short essay about corruption in the philippines

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A look at how corruption works in the Philippines

The Philippines is perceived to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Of 180 countries, the Philippines ranked 116 in terms of being least corrupt. This means that the country is almost on the top one-third of the most corrupt countries, based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International.

According to CPI, the Philippines scored a total of 33 points out of 100. Even as far back as 2012, it has fluctuated around the same CPI score, with the highest score being 38 points in 2014 and the lowest being 33 points in 2021 and 2022. To further contextualize how low it scored, the regional average CPI score for the Asia-Pacific region is 45, with zero as highly corrupt. And of the 31 countries and territories in the region, the Philippines placed 22nd (tied with Mongolia).

It must be noted, however, that CPI measures perceptions of corruption and is not necessarily the reality of the state of corruption. CPI reflects the views of experts or surveys of business people on a number of corrupt behavior in the public sector (such as bribery, diversion of public funds, nepotism in the civil service, use of public office for private gain, etc.). CPI also measures the available mechanisms to prevent corruption, such as enforcement mechanisms, effective prosecution of corrupt officials, red tape, laws on adequate financial disclosure and legal protection for whistleblowers.

These data are taken from other international organizations, such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, private consulting companies and think tanks.

Of course, measuring actual corruption is quite difficult, especially as it involves under-the-table activities that are only discovered when they are prosecuted, like in the case of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, which was estimated to be up to $10 billion based on now-deleted Guinness World Records and cited as the “biggest robbery of a government.” Nevertheless, there still exists a correlation between corruption and corruption perceptions.

4 Syndromes

Corruption does not come in a single form as well. In a 2007 study, Michael Johnston, a political scientist and professor emeritus at Colgate University in the United States, studied four syndromes (categories) of corruption that were predominant in Asia, citing Japan, Korea, China and the Philippines as prime examples of each category.

The first category is Influence Market Corruption, wherein politicians peddle their influence to provide connections to other people, essentially serving as middlemen. The second category is Elite Cartel Corruption, wherein there exist networks of elites that may collude to protect their economic and political advantages. The third form of corruption is the Official Mogul Corruption, wherein economic moguls (or their clients) are usually the top political figures and face few constraints from the state or their competitors.

Finally, there is the form of corruption that the Philippines is familiar with. Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption is present in countries with major political and economic liberalization and weak institutions. Corruption of this kind has been characterized by Johnston as having “disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among contending oligarchs seeking to parlay personal resources into wealth and power.” Other than the Philippines, corruption in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka falls under the same syndrome.

In the Philippines, Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption manifests itself in the political system. As Johnston noted, in this kind of corruption, there is difficulty in determining what is public and what is private (i.e., who is a politician and who is an entrepreneur). Oligarchs attempt to use their power for their private benefit or the benefit of their families. From the Aquinos, Binays, Dutertes, Roxases and, most notoriously, the Marcoses, the Philippines is no stranger to political families. In a 2017 chart by Todd Cabrera Lucero, he traced the lineage of Philippine presidents and noted them to be either related by affinity or consanguinity.

Corruption in the Philippines by oligarch families is not unheard of. In fact, the most notable case of corruption in the Philippines was committed by an oligarchic family—the Marcos family. The extent of the wealth stolen by former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife has been well-documented. In fact, several Supreme Court cases clearly show the extent of the wealth that the Marcoses had stolen.

In an Oligarch-and-Clan system of corruption, oligarchs will also leverage whatever governmental authority they have to their advantage. Going back to the Marcos example, despite their convictions, the Marcoses have managed to weasel their way back into power, with Ferdinand Marcos Jr. becoming the 17th President despite his conviction for tax violation. Several politicians have also been convicted of graft and corruption (or have at least been hounded by allegations of corruption) and still remain in politics. As observed by Johnston in his article, though Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos are the popular images of corruption in the Philippines, he also noted other entrenched oligarchs throughout the country.

Finally, factions also tend to be “unstable and poorly disciplined.” The term “balimbing” is often thrown around in local politics but, more than that, the Philippines is also familiar with politically-motivated violence and disorder.

All these features are characteristics of Oligarch-and-Clan corruption, where these oligarchic families continue to hold power and politicians exploit their positions to enrich themselves or their families.

Corruption, no matter what kind, needs to be curbed. It results in loss of government money, which could have been used to boost the economy and help ordinary citizens, especially those from the lower income sectors.

According to the 2007 study, the Office of the Ombudsman had, in 1999, pegged losses arising from corruption at P100 million daily, whereas the World Bank estimates the losses at one-fifth of the national government budget. For relatively more updated figures, former Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos claimed that the Philippines had lost a total of P1.4 trillion in 2017 and 2018. These estimates are in line with the World Bank estimates of one-fifth (or 20 percent) of the national budget.

So grave is the adverse effect of corruption that the international community recognized it as an international crime under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption where perpetual disqualification of convicted officials is recommended.

But the question stands: can corruption be eradicated in developing countries like the Philippines? Many Philippine presidents promised to end corruption in their political campaigning, but none has achieved it so far. If the government truly wants to end corruption, it must implement policies directed against corruption, such as lifting the bank secrecy law, prosecuting and punishing corrupt officials, increasing government transparency and more. INQ

This is part of the author’s presentation at DPI 543 Corruption: Finding It and Fixing It course at Harvard Kennedy School, where he is MPA/Mason fellow.

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This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and not the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP. He is a member of MAP Tax Committee and MAP Ease of Doing Business Committee, co-chair of Paying Taxes on Ease of Doing Business Task Force and chief tax advisor of Asian Consulting Group. Feedback at [email protected] and [email protected] .

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Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Corruption — The Problem of Corruption and Its Examples in Philippines

The Problem of Corruption and Its Examples in Philippines

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Published: Mar 19, 2020

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The Philippines: a social structure of corruption

• Published: 06 February 2024

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The anticorruption community largely views corruption as a government or development issue. But in the Philippines, corruption is a social structure. The very social bonds and social structures that are good at building civic unity and solidarity are also good at spreading and maintaining corruption, and this is why corruption is so difficult to remove. Patrons use these societal features to implement a ubiquitous social structure of corruption by means of maneuvered friendships that makes it difficult for the masses to know when a patron is acting as a friend or foe. The social structure encompasses the whole of society and corrupts the encircled government, political, and development systems as easily as it infiltrates all other segments of society. It is why oversight and sector-based anticorruption initiatives underperform, and why initiatives must pivot towards addressing this social structure.

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Anti-corruption Institutions: Some History and Theory

Corruption as a political phenomenon.

International Anti-Corruption Initiatives: a Classification of Policy Interventions

Data availability.

The author’s interview notes generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available to help ensure confidentiality of the interviewees, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Pronounced ‘leader’ in English, lider is a term used in the Philippines specifically referring to individuals (or leaders) in the community that are sought by candidates to convince the electorate to vote for that particular candidate. Liders are the individuals that perform the physical exchange of money for votes with the electorate.

A barangay is the lowest level of elected government. Each city or municipality is comprised of multiple barangays (villages).

See Appendix for a full list of respondents.

Interviews 2–3, 6, 14–16, 18–20, 22, 25, 39, 41–42, 44–50.

Utang na loob is usually translated as “debt of gratitude.” The literal translation is “debt of inside” or “internal debt.” It can also be translated as “reciprocity” or “lifelong reciprocation.”

Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.

The paper uses the term ‘client’ to represent the economically lower-class voters who are in clientelistic relationships with political families/candidates (patrons).

Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.

Clans are a connection of least ten extended families – usually more – where each extended family could have more than a hundred members. Clans then have a minimum of a thousand members and usually much more.

Interviews 2,5–6,9–10,14–51.

Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 3–6, 9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 14–22,25–26,39,47–50.

Interviews 16,22,27–38.

Interviews 14,16,21,24,39,42–44.

Interviews 16,22.

Interview 22.

Interview 23.

Interviews 1,20.

Interviews 2,5,14–23,26,32–39,41,45,47–51.

Interviews 15–16,20,22.

Interviews 27–31.

Interview 24.

Interviews 2,6,10.

Interview 22–23.

Interviews 14,18,32–38.

Interviews 32–38.

Interviews 1,10,18–22,32–38,47–49,50–51.

Interviews 2–4,6,14–15,20,22,40,45–49.

Interview 16.

Interviews 2–3.

Interview 3.

Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.

Interview 15.

Interviews 2–3,6,15.

BARMM consists of the region formally known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) plus the addition of Cotabato City and villages in northern Cotabato.

Interviews 3–4.

Interview 1.

Interview 3–4,6,10,12.

Interview 7.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–20,22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

Interviews 1,3–7,10,12,14–15.

Interviews 1,3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

Interviews 1, 3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

COMELEC is the Commission on Elections in charge of ensuring fair and free elections.

Interviews 3–4,6–7.

Interview 6.

Interviews 14–15,25–26.

Interviews 14–16,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–15,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–16,20,22–23,25–38.

Interview 21.

Interview 2.

Interview 14,21,49.

Interviews 2,16,20,22–23,27–31.

Interviews 1,2.

Interviews 52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 6,14,16,18–19,21–23,25,50.

Interviews 3–4,18,52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 3–4,6–8,52,54–55,56–58,61,64.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

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The problem of corruption and corruption of power

Thinking beyond politics.

By Prof. Victor Andres Manhit

Transparency International (TI) has been fighting corruption for 27 years in over 100 countries. Here in the Philippines, I remember their prominent voices such as Randy David, Solita Monsod, Attorney Lilia de Lima, and Judge Dolores Español — all passionate advocates for transparency and accountability, issues that are still very relevant in our society.

Accordingly, TI defines corruption as “the abuse of power for private gain.” By this, corruption has deprived countless citizens around the globe of much-needed public services and benefits of development.

Under the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), corruption indicators pertain to “bribery; the diversion of public funds; the effective prosecution of corruption cases; adequate legal frameworks, access to information; and legal protections to whistleblowers, journalists and investigators.”

But what has corruption caused us?

In September 2018, the United Nations (UN), citing World Economic Forum (WEF) data, expressed that global corruption eats up 5% of the world’s gross domestic product; in November, the World Financial Review stated that Philippines had lost $10 BILLION annually due to illicit financial flows; in December, the UN and the WEF disclosed that $3.6 TRILLION had been lost due to bribes and stolen money; and in December 2019, the WEF published that “corruption, bribery, theft and tax evasion, and other illicit financial flows cost developing countries $1.26 TRILLION a year.”

In the Philippines, an estimated P1.4 TRILLION has been lost to corruption in the years 2017 (P670 BILLION) and 2018 (P752 BILLION), Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos said, where around 20% of the annual government appropriation goes to corruption. Also, according to a study by Carandang and Balboa-Cahig (2020), “some of the more notable typologies and their accompanying corruption cases in the Philippine context are as follows: non-Compliance with the Government Procurement Reform, technical malversation, political dynasty, ghost project, income and asset misdeclaration, red tape, influencing a subordinate to defy order and protocol, bribery, connivance of government officials with drug lords.”

Further, the wide-ranging impact of corruption could result in a myriad of outcomes. In April 2020, the Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Center (GIACC) said that corruption may cause

“inadequate infrastructure, dangerous infrastructure, displacement of people, damage to the environment, reduced spending in infrastructure, reduced public expenditure, and reduced foreign investment.”

The said CPI indicators and data culled to substantiate them, and the gargantuan multi-level impact of corruption represent a formidable platform in instigating institutional reforms to achieve bureaucratic coherence and improve the development capacity of the state. With a multi-stakeholder roadmap against corruption, the plans and investments for economic recovery and development in the new normal will not be for naught. In turn, succeeding economic growths could be dispersed effectively.

Specifically, combating corruption in our country instantly augments the chance of helping the following: the 1.3 million people who have perceived themselves as poor in 2019 (self-rated poverty) and the families suffering from hunger (20.9%) during the pandemic, according to an SWS survey; the 16.7% of the population in poverty (Philippine Statistics Authority); and the additional 1.5 million Filipinos pushed into poverty by the pandemic (Philippine Institute for Development Studies).

But the problem of corruption could dangerously be translated into corruption of power. This happens if political opportunism becomes a trend. Rather than harmonize national unity in a pandemic-ravaged country, division and confusion among the population or a particular sector is instead espoused. In turn, false promises and hopes could frustrate the holistic approach being forged by a wide-range of social actors attuned to the long-standing battle against corruption.

More so, corruption of power could be exacerbated whenever the law is weaponized and used to benefit a new or selected few. Empirically, two examples could be cited. First if more than half of Filipinos agree that “It is dangerous to print or broadcast anything critical of the administration, even if it is the truth,” (SWS, July 3-6, 2020 survey), then what we have now is a terrified citizenry.

Second, the latest political charade in “handling” the country’s elite is not really about dismantling the oligarchy as pronounced. What’s happening is a mere changing of the old guards; the overt creation and empowerment of a new oligarchy, the “Dutertegarchs,” as William Pesek has pointedly raised.

To address corruption, political-institutional and economic reforms beg to be independently and holistically crafted and implemented.

Victor Andres “Dindo” C. Manhit is the President of Stratbase ADR Institute.

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Fighting Corruption in the Philippines: Models for Long-Term Success

May 16, 2012

By Steven Rood

The issue of corruption in the Philippines has once again hit international newspapers with reports that the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Renato Corona (currently undergoing an impeachment trial before the Philippine Senate), had dozens of dollar accounts with millions of dollars flowing through them. Of course, reports on corruption are continually in the Philippine media.

In the latest report of corruption in the Philippines, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Renato Corona, was accused of holding bank accounts with millions of unreported of dollars. Photo by Karl Grobl.

As I have quoted the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) before, “the media, even more than the courts, is the forum in which all sides try to wage their battles of defamation.”  I’ve repeatedly written about corruption , and The Asia Foundation has supported efforts to bring more clarity to the discussion – to go beyond politicized battles – most thoroughly represented in the book by Michael Johnston.

A year ago there was another impeachment case against the former ombudsman (anti-graft prosecutor) that led The Economist to ask cynically, “Progress or Payback?”  Now, one year on we are faced with the same conundrum:  Is the trial of the chief justice part of a political vendetta (since he was perceived to be protecting former President Arroyo), or just the next logical step in removing blockages to President Aquino’s successful 2010 campaign slogan, “If there’s no corruption there’s no poverty?”  The plain fact of the matter is that for those outside a small circle of decision-makers it is impossible to tell. An optimistic read could point to broader bureaucratic reforms (to which I have pointed in analyzing presidential power) while pessimists might cite PNoy’s alleged favoritism to classmates, friends, and shooting buddies.

The purpose of this blog is not to argue either the pessimistic or optimistic case. Rather, it is to try to better understand the political economy structure of corruption so as to be able to point to some directions forward.

A long-standing starting point for understanding the logic of corruption is Robert Klitgaard’s formulation : C = M + D – A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability).

That is, when someone has the monopoly over decisions on how to do things (hire people, contract roads, purchase supplies) and a wide range of discretion in making decisions, there is likely to be more corruption – which can be reduced by introducing accountability mechanisms like transparency of information, independent audits, and the like. Using this heuristic, the Foundation has supported partners in the Philippines working on procurement (particularly with the Departments of Education and Health), cities whose mayors wish to reduce corruption so as to be more investor-friendly, and general civil society (including business associations) efforts to increase accountability.

A recent paper introduces a considerably more complex formal model that includes a bureaucratic decision-maker, different types of clients with differing willingness and ability to pay, and variations in rules about prices, testing, and allocation of the (abstract) good being provided. A warning to fellow non-economists:  slogging through the equations and derivations can be slow. The general logic is clear and some of the implications are interesting, such as the suggestion that “red tape” is more likely in governments serving the poor since poor people have less ability to pay than what a service is worth to them (and thus are more willing to endure red tape).

In checking the formal abstract model against what is known about corruption in the real world, the authors note success stories such as those related by Klitgaard . As is the experience with our programming in the Philippines with cities or government agencies, these anti-corruption successes “all seem to involve a person at the top of each institution who was eager to implement” reforms. But then the question arises: why aren’t such examples more frequent or sustained?  Why don’t leaders pursue these reforms more often?

Politics, of course, is the answer. Repeatedly, in the Philippines it has been demonstrated that reducing bureaucratic corruption in particular agencies, or in particular cities, is possible with the cooperation of the leaders at the top and in partnership with citizens, businesses, and NGOs. But such successes do not yet seem to touch political corruption – the use of corruption to gain, keep, and exercise power as witness the “ hello garci ” scandal regarding the 2004 election in the Philippines and the continued pervasiveness of money politics. This is where the analysis of Michael Johnston is valuable in laying out the logic of “Oligarchs and Clans,” which is the political economic situation in which the Philippines finds itself. This is where corruption is the most harmful to economic growth since decisions or policies of one administration tend to be arbitrarily overturned by a subsequent one (even within presidential administrations as one faction takes over, for instance, a department and uses it as a platform for the next electoral cycle rather than technocratic policy-making).

Johnston’s medium-to-long-term prescription is rooted in the need to change the relation between citizens and their elected officials. Under Oligarchs and Clans, voters tend to reward particular favors (from purchased votes to paying health expenses) rather than effective performance in managing government and delivering service. He suggests an indicator and benchmark strategy that picks services important to people (for example, education or health), develops indicators of good performance, publishes them against benchmarks, and helps citizens hold officials accountable. In a sense, this is adding direct governmental involvement to some of the ideas involved in “social accountability.”

A recent book, The Institutional Revolution by Douglas Allen, studies the effect of better measures of performance to explain changes in institutions (such as the military) at the beginning of the industrial era in Britain (roughly 1780 to 1850). For example, purchase of offices used to be the accepted method of staffing a bureaucracy, but after time, distances, tasks, and talent became more accurately measured then meritocracy could become a viable recruitment strategy. In Allen’s historical account, the “sovereign” using benchmarks and indicators was the Crown. In the current version, Johnston is proposing to “deepen democracy” in order to empower citizens to hold government accountable against objective measurements.

Put this way, reducing both the demand for and supply of corruption can take decades. With the modern pace of politics, the campaign for the May 2013 midterm elections (regarded as rehearsal for the 2016 presidential elections) is already heating up. Necessary as it might be, designing and implementing a long-term strategy is a daunting task.

This is the seventeenth posting in the series, “A Representative Professor,” a weekly series during a teaching sabbatical at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in the Philippines. He can be reached at [email protected] . The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

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People empowerment to decide in justice, serving as system of check and balance over the actuation of public officials by way of adopting the Grand Jury and Trial Jury Systems, is the surest means to substantially eradicate government corruption in the Philippines.

The proposed people’s initiative jury law can be browsed in the web site below:

http://www.mediafire.com/view/?rvyug033vj9x48k

The proposal is anchored on Article 2, Section 1, of the Philippine Constitution.

Marlowe Camello

Homeland, California

People empowerment to decide criminal cases in Court is required so that they can convict grafters and send them to jail. They call it the Jury System in the U.S. and has proven with great success for over 227 years now.

I drafted a people’s Jury Initiative Law patterned after the U.S. Jury law and I am looking for Anti-Graft Organizations in the Philippines to sponsor the Initiative via RA 6735. You will find the draft of this proposed law at this web site: http://mcamello.com/how-to-stop-government-corruption .

I can guide such organization, step by step, by initiative process according to the procedures of RA 6735. The “Road Map” to enact it can be read and downloaded at the following website: http://www.mediafire.com/view/4b5k93xtngu0bfb/1

Jurors for Jury Trial who report for duty will be paid the minimum wage rate per day, given free noon time meal, and paid transportation tickets to and from court.

For quick understanding of the proposed anti-graft solution, please read the one-page jury diagram in the website below: http://www.mediafire.com/view/yuwmlr0xv18d7vq/19

For a full information of the advantages of the Jury System to the Filipino people and the Philippines please download this web site: http://www.mediafire.com/view/y46cv4gd6fgi808/

You may contact me at: [email protected]

Atty. Marlowe Camello

“People empowerment to decide criminal cases in Court is required so that they can convict grafters and send them to jail. They call it the Jury System in the U.S. and has proven with great success for over 227 years now”

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Why Corruption Thrives in the Philippines

A marcos might soon be back in power in manila. that’s because political dynasties are more powerful than parties..

• Southeast Asia

With Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte ineligible for reelection, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.—widely known as “Bongbong”—is poised to win a landslide victory at the polls on May 9. His father, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who ruled as a dictator for 14 years under martial law, was known for his big infrastructure projects but also for his enormous corruption. (The World Bank estimates he stole between $5 billion and $10 billion over the course of his rule.) Marcos Jr., in turn, has been accused of graft and convicted of tax evasion.  

So what accounts for Marcos Jr.’s popularity in spite of his legacy of malfeasance? Like voters everywhere, Filipinos say they don’t support corruption. In fact, 86 percent of Filipinos surveyed in 2020 by Transparency International called corruption in government a big problem. One famous scandal involved members of congress funneling money to phony nongovernmental organizations in exchange for kickbacks in what is known widely as the pork barrel scam and which came to light in July of 2013. Janet Lim-Napoles, a businesswoman and the convicted ringleader of the scheme, claimed Marcos Jr. was involved, although he denied any knowledge and said his signature on forms releasing money to fake NGOs was forged.  

In a political system dominated by powerful families, corrupt politicians can still succeed. Dynasties are so influential that they have largely replaced political parties as the bedrock of Philippine politics. Politicians commonly jump from one party to another, making party labels meaningless. In a country where parties come and go overnight, voters look to families to evaluate candidates.

The history of the Philippine elite—and why voters continue to uphold their power—has colonial roots. 

Over the past four years, I have examined the impact of political dynasties on election outcomes in the Philippines and analyzed the results of 10 election cycles since 1992 involving 500,000 candidates. The results may help explain the Marcos family’s political staying power. Despite being chased out of the country when Marcos Sr. fell from power in 1986, the family bounced back to political prominence in only a few years: Marcos Jr. became a governor in 1998 and a senator in 2010. Imee Marcos later took on his former role as governor and is currently a senator, having been succeeded as governor by her own son Matthew Manotoc in 2019.      

My research shows that, when given a choice, Philippine voters are less likely to vote for corrupt politicians. After accounting for a candidate previously holding office—since incumbents are more likely to be reelected and more likely to face corruption charges—candidates indicted for corruption are 5 percent to 7 percent less likely to be elected. This is similar to how voters react to corruption in other countries. In Brazil, which also suffers from substantial corruption, researchers Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan showed that in the 2004 election, when there was evidence that a mayor had engaged in corruption on one occasion, that mayor was 4.6 percent less likely to be reelected.

A supporter holds pictures of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife Imelda Marcos as Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte-Carpio take part in an election rally in Caloocan, Philippines, on Feb. 19. Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

But Philippine voters don’t punish politicians from large political dynasties even when they’ve been indicted for corruption. Ronald Mendoza and researchers at the Ateneo School of Government calculated that, as of 2019, 80 percent of governors, 67 percent of members of the House of Representatives, and 53 percent of mayors had at least one relative in office. These rich and powerful family networks can protect politicians from real accountability and keep reform at bay.  

The history of the Philippine elite—and why voters continue to uphold their power—has colonial roots. When the United States seized control of the Philippines in 1898, it pledged to give land to the poor. The opposite happened. The United States spent $7 million—almost as much as it paid for Alaska in the 1860s—to buy land from Catholic friars who had run much of the country. But the land was sold at prices well above what the poor could afford. The United States also instituted a system of land titles. This could have helped protect poor farmers from being dispossessed, but the land titles were so expensive and complicated to acquire that only the well-off got titles. The rich were able to buy up more land, while the poor were left without titles or access to the best land. My research shows that areas in the Philippines with more land inequality and where more of these titles were issued by 1918 have a higher concentration of dynasties today.  

The United States created a system where only property owners could vote, limiting the franchise to 1 percent of the population in the 1907 legislative elections. Wealthy landowners appointed allies to run the civil service and passed laws to cement their power. For example, in 1912, the Philippine Assembly made it a crime to break a labor contract, which effectively forced sharecroppers to stay on large plantations. Don Joaquín Ortega was appointed the first governor of La Union in 1901, and 120 years later his descendants are still governors.  

Voters turn to political dynasties for a variety of reasons. Familiarity certainly helps. Families are also known for delivering pork barrel projects and even direct payouts before elections. Vote buying in the form of gifts or cash is common in the Philippines. Some dynasties have also used force to turn out votes of limited competition. In return, the ruling families tend to commission populist projects. Jinggoy Estrada, son of former President Joseph Estrada, helped build day care centers when he was mayor of San Juan. He also was twice indicted for corruption but never convicted.  

The youthfulness of the Philippine population helps obscure the truth of the Marcos dictatorship. About 70 percent are under 40 years old, compared to 51 percent in the United States. Marcos Sr. was forced out of office 36 years ago, which is well before much of the electorate was even born. Few have a recollection of martial law.  

Deeply entrenched political dynasties have hollowed out the political process, making elections not about parties or ideas but about family names.

Over the intervening years, the Marcos clan has spruced up its image: Marcos Jr. appeared as a child in a movie glorifying his father. His older sister ran a children’s TV show when Marcos Sr. was in power. Marcos Sr. projected an air of power and pride that older voters remember. In addition, current Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte gave the clan a boost in 2016 when he had Marcos Sr. reburied in the “Cemetery of Heroes” in Manila.  

Marcos Jr.’s campaign also appeals to nostalgia among voters who lived during the era when Marcos Sr. built new rail lines, cultural centers, hospitals, and other infrastructure projects, as well as among younger voters who have been sold on this sanitized image of the Marcos era. Some recall the martial law period as one of peace (although not for the 34,000 political dissenters whom Amnesty International estimates were tortured by the government). The Philippine economy grew rapidly during much of the Marcos period, though it ended in a steep downturn in GDP and a huge increase in government debt.  

The other major candidates running against Marcos Jr. don’t come from such important families with such deep political connections. Marcos Jr. has avoided saying much about his opponents who have attacked him and his revisionist Marcos history. This has made the campaign all about him and left his opponents looking small. Marcos Jr. has also played up his alliance with the Duterte family, as the outgoing president remains widely popular despite the brutal violence of his anti-drug campaign. Duterte’s daughter Sara Duterte-Carpio is running for vice president, further cementing a Duterte-Marcos alliance.  

Across generations, the deeply entrenched political dynasties of the Philippines have hollowed out the political process, making elections not about parties or ideas but about family names. Powerful families date back to the Spanish period and have cemented their hold on power. While voters categorically oppose corruption, they continue to support families who deliver pork spending but do little for the long-term health of the country. Marcos Jr. has traded on carefully curated nostalgia about his father’s reign to propel himself to the presidency.

Daniel Bruno Davis is a Ph.D. graduate from the University of Virginia, where he studied Philippine politics and corruption. Twitter:  @Daniel_B_Davis

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Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and context

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Challenging Corruption in Asia: Case Studies and a Framework for Action

Combating corruption in a "failed" state: the nigerian economic and financial crimes commission (efcc), state power and private profit: the political economy of corruption in southeast asia, putting out fires: understanding the developmental nature and roles of inmate gangs in the philippine overcrowded jails:, do migrant remittances improve the quality of government evidence from the philippines:, institutions, institutional change and economic performance, institutions, institutional change, and economic performance, corruption and growth, the political economy of the rent-seeking society, a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation., related papers (5), three paradigms for the analysis of corruption, anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach, vertical governance: brokerage, patronage and corruption in indian metropolises, planning and the political market: public choice and the politics of government failure, what do good governments actually do: an analysis using european procurement data, trending questions (3).

Corruption in the Philippines is viewed as a principal-agent problem influenced by historical and social factors, impacting relationships between public interest, politicians, and bureaucrats within the political context.

The paper explains how corruption in the Philippines has evolved from nepotism to smuggling, public-works contracts, debt-financed schemes, asset privatizations, and recently, underworld-related activities.

The paper discusses how corruption in the Philippines is influenced by factors such as social cohesion, economic strategies, political system, market transactions, and economic growth. It does not explicitly mention the specific effects of corruption on the political, social, and economic landscape of the Philippines.

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