' can bring about 'the euthanasia of Judaism'" (32) and that his definition of "enthusiasm" capacious enough to encompass such thinkers as John Locke, Johann Heinrich Schulz, and Francis Hutcheson. While conceding that Kant was "no pluralist about either scientific or moral conclusions," Fleischacker finds it hard to see how Kant could maintain that it was impossible to "be both enlightened and a devout religious believer, like [his] friends Moses Mendelssohn and Friedrich Jacobi" (34) or that he "really regarded Locke, Schulz, and Hutcheson as unenlightened" (36).

What led Kant to these puzzling conclusions, Fleischacker suggests, was Kant's commitment (as laid out in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (Ak 5:294) ) to both the principle of "unprejudiced" thinking (i.e., "to think for oneself") and the principle of "broad-minded" thinking (i.e., thinking from a "universal standpoint"). This dual commitment drove Kant from the MinE of the 1784 essay to the MaxE of his later works:

the cognitive universalization principle seems to demand that I expect others to hold the same beliefs that I do. Of course, I may have made mistakes in my reasoning, but that just means that I should be sure to check it carefully before reaching any conclusions. What I can't do reasonably . . . is to think simultaneously that I have reasoned properly and that you, if you reason properly, could reach a different conclusion. And this would seem to mean that enlightenment should lead us all to one set of beliefs. (37-38)

For Fleischacker, one of the more lamentable implications of Kant's commitment to the universalization principle is that "The minimalist enlightenment would seem to be incoherent; if enlightenment is an employment of reason, it is inherently a maximalist project" (38). Though both Rawls and Habermas would later introduce premises that "block this slide towards maximalism," he sees little evidence that Kant sought to do the same. Nevertheless, he insists that, Kant "needs to do something of the sort if he wants to hold onto the broadly respectful attitudes he often demonstrates towards his intellectual opponents" (38).

Laying aside the question of just how "respectful" Kant actually was towards Schulz and Jacobi, it is unclear why Fleischacker sees a contradiction between Kant's commitment to a conception of enlightenment that harbored "maximalist" tendencies and Kant's capacity to treat individuals who hold unreasonable positions with a certain measure of respect. Kant, of course, was well aware that moral worth did not hinge on intellectual accomplishments. As for Kant's "notorious" comment that Judaism might eventually find its "euthanasia" in a "pure moral religion, freed from all the ancient statutory teachings," it bears noting that Kant also emphasized that these same "ancient teachings" had been retained in another "messianic faith" -- Christianity. The comment on Judaism had been immediately preceded by a characterization of the diversity of religious sects as "desirable" insofar as it was "a good sign -- a sign, namely that people are allowed freedom of belief." But Kant went on to stress that "it is only the government that is to be commended here." That "enlightened Catholics and Protestants" might come to see one another as "brothers in faith" was, for him, but a preliminary step towards an eventual overcoming of the various sectarian differences in a "pure moral religion" (Ak 7:52). It would seem, then, that Judaism was not the only faith that Kant saw as facing the prospect of "euthanasia" in a "pure moral religion."

This, I suppose, is MaxE with a vengeance, but it is hard to see how it was not already present in the critique of the establishment of fixed religious (or, to use Kant's terminology, "sectarian") doctrines that Kant mounted in the allegedly "minimalist" account of enlightenment from 1784. The "maximalist" tendencies of that essay already prefigure the difficulties that Prussian authorities would later have with Kant's religious writings: the "minimalist" Kant was, as Ian Hunter has argued, already engaged in "a radical transformation of the topography of political legitimacy." [5] If Kant strikes us as "torn" between such alternatives, it is perhaps because later commentators on "What is Enlightenment?" -- including John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, and Jürgen Habermas -- have focused on the implications of his account of "public use of reason" and left his discussion of moral religion (and its political implications) to others.

There would seem, then, little reason to assume that Kant equivocated between -- or, indeed, was even aware of -- the alternatives of MinE and MaxE. But while What is Enlightenment? may be misguided in seeing Kant as "torn," its consideration of the diverging projects associated with the "Kantian enlightenment" reminds us how contested the concept of enlightenment has been and, perhaps, still remains. It would seem that Zöllner's question still stands.

[1] Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic , ed. J. Michael Young, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 538.

[2] Johannes Hoffmeister, Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936) 140-143.

[3] Martin Geismar [pseudonymn for Edgar Bauer], Bibliothek der Deutscher Aufklärer des Achtzehnten Jahrhunderts , 5 vols. (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1846).

[4] See Graeme Garrard, "Nietzsche For and Against the Enlightenment," Review of Politics 70:4 (2008): 595-608.

[5] Ian Hunter, "Kant's Religion and Prussian Religious Policy," Modern Intellectual History 2:1 (2005): 1-27, 23. Hunter draws on the important work of Michael J. Sauter, now available as Visions of the Enlightenment: The Edict on Religion of 1788 and the Politics of the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

Immanuel Kant 1784

An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?

Written : 30th September, 1784; First Published : 1798 Source : Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, 1996; Transcribed : by Andy Blunden .

Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! [dare to be wise] Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment.

It is because of laziness and cowardice that so great a part of humankind, after nature has long since emancipated them from other people’s direction ( naturaliter maiorennes ), nevertheless gladly remains minors for life, and that it becomes so easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so comfortable to be a minor! If I have a book that understands for me, a spiritual advisor who has a conscience for me, a doctor who decides upon a regimen for me, and so forth, I need not trouble myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay; others will readily undertake the irksome business for me. That by far the greatest part of humankind (including the entire fair sex) should hold the step toward majority to be not only troublesome but also highly dangerous will soon be seen to by those guardians who have kindly taken it upon themselves to supervise them; after they have made their domesticated animals dumb and carefully prevented these placid creatures from daring to take a single step without the walking cart in which they have confined them, they then show them the danger that threatens them if they try to walk alone. Now this danger is not in fact so great, for by a few falls they would eventually learn to walk; but an example of this kind makes them timid and usually frightens them away from any further attempt.

Thus it is difficult for any single individual to extricate himself from the minority that has become almost nature to him. He has even grown fond of it and is really unable for the time being to make use of his own understanding, because he was never allowed to make the attempt. Precepts and formulas, those mechanical instruments of a rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural endowments, are the ball and chain of an everlasting minority. And anyone who did throw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over even the narrowest ditch, since he would not be accustomed to free movement of this kind. Hence there are only a few who have succeeded, by their own cultivation of their spirit, in extricating themselves from minority and yet walking confidently.

But that a public should enlighten itself is more possible; indeed this is almost inevitable, if only it is left its freedom. For there will always be a few independent thinkers, even among the established guardians of the great masses, who, after having themselves cast off the yoke of minority, will disseminate the spirit of a rational valuing of one’s own worth and of the calling of each individual to think for himself. What should be noted here is that the public, which was previously put under this yoke by the guardians, may subsequently itself compel them to remain under it, if the public is suitably stirred up by some of its guardians who are themselves incapable of any enlightenment; so harmful is it to implant prejudices, because they finally take their revenge on the very people who, or whose predecessors, were their authors. Thus a public can achieve enlightenment only slowly. A revolution may well bring about a failing off of personal despotism and of avaricious or tyrannical oppression, but never a true reform in one’s way of thinking; instead new prejudices will serve just as well as old ones to harness the great unthinking masses.

For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters. But I hear from all sides the cry: Do not argue! The officer says: Do not argue but drill! The tax official: Do not argue but pay! The clergyman: Do not argue but believe! (Only one ruler in the world says: Argue as much as you will and about whatever you will, but obey! ) Everywhere there are restrictions on freedom. But what sort of restriction hinders enlightenment, and what sort does not hinder but instead promotes it? – I reply: The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings; the private use of one’s reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted without this particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one’s own reason I understand that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted. Now, for many affairs conducted in the interest of a commonwealth a certain mechanism is necessary, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so as to be directed by the government, through an artful unanimity, to public ends (or at least prevented from destroying such ends). Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one must obey. But insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of a whole commonwealth, even of the society of citizens of the world, and so in his capacity of a scholar who by his writings addresses a public in the proper sense of the word, he can certainly argue without thereby harming the affairs assigned to him in part as a passive member. Thus it would be ruinous if an officer, receiving an order from his superiors, wanted while on duty to engage openly in subtle reasoning about its appropriateness or utility; he must obey. But he cannot fairly be prevented, as a scholar, from making remarks about errors in the military service and from putting these before his public for appraisal. A citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him; an impertinent censure of such levies when he is to pay them may even be punished as a scandal (which could occasion general insubordination). But the same citizen does not act against the duty of a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts about the inappropriateness or even injustice of such decrees. So too, a clergyman is bound to deliver his discourse to the pupils in his catechism class and to his congregation in accordance with the creed of the church he serves, for he was employed by it on that condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom and is even called upon to communicate to the public all his carefully examined and well-intentioned thoughts about what is erroneous in that creed and his suggestions for a better arrangement of the religious and ecclesiastical body. And there is nothing in this that could be laid as a burden on his conscience. For what he teaches in consequence of his office as carrying out the business of the church, he represents as something with respect to which he does not have free power to teach as he thinks best, but which he is appointed to deliver as prescribed and in the name of another. He will say: Our church teaches this or that; here are the arguments it uses. He then extracts all practical uses for his congregation from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with full conviction but which he can nevertheless undertake to deliver because it is still not altogether impossible that truth may lie concealed in them, and in any case there is at least nothing contradictory to inner religion present in them. For if he believed he had found the latter in them, he could not in conscience hold his office; he would have to resign from it. Thus the use that an appointed teacher makes of his reason before his congregation is merely a private use; for a congregation, however large a gathering it may be, is still only a domestic gathering; and with respect to it he, as a priest, is not and cannot be free, since he is carrying out another’s commission. On the other hand as a scholar, who by his writings speaks to the public in the strict sense, that is, the world – hence a clergyman in the public use of his reason – he enjoys an unrestricted freedom to make use of his own reason and to speak in his own person. For that the guardians of the people (in spiritual matters) should themselves be minors is an absurdity that amounts to the perpetuation of absurdities.

But should not a society of clergymen, such as an ecclesiastical synod or a venerable classis (as it calls itself among the Dutch), be authorized to bind itself by oath to a certain unalterable creed, in order to carry on an unceasing guardianship over each of its members and by means of them over the people, and even to perpetuate this? I say that this is quite impossible. Such a contract, concluded to keep all further enlightenment away from the human race forever, is absolutely null and void, even if it were ratified by the supreme power, by imperial diets and by the most solemn peace treaties. One age cannot bind itself and conspire to put the following one into such a condition that it would be impossible for it to enlarge its cognitions (especially in such urgent matters) and to purify them of errors, and generally to make further progress in enlightenment. This would be a crime against human nature, whose original vocation lies precisely in such progress; and succeeding generations are therefore perfectly authorized to reject such decisions as unauthorized and made sacrilegiously. The touchstone of whatever can be decided upon as law for a people lies in the question: whether a people could impose such a law upon itself. Now this might indeed be possible for a determinate short time, in expectation as it were of a better one, in order to introduce a certain order; during that time each citizen, particularly a clergyman, would be left free, in his capacity as a scholar, to make his remarks publicly, that is, through writings, about defects in the present institution; meanwhile, the order introduced would last until public insight into the nature of these things had become so widespread and confirmed that by the union of their voices (even if not all of them) it could submit a proposal to the crown, to take under its protection those congregations that have, perhaps in accordance with their concepts of better insight, agreed to an altered religious institution, but without hindering those that wanted to acquiesce in the old one. But it is absolutely impermissible to agree, even for a single lifetime, to a permanent religious constitution not to be doubted publicly by anyone and thereby, as it were, to nullify a period of time in the progress of humanity toward improvement and make it fruitless and hence detrimental to posterity. One can indeed, for his own person and even then only for some time, postpone enlightenment in what it is incumbent upon him to know; but to renounce enlightenment, whether for his own person or even more so for posterity, is to violate the sacred right of humanity and trample it underfoot. But what a people may never decide upon for itself, a monarch may still less decide upon for a people;, for his legislative authority rests precisely on this, that he unites in his will the collective will of the people. As long as he sees to it that any true or supposed improvement is consistent with civil order, he can for the rest leave it to his subjects to do what they find it necessary to do for the sake of their salvation;2 that is no concern of his, but it is indeed his concern to prevent any one of them from forcibly hindering others from working to the best of their ability to determine and promote their salvation. It even infringes upon his majesty if he meddles in these affairs by honoring with governmental inspection the writings in which his subjects attempt to clarify their insight, as well as if he does this from his own supreme insight, in which case he exposes himself to the reproach Caesar non est super grammaticos , [Caesar is not above the grammarians] but much more so if he demeans his supreme authority so far as to support the spiritual despotism of a few tyrants within his state against the rest of his subjects.

If it is now asked whether we at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As matters now stand, a good deal more is required for people on the whole to be in the position, or even able to be put into the position, of using their own understanding confidently and well in religious matters, without another’s guidance. But we do have distinct intimations that the field is now being opened for them to work freely in this direction and that the hindrances to universal enlightenment or to humankind’s emergence from its self-incurred minority are gradually becoming fewer. In this regard this age is the age of enlightenment or the century of Frederick.

A prince who does not find it beneath himself to say that he considers it his duty not to prescribe anything to human beings in religious matters but to leave them complete freedom, who thus even declines the arrogant name of tolerance, is himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful world and by posterity as the one who first released the human race from minority, at least from the side of government, and left each free to make use of his own reason in all matters of conscience. Under him, venerable clergymen, notwithstanding their official duties, may in their capacity as scholars freely and publicly lay before the world for examination their judgments and insights deviating here and there from the creed adopted, and still more may any other who is not restricted by any official duties. This spirit of freedom is also spreading abroad, even where it has to struggle with external obstacles of a government which misunderstands itself. For it shines as an example to such a government that in freedom there is not the least cause for anxiety about public concord and the unity of the commonwealth. People gradually work their way out of barbarism of their own accord if only one does not intentionally contrive to keep them in it.

I have put the main point of enlightenment, of people’s emergence from their self-incurred minority, chiefly in matters of religion because our rulers have no interest in playing guardian over their subjects with respect to the arts and sciences and also because that minority being the most harmful, is also the most disgraceful of all. But the frame of mind of a head of state who favors the first goes still further and sees that even with respect to his legislation there is no danger in allowing his subjects to make public use of their own reason and to publish to the world their thoughts about a better way of formulating it, even with candid criticism of that already given; we have a shining example of this, in which no monarch has yet surpassed the one whom we honor.

But only one who, himself enlightened, is not afraid of phantoms, but at the same time has a well-disciplined and numerous army ready to guarantee public peace, can say what a free state may not dare to say: Argue as much as you will and about what you will; only obey! Here a strange, unexpected course is revealed in human affairs, as happens elsewhere too if it is considered in the large, where almost everything is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people’s freedom of spirit and nevertheless puts up insurmountable barriers to it; a lesser degree of the former, on the other hand, provides a space for the latter to expand to its full capacity. Thus when nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell, the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity.

Königsberg in Prussia, 30th September, 1784

Immanuel Kant Archive

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Kant's Answer to the Question "What is Enlightenment?": Criticism, Freedom and Obedience

2024, Felsefelogos

The great question-answer chain of the 18th century, which began with the question "What is Enlightenment?" was singularized and objectified by Kant's definition. However, Kant's relationship with power (especially the events described in the preface to The Conflict of the Faculties) calls into question the definition of Enlightenment. The definition of the Enlightenment is questionable because the theory of the "public use of reason" is bankrupt; or, conversely, Kant's obedience is in accordance with the paradox of tension and balance (or "argue but obey") inherent in his philosophy. In the Critique, Kant calls the age he lived in "the age of criticism", while in Enlightenment he says, "This age is the age of enlightenment". Are the terms "Critique" and "Enlightenment" identical in this nomenclature? In Critique, "criticism" is an analysis of the conditions of knowledge; in Enlightenment, "enlightenment" is the consciousness of the free exercise of the right of thought and expression. Despite the problematic appearance of the assumption of the identity of the terms, the completion of criticism with enlightenment, the condition of criticism for enlightenment confirms the existence of the logical bond between the two terms. If a relationship can be established between the subject matter of the "court of pure reason" and the demand that freedoms be secured by law, the conclusion that the conclusion that Critique's goal is practice and the premises of the Enlightenment were theoretical can be verified.

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Kant's essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?", is part of an intellectual 'revolution' with both philosophical, as well as broadly cultural consequences. As many of Kant's contemporaries saw, and Heinrich Heine made famous, Kant's 'revolution' bears many similarities to the French Revolution -- but in this paper, I argue that it nevertheless sets a very different kind of intellectual precedent.

Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy

J. Colin McQuillan

Kant defines ‘enlightenment’ as ‘humankind’s emergence from its self-imposed immaturity’. This essay considers the meaning, role, and novelty of this definition, while also examining its relation to the Enlightenment slogans: ‘sapere aude’ (‘Dare to be wise!’) and ‘Think for yourself’. It is argued that there are two subtly different aspects to the ‘immaturity’ from which Kant, insofar as he endorses the transformative process of enlightenment, is urging us to ‘emerge’. These aspects correspond to his two images of immaturity: first, confinement within a kind of baby walker (Gängelwagen), and, second, attachment to ‘leading strings’ (Leitbande). It is argued that the first is a matter of thinking only ‘by courtesy’, the second a matter of thinking under the guidance of another – one’s guardian. It is asked whether Kant’s slogan ‘think for yourself’ might not be pragmatically self-defeating, and whether his insistence that one think for oneself can be made consistent with his permitting belief formation on the basis of the testimony of another. Finally, Kant’s concept of enlightenment is situated with respect to his distinction between the public and private ‘uses of reason’, on the one hand, and his defence of ‘freedom of the pen’, on the other.

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The Enlightenment is the change of a state of mankind. But Kant distinguishes two modes of change, with their also distinctive modes of temporality, reform and revolution. Reform belongs to the mode of sense and is the result of elaboration and time while revolution belongs to the mode of thinking and arises inmediately from resolution. Our aim is to show how the exit of the Enlightenment is concerned by both posibilities of change.

Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy

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I urge here that Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” be read in the context of debates at the time over the public critique of religion, and together with elements of his other writings, especially a short piece on orientation in thinking that he wrote two years later. After laying out the main themes of the essay in some detail, I argue that, read in context, Kant’s call to “think for ourselves” is not meant to rule out a legitimate role for relying on the testimony of others, that it is directed instead against a kind of blind religious faith, in which one either refuses to question one’s clerical authorities or relies on a mystical intuition that cannot be assessed by reason. Both of these ways of abandoning reason can be fended off if we always submit our private thoughts to the test of public scrutiny: which is why enlightenment, for Kant, requires both free thinking, by each individual for him or herself, and a realm of free public expression in which individuals can discuss...

Philosophical and Humanistic Postmodern Views INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE 2012

Antonio Pele

This paper aims to understand Kant’s conception of Enlightenment and, in particular the idea of “Sapere Aude” (dare to think for yourself), described in his article published in 1784 An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment ? where he defines pre-enlightened people as living in a self-imposed “minority”. In the first part of the article, I will develop this notion, along with a process of domestication of human beings. In the second part, I will examine the solutions proposed to overcome this situation, with particular emphasis on the development by the State, of the so-called “public use of reason”.

UTCP Booklet 21 / ICCT series 1

Futoshi Hoshino

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Kant's Metaphysics Of Lying Essay

When asked about the standpoint of lying, to many the response would be that it is wrong and should not be done. Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher of the 1700’s, brought forward the topic of lying in his writing titled “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.” The main evidence that he uses for multiple topics is the Categorical Imperative which is where all of our duties are coming from. The Categorical Imperative states that all human beings must act on maxims that can be universal laws for everyone. Among the many assertions he makes, he concludes that lying is wrong with a multitude of premises. John Stuart Mill, a British philosopher of the 1800’s, also tackled the topic of lying in his writing “Utilitarianism.” He agrees that lying is wrong, but for a …show more content…

I agree with Kant as lying can’t be made a universal law amongst different societies, but that standpoint is not as definitive as it could be. There are multiple different societies that use different law systems and guidelines, so to indirectly claim that another society is irrational because their practices are different than yours is not conclusive. In digression, not all societies should be placed at the same stature in terms of internal practices and lying could possibly fit within this. Mill is concerned with lying as a rule. I also agree that lying as a rule could present an absurdity, but lying as a possible casual practice may prove to be beneficial. The idea of your grandparent laying on their deathbed is depressing for both the child and the grandparent. So if the doctors tell you that she only has two hours to live, then I’m sure that you would want to preserve that time and attempt to make it the best time of their life. It may be beneficial to lie in this case to the dying person and in turn, I feel that the most possible amount of happiness would be a result of

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What Is Enlightenment?
"Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" (German: Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?), often referred to simply as "What Is Enlightenment?", is a 1784 essay by the philosopher Immanuel Kant.In the December 1784 publication of the Berlinische Monatsschrift (Berlin Monthly), edited by Friedrich Gedike and Johann Erich Biester, Kant replied to the question posed a year earlier ...
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make remarks on errors in the military service and to lay them before the public for judgment cannot equitably be refused him as a scholar. The citizen cannot refuse to
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1 An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?[1] IMMANUEL KANT (1784) Translated by Ted Humphrey . Hackett Publishing, 1992 . 1. Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.[2] Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another.
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Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's ...
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Enlightenment 2 cases; obedience is imperative. But in so far as this or that individual who acts as part of the machine also considers himself as a member of a complete
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enlightenment."! \ ...
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The opening paragraph of "What Is Enlightenment?": Sample translations (and the original German) Translation by Lewis White Beck, from Immanuel Kant, On History, ed., with an introduction, by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 3: Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage.
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INTRODUCTION. One of the most influential philosophers, Immanuel Kant published "Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" in December 1784. It was intended as a reply to Reverend Johann Friedrich Zöllner's year old question (What is enlightenment?).. Kant's essay defines enlightenment, explores reasons for its lack, and specifies the preconditions that make its achievement ...
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Kant's Metaphysics Of Lying Essay
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A Summary and Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’

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Immanuel Kant on “Enlightenment”

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What Is Enlightenment?

What Is Enlightenment? Questions and Answers

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Immanuel Kant's definition and significance of "enlightenment" in his essay "What is Enlightenment?"

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Kant's "What is Enlightenment?" (1784)

What Is Enlightenment?

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What is Enlightenment?

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